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VOLUME VI JUNE, 1967 NUMBER 1

LATIN AMERICAN STATESMEN, SCHOLARS AND SCOUNDRELS

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FOREWORD

This publication is part of a continuing cooperative effort by West Georgia College and the Sears-Roebuck Foundation to make available to an everexpanding reading public articles of importance in the Social Sciences. It was felt that the college's increasing emphasis on Latin American specialities, its new two-quarter History of the Americas course, its federal grant to bring a Latin American curriculum specialist to the campus for a year, Georgia's proximity and generally increasing awareness of our neighbors to the South, prompted this review. The publication was made possible by a grant from Sears.

The papers herein were delivered at the XIV Annual Meeting of the Southeastern Conference on Latin American Studies (SECOLAS) in Atlanta on April 14, 15, 1967, Alfred B. Thomas, Emeritus, Department of History, University of Alabama, 1966-1967 president. The sessions of three papers each were followed by a criticism. The first, session, "Economics and the Carribean," was presided over by Jack D. L. Holmes, College of General Studies, University of Alabama in Birmingham. Some liberty was taken in the personification of the United Fruit company. The second grouping on "Mexico's Enigmatic Caudillos," was chaired by J. Leon Helguera, Graduate Center for Latin American Studies, Vanderbilt University. The third meeting, conducted by S. Herbert Cockburn, Director, Latin American Studies Program, Campbell College, was on "Brazil: Some Forceful Figures." The article on Hassaurek was the luncheon address and the dinner address was a slide lecture on the "Development of the Amazon Basin" by State Senator McKinley Conway of Conway Research, Inc., of Atlanta. A paper on Victoriano Huerta by William Coker, University of Southern Mississippi, was not included in this publication at his request.

Appreciation is given especially to the authors for their papers and permission to publish as well as to the members of the Division of Social Sciences. Particular thanks go to Dean John M. Martin, Clyde D. Ware of the Sears Foundation, Melvin Ecke for local arrangements, Ione S. Wright as President-elect of SECOLAS, and Gail Adams and Joan Johnston as secretaries.

Eugene R. Huck, Chairman
Division of Social Sciences
1967 SECOLAS Program Chairman

THE IMAGE OF AN AMERICAN IMPERIALIST: COLOMBIAN VIEWS OF THEODORE ROOSEVELT

By Joseph L. Arbena*

The permanent loss of a portion of national territory as potentially significant as the Isthmus of Panama was to Colombia[1] could conceivably contribute directly to later important historical developments. At best, the separation of Panama might have stimulated in Colombia a rejuvenation of nationalistic dedication, a spirit of bi-partisan unity overriding the suicidal conflicts which had caused such bloodshed and destruction throughout the nineteenth century. At worst it might have accelerated the disruptive forces of party and section to the extent of complete national disintegration. At the least, one might justifiably have expected either a serious effort to displace the incumbent Conservative administration in Bogota, or an attempt by that administration to employ the current crisis as a means to strengthen and perpetuate its position; and, in either case, we might have predicted the beginning of a lengthy period of popular and official hostility toward the United States.

Yet, an examination of events since November, 1903 shows the above assumptions to be generally inaccurate and raises some major questions for the student of Colombian history. Why, for example, did Columbia fail to break diplomatic relations with the United States when the latter refused to satisfy even the most limited Colombian demands for settlement? More important, why has Colombia continued to be one of the most consistent friends of the United States in Latin America, despite the fact that, with the possible exception of Mexico, she has suffered as much at the hands of the Northern Colossus as any

*Department of History, Clemson University.

[1] For Colombian views of the value of Panama to Colombia see Felipe Pérez, *Jeografía física i política del Estado de Panamá* (Bogotá, 1862), p. 78; Lorenzo Marroquín, *El Canal* (Bogotá, 1903), pp. 115-116; and, Eduardo Posada, *Discursos y conferencias* (Paris, 1908), p. 135.

of her Latin neighbors? Third, why was there in Colombia neither a revolutionary or reactionary movement which might be viewed as a consequence of the loss of Panama? And, last, considering the manner in which the previous questions are framed, what impact, if any, did the Panama affair really have on Colombian national politics and character?

These questions are clearly too broad to be treated adequately in this paper. One must, however, consider some tentative answers in these areas in order to provide a framework for examining a more specific aspect of the Panama question: that is, Colombian views of the role of Theodore Roosevelt in the Isthmian independence revolution.

The end of the Guerra de los Mil Dias in late 1902 found the Colombian nation physically and spiritually exhausted. The estimates of material and human destruction[2] do not reflect the pessimistic spirit which gripped Colombians for many months after that conflict. Death and other horrors of war were topics of frequent discussion,[3] and "peace at any cost" was a popular slogan in many circles.[4] News of the loss of Panama, fatalistically accepted as permanent surprisingly early,[5] did not obliterate the memories of the Mil Dias. Rather, the events of November, 1903 intensified the sense of fatigue and depression.[6]

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2 Jorge Holguín, *Desde cerca* (Paris, 1908), pp. 112, 148-150; Jorge Sánchez Camacho, *El General Ospina* (Bogotá, 1960), p. 96; Rafael Granados, *Historia de Colombia* (Bogotá, 1960), pp. 265-267.

3 Max Grillo, *Emociones de la guerra* (Bogotá, 1903), pp. 9, 24-25; *Correo del Sur* (Manizales), 23 May 1903, p. 4; *El Conservador* (Cali), 18 Nov. 1903, p. 8; *La Gruta* (Bogotá), 29 Aug. 1903, pp. 92, 94; *Ibid.*, 7 Nov. 1903, p. 183.

4 *El Esfuerzo* (Zipaquirá), 13 Apr. 1902, p. 1; *El Reporter* (Barranquilla), 12 Mar. 1903, p. 2; *El Día* (Honda), 14 Aug. 1903, p. 6; *El Combeima* (Ibagué), 7 Nov. 1903, p. 1; *El Conservador,* 11 Nov. 1903, p. 2.

5 *El Trabajo* (San José de Cucuta), 14 May 1904, p. 3; Eduardo Lemaitre, *Reyes* (Bogotá, 1952), p. 211; Raimundo Rivas, *Historia diplomática de Colombia* (Bogotá, 1961), p. 610.

6 *El Conservador,* 11 Nov. 1903, p. 1; *La Gruta,* 28 Nov. 1903, p. 227; *Ibid.*, 8 Feb. 1904, pp. 301-302; *La Organización* (Medellín), 3 Dec. 1903, p. 3; *Ibid.*, 9 Feb. 1904, p. 2; *El Trabajo,* 12 Dec. 1903, p. 3; *El Adalid Católico* (Pasto), 18 Feb. 1904, p. 167; Jorge Holquín to Rufino José Cuervo 24 Aug. 1904, Jorge Holguín MSS, Correspondencia Oficial, 1904-1908, Academia Colombiana de Historia (hereinafter referred to as Holguin MSS).

Another war, even a holy one, made fine talk, but poor policy.[7] Both the government and the citizenry knew the consequences of pushing for another war.

Reports from Panama failed not only to rejuvenate Colombian spirits; they failed likewise to overcome the forces of disunity which had for so long hindered national development.[8] Despite a superficial closing of ranks, partisan and regional strife continued to prevent concerted, vigorous action. Colombians blamed each other for their country's compounded ills.[9] Only a few were willing to suggest that perhaps the entire nation was at fault.[10] General criticism of the treasonous behavior of the Isthmians[11] and of the immoral and illegal actions of the United States[12] failed to suppress the dissention.

Also detracting from any forceful response was the fear of further national disintegration.[13] Rumors ran rampant that leaders in other discontented regions, not satisfied with criticizing or obstructing gov-

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7 Enrique Cortés to José Manuel Marroquín, 13 Nov. 1903, Belosario Palacios to Marroquín, 1 Jan. 1904, B. Porras to Marroquín, 12 Jan. 1904, José Manuel Marroquín MSS, Archivo: Indices, II, 1903-1904, Academia Colombiana de Historia (hereinafter referred to as Marroquín MSS); *El Oriente* (Barranquilla), 16 July 1904, p. 2; *La Patria* (Medellín), 15 Nov. 1904, p. 1828.

8 For summaries of the internal conflicts in nineteenth-century Colombia see Jesús María Henao and Gerardo Arrubla, *History of Colombia,* trans. J. Fred Rippy (Chapel Hill, 1938) and Antonio Pérez Aguirre, 25 *Años de historia colombiana,* 1853 *a* 1878 (Bogotá, 1959).

9 *El Adalid Católico,* 19 Nov. 1903, p. 115; *La Gruta,* 28 Nov. 1903, p. 229; Grillo, *Emociones,* p. 12; Raul Pérez, "The Treacherous Treaty: A Colombian Plea," *North American Review,* CLXXVII (Dec. 1903), 936-937; *La Organización,* 22 Jan. 1904, p. 2; *Ibid.,* 5 Feb. 1904, p. 2; Juan B. Pérez y Soto, *INRI* (Habana, 1905), p. 5.

10 *El Conservador,* 6 Jan. 1904, p. 34; *El Cauca* (Cali,) 7 Aug. 1904, pp. 198-199.

11 Luciano Herrera, *Independencia de Panamá* (Pasto, 1903), p. 7; Marroquín to Francisco Ramírez, 12 Nov. 1903, quoted in Daniel Ortiz and Rafael Galvís, *Los Estados Unidos y su robo de Panamá. Tratado de* 1846: *anticedentes y consecuentes* (Bogotá, 1920), p. 71; Pedro Valez R. to Sr. Director del *El Porvenir,* 8 Nov. 1903, printed in Pedro Velez R., *Asuntos de Panamá* (Bogotá, 1909), p. 13; *Diario Comercial* (Barranquilla), 20 Nov. 1903, p. 2; *El Adalid Católico,* 10 Dec. 1903, p. 129; Ibid., 24 Dec. 1903, p. 137; *Boletín Militar de Colombia* (Bogotá), 1 Jan. 1904, p. 14.

12 See text and notes below.

13 General references to the separatist threat appear in *La Organización,* 3 Dec. 1903, p. 5; *El Adalid Católico,* 18 Feb. 1904, p. 169; *El Combeima,* 25 Feb. 1904, p. 2; *El Zig-zag* (Buga), 26 June 1904, p. 55.

ernment programs, were planning to imitate the Isthmian pattern.[14] Later developments suggest that these plots, if they ever existed, gained only minimum support. Nevertheless, the fear of potential splintering, a reflection of the continued particularism referred to above, diverted attention and energies away from Panama and led many Colombians to argue that domestic political and constitutional reforms must precede any prolonged effort to regain Panama or retaliate for the loss.[15]

Of course, the administration of Jose Manuel Marroquin[16] did go through the motions of rallying popular support,[17] organizing a military force for reconquest,[18] and authorizing diplomatic missions charged with making the best of a bad situation.[19] But, the government worked to limit overt expressions of popular enthusiasm,[20] never gave full

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[14] References to specific separatist movements appear in Martín Restrepo Mejia to Marroquín, 31 Dec. 1903, Marroquín MSS; *El Boyacensé* (Tunja), 5 Jan. 1904, p. 4; *El Conservador,* 13 Jan. 1904, p. 40; *Ibid.,* 16 Mar. 1904, p. 75; Pérez y Soto, *INRI,* p. 97. An open expression of separatist sentiment is found in *La Organización,* 3 Dec. 1903, p. 4.

[15] *La Gruta,* 5 Dec. 1903, p. 238; José Manuel Marroquín, *Mensaje que el Vicepresidente . . . dirige al Congreso Nacional . . . de* 1904 (Bogotá, 1904), pp. 28-29; *La Organizacion,* 22 Jan. 1904, p. 2; *El Conservador,* 9 Mar. 1904, p. 70.

[16] Marroquín was elected Vicepresident in 1898. He assumed the responsibilities of Chief Executive following a coup of July 31, 1900, which removed the legitimate President, Manuel Antonio Sanclemente; see Luis Martínez Delgado, *Historia de un cambio de gobierno* (Bogotá, 1958).

[17] "Message from the Colombian National Cabinet to the Public," 6 Nov. 1903, Archivo Histórico de Luis Martínez Delgado, 1901-1910, Academia Colombiana de Historia (hereinafter referred to as AH de LMD); Esteban Jaramillo, Ministro de Gobierno, to Gobernadores, 8 Nov. 1903, printed in *El Trabajo,* 14 Nov. 1903, p. 2; *La Gruta,* 14 Nov. 1903, pp. 204-205.

[18] "Message from the Colombian National Cabinet to the Public," 6 Nov. 1903, AH de LMD; Ortiz and Galvís, *Estados Unidos,* pp. 70-71; Decree No. 2 of Rafael Reyes, 15 Nov. 1903, printed in Rafael Reyes, *Mision diplomática y militar,* 1903-1904 (Bogotá, 1904), pp. 38-39; *La Gruta,* 5 Dec. 1903, pp. 241-242.

[19] Reyes, *Mision,* p. 3.

[20] *El Adalid Católico,* 26 Nov. 1903, p. 119; *La Organización,* 12 Jan. 1904, p. 1; Pérez y Soto, *INRI,* pp. 106-107; Juan Ignacio Gálvez, *Conferencias* (Bogotá, 1912), p. 6.

backing to the ragged, volunteer armies,[21] and instructed its ministers to publicize the Colombian view of Panamanian affairs but not to risk alienating world opinion by severing normal ties.[22] This cautious position was justified by the realistic argument that any war with the United States would be costly and futile[23] and that a break in diplomatic relations would restrict Colombia in her campaign to win recognition of her own honorable behavior and legitimate claims.[24] In fact, over the years Colombians have generally shown more interest in proving their own pure and innocent role in the "rape of Panama"[25] than in collecting compensation for the irreparable loss of their supposed international virtue.[26] (When paid, however, such indemnity apparently helped to ease both pain and shame.)[27] But whatever the goal, moral or financial, Marroquin felt that more could be accomplished by reasoning with the attacker than by snubbing him.

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21 Marroquín, *Mensaje,* pp. 102-103, 108; Carlos Uribe, *Colombia* (*asuntos internacionales*), (Medellín, 1913), p. 53; Miltón Puentes, *Historia del Partido Liberal Colombiano* (Bogotá, 1961), p. 556.

22 Enrique Cortés to Marroquín, 13 Nov. 1903, Marroquín MCC; *La Gruta,* 14 Nov. 1903, p. 204; *Ibid.,* 5 Dec. 1903, p. 242; Holguín to Marroquín, 17 Dec. 1903, Holguín MSS.

23 *Diario Comercial,* 16 Dec. 1903, p. 2; Holguín to Marroquín, 13 Nov. 1903, Holguín MSS; Pedro Vélez R. to Sr. Director del *El Porvenir,* 8 Nov. 1903, printed in Vélez R., *Asuntos,* p. 22; *El Combeima,* 17 Dec. 1903, p. 3; *El Trabajo,* 14 May 1904, p. 3; *Anales del Senado* (Bogotá), 5 Aug. 1904, p. 2.

24 Enrique Cortés to Marroquín, 13 Nov. 1903, Marroquín MSS; Rafael Reyes to Marroquín, 2 Jan. 1904, Marroquín MSS.

25 Quoted in A. Curtis Wilgus, ed., *The Caribbean Area* (Washington, 1934), p. 579.

26 Pérez y Soto, *INRI,* pp. 14-15; Baldomero Sanín Cano, *Administración Reyes,* 1904-1909 (Lausana, 1909), p. 19; "Junius," *Notas publicadas en El Republicano . . .* (Bogotá, 1911), p. 59; Jorge Martinez L., ed. *La feria del crimen: el mayor "chantage" de todos los siglos* (Bogotá, 1912), pp. ix-x.

27 For comments on the significance of the $25 million payment see Ortiz and Galvís, *Estados Unidos,* pp. 16, 33, 42; Luis Enrique Osorio, *Visión de America* (Bogotá, 1961), p. 215; Guillermo Torres Garcia, *Miguel Antonio Caro: su personalidad política* (Madrid, 1956), pp. 217-218, 220.

No doubt a major force in shaping Colombia policy after November 3, 1903, was the ideas and personality of General Rafael Reyes.[28] The desire for peace, the search for unity and national survival, and the recent lack of vigorous national direction[29] combined with the Colombian caudillo tradition[30] to make welcome the appearance of a forceful leader who could guide the country through the recognized crisis. This was Reyes, a self-expressed admirer of Porfirio Diaz,[31] who dominated the closing months of the Marroquin administration and initiated his own in August 1904.[32] Reyes believed, above all, that Colombian progress depended on the continuance of domestic stability,[33] the maintenance of peaceful relations with the United States,[34] and the opening of the Panama Canal on terms favorable to Colombia.[35]

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28 A brief sketch in English of Reyes' life is in J. Fred Rippy, "The Dictators of Colombia and Venezuela," in A. Curtis Wilgus, ed., *South American Dictators* (Washington, 1937), pp. 384-390. The best full-length biography of Reyes is Lemaitre, *Reyes.*

29 Criticisms of Marroquín and his frequent lack of decisiveness are found in Luís Martínez Silva to Pedro Nel Ospina, 11 May 1904, AH de LMD; *El Trabajo,* 28 May 1904, p. 2; *La Organización,* 3 Dec. 1903, p. 3; Perez y Soto, *INRI,* pp. 9-10.

30 See Rippy, "Dictators," pp. 367-383.

31 Tulio Enrique Tascón, *Historia del derecho constitutional colombiano* (Bogotá, 1953), p. 222; Reyes, *Misión,* p. 30.

32 In the election of 1904 the Conservatives split between Reyes and Joaquín F. Vélez, the former winning by a small margin in the electoral assembly. The Liberals officially boycotted the election, but may have cast a number of votes for Reyes. See Henao and Arrubla, *History of Colombia,* p. 522; and, Puentes, *Historia del Partido Liberal,* p. 557.

33 Reyes, *Misión,* pp. 30-31; Reyes to Gobierno and Gobernadores, 1 Feb. 1904, AH de LMD; Reyes to Archbishop of Bogotá, 24 Dec. 1904, printed in *El Boyacense,* 30 Dec. 1904, pp. 506-507; "Mensaje presidencial de Rafael Reyes," 13 Dec. 1904, printed in Republica de Colombia, *Documentos oficiales y manifestaciones* (Bogotá, 1904), p. 11.

34 Reyes to Marroquín, 16 Nov. 1903, Marroquín MSS; Reyes to Ministro de Gobierno, 23 Nov. 1903, and Reyes to Luis Carlos Rica, 24 Dec. 1903, in Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, *Libro Azul: Documentos diplomaticos sobre el canal y* la *rebellión del istmo de Panamá* (Bogotá, 1904), pp. 377, 413.

35 Reyes, *Misión,* pp. 28-29; Rafael Reyes, *Por Colombia, por Ibero-América* (London, 1912), pp. 15, 29, 30-34, 55; Reyes to José Domingo de Obaldía, 13 July 1904, printed in Ernesto J. Castillero R., "Panama y Colombia: historio de su reconciliación," (unpublished manuscript, Panamá, 1938), p. 69n.

His task was made easier in that on one or more of these points Reyes had the support of the majority of Colombians. His ultimate mistake was a failure to realize that pursuit of such goals, however commendable and popular, must be confined to certain limits.[36] But in June 1909, Reyes could leave quietly for Europe, having inaugurated a lengthy period of domestic "orden y progreso"[37] and an even longer period of improving relations between Colombia and the United States and Colombia and the Republic of Panama.

The various factors outlined above provide a useful beginning in explaining the failure of Colombians to act decisively in response to the separation of Panama. But, an attempt to answer more fully the broad questions posed at the outset of this paper requires an examination of both Colombian views of the United States in general and of Colombian interpretations of the specific *yanqui* role in the Isthmian debacle. While such views were probably not the major element in determining overall Colombian policy, or lack of said, certainly they have given a special tone to Colombian-United States relations and to the historiography of the entire Panama question.

That the United States had an active part in the Panamanian independence movement few Colombians have doubted. Since the moment news of the Isthmian revolt first reached Colombia proper, commentators have agreed that United States policy violated the accepted standards of international law and morality.[38] By encouraging, perhaps even financing, the revolution the United States improperly interfered in Colombian domestic affairs and promoted a treasonous act which

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[36] For a brief discussion of the factors, domestic and foreign, which led to Reyes' resignation see Henao and Arrubla, *History of Colombia,* pp. 523-527; Lemaitre, *Reyes,* pp. 309-320; and E. Taylor Parkes, *Colombia and the United States,* 1765-1934 (Durham, 1935), pp. 435-436.

[37] A summary of the generally peaceful and orderly political pattern from the fall of Reyes until the chaos of the 1940's is found in Vernon Lee Fluharty, *Dance of the Millions,* (Pittsburgh, 1957), Chapters III-V.

[38] A representative statement of this view is found in F. de P. Borda, *Derecho internacional* (Bogotá, 1905).

did not correspond to the desires of the majority of Isthmians.[39] By preventing Colombian forces from attempting to suppress the revolt,[40] the United States violated the terms of the Mallarino-Bidlack Treaty of 1846.[41] By recognizing the independence of Panama before that presumptuous republic had demonstrated its ability to maintain such independence,[42] Washington rejected the same principles of international law which it had previously defended during its own Civil War.[43] In addition, Colombians have criticized the United States for failing to re-open negotiations after the defeat of the Hay-Herran Treaty,[44] for refusing to submit the Panama question to arbitration,[45] and for persuading (i.e., forcing) other nations to recognize Panamanian independence.[46]

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39 Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, *Protesta de Colombia contra el tratado entre Panamá y los Estados Unidos,* (Bogotá, 1904), p. 31; Herrera, *Independencia de Panamá,* pp. 8-11; Holguín to Marroquín, 13 Nov. 1903, Marroquín MSS; Carlos Gutiérrez Navarro, *El Canal de América* (Bogotá, 1951), p. 145.

40 Pedro Vélez R. to William N. Cromwell, 30 Nov. 1903, printed in Vélez R., *Asuntos,* pp. 28-29; *El Combeima,* 9 Jan. 1904, p. 2; Abelardo Aldana, *et. al., The Panama Canal Question: A Plea for Colombia* (New York, 1904), p. 60; Rafael Uribe Uribe, *Por la América del Sur,* II (Bogotá, 1955), pp. 83-84.

41 Marroquín to Pueblo Americano, Nov. 1903, printed in Lorezo Marroquín, *Historias de Panamá* (Bogotá, 1912), p. 31; Ministerio de RR. EE., *Protesta,* pp. 4, 39; Marco Fidel Suárez, *Doctrinas internacionales* (Bogotá, 1955), pp. 147-149.

42 Ministerio de RR. EE., *Protesta,* pp. 38-39; Herrera, *Independencia* de Panamá, pp. 8, 11, 17; Luis Alfredo Otero, *Panamá* (Bogotá, 1926), pp. 56, 58.

43 Luis Carlos Rico to Colombian Minister in Washington, 2 Dec. 1903, and Jose Pablo Uribe to French Minister of Foreign Affairs, 28 Dec. 1903, Ministerio de RR. EE., *Libro Azul,* pp. 381, 519; Carlos Lozano y Lozano, *La cuestión de Panamá, el arbitraje y el equilibrio en América* (Bogotá, 1924), p. 30.

44 *Anales del Senado,* 17 Nov. 1903, pp. 363-364; Uribe Uribe, *Por la America del Sur,* I, p. 124.

45 Clímaco Calderón to Holguín, 8 Mar. 1909, printed in Diego Mendoza, *Labor privada del ex-ministro de Colombia en Washington* (Valencia, 1909), p. 8.

46 *El Trabajo,* 9 Jan. 1904, p. 3; Uribe Uribe, *Por la América del Sur,* I, p. 94; Pablo Emilio Escobar R., *Panamá en el derecho internacional* (Bogotá, 1918), pp. 17, 23-24; Otero, *Panamá,* p. 46.

In evaluating the broad sources of United States policy, Colombians have suggested three possible explanations: 1) the belief that the United States had been, was, and always would be an imperialistic nation and thus constituted a permanent threat to Latin American integrity;[47] 2) the belief that the United States had once been a source of liberalism and morality but by 1900 was sidetracked in an expansionist program;[48] and, 3) the belief that Americans in general were still loyal to their great traditions and sympathetic with the Colombian desire for justice but that a minority of government leaders, in particular President Theodore Roosevelt, had abused their power and distorted American policy contrary to the wishes of the populace.[49] The latter position seems to have been overwhelmingly the dominant one and thereby significant in the shaping of post-1903 Colombian attitudes toward the United States.

In analyzing this view in depth one notes that Colombians had long shown great respect for American ideals and traditions[50] and the events of 1903 did not totally destroy this feeling. In an open letter to the people of the United States, President Marroquin referred to "la bandera estrellada," always beloved by all republicans in the Americas.[51] An editor in Barranquilla affirmed his admiration for the United States, "destined by its institutions and by its exuberant elements of civilization and life to be the greatest nation on the earth."[52] Raul Perez, appealing in the United States press for sympathy for his country's position, promised that

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47 *El Espectador* (Medellín), 2 Jan. 1904, pp. 248-249; *El Conservador,* 9 Dec. 1903, p. 18; *Ibid.,* 6 Jan. 1904, p. 34; Carlos Uribe, *Colombia,* p. 16; Reyes, *Por Colombia,* pp. 35-36; Raimundo Rivas, *Relaciones internacionales entre Colombia y los Estados Unidos.* 1810-1850 (Bogotá, 1915), p. 169; Osorio, *Vision de América,* p. 213.

48 Antonio José Uribe, *La reforma administrativa en Colombia* (Bogotá, 1917), pp. 23, 318-319; *El Día,* 24 Dec. 1903, p. 1; *El Combeima,* 24 Dec. 1903, p. 1; Reyes, *Misión,* p. 23; Borda, *Derecho internacional,* pp. 50, 53, 69; Antonio José Uribe, *Cuestiones internacionales, económicas, políticas y sociales* (Bogotá, 1925), p. 4.

49 See text and notes below.

50 Ernesto Murillo, *Estudio sobre la historia de la diplomacia en Colombia* (Bogotá, 1910) p. 18; A. J. Uribe, *La reforma,* pp. 341-342.

51 Printed in Lorezo Marroquín, *Historias,* p. 32.

52 *Diario Comercial,* 7 Dec. 1903, p. 2.

> notwithstanding the incalculable wrong done to Colombia . . . there has been no ill-feeling in our hearts. We have continued to love our great sister republic and to wish that we could imitate her in many ways, because we attributed her mistakes in her dealings with us to ignorance of true conditions.[53]

And, in most eloquent fashion, Rafael Uribe Uribe, leader of the oft-persecuted Liberal Party, proclaimed the following:

> As men, as republicans, and as Americans we are all proud of your nation, because she honors humanity, because she supports free institutions, and because the very existence of the great republic to the north of our continent is by itself such a colossal geographical and political fact that, even without such a controversial doctrine as Monroe's, it infuses respect and fear into a world that awakens so many antipathies and misgivings.[54]

Since the ratification of the Thomson-Urrutia Treaty,[55] Colombians have been more generous in speaking favorably of the United States. Even such critics of the events of 1903 as Luis Alfredo Otero and Alvaro Rebolledo commented respectively on the "tie of sincere and loyal friendship" which bound Colombia to "la potencia del Norte"[56] and the lack of Machiavellian techniques in American diplomacy.[57] Other observors have labeled the United States the spiritual and military leader in the fight for liberty[58] and "the country which has acquired

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53 Pérez, "The Treacherous Treaty," p. 944.

54 *Por la América del Sur,* I, pp. 136-137.

55 For a summary of negotiations and debate surrounding this treaty see Rivas, *Historia diplomática,* pp. 617-621, 661-662; Germán Cavelier, *La política internacional de Columbia* (Bogotá, 1959), III, pp. 85-106.

56 Otero, *Panamá,* p. 112.

57 Alvaro Rebolledo, *Reseña histórico-política de la comunicación inter-oceánica* (San Francisco, 1930), p. 325.

58 Antonio José Uribe Portocarrero, *En torno de los Estados Unidos de América* (Bogotá, 1944), pp. 61-62.

today the highest level of civic culture."[59] In September 1964, President Leon Valencia summed up what is apparently the conviction of many of his countrymen:

> Colombia has always maintained optimum relations with the great northern democracy. These relations have been cut by only one deplorable and iniquitous act, the wound from which has left on us an unforgettable impression. But we bear no grudge, because the Americans found a satisfactory way to make amends, not by the exiguous indemnification they offered us but rather by the rectitude and honesty of their conduct. Later, the natural and fruitful power of the United States . . . put in their hands, and their hands alone . . . the enslaving and incontrastable power of the atomic bond.[60]

But, Valencia recalled, the United States remained loyal to its traditional principles and did not use this tool for world conquest. It put that force instead to the use of right; for this behavior it deserves the gratitude of all men of good will.

More indicative of the continued Colombian faith in American concepts of justice in the wake of the events of 1903 were the frequent expressions of confidence in the ability of the American people to understand Colombia's grievances and to take steps to rectify the obvious wrong. Private citizens and government officials alike, having no hope for cooperation from the Roosevelt administration,[61] saw ". . . no other course left but to appeal to the people of the United States and to their undoubted sense of honesty."[62] The Colombian people were certain, wrote Marroquin, that the American people, possessing "sentiments of equity and justice" would never permit "the violation of treaties and the rejection of glorious traditions."[63] These same Americans, declared Juan Perez y Soto, president of the patriotic

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59 Jesús María Yepes, *Una política internacional para Colombia* (Bogotá, 1956), p. 16.

60 *El Tiempo* (Bogotá), 23 Sept. 1964, p. 24.

61 *La Gruta,* 5 Dec. 1903, pp. 241-242; Reyes to Holguín, 23 Dec. 1903, AH de LMD; Reyes to Rico, 8 Jan. 1904, Ministerio de RR. EE., *Libro Azul,* p. 480.

62 Pérez, "The Treacherous Treaty," p. 946.

63 Lorenzo Marroquín, *Historias,* pp. 31-32.

society, Integridad Colombiana, would soon become "our ally" to prevent the spoilation of "our territory."[64]

In light of these statements it is not surprising that the Marroquin government placed more emphasis on the propagandist activities of its diplomats in the United States than on any efforts at an immediate negotiated settlement. The members of the Reyes Commission,[65] which arrived in Washington in late November 1903, received instructions to conduct an active campaign for the sympathies of the American public and the support of anti-administration politicians.[66] Through the press, public meetings, and private conferences, the Colombian representatives struggled to arouse criticism of United States policy.[67] And in this struggle they found sufficient favorable response to keep their hopes alive. Any condemnation of Roosevelt, however slight, served the anxious Colombians as justification of their position.[68]

The fact that the bulk of the anti-Roosevelt feeling in the United States was concentrated in the Democratic Party led Colombians, in turn, to look at the American presidential election of 1904 with great expectations, seeing in the desired election of that "alta figura," Judge Alton B. Parker, the "recovery of the rights and privileges of the South American nations."[69] (One optimistic observor gave Parker a 90% chance of winning.)[70]

The Republican victory in 1904 did not permanently destroy Colombian hopes that the American people would eventually elect an administration which would treat justly and honorably with an agrieved

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64 Pérez y Soto, *INRI*, p. 100.

65 For details and initial instructions see Ministerio de RR. EE., *Libro Azul*, pp. 372-373.

66 *Ibid.*, Marroquín to Colombian Consul in New York, 23 Nov. 1903, and Rico to Reyes, 7 Dec. 1903, in *Ibid.*, pp. 377, 392; Reyes, *Misión*, p. 11.

67 Holguín to Marroquín, 18 Dec. 1903, Holguín MSS; Reyes to Rico, 25 Dec. 1903, and Reyes to Gobierno, 2 Feb. 1904, Ministerio de RR. EE., *Libro Azul*, pp. 415, 538.

68 Arturo de Brigard to Rico, 14 Nov. 1903, and Reyes and Holguín to Rico, 4 Dec. 1903, *Ibid.*, pp. 375, 389; *El Adalid Catolico*, 24 Dec. 1903, pp. 136-137; Holguín to Marroquín, 17 Dec. 1903, Holguín MSS.

69 *El Trabajo*, 5 Nov. 1904, pp. 2-3; Holguín to Ministro de Hacienda, 5 Apr. 1904, Holguín MSS.

70 *Boletín Militar*, 1 Jan. 1904, p. 30.

friend[71] nor deter efforts to exploit all signs of pro-Colombian sentiment in the United States.[72] Particularly pleasing were the Rainey Resolution and the Congressional investigations which followed it and the continued publication of books critical of Roosevelt's behavior.[73] The election of Woodrow Wilson and the signing of the Thomson-Urrutia Treaty, despite its limitations,[74] convinced many Colombians that their faith had not been misplaced.[75] Any chance that wide-spread, permanent bitterness might develop toward the United States apparently died with the ratification of that pact.[76]

Why did many Colombians from 1903 to 1921 continue to display considerable respect for the "people" of the United States and to look to them for an acceptable settlement of the Panama question? And, why did most of these same Colombians find the implicit apology of the final Treaty of 1921, with its "exiguous" indemnification, sufficient compensation for the loss of the invaluable Isthmus? That they could do nothing about the situation, an incontrovertible fact, is an incomplete explanation. This continuing strain of optimism and qualified friendship was the product of the frequently expressed belief, noted above, that the role of the United States in the Panamanian inde-

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71 Pérez y Soto, *INRI,* p. 13; Murillo, *Estudio,* p. 11; Pedro Nel Ospina to Carlos E. Restrepo, 17 Aug. 1911, printed in Emlico Robledo, *La vida del general Pedro Nel Ospina* (Medellín, 1959), p. 237.

72 Ospina to Restrepo, 17 Aug. 1911, and Ospina to Enrique Olaya Herrera, 1 Nov. 1911, in *Ibid.,* pp. 237, 259.

73 See assorted correspondence from Ospina, *Ibid.,* pp. 233, 251, 254, 256-257; Martínez L. *La feria del crimen,* p. v; Lorenzo Marroquín, *Historias,* pp. 34, 39; Ortiz and Galvís, *Estados Unidos,* pp. 114, 118.

74 For various views on the pros and cons of that treaty see *Tratado de 6 de Abril,* 1914 (Bogotá, 1914); Suárez, *Doctrinas internacionales,* pp. 157-191; Carlos José Espinosa, *Inconstitucionalidad del tratado del 6 del abril de* 1914 (Bogotá, 1914), pp. vi-xx.

75 Escobar R., *Panamá,* p. 28; Nicolás Aristizábal Llano, *Dos tesis y un canal* (Bogotá, 1914), p. 58; Antonio José Uribe, *Las modificaciones al tratado entre Colombia y los Estados Unidos* (Bogotá, 1921), pp. 24, 30, 32, 77-78, 85, 98; Lozano y Lozano, *La cuestión de Panamá,* p. 49; Otero, *Panamá,* p. 91; Luis Eduardo Nieto Caballero, *Por que soy liberal* (Bogotá, 1931), p. 210.

76 Luis Martínez Delgado, *A propósito del Dr. Carlos Martínez Silva* (Bogotá, 1930), p. 457; A. J. Uribe P., *En torno,* p. 16; Torres García, *Miguel Antonio* Caro, p. 217; Robledo, *Vida,* p. 92.

pendence movement was the work primarily of Theodore Roosevelt and other top administration leaders.[77]

The earliest Colombian descriptions and analyses of Isthmian developments placed special emphasis on the personal part played by Roosevelt. Perez y Soto, himself an Isthmian, argued that the criminals who led the November revolt proceeded in agreement with Roosevelt who "helped and sustained them."[78] *La Gruta,* leading literary journal of the day, asserted that ". . . it was Mr. Roosevelt and not the American people who hastened to treat with Panama as an independent republic . . ."[79] Abelardo Aldana, writing for an American audience, held that ". . . the good faith pledged by the United States, the most powerful nation of the earth, was dragged in the mire by the actions of a President to whom fifteen centuries of moral advancement in the respect of treaties are of no importance."[80] Jorge Holquin, a member of the Reyes Commission and later special agent in Paris, accused Roosevelt of using the Panama situation to strengthen his political position.[81] Other contemporary commentators included such phrases as the following: ". . . Roosevelt's offence is the bloodiest abuse [burla] of conscience, the Monroe Doctrine and the Law of Nations;"[82] "the insanity of the 'victimario'[83] Theodore Roosevelt has dug for us with his (sic) own hands a formidable hell;"[84] "the cupidity of Roosevelt and his lieutenants is insaciable;"[85] and, "Mr. Roosevelt has turned his back upon the Americanism of Lincoln and Seward, and has by his deeds shown the world that his true motto, stripped of cant and verbiage, is the 'I will it' of the middle ages."[86] Pedro Velez R. of Cartagena, a

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77 Other United States officials chosen for special attack included Secretary of State John Hay and Assistant Secretary Francis B. Loomis.

78 *INRI,* pp. 98-99.

79 *La Gruta,* 21 Nov. 1903, p. 214.

80 *Panama Canal Question,* pp. 54-55.

81 Holguín to Marroquín, 17 Dec. 1903, Holguín MSS.

82 *El Adalid Católico,* 21 Jan. 1904, p. 151.

83 Servant who attends the sacrificing priest.

84 *El Trabajo,* 19 Mar. 1904, p. 7.

85 Ibid., 5 Nov. 1904, p. 2.

86 Aldana, Panama Canal Question, p. 50.

prolific contributor to the bibliography of Isthmiania, summarized this interpretation in an open letter to Roosevelt himself:

> It appears to the world that you . . . have fomented, created, and made the revolution of Panama; and once this horrid affair is brought to the light, it will be known that the only revolutionary, the chief of the mutiny, the instigator of the crime of treason that was committed in the Isthmus was you.[87]

Later Colombian writers have been no less emphatic in their declaration that Roosevelt himself deserves to bear the blame for the separation of Panama, having acted contrary to American traditions and general public opinion. It was Roosevelt, the "godfather"[88] of Panama, who "composed and decreed the act of separation," and, in so doing, wrote Marco Fidel Suarez, "set himself in contrast to his illustrious predecessors, heroes of wisdom, honor, and patriotism, such as Adams, Lincoln, Seward, Garfield, and Blaine."[89] Over the years Roosevelt personally has been accused of "contriving," "inspiring," "fomenting," "sponsoring," and "commanding" the revolution.[90] He is reported to have "usurped" Panama; "ferociously offended a weak nation;" pursued a "Hitleristic" and "savage" international policy, labeled "palo grande" or "gran garrote;" extended over Panama his "pirates claws;" and, "looked upon the little countries of Latin America as mice."[91] Colombians have classified him "the hunter of nations,"

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87 Printed in Vélez R., *Asuntos,* pp. 32-33.

88 Enrique Pérez, *Causa y efecto* (Bogotá, 1910), p. 42.

89 *Doctrinas internacionales,* pp. 149, 151.

90 - 94 *El Combeima,* 24 Dec. 1903, p. 2; Aristizábal, *Dos tesis,* pp. 3, 53; Ortiz and Galvís, *Estados Unidos,* p. 41; Lozano y Lozano, *La cuestion de Panamá,* p. 36; Otero, *Panamá,* pp. 13, 36, 38, 43; Martínez D., *A propósito,* pp. 454-455; Nieto C., *Por que,* pp. 177-178; Rivas, *Historia diplomática,* pp. 580-597, *passim.;* Puentes, *Historia del Partido Liberal,* p. 556; Victor M. Salazar, *Memorias de la guerra,* 1899-1902 (Bogotá, 1943), pp. 8, 344, 391-393; Germán Arciniegas, *Biografía del Caribe* (Buenos Aires, 1959), pp. 508-509; Justo Ramón, *Historia de Colombia* (6 ed., Bogotá, 1954), p. 353; Jorge Sánchez Camacho, *Marco Fidel Suarez* (Bucaramanga, 1955), p. 124n; Robledo, *Vida,* p. 88; Jesús Arango Cano, *Estados Unidos, mito y realidad* (Bogotá, 1959), p. 137; Sánchez C., *General Ospina,* p. 94; Granados, *Historia,* p. 267; Germán Arciniegas, *Colombia* (Washington, 1962), p. 14; Eduardo Santa, *Rafael Uribe Uribe: Un hombre y una época* (Bogotá, 1962), pp. 400-402.

"the symbol of Caesarism," "the soul of the plot" against Colombia, and, "the founder of yankee imperialism."[92] Descriptions of his character and personality have included such adjectives as immoral, vainglorious, bigoted, arbitrary, unscrupulous, and atrabilious.[93] His crime against Colombia has been likened to the German violation of Belgian neutrality in 1914, the partitions of Poland, and Judas' betrayal of Christ.[94] All this, of course, is in addition to the aforementioned and unquestioned belief that Roosevelt, with or without American popular sanction, violated international law and morality.

Especially galling to the Colombians was Roosevelt's condescending and insulting attitude toward their "defenseless" fatherland. Alvaro Rebolledo summarized resentment of such treatment in these sharp words: After the events of November, 1903, there followed ". . . a campaign of injuries and diatribes against the Colombian government and people, which Mr. Roosevelt undertook without even a token of justice or gentlemanliness. His hatred of them became an obsession in his agitated mind. He never lost an opportunity to defame them with the vilest words of his rude and expressive speech."[95]

This persistent preoccupation with the actions of Roosevelt alone resulted, we have noted thus far, from three major impulses: 1) Colombian respect for American traditions and ideals; 2) considerable evidence in the United States of displeasure over Roosevelt's policy; and, 3) the eventual admission by the American government, in treaty form, that Colombia was due some compensation for the loss of Panama. But, the supreme confirmation of the Colombian position came from the lips of Roosevelt himself, in a speech of March 23, 1911, when he boasted that "I took the Canal Zone and let Congress debate."[96] One can easily lose count of the Colombian writers who quoted this "shameless," "proud," "unmuffled" confession as the final word on Roosevelt's role in the revolt.[97] But, had the other factors not

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[95] *Reseña,* p. 255. For additional comments on the same topic see Holquín to Marroquín, 23 Jan. 1904, Holguín MSS, Ministerio de RR. EE., *Protesta,* p. 16; Julio Holguín Arboleda, *Mucho en serio y algo en broma* (Bogotá, 1959), p. 238.

[96] Quoted in George E. Mowry, *The Era of Theodore Roosevelt* (New York, 1962), p. 154.

[97] Rivas, *Historia diplomática,* p. 597; Ramón, *Historia,* p. 353; Santa, *Uribe Uribe,* p. 402.

created a receptive attitude, Colombians undoubtedly would have given far less credence to Roosevelt's claim.

Admittedly, not all Colombians have appeared so determined to restrict the blame to Roosevelt. Some, as suggested above, have skirted the problem by referring impersonally to "the Americans," "the United States," or "the American government." Only a restricted few, however, have specifically linked Roosevelt's policy to the will of the American majority. Daniel Ortiz and Rafael Galvis, writing in 1920 before the ratification of the Thomson-Urrutia Treaty, noted that those Colombians who sought to label Roosevelt the exclusive planner and perpetrator of the "crimen monstruoso" overlooked the fact that later administrations, despite the efforts of a few honest diplomats, had not made reparation and therefore had aligned themselves with Roosevelt, "before God and History," in the completed robbery.[98] Alavaro Rebolledo and Raimundo Rivas both conceded that some Americans continued "to raise eloquent voices in defense of justice,"[99] but likewise observed that the American people had given Roosevelt "a vote of confidence" by returning him to the Presidency.[100]

In contrast, I have found only one Colombian, an anonymous editor in Manizales, who has attempted to see Roosevelt in any context other than that of the narrow story of Panama or in the almost as narrow history of American imperialism. Commenting on Roosevelt's success at Portsmouth in ending the Russo-Japanese War, this lonely soul wrote:

> How strange are the vicissitudes of destiny! Never did I imagine that he who humiliated my country would one day awaken in me a spirit of admiration and respect. Never did I imagine that I would one day consider among the greatest benefactors of humanity a name I once hated. Now, I make my own the eloquent words of the German Emperor . . . "Roosevelt has made himself worthy of the gratitude of all men and in each heart we should raise up to him an altar."[101]

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98 Estados Unidos, pp. 103-104, 108.

99 Rebolledo, *Reseña,* p. 261.

100 Rivas, *Historia diplomática,* p. 598.

101 El Mensajero (Manizales), 18 Nov. 1905, p. 1.

Such a paucity of balanced interpretations of Roosevelt in Colombian writings reflects not only the peculiarities of the Panama problem, but also both the common Latin American tendency to personalize conflicts and a poor appreciation of the standards of modern historical methodology.

However much we as scholars may vocally lament this lack of historical accuracy, as citizens of the United States and professed friends of Latin America, at times we may secretly be thankful that Rooseveltian braggadocio and Colombian myopia have protected us from more intense condemnation and resentment. It is not that the Colombians have failed to react vigorously toward the United States because they have believed that Roosevelt was totally guilty and all other Americans totally innocent of complicity in the "rape of the Isthmus." Traditional sympathy for American ideals, institutions, and achievements, has weighed heavily against the incongruous behavior of an American administration which, Colombians have argued, did not represent the American people. Rather, it seems, that the embodiment of Colombian frustrations in the personage of Theodore Roosevelt has permitted past and present generations to vent their hostilities toward the United States without taking up arms or displaying open bitterness and has provided them, at the same time, with an implicit explanation for the lack of just such a vigorous anti-American policy—a lack which, if allowed to go unexplained, would represent a blot on Colombian national character and honor.

A clearer understanding of the true extent of American support for Roosevelt might have created greater tensions in United States-Colombian relations for a while. One doubts that this would have mattered much in the long run. In fact, a judicious appraisal of Roosevelt as scholar and statesman, as well as scoundrel, might have generated some appreciation among Colombians for the American point of view. Of more importance is a wide-spread, realistic awareness of those domestic factors, discussed in the opening paragraphs, which hampered effective, concerted action. If understood they might have united Colombians and stirred them to more selfless, constructive efforts at national progress. It still might!

CASTRO: SOME ECONOMIC BENEFITS FOR LATIN AMERICA

By Alfonso Gonzalez*

Fidel Castro has had a more profound effect upon the course of Latin American affairs than any other individual in recent times. Castro's socio-economic revolution combined with his political opposition to the United States and his charismatic personality have all contributed to granting him a historical importance of the first magnitude within Latin America. Castroism (or *Fidelismo* to the Latin Americans) embodied much that was longed for by the frustrated Latin American intellectuals and masses. There is no doubt that the impact of Castro has lessened notably since the 1959-60 period but there is also no doubt that he has significantly contributed to the fundamental altering of policies in Latin America and he remains a force that must be reckoned with.

Castro's policies have produced both advantageous and unfavorable effects and reactions within Latin America. Some of the developments that have occurred in Latin America since the rise of Castro are rather readily traceable to Castroism, but in others the relationship is more tenuous and perhaps the trend or development would have occurred regardless of Castro but his presence has served as a catalyst to accelerate the particular process.

Despite the fact that Castro has had some fundamentally adverse effects on the economies of the Latin American countries, his programs and policies, and the reactions that they have engendered, have contributed substantially to the amelioration of certain socio-economic conditions in the region. The beneficial effects: (1) greatly augmented United States assistance and interest in Latin America, (2) increased attention to social services and attempts at socio-economic reforms, (3) revision of the United States sugar quota and some expansion as an export market, and (4) increased tourism.

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United States Assistance & Interest in Latin America. In the post-World War II period the United States became actively involved in the reconstruction of Western Europe and Japan in the late 1940's and this was followed by the Korean conflict and the organization of military alliances. For about the first decade and a half of the post-war period the economic and military resources of the United States were directed to the Eurasian region with scant interest given to Latin America. This was a notable letdown to the latter region because of the attention it had received in the pre-war and war periods. As a result of post-war circumstances, Latin America received a gradually declining share of both United States foreign trade and foreign investments. In the 1945-52 period less than 2 percent of foreign assistance was devoted to Latin America and nearly a fifth of this aid was military (Table 1).

During the Eisenhower Administration (1953-60) total assistance to Latin America increased to more than 6 percent of the world total but the proportion of military grants remained about the same high level as during the Truman Administration (1945-52). Until relatively recently the United States government placed the emphasis for economic development in Latin America on private capital and private business efforts. Stress was placed on establishing stability and a favorable investment climate, even to the degree of supporting military and dictatorial regimes. In the realm of socio-economic development little leadership was provided in helping Latin America alleviate its fundamental problems and little attention was given (e.g., at the 1954 Caracas conference) to these pressing problems. The United States, in turn, was more interested in the hemisphere problems of stability, security and anti-communism.

The deteriorating political and economic conditions of the 1950s combined with United States policy in Latin America also exacerbated social conditions. The degree of alienation from the Latin American masses was dramatically illuminated with the attacks on Vice-President Nixon in Lima and Caracas in May, 1958. In the remaining two and a half years the Eisenhower Administration moved (apparently reluctantly in view of its attitude toward economic development and commitments to other world regions) toward a greater involvement and contribution to Latin American affairs. Although immediate significant

outlays of funds were not made available, the United States finally accepted the concept of the Inter-American Development Bank and was also prepared to provide loans for social development programs. Latin America had long favored the establishment of a regional development bank and had pressured the United States government to provide assistance for necessary social development projects. Because of the urgent demands for capital and the difficulties encountered in loan repayment, Latin America (along with other underdeveloped regions) favored the establishment of "soft" loans and fewer restrictions on where loan expenditures could be made. To satisfy the demands for "soft" loans and less conventional terms for loans to underdeveloped regions, the United States established the Development Loan Fund in 1958. In 1961 an international institution, the International Development Association which was affiliated with the World Bank was founded. However, United States loans have become increasingly more tied to purchases within the higher-priced United States market due to United States balance-of-payments difficulties and Congressional reluctance to provide more liberalized aid conditions.

A few months before Castro gained control of Cuba, President Juscelino Kubitschek promised (August 1958) a grandiose long-range plan "Operation Pan America" that proposed to rapidly increase both private and public investment and stimulate economic development of the region. This idea was received with some United States interest but Castro's proposal in April 1959 at Buenos Aires that Latin American development be underwritten by $30-40 billion over a decade was rejected by the United States delegation.

By the time Castro assumed power, the United States had liberalized its attitude somewhat regarding assistance to Latin America and had made some concessions in the direction that they favored. With the rise of Castro the pressure for socio-economic reforms and development became considerably greater and as the Cuban revolution assumed an ever-more radical posture the threat of similar revolutions erupting in Latin America became a paramount consideration in Latin American policy. By the Act of Bogota in September 1960 the United States was formally committed to contribute to Latin America's social progress and Latin America, in turn, promised to undertake basic socio-economic

reforms. In March 1961, President Kennedy announced the Alliance for Progress and the program was formally inaugurated at the Punta del Este conference that August.

In the 1961-65 period the amount of net United States foreign assistance to Latin America amounted to $3.4 billion and slightly exceeded all aid given by the United States in the post-war period through 1960 (Table 1). The proportion of the total world assistance by the United States that Latin America received doubled to more than 14 percent from the Eisenhower period. Latin America was receiving under the Alliance more than $350 million annually above the level received under President Eisenhower and military grants to Latin America except for the 1960-62 period were no greater than those received during the latter part of the Eisenhower Administration. Despite this increased assistance, Latin America still does not reecive as much non-military assistance as the Middle East to say nothing of the Orient (Table 2).

Private business was to contribute approximately $300 million annually (of the United States' $1 billion annual share of the Alliance for Progress total annual investment of $10 billion) in investment in Latin America.[1] However, the net capital outflow from the United States of direct investments in Latin America in the 1961-65 period averaged only about $100 million annually or one-third of the private investment projected as necessary (Table 3). This reluctance to invest in Latin America in the early 1960s stems in large part from the instability generated by Castroism. The nationalization of nearly one billion dollars of United States investments in Cuba (one-ninth of Latin American total) was a potent factor in discouraging capital flow into the region. Although gradually, with State Department encouragement and stimulus, net private capital outflow to Latin America gradually increased from 1962 onward so that by 1965 about half of the

[1] Simon G. Hanson, "The Alliance for Progress: The Fourth Year." *Inter-American Economic Affairs.* Vol. 20, No. 2 (Autumn 1966), p. 71; J. Warren Nystorm and Nathan A. Haverstock, *The Alliance for Progress.* (New Jersey, 1966), pp. 22-23.

projected target investment of the Alliance was achieved. More than ever, United States investors in Latin America in recent years have been relying on undistributed subsidiary earnings (i.e., reinvestment of profits) rather than on net capital inflow (i.e., investment of new capital). Furthermore, in the 1954-59 period about one-tenth of all United States net capital outflow to Latin America for direct investments was destined for Cuba ($40 million) and as a result of Castro this capital can now be diverted to other countries. During the 1950's overall, the average annual net inflow of all foreign capital into Cuba was more than $70 million (less than 7 percent of the total entering Latin America), so that Cuba no longer competes for a significant portion of foreign capital that would be invested in Latin America.

Clearly the greatest beneficiaries of United States non-military assistance under the Alliance for Progress have been Brazil and Chile which have accounted for one-half of all United States net assistance to Latin America (Table 2). A second group, including Colombia, the Dominican Republic, Bolivia, Venezuela, and Argentina, has received nearly one-third of United States assistance in the 1961-65 period. Mexico, which is frequently cited as a model for development and an example for the remainder of Latin America, has received very little United States assistance indeed under the Alliance.

Another side effect perhaps of Castroism is that in Latin America there is increasing national participation in the control of foreign industries. Probably the most significant example of this is the current process of the "Chileanization" of the copper industry under the Christian Democratic President Eduardo Frei Montalva.

Socio-Economic Reforms & Social Services. One of the fundamental cornerstones of both Castroism and the Alliance for Progress is the formulation of basic socio-economic reforms. Relatively little attention was given to these basic necessities of modernization until the Cuban Revolution centered upon radical measures to change the structure of both society and the economy. The need for basic change was recognized in the Alliance and by early 1966 fairly extensive agrarian reform programs, all initiated prior to the Alliance, had been implemented in Mexico, Bolivia, and Venezuela and nine other Latin American coun-

tries had undertaken initial measures in this direction.[2] However, even the more established programs are not comprehensive enough and are seriously lacking in capital and technical assistance. The best they have been able to do so far is prevent the rural situation from deteriorating as rapidly as it had been in the past. For example, Venezuela in more than seven years (1958-65) has only distributed 6.25 million acres (less than a tenth of the farmland) to about 114,000 families (less than a third of all rural families).[3] The near futility of these endeavors, in view of the very rapid population growth, can be viewed in the perspective that during the above period the number of rural families in Venezuela probably increased by about sixty thousand. In Mexico, where a significant and profound land program was implemented (at least that appears to be a belief widely held in the United States), less than 2 percent of the landholdings account for more than three-quarters of the total farmland in 1960.[4]

At least nine Latin American countries had adopted tax reform legislation by early 1966 in order to establish a more equitable fiscal system. Apparently this has resulted in improved tax structures and significantly increased collected governmental revenues.[5] Virtually all of the countries for which central government budget accounts are available (excludes Nicaragua, Cuba, Paraguay, and Uruguay), indicate a generally greater reliance on taxes on income and wealth (except Argentina, Ecuador, and Brazil) in the mid-1960s than during the previous decade.[6] The inequities in the fiscal structure of Latin America generally are of a large magnitude. It was estimated in late 1965 that the top 5 percent income group in Latin America overall accounted for two-fifths of the total income and although this group should con-

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[2] Agency for International Development, *Proposed Economic Assistance Programs: FY 1967: Summary Presentation to the Congress.* (Washington, 1966), p. 69.

[3] Pan American Union, *Alliance for Progress Weekly Newsletter.* Vol. IV, No. 13, (Washington, 1966).

[4] Inter-American Institute of Statistics of the Pan American Union, *América en Cifras* 1965. *Situación Económica*: 1. *Agriculture, Ganadería, Silvicultura, Caza y Pesca.* Table 311-04, (Washington, 1966).

[5] AID, *Proposed Economic Assistance Programs: FY* 1967.

[6] United Nations, *Statistical Yearbook*: 1965. Table 192, (New York, 1966).

tribute three-fifths of the tax revenue it was only paying about one-third of the total.[7]

Many governments have been granting a larger share of the budget to the social services in order to ameliorate the generally deplorable conditions in education and health that exist over much of Latin America (Table 4). Peru, Mexico, and Venezuela have exhibited the most marked increases devoted to the social services and these have joined Panama, Honduras and Costa Rica as the only countries of the region that contribute more than one-third of the central governmental budget to the social services. In all of the above countries the budget for education alone exceeds that of the military and the same holds true for El Salvador, Bolivia, Ecuador, Chile, and probably Guatemala. Only two countries, Colombia and Haiti, during the 1960s moved in the direction of further sacrificing social services for greater military expenditures.

United States Sugar Quota & Trade. One of the major steps in the escalation of the United States-Cuban conflict that had important economic repercussions for Latin America was the suspension of the Cuban sugar quota in July 1960 by President Eisenhower. Cuba, by far the world leading sugar exporter, had been providing slightly more than a third (35.3 percent in the 1955-59 period) of all the sugar consumed in the United States.[8] The seven other Latin American countries exporting sugar to the United States prior to 1960 (Table 5) contributed less than a tenth of the Cuban tonnage. This sugar entered the highly preferred market at a price ("quota premium") approximately 2c more per pound than the world market price. This is in reality a subsidy to all sugar producers selling under the United States quota, although it was intended to protect domestic producers. This extra premium payment in 1959 to Cuba amounted to $153 million

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7 " 'Social Development' and 'Social Planning': A Survey of Conceptual and Practical Problems in Latin America" in *Economic Bulletin for Latin America.* Economic Commisson for Latin America. Vol. IX, No. 1 (April 1966), pp. 62-63, (Washington, 1966).

8 United States Dept. of Agriculture, *Agricultural Statistics*: 1966, Table 131, (Washington, 1966).

and to the remainder of Latin America only $12.8 million.[9] The suspension of the Cuban quota in mid-1960 resulted in the reassignment of Cuba's quota to other countries with about three-fifths designated to other Latin American countries. As a result of this action against Cuba the United States domestic (high cost) producers have gradually increased their share of the total United States market from approximately half in the late 1950's to three-fifths in 1964-65 (Table 5).

The Latin American countries have benefited significantly from the suspension of the Cuban quota and have contributed between one-fifth and one-quarter of the United States total supply in 1961-63 but in the following years this proportion was reduced to less than one-fifth. Obviously, Latin America was not the only region to benefit from this largesse because the Philippines increased its large quota and new countries were added, notably the European West Indies, Australia, South Africa, India, and Taiwan.

The permit to enter the United States sugar market presented Latin America with a nearby and relatively stable market for its third most valuable export (after petroleum and coffee). The market is especially lucrative if the sugar enters under the special sugar quota (generally 2-4c per pound above world market price, except in 1963), rather than the "global" quota (special import fee absorbs the differential between the United States and world market prices). This latter was used in the 1962-65 period for the suspended Cuban quota (which by then had been reduced from approximately 3.1 million to 1.6 million tons). The Latin American countries, the main beneficiaries of the reassigned Cuban quota, complained (and lobbyied persistently) and the "global" quota was eliminated from the Sugar Act of 1965.

The Dominican Republic, despite an augmented quota due to the reassignment of Cuba's quota, had to pay the special import duty in late 1960 and in 1961 because the United States severed relations with the Dominican Republic in August 1960 in accordance with the OAS resolution that same month condemning her for involvement in the

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[9] Congressional Quarterly Service, Inc., *Congressional Quarterly Almanac: 1962*. (Washington, 1963), p. 130.

political affairs of Venezuela. Relations were not restored until January 1962.

The greatest beneficiaries, in Latin America, of the suspension of the Cuban sugar quota have been the Dominican Republic, Mexico, Peru, and Brazil. These four countries generally provide four-fifths of the Latin American sugar shipped to the United States (Table 5) which will be the case under the 1965 quota system, until it expires in 1971. The relatively stable New York wholesale price has remained between 6c and 7c per pound while the world sugar price was less than 3c per pound in 1966. As a result the "quota premium" was between $60-70 per ton and the quota for Latin America exceeded 1.6 million tons annually. This subsidy to Latin America probably is on the order of $100-115 million annually but, of course, will fluctuate with the price differential. Not all of these payments go to foreign purses because American interests control significant segments of the sugar industry in at least three Latin American countries with quotas:

% of milling capacity owned by United States interests[10]

Dominican Republic	30
Peru	25
Haiti (small quota)	84
Cuba (up to 1959)	36

The cessation of trade between Cuba and the United States also provided the opportunity, although a relatively small one, for other Latin American countries to substitute other commodities for those formerly supplied by Cuba. However, since four-fifths of Cuba's export trade consisted of sugar, other export commodities from Cuba were relatively of minor importance. However, for some other products that Cuba supplied to the United States probably some of the other Latin American countries have been able to benefit to some degree by now exporting increasing amounts of these commodities to the United States. The more significant of these commodities would be tobacco (Cuba's second export), and some strategic minerals, e.g., nickel, copper, manganese, chromium, and iron ore.

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[10] *Ibid.*, p. 130.

Tourism. Travel expenditures by Americans was a significant source of income for the Cuban economy in the pre-Castro period. In the 1956-58 period, a quarter of a million American tourists annually visited Cuba and their total yearly expenditures on the island amounted to nearly $40 million.[11] There apparently was a decline of American tourism in Cuba during 1959 and it ceased in 1960. It would be difficult to ascertain as to where Cuba-destined tourists would now visit. In comparing the immediate post-Castro period (1960-62) with that of the late 1950's, the number and expenditures of American travelers to the West Indies increased by one-half. During the 1950's and early 1960's the average expenditure per traveler was on the increase so that it seems fairly safe to assume that the isolation of Cuba permitted an addition of at least $40-50 million to be spent by tourists in Middle America. The Bahamas and, especially, Puerto Rico seemed to have had the most marked increase in tourists following the rise of Castro[12] There was a relatively slight increase in the tourist trade in Barbados, Jamaica, and Trinidad. It is also very possible that Mexico may have also benefited in this way also. Haiti and the Dominican Republic have apparently not benefited significantly from the diversion of the tourist trade from Cuba because of the political nature of the regimes and their instability. They have had difficulty or have not been able to maintain their earlier levels of tourism.

Conclusion & Prospects

Precisely how much effect Fidel Castro and his policies have had on the economies of the Latin American countries is difficult to gauge. That he has basically altered or helped modify economic conditions in the region appears to be abundantly clear. Notable changes in foreign

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[11] *Survey of Current Business.* United States Dept. of Commerce. Office of Business Economics. 1956-66. Article dealing with tourism and travel appears in the June issue. Author was Frances P. Sasscer from 1956-59 and joined by Elizabeth M. Outten in 1961. Author not stated in 1960. Beginning with 1962 the author has been Etienne H. Miller.

[12] *Statistical Yearbook*: 1965, Table 161; *América en Cifras*: 1965, *Situación Económica*: 3. *Comercio, Transporte, Communicaciones y Turismo.* Table 335-11, 335-12.

investment and assistance, domestic capital outflow, central governmental budgetary expenditures, and expanded trade and tourism have occurred since the 1950's. During this period of change Castro is largely responsible, or at least a major contributary factor, for some of those changes. Some incipient changes, notably in the flight of United States capital and assistance were visible during the 1950's but the impact of Castroism clearly delineates the early 1960's.

In comparing these periods perhaps as much as two-thirds of a billion dollars more in domestic capital outflow occurred annually from Latin America and private foreign investments in the region amounted to at least a quarter million dollars less annually. This constituted a considerable drain on the region's resources combined with increasing demands for greater military expenditures and assistance in order to preserve stability and counteract "communism" (i.e., almost any movement advocating fundamental change and threatening the status quo, especially if an authoritarian regime is in power). On the credit side, one must consider the significant increase in United States foreign assistance (more than a third of a billion dollars more annually), despite the fact that one-ninth of all net assistance consists of military grants. The reallocation of the sugar quota provides Latin America with a quota premium of at least $100 million in addition to receiving the world market price for the sugar and diversion of United States tourism from Cuba probably adds about half again that amount.

There already was an evolving growth and commitment of United States assistance to Latin America during the last stage of the Eisenhower Administration and probably under President Kennedy this trend would have accelerated. How willing Congress would have been to appropriate large sums to Latin America without the threat of Castro is questionable. In the spring of 1967, despite the waning of the threat of Castro, the Johnson Administration is willing to allocate considerably larger sums for Latin America, but Congress does not concur. In recent years appropriations to Latin America have increased slightly but the augmenting pressures of the Vietnam conflict, balance-of-payments difficulties, and increasing Congressional disquietude regarding the efficacy of foreign economic assistance is certainly not encouraging from the Latin American perspective.

The philosophy of the Alliance for Progress has deviated from its original conception in two important respects. The multilateral leadership, such as it was, has in practice been notably restricted during the Johnson Administration. The resignation in April 1966 of the Panel of Nine which reviewed national development plans and provided advisory planning assistance was a result of the apparent approach of the Johnson Administration and the prevailing Congressional attitude that favored greater United States assertion in the hemisphere. The other founding and more important concept that has been relegated to a secondary role in recent years is that of fundamental socio-economic reforms. Undoubtedly, given the socio-economic structure of Latin America, basic reforms of this nature are extremely difficult to implement, although numerous reform acts have passed many of the national legislatures. The current emphasis for the solution or improvement of Latin American problems is that of a common market. This approach was strongly advocated at Punta del Este (April 1967) because of augmented trade among five small Central American countries. However, the Latin American Free Trade Association has encountered considerable difficulties of both a political and economic nature.

Despite the renewed interest in Latin America the region continues to receive a declining share of United States foreign trade and investment. Latin America, through the Alliance for Progress and other programs, now receives a larger share of United States foreign assistance but like many other programs may be subject to reductions and restrictions should the Vietnam War continue and escalate. Although Latin America has sought United States economic assistance, in the form of the long-term, low-interest, "soft" loans, one of Latin America's most pressing and persistent requests has been for the price stabilization of primary commodities the United States has been reluctant or unable to provide. Price fluctuations of these commodities combined with the general downward trend since 1954 and the general upward trend of prices of industrial goods has produced a severe strain on Latin America. If in 1964 the price levels of 1954 had prevailed for Latin America's exports and imports, the additional regional income would

have amounted to $2.2 billion.[13] In contrast, in 1964 total net United States capital outflow for direct investments and economic and military assistance to Latin America was approximately $800 million. The loss, therefore, to Latin America because of fluctuations in commodity prices is prodigious, especially in view of the importance of the foreign trade sector to underdeveloped regions as a potential source of securing capital.

Cuba has no chance of securing a sugar quota or receiving American tourists until the relations between the two countries improves. However, the benefits accruing to Latin America from the United States sugar quota may not last indefinitely. Although it will be a long time before Cuba regains its former sugar quota the increasing opposition to the present sugar quota system due to expire in 1971 and the defeat of Representative Harold D. Cooley (D, NC, longtime Chairman of the House Agriculture Committee) in the spring 1966 primary, may lead to the revamping of the quota system. Perhaps the largesse will not be passed on to foreign producers and prices to the United States consumers will decrease.

Pressure in many parts of Latin America continues to increase as the population growth is relentless and the rate of increase will probably be augmented still further before meaningful fertility control can be implemented. The very rapid urban influx, without corresponding economic opportunities, creates a serious social and political problem that will erupt sporadically and may actually produce more profound upheavals such as occurred in Mexico, Guatemala, Bolivia, and Cuba. The rate of economic development is inadequate in many countries, especially (among the larger countries) Brazil and Colombia, and several small countries (viz., Dominican Republic, Haiti, Uruguay, Costa Rica, Ecuador, and Paraguay). The race between food and population is even more crucial and more immediate. Here the problem is most critical in Haiti, Dominican Republic, Chile, Costa Rica, Bolivia,

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[13] *Economic Survey of Latin America*: 1964. Economic Commission for Latin America. 1966. Based on data from Table 224. Primary commodity prices (exports from Latin America) were slightly higher in 1963 and 1964 than in preceding years.

Brazil, Paraguay, and Peru. Inflation is a serious problem in Brazil, Chile, Argentina, and Colombia, while balance-of-payments problems especially plague Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Uruguay, Costa Rica, and Haiti. The hope is that United States assistance combined with the programs of the more democratic and popularly supported regimes in Mexico, Venezuela, Colombia, Peru, Chile, Uruguay, and Costa Rica, will be sufficient to restrain the radical and reactionary extremist elements. There is apparently guerilla and terrorist activity in Guatemala, Venezuela, Colombia, Peru, Bolivia, and the Dominican Republic but other countries are always vulnerable. Perhaps the next charismatic leader with a radical program will convince the Latin American elite and the United States of the dire necessity of fundamental reforms so that for the Latin American upper classes to have things remain the way they are they must change.

TABLE 1

UNITED STATES NET FOREIGN ASSISTANCE (1945-65)[a]

($m)

	World Total	Lat. America Total	Military Grants	Other	Lat. Amer. Total Annual Average
1945-52	38 020	657	124	533	88[b]
1953-60	39 938	2 584	440	2 144	323
1961-65	23 864	3 426	388	3 038	685

[a] *Statistical Abstract of the U.S.*, 1960-66 editions. Dept. of Commerce.

[b] Period begins with 1 July 1945.

TABLE 2 — NET UNITED STATES FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ($m)

	Post-War 7/45-12/65	7/45-12/58	1959	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965
TOTAL	102 490	70 112	3 924	4 590	4 239	4 537	5 147	4 903	5 038
Four International Financial Institutions	1 290	670	—	153	172	122	62	112	—
Assistance program	101 200	69 442	3 923	4 437	4 067	4 416	5 086	4 792	5 038
Military grants	35 691	23 929	2 031	1 812	1 518	1 630	1 721	1 385	1 665
West Hemisphere	955	430	59	77	133	74	63	59	59
Other grants, credits & other assist.	65 509	45 513	1 892	2 625	2 549	2 786	3 364	3 407	3 373
West Hemisphere									
Lat Amer rep	5 461	2 123	333	187	697	571	544	408	598
other	59	2	-3	2	3	4	13	13	25
Inter-Amer Development Bank[a]	300	—	z	80	110	60	—	50	—
Mexico	403	319	12	3	83	21	18	-55	38
Guatemala	158	79	9	16	14	9	10	9	11
Salvador	56	8	1	1	8	6	11	10	11
Honduras	55	15	6	4	8	4	5	4	10
Nicaragua	68	17	4	8	9	7	7	7	7
Costa Rica	97	39	8	4	7	9	7	10	14
Panama	112	25	6	12	9	11	19	10	21
Cuba	41	35	6	z	z	-z	z	—	z
Haiti	96	45	13	10	14	5	3	3	5
Dom Rep	171	z	z	z	z	22	48	22	79
Venezuela	150	10	-3	6	32	64	43	-40	38
Colombia	415	151	32	-7	53	45	69	38	34
Ecuador	123	42	2	7	11	12	14	17	17
Peru	254	179	52	-16	-20	5	4	17	32
Bolivia	352	156	22	13	23	29	45	33	30
Paraguay	67	20	7	6	10	4	9	7	5
Chile	735	174	33	10	122	88	111	96	101
Argentina	380	140	73	47	41	66	11	5	-3
Uruguay	60	9	13	20	3	4	8	z	2
Brazil	1 666	660	35	42	270	159	139	213	149

Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1966. Dept. of Commerce. 1966. Table 1246.

— indicates 0

z less than $500,000.

[a] Included with 4 international financial institutions listed at top of table. The other 3 are International Bank for Reconstruction & Development. International Development Association, and International Finance Corporation.

TABLE 3

UNITED STATES FOREIGN INVESTMENTS IN LATIN AMERICA ($m)

(also Latin American Assets in the USA)

	U.S. DIRECT INVESTMENTS						TOTAL U.S. ASSETS		TOTAL FOREIGN ASSETS IN USA	
	U.S. Net Capital Outflow			Value of Investments						
	World Total	Latin Amer	Cuba	World Total	Latin Amer	Cuba	World Total	Latin Amer	Latin Amer	Total
1953	721	117	-5	16286	6034	686	39567	7981	2687	23628
1954	664	88	27	17626	6244	713	42209	8658	3026	26804
1955	779	193	15	19313	6233	736	44947	9292	3287	29557
1956	1859	592	28	22177	7059	777	49476	10453	3644	31607
1957	2482	1163	88	25394	7434	849	54232	11771	3820	31427
1958	1181	299	20	27387	7751	879	59335	11853	3730	34931
1959	1372	218	63	29827	8120	956	64830	12675	3794	42146
1960	1694	95		32778	8387	956	71497	13565	3723	44670
1961	1599	173		34667	8236		75014	14333	4019	46878
1962	1654	-32		37226	8424		80343	15222	4018	96280
1963	1976	69		40680	8662		88301	15727	4792	51486
1964	2416	143		44386	8894		99119	17325	5462	56883
1965[a]	(3371)	(171)		(49217)	(9371)		(106065)	(18207)	(6034)	(58932)

Survey of Current Business. Dept. of Commerce. Office of Business Economics. 1954-66.

Annual article on foreign investments by Samuel Pizer and Frederick Cutler usualy appears in the August issue (except in September in 1958, 1960, 1965, 1966, and in November in 1954).

[a]Preliminary.

TABLE 4

CENTRAL GOVERNMENT EXPEDITURES: DEFENSE & SOCIAL SERVICES

(% of total)

	1953		1957		1958		1959		1960		1961		1962		1963		1964		1965	
	Def	SocSer	Def	SocSer	Def	SocSer	Def	SocSer	Def	SocSer	Def	SocSer	Def	SocSer	Def	SocSer	Def	SocSer	Def	SocSer
Mexico	9.3	13.5	8.1	19.0	7.5	19.3	7.7	22.5	6.7	22.5	8.0	26.5	8.2	27.6	7.8	27.7	10.5	38.1	11.0	40.0
Guatemala	9.8	27.7	7.8	19.9	8.5	20.2	9.5	21.4	10.0	25.6	10.5	25.4	9.1	18.5	9.6	29.8	10.3	24.9		
Salvador	10.7	22.9	10.3	25.2	10.3	25.5	9.4	28.2	9.5	30.3	9.1	33.1	12.9	34.7	12.2	35.2	10.8	29.2	9.7	27.3
Honduras	12.6	19.4	11.6	22.4			11.8	27.2	10.1	28.6	18.1	35.8	17.9	39.7	18.6	49.9	10.3	35.4	9.8	39.1
Costa Rica	5.0	35.0	4.4	34.6	4.2	38.8	4.1	40.4	3.8	39.7	3.5	41.0	3.2	38.1	3.2	39.4	3.2	40.0	3.1	37.9
Panama[a]		41.7		42.7		42.5		41.4		40.3		35.5		38.9		32.5		39.6		41.3
Dom Rep					21.3	15.6	27.2	15.0	22.5	14.5	23.0	14.9	20.3	15.2	19.1	16.9	20.2	20.9	18.9	24.0
Haiti	17.4	20.9	19.1	24.2	18.6	18.8	18.8	19.8	23.6	21.8	23.2	21.9	20.6	21.1	21.9	23.1	25.4	21.7	26.0	23.2
Venezuela	8.8	14.9	10.7	(6.2)	[b]9.4	10.5	17.5	19.6	9.5	27.7	7.9	30.0	9.7	29.0	10.2	29.1	10.1	32.3	9.8	30.4
Colombia	25.5	14.1	23.2	11.2	19.5	14.2	17.3	21.0	14.5	19.0	12.9	18.0	25.7	18.7	23.0	17.3	23.3	20.3	23.5	20.3
Ecuador	22.2	22.2	21.6	18.4	21.6	21.3	17.5	19.6	18.6	19.1	16.3	19.5	17.8	24.2	14.5	25.7	12.7	21.1	11.8	21.6
Peru	15.9	8.7	16.5	9.3	17.9	14.8	16.7	12.6	16.0	24.7					13.5	33.7	12.1	43.2		
Bolivia	25.0	40.5	8.7	38.3							13.8	37.8	12.6	38.7	11.7	37.4				
Chile	22.2	27.0	20.8	24.1	17.9	24.1	14.1	28.6	12.1	22.7	11.6	22.2	11.3	22.5	10.1	24.0	8.8	24.2	9.6	20.3
Argentina	23.0	25.4	25.9	19.0	12.6	19.2	15.1	20.2	18.6	18.9	15.9	21.1	16.5	22.4	17.3	23.7	15.3	22.7	12.0	16.9
Brazil	28.2	10.2	29.2	38.1	27.5	9.8	23.9	10.7	20.8	10.8	16.6	9.2	15.7	9.9	15.2	8.7	16.1	13.4	23.1	14.1

Statistical Yearbook: 1955, 1959-65. United Nations. Based on Table: Budget Accounts & Public Debt.

[a]No outlays for defense.

[b]Education only.

TABLE 5
RAW SUGAR MARKETINGS IN CONTINENTAL USA
(tons)

	1955-59	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	Sugar Quota 1965 Act(a)
Mainland U.S.	2,659	2,784	3,391	3,202	4,037	3,604	4,125	4,125
Offshore U.S.	1,950	1,740	2,041	1,999	1,923	1,919	1,971	2,265
TOTAL Domestic	4,609	4,532	5,432	5,201	5,960	5,523	6,096	6,390
Mexico	40	401	674	398	379	480	474	348.5
Guatemala	—			33	51	37	43	34.0
Nicaragua	10			47	38	50	49	40.0
Costa Rica	2			27	41	41	42	40.0
Panama	2			4	10	19	18	25.1
Cuba	3,146	2,390	—	—	—	—	—	(1,130.0)[b]
Dominican Rep.	61	450	333	862	590	399	469	340.9
Haiti	6			34	40	15	23	18.7
Colombia	—	—	171	66	45	28	34	36.0
Ecuador	—			67	56	58	60	49.8
Peru	76	274	625	530	413	233	293	272.0
Argentina	—			10	229	20	67	40.0
Brazil	—	100	306	391	470	182	269	340.9
Other LA								50.1[c]
TOTAL LAT AMER	3,343	3,615	2,109	2,469	2,362	1,562	1,841	1,636.1
Philippines	965	1,155	1,355	1,256	1,195	1,217	1,178	1,050
Others[d]	7	220	1,006	871	963	775	811	621.9
TOTAL Other Foreign	972	1,375	2,361	2,127	2,158	1,992	1,989	1,671.9
GRAND TOTAL	8,924	9,522	9,731	9,797	10,515	9,109	9,921	9,700.0

Agricultural Statistics: 1963, 1965, 1966. Dept. of Agriculture. Table 131 (except in 1963, Table 130).

[a]*Congressional Quarterly Almanac*: 1965. Congressional Quarterly Service. 1966. p. 141.

[b]Suspended. Reallocated and included under quotas for the different foreign countries.

[c]El Salvador 25.0, Venezuela 17.0, Bolivia 4.1, Honduras 4.1.

[d]The most important include: Australia, British W. Indies, Taiwan, India, South Africa, French W. Indies, and Fiji. Also includes some Latin American countries exceptin column under "Sugar Quota 1965 Act"). El Salvador Paraguay, Venezuela, Bolivia, and Honduras.

LA HUELGA DE LA COSTA NORTE: AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE 1954 STRIKE AGAINST THE UNITED FRUIT COMPANY IN HONDURAS

By Richard A. LaBarge*

Random shocks—the unexpected and disruptive occurrence of wars, revolutions, plagues, earthquakes, and other great upheavals of society or nature—often are the bases for explaining departures from the predictions of economic models. Alternatively, such forces may be instrumental as the impetus which triggers subsequent action. But in spite of the great improvements in growth, decay, and cycle models which have resulted from inclusion of random shocks through the application of probability theory, we know little about such shocks themselves. An understanding of the nature and magnitude of shock forces can be obtained only from case analysis provided by these events themselves.

This paper records—almost entirely from primary sources[1]—the shock forces and their aftermath from "the North Coast Strike" which took place in 1954 against operations of the United Fruit Company in Honduras. In that country the events of this year are remembered as catastrophes which underlay the subsequent development of serious bottlenecks in supply, temporary inflation, and a lack of investment

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[1] The author is indebted to the Social Science Research Council for fellowship support which allowed for field work in the affected zones of Honduras during the summer of 1957. This grant made possible the collection of testimony and of the many unpublished documents available only at the source.

capital inflow.[2] The last of these results brought structural disequilibrium to the international balance of payments and a severe threat of devaluation so strong that the pressure was removed only by large inflows of investment on public account resulting from the various aid programs sponsored since 1961 under the Alliance for Progress.[3]

Background

The first provisions on labor to appear in Honduran legislation took the form of a section on work and the family which was incorporated into the Constitution of 1936. This section specified eight hours as a normal work day and six such days as a normal work week. Women and children were excluded from unhealthful and dangerous work (although definitive standards for "unhealthful" and "dangerous" were not provided) and from night work. Children under twelve years of age were forbidden to work, and those between the ages of twelve and sixteen years were limited to working not more than six hours per day. In order to curtail the practice of paying in kind or in script redeemable only at the commissaries owned and operated by the employer, payment of all wages in the national currency was required. A final article specified that large industrial enterprises were obligated to establish hospitals at the site of their operations in order to care for workers who became ill or who met with accidents. No provisions were included for a supervisory agency to enforce these articles,

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2 Banco Central de Honduras, *Memoria,* 1954 (Tegucigalpa: Banco Central de Honduras, 1955), especially pp. 5-10 and 22-23, and the following report, Banco Central de Honduras, *Memoria,* 1955-1956 . . . , pp. 7, 16, 18-24, and 30-32.

3 See Richard A. LaBarge and Frank Falero, Jr., "Central Banking and Monetary Policy in the Open Economy of Honduras, 1950-1965" (Tallahassee: Florida State University, mimeo., 1966), pp. 46-47, summarizing more detailed analysis in earlier portions of the paper. This paper is a multiple regression stepwise iteration analysis of the monthly monetary stock of Honduras which was presented in honor of Dr. Emanuele Tosco at the 36th Annual Meeting of the Southern Economic Association in Atlanta, Georgia, on November 12, 1966. Interested persons may obtain the mimeograph version of this paper prior to publication by writing to the authors.

and they were honored more in breech than in observance.[4] However, the large concerns (especially those of foreign ownership), whose public visibility made attempts at compliance a matter of business prudence, clearly had a better record on this account than smaller firms which were correspondingly less in the public eye.

Further significant labor legislation did not appear until March, 1949, when the *Congreso Nacional* passed Decree Number 96. This decree provided that holiday workers would receive double time pay. During 1952 two new labor laws were added which further defined working conditions for women and children (*Ley de Trabajo de Menores y Mujeres*) and which provided indemnization for certain occupational hazards and for accidents resulting from the negligence of employers (*Ley de Accidentes de Trabajo*). Separate legislation established the *Direccion General de Trabajo y Prevision Social,* which spent most of its early years hearing workmen's compensation cases.

In spite of these enactments the Honduran labor market remained largely *laissez-faire.* Prior to 1955 unions had no legal standing, and government officials sided strongly with management. In the banana zones the United Fruit Company's Honduran subsidiary, the Tela Railroad Company, conducted its labor relations entirely through the supervisors directly in charge of each job. There was almost no senior supervision from management as long as output of the appropriate quality arrived on schedule. Grievances were settled by the immediate superior of the complaining worker. Most issues never even reached the ears of higher administrators because the workers feared, not without reason, that going over the heads of immediate supervisors eventually might cost them their jobs.

Indeed, the management compounded its problems by sending some of its tactless foreign employees to the Honduran Division, where

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[4] Jorge Fidel Durón, *A Statement of the Laws of Honduras in Matters Affecting Business in Its Various Aspects and Activities* (Washington: Inter-American Development Commission, 1947), p. 49; Práxedes Martines Silva., "El problema económico del trabajo en Honduras," Tésis de grado, Universidad de Honduras, agosto de 1955, p. 63, citing [Honduras], *Constitución Política y Leyes Constitutivas* (Tegucigalpa: Talleres Tipográficos Nacionales, 1936), pp. 32-33, "Titulo XII — Del Trabajo y de la Familia."

courteous treatment of the common worker appeared to be unnecessary. In Company circles it was said that if a man were thrown out of Guatemala, Costa Rica, or Panama, he always could be given a job in Honduras. To their credit most of the managerial personnel of the Tela Railroad Company were willing by 1957 to admit the deficiencies of their labor policy (or lack of one) prior to May, 1954. As one of the superintendents put it: "I can't blame these people. We were just asking for a strike, but none of us really thought they could do it!"

The Strike

When the author visited the Tela Railroad Company during May and June, 1957, Company officials still spoke with awe of the efficiency with which the strike had been organized three years before. The dispute began early in April, 1954, when wharf workers at Puerto Cortes advanced the claim that the double time holiday pay provided by Decree Number 96 of March, 1949, applied also to Sunday work. Company officials rejected this claim and dismissed one of the workers who had been most active in pressing it. In protest the workers left their jobs. The Company's response was an attempt to re-route its foreign trade through the nearby port of Tela, but the longshoremen and stevedores at Tela struck in sympathy with those at Puerto Cortes. At this juncture the government intervened with a promise to settle the question satisfactorily within fifteen days. The workers returned to their jobs, but after a lapse of fifteen days no solution was in evidence.

In the meanwhile separate dissatisfactions were brewing among workers in the Company hospital at Tela. These workers left their jobs over a grievance with the medical superintendent. Again the government intervened with the promise of a solution in fifteen days. This time there was opposition to the proposal, and those who were unwilling to accept it were imprisoned.

Toward the end of the month workers in other departments joined in protesting their working conditions, and several letters were dispatched to the manager's office requesting wage and salary increases,

free hospital care, and numerous other fringe benefits. None of these letters received a reply. Workers in the construction and engineering departments at Progreso then sent a joint petition to the manager in which they indicated that relations would be worsened greatly if they were not given the courtesy of a reply to their previous demands. An oblique reply appeared on April 28, when the manager's office issued a statement that further work in the construction and engineering departments would be purchased by the piece, not by the hour or by the month as previously. The next day workers in those departments dispatched notes to their respective superintendents saying that they would not work under the new system.

On May 1 Honduras' first celebration of Labor Day was held in Progreso's Parque Ramon Rosa. It began as a small, informal gathering. By afternoon it was a massive crowd which marched through the city's streets singing patriotic songs and chanting anti-American slogans. One glowering group surrounded a Protestant mission on the outskirts of the city. When the minister protested that he had nothing to do with the Company, their sullen answer was: "Yes, but you speak their language!"

The next day the construction and engineering workers agreed to amplify their demands and to stop work. The strike began on Monday, May 3. By May 6 only the railroad workers remained on the job in Progreso. Large numbers of farm laborers began to migrate into the city to join the strikers, and by May 9 an estimated 13,000 persons had been added to Progreso's normal population of 5,000. The railway workers joined the strike, and the movement generalized rapidly to the other Company centers at La Lima, Bataan, Tela, and Puerto Cortes. Once again the government offered to settle all strike issues within fifteen days. The offer went unheeded.

By this time the strikers were highly organized. Workers in each department had met to select their strike committees (*Comites de Huelga*), and these representatives in turn had met at Progreso to elect a *Comite Central de Huelga.* The speed and efficiency with which the organization progressed led some observers to believe that the strikers

were receiving assistance from labor leaders in Guatemala.[5] Timing contributed to their suspicions, for during this same period the forces of Colonel Carlos Castillo Armas were massing in northwestern Honduras for their June invasion of Guatemala. To have paralyzed any part of the area in which they were concentrating would certainly have benefited the Arbenz regime.

However, the available evidence is all circumstantial. The author was unable to find anyone who could give specific names, dates, and places for the supposed aid from Guatemala. Honduran labor leaders categorically deny that there ever was any. They attribute the efficiency of the strike organization to the presence of many semi-skilled and skilled workers in its leadership. Regardless of the truth, it is known that the Honduran government feared the possibility of a revolution stemming from the strike, and the administration of President Juan Manuel Galvez acted rapidly to create a mediatory commission to meet with the parties to the dispute. The talks were held in San Pedro Sula.

On May 11 the strikers made known their specific demands in a petition addressed to the manager of the Tela Railroad Company. This petition contained thirty separate points, of which the most important were respect for the right to organize and bargain collectively, a pledge that no reprisals would be taken against the strike leaders, and claims for wage, salary, and piece work increases ranging from 30 per cent to 300 per cent of existing levels.[6]

Company officials indicated that they were unprepared to discuss these demands without thorough study. Instead, they opened the talks at San Pedro Sula by negotiating for the re-opening of certain essential

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[5] "Banana Battle in Honduras," *Business Week* (May 22, 1954), p. 166; "General Strike in Honduras," *Time* LXIII (May 24, 1954), p. 40. Note especially the comments of Mr. John Foster Dulles as reported in the latter reference: "There is at least an interesting coincidence in the fact that the strikes have occurred principally in an area to whch the Guatemalan government recently sent three consuls who have subsequently been declared *persona non grata* by the government of Honduras because of their activities."

[6] [Honduras], "Aspectos fundamentales de la mediación en el conflicto obrero-patronal entre la Tela Railroad Company y los trabajadores de la empresa," Primera parte: "Pliego de peticiones de los trabajadores" (Tegucigalpa: mimeo, junio de 1955).

services which had been terminated by the strike. The strike committee viewed this as a move to disrupt worker solidarity. For public health reasons they agreed, after lengthy debate, to re-open sewage disposal plants at the major centers, but the commissaries, electric plants, and hospitals remained closed except when operated by administrative personnel. With this reaction the management claimed that the strike committee could not possibly be representative of the strikers at large. To prove the contrary the committee voluntarily disbanded itself, held new elections among the strikers, and returned to the conference table with a fresh mandate from the rank-and-file. The services remained closed.

On June 13, after the lapse of more than a month, the management issued a formal reply to the demands of May 11. It was a brief statement which denied the abuses alleged by the strikers and asserted the financial impossibility of meeting their demands. The management then offered a counterproposal of expanded fringe benefits and limited wage increases which amounted to the additional annual expenditure of L 5,172,200 ($2,586,100 at the foreign exchange rate of two lempiras for one U. S. dollar). On June 17 the strike committee rejected this offer.

Four days later the government mediators offered their own solution. With painstaking care the mediation commission had added up the cost of providing each of the benefits contained in the strikers' original demands. Their total came to L 59,859,400, which, the mediators dryly noted, amounted to 228.2 per cent of the average annual profits reported by the Tela Railroad Company for the period 1946-1952. By comparison the Company offer had amounted to 19.7 per cent of that average. The government's compromise involved increased wages and benefits totaling 49.6 per cent of the profit average, or L 13,009,500.[7] In the strikers' eyes this was a reasonable concession. Company officials did not agree, and on that note the talks at San Pedro Sula ended. Further negotiations continued by means of written communiques.

As June waned, so did the enthusiasm of the strikers. In the earlier

[7] [Honduras], "Aspectos fundamentales . . . "

days of the strike the workers had lived from their meager savings, those who had more sharing with the less fortunate. When the strikers ran out of funds, local shopkeepers either gave them what they needed or sold it on credit until bankruptcy threatened. Almost everyone who was not in the administration of the Company contributed to the strikers' cause, but after eight weeks their combined resources showed signs of exhaustion. Hunger took its toll, and the old battle cry, "!Que se siga la huelga!" evoked weakening responses. As June became July, men began to falter and drop in the streets. It was clear to all observers that the workers could not hold out much longer. During the first week of July the mediation commission suggested a new agreement to end the strike, and with minor modifications this agreement was formalized on July 9. The bitter 69-day conflict had come to an end.[8]

By comparison with the goals which had been established at the outset of the strike, workers throughout the division felt that little had been gained by their sacrifices. Nevertheless, the concessions which they won in the contract of July 9, 1954, were surprising for a lost cause. Rates on all piece work were raised by fifteen per cent. The longshoremen and stevedores obtained wage increases of L 0.10 per hour, while other hourly workers received pay boosts on a sliding scale from L 0.05 to L 0.09. Even the monthly employees found their paychecks increased by amounts ranging from L 8.00 to L 20.00. The Company also agreed to pay time and one-half for work required beyond the eight hour day. In addition, the contract contained two important concessions on fringe benefits. The first of these concessions established free income insurance for workers in case of illness. Those with more than three continuous months of service received the right to daily payments of L 2.00 or L 3.00 whenever they were incapacitated for more than three days. The second concession established annual vacations of two weeks with pay for any worker whose wage or salary averaged L 150.00 per month or more. There was one other major provision of a somewhat unusual nature. In view of the personal hardship wrought by prolonged unemployment during the strike period, the Company agreed to make

[8] For detailed reference on this history of the North Coast Strike, see Práxedes Martines Silva, "El problema económico . . . ," pp. 70-75, and Antonia Suazo B., "Los sindicatos y su importancia frente al derecho laboral hondureña," Tésis de grado, Universidad de Honduras, 1956, pp. 33-44.

lump sum rehabilitation payments of L 40.00 to all workers whose normal remuneration was less than L 200.00 per month. Those few who earned more than L 200.00 per month were entitled to a rehabilitation payment of L 100.00. No reprisals were to be taken against any of the strikers.[9]

The Aftermath

Unfortunately, it is not possible to isolate the income and employment effects of these concessions alone, for in less than three months a second shock—a natural catastrophe of major proportions—intervened to reinforce them. At the end of September, 1954, a severe hurricane struck the banana zones on the North Coast of Honduras, and widespread heavy rains in the aftermath of the storm continued well into October. The Ulua and Chamelecon rivers rose to unprecenteded levels, breaking the stoutest levees, carrying away dams and pumping stations, and flooding almost the entire length of their joint basin.

Some banana farms were submerged to depths of fifteen to twenty feet, and 75 per cent of the Tela Railroad Company's banana plantations were damaged in one way or another.[10] Thirty-one per cent of Company banana acreage was forced out of production altogether, requiring a minimum twelve-month lag for replanting and maturing. At the end of 1954 only 31,784 acres of bananas remained in cultivation by the Tela Railroad Company compared with a post-war peak of 45,944 acres at the close of 1953.[11]

The cultivations never recovered. During 1955 much of the ruined banana area was replanted, but the flood waters had spread the *fusaria* of Panama Disease throughout large tracts in which the infirmity

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9 "Convenio celebrado entre la Tela Railroad Company y los trabajadores de dicha empresa, 9 de julio de 1954" (Tegucigalpa: typescript, 1954).

10 [Tela Railroad Company], "Plan a desarrollar por la Tela Railroad Company a consequencia de las inundaciones," *Comizahualt* (Tegucigalpa) Navidad de 1954—Año Nuevo de 1955, p. 49.

11 For complete detail of land use by the Tela Railroad Company see December 31 acreage figures for each year from 1946 through 1956 in Richard A. LaBarge, "A Study of United Fruit Company Operations in Isthmian America, 1946-1956" (Ann Arbor: University Microfilm Service, 1959), pp. 172-174.

previously had not appeared. Although effective flood-fallowing techniques were known to purge the infection from the land, expensive investment for construction and control of artificial lakes was necessary for implementation. In view of the increased labor tension which prevailed following the 1954 strike there was little management incentive to make such a commitment. Subsequent information shows that the pre-1954 cultivations have not been replaced despite the lapse of more than a decade.[12]

From 1946 through 1953 the sizeable net sum of $41.8 million had been invested in plant, equipment, and working inventory of the Tela Railroad Company. In terms of the percentage of net profits reinvested the amounts returned to Honduras for capital formation in this period averaged forty cents per dollar earned. The conditions under which the Company operated in Honduras prior to 1954 were viewed by the management as the most favorable in Isthmian America. Favorable expectations are borne out by the results, for the annual net profits of the Tela Railroad Company during that period ranged from $8.2 million (1952) to $18.3 million (1947) with a cumulative total of $104.5 million for the eight year span.[13]

This picture was altered radically by the catastrophes of 1954. Within two years the Company lost $15.3 million on current operations with a net disinvestment of $2.2 million. A much reduced profit of $3.8 million reappeared in 1956, but this was not accompanied by the reinvestment burst which one might have expected had only the natural disaster occurred.[14]

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[12] William S. Stokes, "Honduras: Problems and Prospects," *Current History* L (January, 1966), p. 24 reports that ". . . by 1965 the United Fruit Company and associated producers had about 30,000 acres under cultivation"—in other words just about the amount remaining after the 1954 catastrophes, and this after inauguration in 1963 of a $15 million five year re-investment program!

[13] Richard A. LaBarge, "A Study of United Fruit Company Operations . . . ," p. 128.

[14] Profit and investment figures for Tela Railroad Company operations are not available for the years following 1956, but it is known that no sizeable investment was initiated by the Company until 1963. See Banco Central de Honduras, *Memoria,* 1963 (Tegucigalpa: Banco Central de Honduras, 1964), pp. 9, 19, and 28-29; Richard A. LaBarge and Frank Falero, Jr., "Central Banking . . . ," p. 36; and William S. Stokes, "Honduras . . . ," p. 24.

These developments brought with them a general contraction of the scale of Company operations with reduced demand for labor. The initial extensive layoffs continued until the end of February, 1955.[15] Those who had been the most active in leading the strike appeared early on the termination rolls, while those who always had worked hard without complaints were the last to be dismissed. As one assistant superintendent put it: "It was possible to be somewhat selective, I'll admit that. During the strike they used to greet us with *'!Que se siga la huelga!'* Well, our answer to that was *'!Que se siga el rebajo!'* " Of course, this result was a foregone conclusion. It certainly would have been unusual had the Company dismissed those who cost it least in favor of retaining those who had cost it most.

Yet Company officials were well aware of the socio-economic difficulties involved in throwing large numbers of workers back into the Honduran labor market, and efforts were made to cooperate with the government and with labor leaders in finding other employments for these persons. On November 16, 1954, the Tela Railroad Company issued a five point program which had resulted from talks with government and labor leaders: 1) The Company had turned over to the state 38,174 acres located between Tela and La Ceiba and another 24,317 acres located in the Department of Choluteca. Displaced Company workers were to be given first priority in settling on these lands. 2) The Company had agreed to lend or rent certain other lands to the government for six months, so that those lands might serve as temporary relocation centers while more permanent arrangements were being made. 3) All dismissals had been delayed for at least a month in order to give the government's special *Comision de Rehabilitacion* time to expand public works projects. This commission had informed the Company that some 1,000 persons were employed in such work and that 1,100 new jobs would be made available shortly. 4) The Company had agreed to dismiss fewer workers than at first planned. And 5) the Company had agreed to pay a small separation to each

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[15] Práxedes Martinez Silva, "El problema económico . . . ," p. 55.

dismissed worker in order to assist him in covering his relocation expenses.[16]

Even so, labor—like the Company—was hard hit. From 1946 through 1956 a mean of some 22,000 workers of all types was employed by the Tela Railroad Company. But the highest employment figures occurred prior to the strike, hurricane, and flood damages of 1954, and peak employment (during 1952) had approached 29,000 workers. The lowest employment, less than 16,000 workers occurred at the end of 1954 and during 1955. December 31 employment data supplied by the Comptroller's Office of the United Fruit Company indicate that net dismissals by the Tela Railroad Company during 1954 totaled 10,555 employees, most of whom were unskilled or only semi-skilled.[17]

Comparison of these figures with the existing estimates for Honduras' total labor force during this period[18] indicates that the Tela Railroad Company employed 4 to 5 per cent of that total from 1946 to 1954 and about 2 per cent of that total during 1955 and 1956. A similar comparison shows that 12 to 14 per cent of Honduras' wage earners (the monetized labor market) were employed by the Tela Railroad prior to 1954, while some 8 per cent remained in the Company work force immediately following the 1954-1955 layoffs. The enormous task of finding alternative employment for 4 to 6 per cent of the wage earning work force of an underdeveloped country cannot be minimized. Government projects and net private investment in construction and light industry provided some relief,[19] albeit not at comparable wage

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[16] [Tela Railroad Company], "Plan a desarrollar . . . ," *Comizahualt* (Tegucigalpa) . . . , p. 49. This is a reprint of a handbill entitled, "A Nuestros Trabajadores," which the Company distributed to its workers on November 16, 1954. See also, Tela Railroad Company, Departamento de Relaciones Públicas, "El Presidente de la United Fruit Company revisa personalmente daños de recientes inundaciones," *Comizahualt* (Tegucigalpa) Navidad de 1954—Año Nuevo de 1955, p. 50.

[17] Richard A. LaBarge, "A Study of United Fruit Company Operations . . . ," p. 242.

[18] Honduras, Ministerio de Gobernación, Dirección General de Censos y Estadísticas, *Anuario estadístico,* 1955 (Tegucigalpa: agosto de 1956), p. 34.

[19] Banco Central de Honduras, *Situación económica durante el primer trimestre y el mes de abril de* 1955 (Tegucigalpa: Banco Central de Honduras, mayo de 1955), p. 3.

levels. There are no figures on the numbers for whom alternative employment was available only in the slash and burn of migratory subsistence agriculture. Even in the summer of 1957 the sign *"No Hay Plazos"* was posted visibly on every major Company installation, and several of the workers with whom the author talked sought his intercession to obtain jobs for themselves or for relatives.

Conclusions

From the standpoint of welfare economics there is little problem in assessing the combined results of strike and storm on the North Coast of Honduras. In this case there was no trade-off of gains by one group at the expense of another to provoke the neo-classical question of whose gains and whose losses were worth the most to society at large. Everybody lost. Land, capital, and labor all suffered immediate reduction in employment, and output and incomes fell. Some of these factors of production still are employed to their disadvantage in alternative economic activities which have proved to be far less remunerative than the production and sale of bananas.

Of course, it may be alleged on non-economic grounds that other "social advantages" derived from the contraction of Tela Railroad Company operations were tangible enough to justify the economic losses involved. But such propositions usually have been advanced either with the support of defective economic argument[20] or without proper scientific measurement available from the other disciplines of behavioral science.

Let it suffice to point out—as Stokes has done[21]—that the Liberal Party government in power in Honduras from 1957 to 1963 considered the prospect of expropriating Tela Railroad Company properties and backed away from it, though not from any love of United Fruit Com-

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[20] A leading case is presented in Richard A. LaBarge, "The Imputation of Values to Intra-Company Exports: The Case of Bananas," *Social and Economic Studies* (Jamaica) X (June, 1961), *passim*. Note especially footnote 5, p. 185, which exposes an outright case of lying by major officials in the Arbenzista government of Guatemala.

[21] William S. Stokes, "Honduras . . . , " pp. 23-24.

pany interests. And earlier, when the Supreme Court in neighboring Guatemala under the Arbenzista government scheduled United Fruit's subsidiary *Compania Agricola de Guatemala* for sale in 1952 to satisfy claims brought against the Company by its workers, the union itself withdrew the claims in favor of a separate settlement out of court.[22] Both actions said very clearly that the people actually involved were somewhat uncertain about the nebulous "social advantages" to be derived from such action.

Verily it is written that Man does not live by bread alone. But in the underdeveloped economies of Latin America there is a justifiable and prudent concern for bread. That concern is shared by the development economist. At the risk of great academic storm, one is tempted to suggest in this case that what was bad for the Tela Railroad Company was bad for Honduras.

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22 For detail see Richard A. LaBarge, *Impact of the United Fruit Company on the Economic Development of Guatemala,* 1946-1954 (New Orleans: Middle American Research Institute, Tulane University, 1960), p. 50 and the primary documents cited there.

COMMENTS ON MANUSCRIPTS BY LABARGE & ARBENA GONZALES

By John R. Hildebrand*

I suppose I should fulfill my responsibility by asserting that these three papers present a fascinating opportunity for a critic. As a vigorous critic once said at the beginning of his remarks, "I feel like a mosquito in a nudist colony. I don't know where to begin with so many challenging opportunities." Seriously, these are three excellent papers. I have no devastating criticisms—only a few viewpoints that might lead to worthwhile extensions of these papers.

Viewing from the vantage point of the Inter-American Conference of Presidents going on at Punta Del Este this week (April, 1967), it is clear that U.S. policy has in a real sense made a 180 degree turn since President Teddy Roosevelt supported the separation of Panama from Colombia. Today, President Johnson and the other heads of state recognize that the current subdivision of Latin America is a mistake. We are now officially trying to put Latin America back together in a more productive relationship that fits modern technology. Economic and political integration is the order of the day. The hope is to tie together the various countries of the Latin American Free Trade Association and of the Central American Common Market in a more vigorous common market patterned after the successful common market of Europe.

With respect to Castro's Cuba it seems to me the issue for the U.S. has not really been one of communism, or fascism, or economic development, or welfare *per se,* but rather the question of the international balance of military power. The United States does not seem to ask whether a country has a communist, fascist, capitalist, dictatorial or democratic regime. It seems only to ask which direction are you apt

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to point your guns today. As Senator Paul Douglas was reported to have responded some years ago to a critical question about several billion dollars of aid to Tito's communist Yugoslavia and Franco's Spain, "They may be SOB's but damn it they're *our* SOB's."

I suspect a resolution of these kinds of military balance of power difficulties must await, to some extent, the replacement of international anarchy with the rule of law. Fortunately, we are moving in this direction on regional and global levels with new and strengthened international institutions.

As was reported, Castro claims some credit for the Alliance for Progress. It does seem reasonable that someone ought to help the poor in Latin America catch up with the rich in Western Europe who were given over 12 billion dollars under the Marshall Plan. I am reminded of a big placard I saw in the Havana airport in October 1960 just before commercial flights to Cuba were terminated. The placard read, "Jesus Christ was for the poor. Fidel Castro is for the poor. Why aren't you for the poor?"

In regard to LaBarge's paper, I am placed in a difficult situation because his work concerning the United Fruit Company and its Honduran subsidiary, the Tela Railroad Company, is largely a descriptive study involving facts that I have neither the time nor the sources to check. Consequently, may I suggest that he might appropriately have allowed more space for drawing implications from the facts concerning the 1954 "North Coast Strike" against the United Fruit Company in Honduras. As facts do not speak for themselves, I would suggest more interpretation and prescription even if one then faces the risk of being controversial and "unscientific"—the last word in quotation marks, of course. Much of the value of a study is lost if it does not go beyond description and the presentation of facts.

The controversial subjective areas of ends, goals, values, and policy measures, being of crucial importance to the survival and quality of life on this planet, should not be neglected. Economists ought not to be narrow like the physicist who said, "I just discover the facts surrounding hydrogen bombs; I don't care how bombs are used."

In Latin America the contest is clearly between peaceful evolutionary reform or change through violence. What then becomes the role of major firms like the United Fruit Company? What then becomes the role of organized labor in Latin America? Can organized labor play the role of a responsible agent for peaceful social reform as has generally occurred in the United States and elsewhere in the world? What are the responsibilities of an enlightened business management? What are the prospects in Latin America for the American Institute For Free Labor Development for which we find an amazing amount of support among enlightened business firms, labor unions, and governments? How significant is this cooperative effort to establish labor unions as responsible institutions for peaceful reform? Human relations and social justice can not be ignored in this troubled world. I suggest the role of labor unions in Latin America, as a major force in developing a brighter tomorrow, merits study.

The United Fruit Company and organized labor are both emotion-charged symbols in Central America. Like any human institution both suffer the usual weaknesses of the human species. Both are a mixed blessing, a double-edged sword, and "good" as well as "bad." Thus I could not subscribe unconditionally to the manuscript's final suggestion or inference that "what was bad for the Tela Railroad Company was bad for Honduras." Surely in the long run a more sophisticated labor and management leadership growing out of the strike could be a sound basis for more rapid economic, political, and social development that would easily offset the obvious short-term loss.

Finally, in all modesty may we admit that the eyes of yesterday, today, and tomorrow peer at the world through tinted glasses of different hues. The pattern seems to be that future generations often view the earlier generations as crude barbarians. Perhaps I should add a note of charity recognizing that LaBarge may have drawn from the descriptive facts interpretations and policy recommendations had he been alloted another half hour.

Perhaps I should close with a general comment concerning Teddy Roosevelt, Fidel Castro, and the United Fruit Company. For those of you with some interest in the humanities, think of the richness of the literature, the art, and the cartoons that we would not possess without these individuals, organizations, and events.

CORTES: A COMMENT

By Robert W. Page, Jr.*

Preface

Few men enjoy a life the reality of which reached beyond their wildest dreams. Cortes was one of these few.

Who is—to give him all of his name—Don Fernando Cortes, Marques del Valle de Oaxaca and Captain General of New Spain and the South Sea? Whether latter day writers or the chroniclers of his own day are consulted, the answer would seem to be: he is a shadow; nothing more. This is a pity. Somewhere between the legends and the facts—and there are more legends than facts—Cortes had his being. For a short span of time he strode the world in god-like grandeur —in point of wondering fact to some he *was* a god—and changed forever a part of the world. But he was a man. He ran his course and then was no more. Other men in others days tried to deny or to ignore him.

This essay will visit briefly with writers both new and old in an attempt to strengthen the shadowy lines of Fernando Cortes. If in the process the idea should be evidenced that the essayist is somewhat partial to Don Fernando, rest assured that he is. At great hazard Cortes dared to cross over the rim of the western world to stand at last and to look down upon an unknown civilization—and to know that he was one of a few hundreds and they were counted in their hundreds of thousands. Yet he went on. Cortes was cruel and avaricious and bigoted and many things beside that we do not admire in men. But he was brave to a haunting degree. This essayist admires brave men.

Cortes and the Latter Day Writers

Cortes has scant popular recall. In trying to unravel the reason for this lack of historical appreciation, contradictory opinions of every hue are found.

*Colonel, U.S. Army

Perhaps the unkindest cut was to be recalled as a lesser man. In his poem, "On First Looking Into Chapman's Homer," Keats has "stout Cortes . . . with eagle eye . . . silent upon a peak in Darien."[1] As we all know, it was Balboa who first stood on a peak in Darien to find a new ocean and a new horizon. Known—by checking the currencies of the Latin American world—is this fact: of all the *conquistadores,* only Balboa is recalled in a truly popular sense as the unit on currency (Panama). There are those who with a sniff would note that Panama as a country has a dangerous "Made in U.S.A." label on its birthright. Perhaps the homage of Balboa is as synthetic as Panama's coming to nationhood.

Another account of Cortes says that he has no "monuments . . . in Mexico, yet the very land breathes of him."[2] The sense of this article, written at the turn of the century, would indicate that the history of Mexico was one with Cortes. Nothing could be farther from the truth. This account, it should be noted, rested largely on Cortes' letters to the Spanish crown, letters that bore a strong resemblance to Caesar's *Commentaries.* The turn of the century comment said of Cortes' letters that they did not come "from the secluded library of the musty historian, but from the open-air workshop of the tumultous warrior."[3] (One cannot help wondering in passing: is this, as it appears, rather artless and superficial or is it veiled criticism of Prescott? Prescott is not musty, but his library was secluded in a very special sense. The blind and the near blind need little light in their libraries so long as their inner lights, as did Prescott's, burn well to light the way of the unwary.)

Perhaps the most recent commentary (1961) on Cortes moves him from the status of warrior to that of symbol, "of the ruthless foreigner, the exploiter."[4] Curiously, however, it could almost be said

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[1] Harry Buxton Forman (ed.), *The Poetical Works and Other Writings of John Keats* (London: Reeves and Turner, 1883), I, p. 79.

[2] G. F. Paul, "Hernando Cortes, the Central Figure in Mexican History," *New England Magazine,* Vol. XXXV (Jan., 1907), p. 515.

[3] *Ibid.*

[4] William Weber Johnson and the Editors of Life, *Life World Library: Mexico* (New York: Time Inc., 1961), p. 43.

that this latest comment went in search of a symbol. For example, the name of Cortes' interpreter-mistress—Dona Marina to the Spaniards, Malinche to the Aztecs—is cited as the source for "malinchista . . . one who sells out country or friends, who consorts with foreigners and bestows favors on them at the expense of his countrymen."[5]

Granted that such an opinion can be set forth, it cannot be supported. In two Mexican books which attempt to establish that "the history of Mexico City . . . has much relationship with the names of her streets, some historical and others legendary."[6] Dona Marina fares very well. After noting that her "Mexicanized" name was "Malintzin" which the Spaniards corrupted to "Malinche," the author says that "Dona Marina . . . is quite celebrated in our history, has been the protagonist of popular legends and traditions and her name . . . has been given perpetually to our tall mountains or crystaline pools."[7] This is hardly the heavy breathing indictment of a traitor. (Assuming that the more cautious might consider this last author as something of a gallant, it should be noted that in three tomes no remotely concerned with gallantry, *malinche* is variously defined. In one it is a "mountain more properly called *Martintzi or Matlalcueyalt,* situated in the State of Tlaxacala (Mexico) of 4,107 meters of altitude."[8] In another, *malinche* is defined "in Costa Rio and Nicaragua (as) the common name of a plant that in Mexico is called *tabachin.*"[9] And—to carry a minor matter to its ultimate absurdity—in yet another place malinche is defined as "the unique woman" ("la unica mujer") who "performs reverences and ceremonies . . . in the steps (danzas) . . . traditional

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5 *Ibid.,* p. 44.

6 Luis Gonzalez Obregon, *Las Calles de Mexico: Leyendas y Sucedidos* (Mexico: Ediciones Botas, 1936), pp. 1-2.

7 Luis Gonzalez Obregon, *Las Calles de Mexico: Vidas y Costumbres de Otros Tiempos* (Mexico, Ediciones Botas, 1936), p. 29.

8 Elias Zerdo and others, *Diccionario Enciclopedico de la Lengua Castellana* (Paris: Garnier Hermanos, Libreros-Editores, 1898), Vol. II, p. 247.

9 Francisco J. Santamaria, *Diccionario General de Americanismos* (Mejico, D. F.: Editoral Pedro Robredo, 1942), Vol. II, p. 221.

with ancient Mexican dances."[10] A certain degree of consistency, however is maintained. This last also adds a secondary explanation that *malinche* is "in Central America the name given to tabachin."[11] Mountain, tree, or dance step is malinche—but not traitor.)

If absurdity be carried to a high degree by stretching *malinche* to meaning no reputable authority will support, how much more absurd are some of the things done with Fernando Cortes. Perhaps a watershed of sorts was crossed in a small volume that is little better than a curiosity wherein nineteen pages are devoted to the "Historical Part of Mexico." Being a history written as of 1876 this "historical part" concerns itself only with the migrations of tribes into Mexico from the north. The historical survey ends with a chronology of Aztec kings from 1352 to 1521. Apparently neither the Spaniards nor Cortes ever existed![12]

Cortes did exist. A traveler from the United States toward the end of the nineteenth century noted that "no statue, or enduring effigy of Cortes . . . is said to be . . . in the republic, such has been the intense bitterness of the people toward the conqueror of Mexico."[13] Apparently this bitterness was then abating. At least our traveler learned that in the Paseo de la Reforma then a building in Mexico City, six circular spaces were being created to provide for statues of prominent men. Columbus occupied one niche. "In the second space the foundation" was "laid for a statue of Guatemotzin,[14] the last Aztec Emperor, and in the third" was "proposed to place that of Cortes."[15] Such planning, our traveler noted, furnished proof that Mexico was "becoming civilized" and was no longer capable of enduring Humboldt's reproach "that we nowhere

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[10] Francisco J(avier) Santamaria, *Diccionario de Mejicanismos* (Mejico; Editorial Porra, S. A., 1959), p. 634.

[11] *Ibid.*

[12] Antonio Garcia Cubas, *The Republic of Mexico in* 1876, trans. George F. Henderson (Mexico: "La Ensenanza" Printing Office, 1876).

[13] Federick A. Ober, *Travels in Mexico and Life Among the Mexicans* (Boston: Estes and Lauriot, 1888), p. 350.

[14] One of several spellings beginning variously with C, G, or Q.

[15] Ober, *Travels in Mexico and Life Among the Mexicans,* p. 350.

in the Spanish colonies meet with a national monument erected by the public gratitude to the glory of Christopher Columbus and Hernan Cortes."[16]

Columbus has been redressed in effigy in countless places. His name in lower case even enters everyday usage as the unit of currency in El Salvador and Costa Rica. But Fernando Cortes still waits a suitable memorial.[17] Had our late nineteenth century traveler been able to project himself forward half a century, he doubtless would have reconsidered his stand that Mexico was becoming civilized. (Perhaps it should be hastily noted that *any* opinion concerning the relative degree of civilization is suspect. Like morality, the opinion is rooted in standards not everywhere the same—and not everywhere capable of being the same.)

Near mid-twentieth century apparently well documented sources led to the discovery of the last remains of Fernando Cortes. At the moment of discovery Cortes had been dead four hundred years less a year and a month. The discovery raised prickly questions that, finally had to be answered by the President of Mexico himself. "The remains of Conqueror Cortes, he decided, would be buried again, for the eighth time, in the ancient church where they had been discovered, and the church would be made a national monument."[18]

Before that was done, another voice offered his opinion. "Vincente Lombardo Toledano, head of the General Confederation of Labor (of Mexico) declared . . . that the bones should be 'buried with those of Franco.' "[19] Whether the *caudillo* of Spain was to be immured alive or dead was not noted in the popular press. Clearly expressed was hatred for *caudillos* if not for Spain itself. (Naturally a good labor leader can find no praise for the management of labor by Spain's Franco.)

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16 *Ibid.*

17 John Edwin Fagg, *Latin America: A General History* (New York, 1963), p. 128.

18 "Mexicans Find the Lost Bones of Cortes," *Life,* Dec. 16, 1946, p. 43.

19 *New York Times,* Nov. 29, 1946, p. 17.

By turns this hatred of Spain can be called a national expression. At least no other sensible meaning can be given to this continuing hatred for a man dead four centuries. This was amply demonstrated in 1951 when the latest painting by Diego Rivera incorporating Fernando Cortes showed him "a cross-eyed, hunch-backed, bowlegged cretin."[20] Despite four previous portraits in which Cortes was shown "as a handsome, broad-shouldered hero," the artist defended his changed outlook by saying: "I have been a victim of history."[21] Perhaps. The journalistic notice concluded by observing that the "low-browed Cortes" fitted "current Mexican Nationalistic versions."[22]

Nationalism aside, there are moments when Cortes seems still filled with vibrant, demanding life. In following his trail from Vera Cruz to Mexico City in 1940, a *National Geographic Magazine* author chatted with the municipal president of Ixhaucan. Recounting the arrival of Cortes at the same place over four hundred years earlier the president said that Cortes was uncertain of his reception. To resolve some of the uncertainty, he had "two shots (fired) from one of his bronze cannon. While the echos still crashed . . . , our leaders hastened out to assure the Spaniards they would be well treated."[23] Calling them our leaders gave an immediacy to the telling that belied the age of the four centuries old trail.

As can be readily appreciated, Cortes is dead yet he lives. He was a man yet now his manly shape is twisted beyond recognition. He was (to quote a most curious conclusion) so "active . . . in the encouragement of this practice, . . . *barragana* . . . a kind of recognized concubine . . . he might be termed the grandfather and/or godfather of mestizo Mexico."[24] This conclusion is not only tasteless; it seemingly

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20 "Cross-Eyed Conqueror," *Time*, Nov. 19, 1951, p. 86.

21 *Ibid.*

22 Ibid.

23 Luis Marden, "On the Cortes Trail," *National Geographic Magazine*, LXXVIII (Sept., 1940), p. 344.

24 C. A. Hauberg, "Cortes: Conquistador," *Current History*, XXVI (Mar. 1954), pp. 141-42.

ignores Cortes' other companions who had nothing to do with fathering mestizos. The point, however, is that Cortes in no wise is a father figure to Mexico. He is an alien, a stranger. No wonder that Mexicans and lovers of Mexico pay him such scant heed.

To meet Cortes it is necessary—with one singular exception—to go back in time to the chroniclers of his own day. That exception, William H. Prescott, is a "modernist" who sets at naught all of the lesser men who attempt to tell the story of Fernando Cortes. His great work, *The Conquest of Mexico,* is preface dated October 1, 1843.

In writing of the conquest, Prescott noted that his work was not truly chronological. He said that it had "somewhat the character of a *philosophic* theme, . . . (a) conclusion . . . strictly *biographical,* "both an indifferent" match . . . with the main body, or *historical* portion of the work."[25] His endeavor was to surround the reader "with the spirit of the times. . . to make him . . . a contemporary of the sixteenth century."[26]

What sort of conqueror emerged from the manuscript its author could not read? According to Prescott, Cortes was "the instrument selected by Providence to scatter terror among the barbarian monarchs of the Western World, and lay their empires in the dust."[27] He it was who called upon his men to give up their part of the treasure they gathered to send off to the Spanish crown as "worthy of the monarch for whom it was intended . . . Another example of the extraordinary power obtained by Cortes over these repacious spirits, who, at his call, surrendered up the very treasures which had been the great object of their hazardous enterprise!"[28]

At the end, in summing up, Prescott wrote:

> The History of the Conquest, as I have already had occasion to remark, is necessarily that of Cortes, who is, if I

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25 William H. Prescott, *History of the Conquest of Mexico* (New York, n. d.), p. 7.

26 *Ibid.*

27 *Ibid.,* p. 143.

28 *Ibid.,* p. 196.

> may say so, not merely the soul, but the body, of the enterprise . . . He was a knight-errant, in the literal sense of the word. Of all the band of adventurous cavaliers, whom Spain, in the sixteenth century, sent forth on the career of discovery and conquest, there was none more deeply filled with the spirit of romantic enterprise than Hernando Cortes.[29]

Allowing for one small *caveat*—these cavaliers went forth; they could hardly have been sent—this last is fitting summation as to who was Don Fernando Cortes, Marques del Valle de Oaxaca and Captain General of New Spain and the South Sea. Let us now visit briefly with the men of his own day. This is not to say that they were writers with greater vision or more accurate perception. But they belonged to their time. A part of their wonder and pride, clear and undimmed, comes through the long years from then to now.

Cortes and the Chroniclers of His Own Time

In attempting to describe Cortes as his contemporaries saw him, it will help to remember that one writer of the time was Cortes himself. Whether Don Fernando wrote for the ages—consciously—is hard to say. He wrote to vindicate his actions. When, early in 1519, he sailed west to follow up the explorations of Grijalva in what is today the Yucatan Peninsula of Mexico, Cortes was acting in the name of Diego Velasquez, governor of Cuba. The matter of personality aside, Cortes' first loyalty was to the governor. Yet no sooner was Cortes arrived in the vicinity of what is today the city of Vera Cruz in Mexico than this simple relationship was radically altered.

How simple it all was. The land was good and obviously there was a large quantity of gold.

> For these reasons, it seemed to us that it was not advantageous for Your Majesties' service to do as Diego Velasquez had ordered the said Captain Fernando Cortes to do which was to trade for all the gold we could, and, having obtained it, to return to the island of Fernandina (Cuba), in order that

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[29] *Ibid.*, p. 681.

the said Diego Velasquez, and the said Captain might profit exclusively by it.)[30]

That was the starting point sometime in May or June 1519 wherein a limited exploration for the governor of Cuba was changed to the matchless conquest of a land that in time became New Spain. And who was to be trusted with the change? A man "whom we could all respect, "one" moreover very zealous in the service" of the Spanish crown—in short, Fernando Cortes.[31]

There was, however, nothing spontaneous in this. As one of the participants said, "Cortes agreed . . . although he pretended to need much begging, as the saying goes: 'You are very pressing, and I want to do it.' "[32]

Another account written later but in all probability with Cortes' full knowledge (if not in fact, at his dictation) noted that this change whereby Cortes would be the leader in a new venture was done as being customary in the villages and towns of Castile. The feeling was freely expressed that with Cortes in command, "God and the King would be well served. Cortes' followers seemed satisfied with the knowledge that he would govern them with justice, treat them with humility, and lead them with diligence and boldness."[33]

However we may regard this change in relationship, it was in fact a bold gamble on the part of Cortes, a gamble that paid handsomely. The fact that the very first telling of his changed loyalty (July 10, 1519) was accompanied by all of the treasure that had then been obtained may have had some useful result in the eventual recog-

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30 Francis Augustus Mac Nutt, *Letters of Cortes: The Five Letters of Relation from Fernando Cortes to the Emperor Charles V* (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1908), I, p. 133. Hereafter, Cortes, *Letters.*

31 *Ibid.,* p. 159.

32 Bernal Diaz del Castillo, *The Discovery and Conquest of Mexico* 1517-1521, trans. A. P. Maudslay (New York, 1956), p. 82.

33 Francisco Lopez de Gomara, *Cortes: The Life of the Conqueror by His Secretary,* trans, Lesley Byrd Simpson (Berkeley, 1964), pp. 67-68.

nition of Cortes as the leader in New Spain. As one of his companions, the doughty Bernal Diaz put it (in relation to another matter), "presents of gold" were "that solvent of hardness."[34]

Yet it would be a sad mistake to believe that only gold or other treasure drew Cortes and his little band on. When describing the natives, Cortes also described their customs of human sacrifice as "the most terrible and frightful thing to behold that has ever been seen."[35] The strong belief comes through the centuries

> that it is not without cause that God, Our Lord, has permitted that these parts should be discovered in the name of Your Royal Highnesses (Queen Dona Juana and Emperor Don Carlos V), so that this fruit and merit before God should be enjoyed by Your Majesties, of having instructed these barbarian people, and brought them through your commands to the True Faith.[36]

In point of fact, loyalty to God and to King appeared to be the dominant reality in Cortes' life—those and incessant fighting. In the growing and nearly successful Aztec uprising in June-July 1520 Cortes very nearly lost. "With the help of God, and His Glorious Mother . . . we reached the top."[37] goes one account. Following the retreat from the Aztec capitol—at the cost of "over one hundred and fifty Spaniards . . . killed . . . forty-five mares and horses and more than two thousand of the Indians who had aided the Spaniards"—the dwindling band found safety when "Our Lord was pleased to show us a tower and good lodging place on a hill."[38] The loss of the horses, apropos, is better understood in a later revelation: "After God, our only security was the horses."[39]

God did get suitable mention—and so did Cortes. Near the end

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[34] Diaz, *Discovery and Conquest,* p. 85.

[35] Cortes, *Letters,* I. p. 164.

[36] *Ibid.,* pp. 164-65.

[37] *Ibid.,* p. 292.

[38] *Ibid.,* pp. 298-299.

[39] *Ibid.,* p. 301.

when loss and disaster would have turned aside a lesser man, Cortes wrote:

> I . . . remembered that Fortune is always on the side of the daring, and that we were Christians, confiding in the very great mercy of God, who would never permit us to perish; and I considered them to abandon us . . . Disregarding all difficulty and danger which might offer, I said that I would not abandon this country; for besides its being disgraceful to me and very dangerous to all, we would act treasonably towards Your Majesty (Emperor Don Carlos V).[40]

Bernal Diaz gave credit to God too. Of Cortes he said simply (in connection with the near disastrous flight in June-July 1520), he "showed himself very much of a man, as he always was."[41] Another contemporary chronicler avers that "never had there been a more notable feat of arms in the Indies . . . and all the Spaniards who that day saw Hernan Cortes in action swear that never did man fight as he did . . . and that he alone in his own person saved them all."[42]

Cortes was brave, audacious, even presumptous. What else was he? The records of his own time add conquest on conquest, the enlargement both of New Spain and Cortes' part in the growing empire. Withal, Cortes the person seems lost behind the events.

When the great adventure in Mexico was finished, Cortes wrote his King asking for a place at court.

> I assure Your Sacred Majesty that my service there will not be of less importance, for my advice may help to preserve this land, and advance the conversion of the natives to our Catholic Faith, and increase Your Majesty's revenues in these parts . . . If I have exposed myself to so many fatigues and dangers, and have suffered such hardships, it was to gain the renown of being a servant of Your Majesty . . . and not from covetousness of treasures.[43]

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[40] *Ibid.*, pp. 305-306.

[41] Diaz, *Discovery and Conquest*, p. 307.

[42] Gomara, *Cortes*, p. 4.

[43] Cortes, *Letters*, II, pp. 346-47.

One can only read and marvel. When that wish was expressed (in a letter dated September 3, 1526), Cortes was forty-one years old. Twenty-one years later when his old companion, Death, was near—on a visit that would not be denied—Cortes in his will wrote that he had spent "large sums of money" in the conquest of New Spain and in explorations to the Molucca Island and to Honduras. He directed "that this account be made and presented to His Majesty, since he was pleased to order payment to me."[44]

It can be fairly assumed that Fernando Cortes wanted both place and possessions. At the end, when he was dead, the chroniclers of his own times wrote about the great days then gone. Bernal Diaz said that "an eloquence and rhetoric far beyond my powers" would be needed to tell the tale of "the Conquest of New Spain . . . in the company of that valiant and doughty Captain, Don Hernando Cortes."[45] Francisco Lopez de Gomara (in dedicating his work to Cortes' son) wrote: "Long live, then, the name and memory of him who conquered so vast a land, converted such a multitude of men, cast down so many idols, and put an end to so much sacrifice and the eating of human flesh!"[46]

Perhaps another way of putting it would be to note that Fernando Cortes was a man of action. He was not given to introspection. Such men do not make good models for grave eyed statues in heroic poses. In Mexico today there is no monument to Cortes; at least no monument that dullards can read about in lack luster guide books. But Cortes does have a monument. It is found in the harsh lights and shadows hard by Popocatepetl's snow-capped awe where Cortes and his band breasted the last pass on their way to the central valley of Mexico.

If you go that way, stop awhile and look and listen. Cortes' monument is a shadow in the high pass; a shout in the wind; the faint cry echoing down the long years, "Santiago y a ellos!"

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[44] *Ibid.*, I, pp. 90-91.

[45] Diaz, *Discovery and Conquest*, p. xxxiii.

[46] Gomara, *Cortes*, p. 4.

SANTIAGO VIDAURRI, CHAMPION OF STATES' RIGHTS: 1855-1857

By Edward H. Moseley*

Possibly the most irrational concepts involved in United States politics are those relative to states within our federal system. Champions of states' rights identify their cause with individual rights and basic freedoms, and associate the central government with tyranny which usurps every liberty of the common man. A parallel situation can be found in Latin American politics where in the nineteenth century liberal factions advocated federalism as a part of their attempt to overthrow various centralized dictatorships. Latin American historians have often constructed an oversimplified equation in which they identify liberalism with federalism and conservatism with centralism. This thesis is far too simple to be accurate. In Latin American politics, as in our own, parties or factions which find themselves in the minority or out of power, find a convenient tool in the doctrine of states' rights.

Another very important ingredient further complicates the study of states' rights. This is the role of the *caudillo* or ambitious politician. It is this aspect of states' rights which is the topic of this study. It seems fitting for an Alabamian to discuss before an Atlanta audience the topic of states' rights and *caudillismo*. It is politic for him to draw his theme from the history of Mexico rather than from more obvious examples.

The career of Santiago Vidaurri in the history of Mexico is overshadowed by the charge of treason. During the French intervention he broke with the government of Benito Juarez, and later joined the Empire of Maximilian.[1] The *caudillo* was branded as a traitor, captured

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[1] The conditions which led to this break are themselves involved in the question of states' rights within the liberal government of Benito Juárez. Basic events can be found in Santiago Roel (ed.) *Correspondencia Particular de D. Santiago Vidaurri,* Tomo Primero: Juárez-Vidaurri, (Monterey, 1946).

after the fall of Mexico City and executed by order of General Porfirio Diaz. Influenced by these events, most Mexican historians dismiss Vidaurri as a strong man, interested only in personal power. Whereas there is validity in this opinion it has tended to obscure the career of one of the nation's most powerful regional leaders. An examination of the early career of Santiago Vidaurri provides an interesting case study in the use of the doctrine of state sovereignty by an astute politician.

The Plan of Ayutla of March 1, 1854, was primarily a negative pronouncement against the dictatorship of Antonio Lopez de Santa Anna.[2] A year later (May 11, 1855) Santiago Vidaurri denounced the dictator, and issued his own Plan of Monterrey.[3] In less than two weeks he was in control of most of the state of Nuevo Leon.[4] One of the first things the new *caudillo* did upon coming to power was to appeal to the pride of the people of the state. He assured them that they were not like the "miserable Indians" of the interior states of Mexico, and promised that he would return the rightful sovereignty to their hands.[5] At the same time, he accused Santa Anna of acting against the national interest in selling part of the nation's territory to the United States. In return the dictator hurled charges at Vidaurri, asserting that he was trying to establish a separate nation, "The Republic of Sierra Madre." The *caudillo* naturally rejected these as false charges which were intended to cover up Santa Anna's own crimes.[6]

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[2] Mario de la Cueva (ed.) *Plan de Ayulta, Conmemoracion de su primer Centenario,* Prólogo, (Mexico: Ediciones de la Facultad de Derecho, 1954).; Richard A. Johnson, *The Mexican Revolution of Ayulta,* 1854-1855: *An Analysis of the Evolution and Destruction of Santa Anna's Last Dictatorship,* (Rock Island, Illinois: Augustana College Library, 1939)., p. 38.

[3] *Periódico Oficial del Gobierno del Departamento de Nuevo León,* May 17, 1855. The revolt actually began in the little village of Lampazos with the assistance of Colonel Juan Zuazúa.

[4] *El Restaurador de la Libertad,* June 4, 1855. (This is a semi-official newspaper of the Vidaurri regime, bearing the title of the movement which the *caudillo* had launched in Lampazos and is hereinafter cited as *El Restaurador*).

[5] *El Restaurador,* May 28, June 4, 1855.

[6] *El Restaurador,* June 23, 1855.

The movement which triumphed in Nuevo Leon gained support throughout the northeast. A force of over one thousand men was raised and equipped, being christened the "Ejercito del Norte."[7] Vidaurri then made plans to extend his movement, inviting the people of Tamaulipas to join the revolt against centralized distatorship. Though he made it clear that he was the commander of the military effort, the strong man promised the citizens of Tamaulipas that he would promote their right to organize a civil government for a sovereign and independent state. During July 1856 several municipalities in western Tamaulipas announced their acceptance of the Plan of Monterey. Success seemed assured, and plans were formulated to march against the federal garrison which occupied the important Gulf port of Matamoros.[8]

Events in the west, however, forced the abandonment of plans to sieze the port city. A federal army in Saltillo threatened to assault Monterey, and citizens of that city were filled with panic.[9] Governor Vidaurri made a forced march with the Army of the North, announcing to the people of Nuevo Leon that they could rest assured that he would protect them from the forces which threatened the state.[10] As the army arrived in Monterey the federal force which had reached outskirts of the city went scurrying back up the road to Saltillo.[11]

Saltillo had a reputation for conservatism, and the presence of pro-Santa Anna elements there posed a serious threat to the revolutionary government which had come to power in Nuevo Leon. Leaving Juan Jose de la Garza to guard the Tamaulipas flank, General Vidaurri began operations against the capital of Coahuila. Although it was a strong position, the defenders became demoralized upon hearing of the

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7 *El Restaurador,* July 14, 1855.

8 Statement of Vidaurri (Issued in Mier, Tamaulipas July 8, 1855), *El Restaurador,* July 14, 1855.; Juan José de la Garza, an important political figure in Tamaulipas, accepted the plan and became the second in command of the "Ejercito del Norte," and director of the forces of Tamaulipas.

9 *Boletín* (of the government of Nuevo León), July 29, 1855.; *El Restaurador,* June 30, 1855; July 14, 1855.

10 Vidaurri to Secretario de Gobierno, July 13, 1855, *Boletín,* July 14, 1855. ". . . primero es salvar á Nuevo León que ha puesto en mis manos su suerte."

11 *Boletín Extraordinario,* July 17, 1855.

approach of the Army of the North.[12] On July 23, 1855, after only one day of seige, the city surrendered, and the Ayuntamiento voted to give Vidaurri both political and military command of the state of Coahuila until a governor could be elected.[13] Other municipalities followed the example of the capital city, and by early August the *caudillo* from Nuevo Leon had almost complete control in Coahuila.[14] He returned to Monterey with the laurels of victory. Citizens filled his pathway with flowers, shouted and shot fireworks, rifles and cannon.[15]

At the same time Vidaurri was winning control of Coahuila, other enemies of Santa Anna were having success in the central region of the nation. The dictator fled into exile August 13, 1855.[16] The actions of Vidaurri had helped to bring about this collapse of the central government, and the revolutionary leaders of the interior were aware of the political and military strength which the *caudillo* enjoyed in the northeast.[17] He had never accepted the Plan of Ayutla, but had insisted that his was an independent movement for the restoration of liberties of the people and sovereignty of the states. Vidaurri asserted that each of the departments which had revolted against Santa Anna had resumed its interior sovereignty as a free and independent state.

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12 Bucheli to Esparza, July 20, 1885, *El Restaurador,* August 18, 1855. (This letter was captured after the fall of Saltillo, and illustrates the fear which spread throughout the city concerning the army from Monterrey.

13 Vidaurri to Secretario del Gobierno de Nuevo León, July 23, 1855, *Boletin* July 24, 1855.; "Acta del pronunciamiento de la Ciudad del Saltillo," July 26, 1855, *El Restaurador,* August 4, 1855.

14 *Boletín,* August 7, 1855.

15 "Entrada Triunfante del Exmo. Sr. Gobernador del Estado y las Tropas de su Mando á Esta Capital," *El Restaurador,* August 11, 1855.

16 Johnson, *The Mexican Revolution of Ayutla,* 61-62; Tomás Sanchez Hernandez, "Las operaciones Militares como consecuencia de la proclamacion del Plan de Ayutla Hasta el Triunfo de la Revolucion Liberal," *Plan de Ayutla* (Mario de la Cueva director), pp. 163-164.

17 Eulalio Degollado to Manuel Doblado, August 25, 1855, *Documentos Inéditos o muy raros para la historia de México publicados por Genaro Garcia y Carlos Pereyra,* Tomo XXVI, "La Revolucion de Ayutla segun el archivo del General Doblado," (Mexico, 1909).

As such they had the right to conduct their own affairs and to control their own militia until a new federal constitution could be drawn up by a convention of these free states.[18]

Opinions throughout Mexico varied concerning the northern strong man. The conservative press quite naturally denounced him as a threat to ". . . property and to the virtue of the wives and daughters of Mexico," and "to the sacred religion . . ."[19] Some liberals too expressed concern over the possibility that Vidaurri might have connections with the "yankees."[20] As early as May, 1855, however, various *puros* or ultra-liberals came to consider Vidaurri to be a member of their ranks. They realized that the *caudillo* from the north would be an important figure in the movements to restore a national government following the overthrow of the dictator.[21]

The Revolution of Ayutla was followed by a period of political turmoil. The old revolutionary leader Juan Alvarez filled the office of provisional president for a short time, but then turned it over to Ignacio Comonfort. Considered to be a *moderado,* the new official attempted to bring various hostile factions into a temporary government while a new constitution was being written. He accepted some of the old supporters of the dictator back into the national family. Many *puros* denounced this as being contrary to the aims of the revolt which had succeeded. In May of 1856 Benito Juarez denounced Comonfort for actions contrary to the aims of the Revolution.[22] The provisional president, however, stressed the need for a workable government which

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18 *El Restaurador,* June 11, 1855; June 30, 1855.

19 *El Universal,* July 26, 1855.

20 M. Siliceo to Doblado, September 3, 1855, *Documentos Inéditos,* XXVI, ". . . me temo que ese Vidaurri sea la avanzada yankee . . ."; W.E.M. Radley to Vidaurri, July 31, 1855, *Correspondencia Particular de Santiago Vidaurri* (Located in the state archives of Nuevo León in Monterrey. Hereinafter cited as *Corr. Par.*)

21 Guillermo Prieto to Manuel Doblado (n.d.), *Documentos Inéditos,* XXVI. "Pero puedo asegurar á V. que en el partido exaltado tiene un lugar eminente las doctrinas de Vidaurri."

22 Francisco Zarco, *Historia del Congreso Estraordinario Constituyente de* 1856 *y* 1857, *Estracto de todas sus sesiones y documentos parlamentarios de la epoca,* (2 volumes), Mexico, Imprenta de Ignacio Cumplido, 1857, 1861), I, pp. 79-81.; Antonio Aguado to Manuel Doblado, May 21, 1856, *Documentos Inéditos,* XXVI.

would extend its administrative powers throughout the national territory in order to bring an end to chaotic conditions.[23]

Santiago Vidaurri became one of the most severe critics of Ignacio Comonfort.[24] Early in 1856 he came forth in righteous indignation to denounce the provisional president for subverting the purposes of the revolution, and for allowing the supporters of the dictatorship to reenter the national fold. Among the most serious of crimes laid at the feet of the chief executive, however, was that he was attempting to usurp the rights of the sovereign states.[25] This gained the *caudillo* a new position of popularity with the *puros,* and they even mentioned his name as a possible candidate for the presidency.[26] Vidaurri, however, was primarily concerned with affairs in his own domain. In fact, to understand the real motives for his opposition to the provisional government it is necessary to consider conditions on the northern frontier.

As has been stated, the Governor considered the movement which he led to be independent of that in Central Mexico. He informed President Comonfort that he was willing to recognize the provisional government in Mexico City, but made it quite clear that he considered himself to be the rightful political and military leader on the northeastern frontier.[27] His plans for the frontier included the unification

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23 J. M. Lafragua (Comonfort's Minister of Gobernación) to Manuel Doblado, December 15, 1855, *Documentos Inéditos, XXVI.* ". . . que no puede haber unidad nacional si no hay un gobierno que organice los ramos todos de la administración publica."

24 Vidaurri to Ignacio Comonfort, September 28, 1855, *Bolétin,* September 29, 1855. This letter, coming prior to Comonfort's taking charge of the provisional government, involved the problem of granting a truce to certain military leaders who had supported Santa Anna.

25 Vidaurri to Juan Alvarez, April 27, 1856, *Corr. Par.* (There are many other letters in the *caudillo's* private correspondence relating to this matter.)

26 Antonio Aguado to Manuel Doblado, May 21, 1856, *Documentos Inéditos.* XXVI.; Gabino Montemayor to Vidaurri, March 28, 1856, *Corr. Par.*

27 Vidaurri to Comonfort, September 28, 1855, *Boletín,* September 29, 1855 ". . . estoy dispuesto á sostener al nuevo Gobierno si no se falsea el plan de Ayutla . . . ;" "Verdadero Objeto, Caracter y Tendencias del Plan Politico de Nuevo León," *El Restaurador,* August 11, 1855.

of the states of Nuevo Leon and Coahuila under a single administration, with himself as chief executive.[28] It was this desire to incorporate Coahuila into a permanent union with Nuevo Leon which led to a direct conflict with the provisional president.

Governor Vidaurri preferred to have the movement for union with Nuevo Leon to originate in Coahuila, and privately took steps to assure such a movement. Francisco Vidaurri, a resident of Muzquiz, Coahuila and a brother of the *caudillo,* proved to be a great assistance, as did other relatives and friends in that area of northern Coahuila.[29] In Monclova and surrounding villages there was rather widespread approval of the idea, especially after Vidaurri promised to send expeditions to crush hostile Indian bands.[30] The newspapers in Monterey published accounts of the growing demands throughout Coahuila for a permanent union with Nuevo Leon.[31] Opponents of the scheme, centered primarily in Saltillo, were identified with Santa Anna, and branded as enemies of liberty.[32] Expressing confidence that all of the good and honest people of Coahuila desired union, Vidaurri issued a decree on February 19, 1856, which accomplished just that. He proclaimed that henceforth the region would be a single political unit, the State of Nuevo Leon y Coahuila.[33]

President Comonfort considered Vidaurri's action to be a threat

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28 Vidaurri to Francisco Vidaurri y Borrego and D. Santiago del Valle, September 28, 1855, *Corr. Par.*

29 Francisco Vidaurri to Vidaurri, September 22, 1855, *Corr. Par.;* Marcial Vidaurri to Vidaurri, December 19, 1855, *Corr. Par.* (Marcial Vidaurri is a nephew of Santiago Vidaurri.)

30 Juan Long to Vidaurri, January 16, 1856, *Corr. Par.* (Long was also related to Vidaurri by marriage.)

31 *Boletín,* October 1, 1855.

32 Marcial Vidaurri to Vidaurri, December 19, 1855, *Corr. Par.* (There was some validity to the charge it was primarily a power struggle for the seat of government.)

33 "Proclama del Gobernador del Estado de Nuevo León y Coahuila, Santiago Vidaurri," *Colección de Documentos para la Historia de México, VII* (de la Segunda Serie.).

to the authority of the provisional government.[34] He rejected the decree of unification, but attempted to maintain peaceful relations with the *caudillo*. The President pointed out that the Plan of Ayutla recognized Coahuila as a separate state, and affirmed that neither Vidaurri nor the federal government could violate its sovereignty. He appealed to the Governor to withdraw the decree.[35]

Vidaurri, the champion of states' rights, did not intend to have his own doctrine used against his scheme. He stated that his decree had merely been in answer to the demands of the people of Coahuila. The central question was not that of the size of a state or the seat of its government, but the will of the people.[36] The Governor indicated that the central authorities, in opposing his decree, stood as enemies of liberty and the sacred right of the people of a state to choose their own government.[37]

By early May, 1856 the situation on the northern frontier was tense. Political leaders in Saltillo who opposed unification took steps to prevent its completion. Governor Vidaurri's relatives in Coahuila warned that hostilities with President Comonfort might bring defeat for the *caudillo* in their state, and possibly in Nuevo Leon.[38] The governor was aware of the dangers involved, and sent a delegation to Mexico City to work out a peaceful settlement with the national authorities.[39] The attempt at compromise, however, was unsuccessful, and

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[34] Joaquin López Hermosa to Doblado, December 8, 1855, *Documentos Inéditos*, XXXI. (This document indicates that were still fears that Vidaurri might establish the "Republic of Sierra Madre.")

[35] D. Anselmo de la Portilla, *Méjico en* 1856 *y* 1857, *Gobierno del General Comonfort* (New York: S. Hallet, 1858), 49.

[36] Vidaurri to Juan Álvarez, April 27, 1856, *Corr. Par.*

[37] Vidaurri to Juan José de la Garza, May 28, 1856, *Corr. Par.*

[38] Francisco Vidaurri to Vidaurri, May 1, 1856, *Corr. Par.* ". . . yo te suplico á pesar del gran interes qe. tengo en la agregacion á Monterrey qe. no Comprometas tu persona, ni tu reputacion pr. el negocido de anexacion, Sino qe. no mas empleas su influyo pa. con tus amigos y qe. conserves siempre la buenos relaciones de amistad qe. llevas con el Presidente de la Republica."; Marcial Vidaurri to Vidaurri, May 2, 1856, *Corr. Par.*

[39] Vidaurri to Encarnación Álvarez, May 28, 1856, *Corr. Par.*

by June open conflict seemed imminent. Vidaurri had no intention of surrendering to the demands of Mexico City, but set about to prepare for an attack. Additional military units were formed and equipped, especially among the loyal towns of northern Coahuila.[40] At the same time the governor increased his political attacks on the central government, denouncing the federal taxes as a return to the policies of Santa Anna, and a violation of the rights of sovereign states.[41]

In June J. M. Lafragua, federal minister of war, declared that Governor Vidaurri was in direct opposition to the policies and actions of the nation.[42] He ordered that all arms and ammunitions be prevented from entering the states of Nuevo Leon and Coahuila. This order brought an open break, for Vidaurri demanded the removal of Comonfort from his position as provisional president. The Governor charged that national officials were attempting to force the people of Nuevo Leon and Coahuila to serve as slaves in return for aid against hostile Indians.[43] In response to these charges, Comonfort declared Vidaurri to be in rebellion, and ordered him to resign from his position as governor of both Nuevo Leon and Coahuila.[44] As might be expected, Vidaurri refused, and expressed confidence that the armies of the frontier were fully capable of resisting federal aggression. He was determined to protect the liberties of the people and the rights of the sovereign states.[45]

In October, General Rosas Landa marched with a federal army from San Luis Potosi to Saltillo.[46] At the same time, Juan Jose de la Garza of Tamaulipas announced that he would support President Com-

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40 Juan Long to Vidaurri, July 21, 1856, *Corr. Par.*

41 Statement of Vidaurri, quoted in Necito de Zamacois, *La historia de Méjico,* XIV, p. 263.

42 Lafragua to Vidaurri, July 5, 1856, *Documentos que manifiestan los principales sucesos que precedieron el desconocimiento que el Sr. General D. Santiago Vidaurri hizo, de la autoridad del Gobierno de la Republica,* 1856.

43 "Proclama del Governador del Estado de Nuevo León y Coahuila, Santiago Vidaurri — Monterey Julio 12 de 1856," *Colección de Documentos para la Historia de México,* VII (de la Segunda Serie).

44 Zamacois, *La Historia de Méjico,* XIV, p. 342.

45 Vidaurri to Juan Álvarez, July 3, 1856, and August 17, 1856, *Corr. Par.*

46 Vidaurri to José S. Aramberri, September 27, 1856, *Corr. Par.;* Aramberri to Garza Gonzales and García Rejón, October 26, 1856, *Corr. Par.*

onfort in his confrontation with Vidaurri.[47] This placed hostile elements on two of the flanks of Nuevo Leon and Coahuila. The Army of the North, commanded by Colonel Juan Zuazua, moved to block the advance of Rosas Landa. At the same time a force from Tamaulipas struck against Monterey, defeating a small outpost under the command of a young officer named Mariano Escobedo. De la Garza placed Monterey under siege, demanding its surrender by authority of the national government. Colonel Zuazua, however, marched back to the city and expelled the attacking force.[48] Fortunately for Vidaurri, the forces of Rosas Landa had not coordinated their attack with those from Tamaulipas.

Monterey was still threatened by the federal army, moving down from Saltillo. Rather than await attack in his own capital, Vidaurri dispatched the Army of the North to intercept the enemy. Colonel Zuazua encountered the federal army about mid-way between Monterey and Saltillo, at a place called *la Cuesta de los Muertos*. A showdown seemed imminent, but on November 18, 1856, Governor Vidaurri signed a truce with the federal commander. The *caudillo* agreed to recognize the authority of President Comonfort, and to turn over the administration of Nuevo Leon and Coahuila to a council of state until an open election for governor could be held. He also agreed to submit the question of annexation to a popular vote in Coahuila. In return, Rosas Landa promised that the national government would grant a sum of eight thousand pesos each month to the region for the renewal of campaigns against the hostile Indians. The people of Monterey received news of the peace with open rejoicing. In Mexico City Comonfort gave his approval gladly, and the threat of war between the *moderado* president and the northern caudillo seemed to have been averted.[49] On the surface it seemed that Vidaurri was surrendering to the demands of the central authority in exchange for federal aid. Other factors, how-

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[47] Hermenegildo Dávila, *Biografia del Sr. General Don Juan Zuazúa* (Monterrey, 1892), 41.

[48] *Ibid.*, pp. 41-43.

[49] *Ibid.*, p. 43.

ever, explain why the strong man was so willing to accept this compromise settlement.

Before open hostility between Comonfort and Vidaurri had raged on the northern frontier delegates from all of the states of Mexico gathered to frame a new national constitution. *Puros* tended to dominate the convention, and viewed the Comonfort government with suspicion. They were also advocates of a relatively weak central government, with virtually independent states.[50] Vidaurri enjoyed a high prestige among many of these delegates, and continually worked to convince them that the question of Coahuila reflected the larger issue of liberalism and rights of the individual states.[51] Needless to say, these arguments also had an appeal to the many local and regional *caudillos* throughout the nation who wished to preserve their positions.[52]

During the fall of 1856 the constituent congress continued its debates. Many delegates tended to favor the position of Vidaurri, and to be quite critical of President Comonfort. On September 15, 1856, the assembly voted sixty to twenty-four in favor of joining Coahuila with Nuevo Leon.[53] This action by the assembly in Queretaro helps to explain the willingness of Vidaurri to sign the truce with General Rosas Landa two months later. Then, in January of 1857 the people of Coahuila voted overwhelmingly in favor of joining with Nuevo Leon.[54] When the new national constitution was promulgated February 5, 1857, one of the states listed by that fundamental law was that of Nuevo Leon y Coahuila.[55]

The combined state was firmly under the control of Santiago Vidaurri.[56] In the name of liberalism and states' rights he had defied the national government and had emerged triumphant. For the next eight years he was to remain the most powerful individual on the northern frontier, and an untiring advocate of state sovereignty.

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50 Daniel Moreno, *Los Hombres de la Reforma* (Mexico, D. F., Ediciones Libro-Mex., 1956), 49-53, 61.; Frank A. Knapp, Jr., "Parliamentary Government and the Mexican Constitution of 1857: A Forgotten Phase of Mexican Political History," *Hispanic American Historical Review,* Vol 33 (February, 1953), 65-80.; Walter V. Scholes, "El Liberalismo Reformista," *Historia Mexicana,* II (Julio, 1952 - Junio, 1953), 342-352.; Zarco, *Historia del Congreso Estraordinario,* I, 31.

51 Vidaurri to Juan Álvarez, July 3, 1856, *Corr. Par.;* Zarco, *Historia del Congreso Estraordinario,* 273-278, 344-345, 353-354, 508.

52 Antonio Aguado to Manuel Doblado, May 21, 1856, *Documentos Inéditos,* XXXI.

53 Zarco, *Historia del Congreso Estraordinario,* II, pp. 310-311.

54 *El Restaurador de la Libertad,* January 23, 1857. (The vote was 4056 for annexation and only 260 against.)

55 Zarco, *Historia del Congreso Estraordinario,* II, p. 910, p. 1001.

56 *El Restaurador,* March 13, 1857. (His popularity was demonstrated December 27, 1856, when he was voted back into office by a substantial majority. Future elections were to sustain his power.)

COMONFORT: MISUNDERSTOOD REFORMER

By Ray F. Broussard*

Ignacio Comonfort, President of Mexico during the early years of the Mexican Reform, first achieved national prominence as one of the leaders of the Revolution of Ayutla, which overthrew Antonio Lopez de Santa Anna and exiled him from Mexico for the last time. Although second in command under General Juan Alvarez, the old hero of the War of Independence, Comonfort was really guiding force behind the military strategy and was generally accepted as the author of the *Plan de Ayutla.*[1]

While relatively unknown to the general public before this time, Comonfort had developed a reputation in government circles for personal integrity and for able progressive administration. He was associated with the moderate wing of the Liberal Party, which had administered the country in the interval between the end of the Mexican War and the dictatorship of Santa Anna.[2]

Of particular importance to Comonfort's and Mexico's political future was his almost uncanny ability as a mediator and concilator. If there is any central factor in his character, it is this optimistic faith that he could settle almost any conflict which might arise. He believed that in the final analysis all men had his own unswerving partiotism and would be willing to compromise for the good of the country.

The question was whether a sufficient number of men of good will would be prepared to sacrifice their vested interests, particularly

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[1] Felipe Tena Ramirez, "Comonfort, los moderados y la Revolución de Ayutla," in Mario de la Cueva *et. al., Plan de Ayutla* (Mexico City: Facultad de Derecho, Universidad Nacional Autonomo Mexicano, 1954), pp. 298-299.

[2] Ray F. Broussard, "Mocedades de Comonfort," in *Historia Mexicana,* XIII, pp. 386-390.

since it was not at all clear in anyone's mind exactly what was good for the country. Was the *status quo* of the conservatives, or the completely new order demanded by the doctrinaire liberals better? Comonfort could get along with either, but really wished for a little of both. Progress yes, but slow evolutionary progress as typified by the slogan of the *moderados, "libertad y orden."*[3]

Comonfort's political manifesto written after he had left the presidency catches his spirit of moderation. Writing of public opinion at the end of the Revolution of Ayutla, he stated, "The country wished for order, but not despotism; liberty, not license; reform, but not destruction; progress but not violence . . ."[4]

It must not be assumed, however, that Comonfort had no firm political opinions of his own and was willing to adopt whatever stand he believed the majority desired. There is inserted in the preamble of the *Plan de Ayutla* the statement that "Liberal institutions were the only ones which were suitable to the nation."[5] Such an indefinite statement could easily be misinterpreted, but it is evident from his subsequent actions while president that Comonfort intended to put into effect traditional liberal reforms such as guarantees of personal liberty, economic freedom for individuals, and limitation of the size of the army as well as the power of the clergy.[6]

Once the revolution had triumphed and the dictatorship was overthrown there was a rush to fill the political vacuum. Conservatives were confident that they would be able to dominate any situation and were eager to preserve the *status quo,* while on the other hand exiles such as Melchor Ocampo, Ponciano Arriaga and Benito Juarez hurried home to guide the course of the revolution and to insure that it would

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[3] Ignacio Comonfort, *Política del General Comonfort* in Anselmo de Portilla, *Méjico en* 1856 *y* 1857 (New York: Hallet & Co., 1858), p. 373; Cueva (ed.) *Plan de Ayutla,* pp. 290-291.

[4] Comonfort, *Política del General Comonfort,* pp. 373-375.

[5] *Plan de Ayutla* in Francisco Zarco, *Historia del Congreso Constituyente,* 1856-1857 (Mexico City: Colegio de Mexico, 1956), pp. 7-12.

[6] Vicente Riva Palacio (ed) *México, a través de los siglos,* V. pp. 78-79.

become a genuine liberal movement.[7] If Comonfort's philosophy of government were to work he would have to steer a middle course between these two extremes. That his intentions were sincere is evident, but that his political skill was not up to the task is also lamentably apparent. Yet one cannot wonder if under the same circumstances whether any other leader could have succeeded where Comonfort failed.

Limitation of time and space will make it necessary to confine this paper to one or two examples of Comonfort's policy which serve to illustrate the manner in which his moderate method of rule succeeded or failed under differing sets of circumstances. The first example concerns the position of the military in the new Post-Ayutla revolutionary society. To the conservative, the army with all of its traditional privileges was the very foundation upon which an orderly society could be built. Any attack against the military or its privileges was an attack against the very fibre of society.

On the other hand, the liberals believed that the military establishment was exactly what was wrong with the old order, therefore it had to be eliminated before any other basic reforms could take place. The security of the nation could then be protected by citizen-soldier National Guard units which would be under the control of the state governors.

Comonfort's position was somewhere between the two ideas here presented. He was a reserve officer, a member of the military establishment and believed that some type of force was necessary to preserve order. On the other hand, as a moderate liberal, he was just as firmly convinced that the old regime of special privilege had to go. As he put it, he wished to preserve what was good in the old order by reforming it. When he arrived in Mexico City in October of 1855 and took command of the army he addressed its members in the following manner,

> I have come . . . to begin the difficult task of reforming the abuses which resulted from the indiscreet attempts to glori-

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[7] Jorge Tamayo (ed.) *Benito Juárez: Documentos, discursos y correspondencia* (2 vols., Mexico City: Secretaria de Patromino Nacional) I, pp. 183-185.

> fy the army and which have stained your good name and dishonored the institution. The soldiers of a republic are not, nor could not, be the praetorian guards of a despot. Citizens: like other sons of the Mexican family, you have rights to exercise, and duties to perform and you can neither give up the one nor forget the other.[8]

The clash came early during the Administration of President Alvarez. The *puros* or extreme liberals, led by Melchor Ocampo dominated the cabinet of the revolutionary administration, except for Comonfort who served as Minister of War.[9] Ocampo and the liberals immediately drew up plans to dismantle the army.

Comonfort, who had in effect commenced a moderate program of reform by drastically reducing the size of the army by ordering the organization of locally controlled National Guard units was alarmed.[10] To eliminate the standing army at one stroke, was too much for him. He objected vigorously and precipitated a cabinet crisis. The argument was over methods, not objectives. Both sides wished to reform the army, but Comonfort wished a gradual reform while the *puros* felt that it should be done all at once if it would ever be accomplished. But Comonfort had the power, and by the time the affair was settled, Ocampo had resigned and Comonfort had his way, the army was to be subject to gradual reforms but was not to be dismantled.[11]

Comonfort's defense of the military against the attacks of the *puros* brought him to the attention of the conservatives. They had at first believed him to be a liberal, particuarly after his initial reforms,

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[8] Riva Palacio (ed.) *México a través de los siglos,* V. pp. 79.

[9] Clyde Bushnell, "The Military and Political Career of Juan Álvarez, 1790-1867," (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Texas, Austin, Texas, 1958), p. 295.

[10] Manuel Dublán and Jose Maria Lozano, *Legislación mexicano o coleción completa de las disposiciones expedias desde la independencia de la república.* (México: Imprenta del Comercio de Dublán y Chavez, 1877), VII, pp. 568-573, 585, 586.

[11] Bushnell, "Juan Álvarez," 297; Melchor Ocampo, *Obras Completas* (3 vols., Mexico: F. Velásquez, 1900-1901), II, p. 102; Melchor Ocampo to Valentín Gómez Farías, November 3, 1855, Gómez Farías Papers, folder 58 Latin American Collection, University of Texas Library, Austin, Texas.

but when he came out publicly in defense of the army he become their knight in shining armor. He would save them by tilting with the potential despoilers of their wealth and prestige. They so misread the actions of Comonfort that they even began to demand that the Minister of War overthrow Provisional President Alvarez and establish a conservative dictatorship.[12]

Meanwhile, Minister of Justice Benito Juarez issued his famous *Ley Juarez,* an edict which would eliminate the *fueros* or special privileges of the clergy and the military.[13] The conservatives, looking to Comonfort for support, attacked the measure and renewed their demands that he overthrow the presidency. They were to be disappointed, however, for Comonfort refused to follow their advice.[14]

Their expectations rose, nevertheless, when Alvarez retired and named Comonfort to replace him as Substitute President on December 11, 1855.[15] Once again, the conservatives were not to realize their dreams, however, for one of the first acts of the new President was to issue the edict which put the Ley Juarez into effect.[16]

Disconcerted and chagrined, the conservatives belatedly realized that they had misunderstood Comonfort's defense of the army against the attacks of the *puros.* His promulgation of the *Ley Juarez* proved he was a liberal who favored reform and for this the conservatives never forgave him. While they had clamored for him to replace Alvarez the previous November, they now began to plot to overthrow his government by force and continued as his inflexible enemies until he was finally toppled from power.

Another cardinal principle of the doctrinaire liberals was their anticlericalism. In their estimation, the backwardness of Mexico was

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12 *La Sociedad,* December 1, 2, 3, 1855.

13 *Ley Juárez,* in Tamayo (ed.) *Juárez, documentos,* II, pp. 98-115.

14 L. Ghilardi to Ignacio Comonfort, Mexico, November 11, 1855, Comonfort Papers, folder 23B. University of Texas Library, Austin, Texas.

15 Lucas de Palacio y Margola to Ignacio Comonfort, Mexico, December 10, 1855; Juan Alvarez to Lucas de Palacio y Magarola, Mexico, December 8, 1855, both letters located in Comonfort Papers, folder 17.

16 Dublán and Lozano, *Legislación mexicana,* VIII, p. 10.

caused by the dominance of the Catholic Church over politics, economics, and society in general. For progress to take place, they reasoned, the political and economic power of the Church had to be broken.

On the other hand, Comonfort was no anticlerical. While professing to be a liberal, he had a genuine trust and admiration for the position of the Church and enjoyed the personal friendship of many high ranking clergymen. He could understand better than most liberals the important part the Church had played in the past. Yet, he was also of the opinion that certain reforms were necessary.[17]

Once again, his ideas are best expressed in his own words.

> That the influence of the clergy in politics was a necessity in other times, and a good thing for society; that the history of the Catholic clergy is the history of civilization and that Mexico owes a tremendous debt of gratitude to the Mexican clergy are facts which history cannot deny . . . But that times have changed, and with them the nature of this influence, and that equal changes have taken place in public opinion on this question is also a fact which cannot be hidden from anyone who studies the development of ideas in our country or the character of Mexican revolutions. The influence of the clergy is [now] considered pernicious both for religion and for society; and their riches and privileges are the occasion of great alarm, of formidable temptations and even the reason for deep hatreds.[18]

Gradually, in spite of his reluctance to offend the Church, the President was forced by circumstances to take a harsher stand against it. Each act of his was met by greater defiance on the part of the clergy until he was virtually forced into anticlericalism. The process began with the promulgation of the *Ley Juarez* early in 1856. This led to a large-scale rebellion in Puebla. In the process of putting down this counter-revolution, Comonfort discovered that members of the clergy

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[17] Tamayo (ed.) *Juárez, documentos,* I, pp. 205-206, II, p. 143; Riva Palacio (ed.) *México a través de los siglos,* V. p. 108.

[18] Comonfort, *Política del General Comonfort,* pp. 376-377.

in Puebla had contributed Church funds to it.[19] As punishment, the President levied an indemnity against the income-producing properties of the diocese of Puebla.[20] When Bishop Pelagio Antonio de Labastida y Davalos objected and when his objections continued the President ordered him exiled from the country.[21] Yet, while he was engaged in this controversy there was still warm and friendly relations between President Comonfort and Archbishop Lazaro de la Garza of Mexico City. This apparently close friendship between the President and the Archbishop disturbed the extreme liberals who could not understand how a man could be anticlerical with the Bishop of Puebla and proclerical with the Archbishop of Mexico City. In essence, Comonfort earned the hatred of the conservatives for his punishment of the Puebla clergy while at the same time he was the object of growing mistrust by the liberals who misunderstood his relationship with the Archbishop.

Other reforms followed rapidly. Comonfort issued an edict which refused the protection of civil law for the enforcement of monastic vows and then allowed the Congress to expell the Jesuits.[22] But the bombshell was the *Ley Lerdo,* drafted by Minister of Finance Miguel Lerdo de Tejada. The edict provided that all ecclesiastical property not being used for religious purposes was to be placed on sale.[23] The measure was expected to increase the amount of taxable property and also to make it possible for landless farmers to acquire agricultural holdings. However well intentioned it may have been it did not achieve its desired

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[19] Ignacio Comonfort to Santiago Vidaurri, Mexico, January 6, 1856, Vidaurri Correspondence in Archivo General del Estado, Monterrey, N.L.

[20] *Siglo XIX,* April 2, 1856.

[21] J. de Portilla, *Episodio histórico del gobierno dictatorial de Sr. Ignacio Comonfort en la República mexicana, anos,* de 1856-1857 (Mexico: I. Cumplido, 1861), p. 57, p. 60n; Portilla, *Méjico en* 1856 *y* 1857.

[22] *La Sociedad,* March 4, 1856; Dublán and Lozano, *Legislación mexicana,* VIII, p. 190.

[23] Dublán and Lozano, *Legislación mexicana,* VIII, 197-201; Manuel Siliceo to Manuel Doblado, Mexico, June 25, 1856, in Genaro García (ed.) *Documentos ineditos o muy raros para la histório de México,* XXXI, pp. 210-211; Walter V. Scoles, "A Revolution Falters," *Hispanic American Historical Review,* XXXII (February, 1952), p. 2.

results because the property sold generally went to increase the holdings of already wealthy landlords.

The promulgation of the *Ley Lerdo,* June 25, 1856, coming at a time when the President was engaged in a fierce struggle with the members of the Constituent Congress, was a great help to Comonfort. Suddenly the atmosphere changed. Liberal members of Congress who only days before had been calling for his impeachment now cheered him with enthusiasm.

The conservative reaction to the *Ley Lerdo* was vigorous indeed. An alliance was forged between members of the military furious over the *Ley Juarez* and the clergy, angry over the *Ley Lerdo.* Plots and conspiracies increased in number. One such plot was discovered in the San Francisco monastery right in the center of Mexico City. A surprise raid by police caught several friars and military officials red handed. Comonfort ordered the officers exiled and the monastery suppressed. Then he ordered that a street be cut through the monastery grounds.[24]

Thus it would seem that by the summer of 1856, Comonfort had earned his spurs as an anticlerical. His frequent visits to the Archbishop were discontinued, particularly after that venerable churchman openly attacked the *Ley Lerdo.*[25] Yet, at the same time that he was cutting streets through monastery grounds, expelling Jesuits, exiling bishops and forcing the sale of Church property, he was leading an attack in the Constituent Congress against the proposed Article 15 of the Constitution which would have allowed religious toleration. The President was convinced that this was contrary to the wishes of the majority of the people. After a strenuous fight, the article was defeated and the final version of the Constitution of 1857 did not contain it.[26]

Once again, however, his intentions were misunderstood by the liberals. Quick to jump to conclusions, the liberals who had cheered

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[24] Riva Palacio (ed.) *México a través de los siglos,* V. p. 184.

[25] *Ibid.,* pp. 159-160; Comonfort to Joaquin Moreno, Tacubaya, September 26, 1856, Comonfort Papers, folder 17.

[26] Zarco, *Congreso Constituyente,* pp. 548-689.

him for the promulgation of the *Ley Lerdo* now condemned him for his opposition to Article 15.

The reformist policies of Comonfort with regard to the military and the Church were successful. In spite of opposition from both extremes he managed to put his policies into effect, and eventually both of these reforms were incorporated into the Constitution of 1857. It was this very constitution, however, and Comonfort's attitude toward it, which was to be the cause of the failure of his policy of middle-of-the-road moderate reform.

The new constitution was completed and published early in 1857.[27] It was considered a terrible blow by conservatives. The Church threw its weight into the fight and declared that any Catholic swearing allegiance to the document would be excommunicated.[28] In spite of such opposition, however, the constitution was put into effect and Comonfort was elected president under its provisions in September of 1857.[29]

While serving as Provisional President, Comonfort had enjoyed full emergency powers as authorized by the *Plan de Ayutla.* Using these powers to best advantage, he had held off conservative attacks while Congress drafted the constitution which had been promised the country by the *Plan de Ayutla.* In addition to this he also used his position to begin a progressive program for the reconstruction of the country. Now as constitutional president he found the traditional liberal restrictions upon a strong executive tended to make it impossible for him to cope with the underlying element of instability during his administration. That element was the constantly recurring military uprisings.[30]

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27 Ignacio Comonfort to Joaquin Moreno, Mexico, February 18, 1857, Comonfort Papers, folder 17.

28 Riva Palacio (ed.) *México a través de los siglos,* V, 228; Wilfred H. Callcott, *Liberalism in Mexico,* 1857-1929 (Stanford, Calfornia, 1931), pp. 4-12.

29 Certification of the election of Ignacio Comonfort, Comonfort Papers, folder 17; *Siglo XIX,* September 17, 1857.

30 Niceto de Zamacois, *�tório de Méjico, desde sus tiempos mas remotos hasta nuestros días* . . . (23 vols., Mexico: F. J. Farres, 1878-1902), XIV, 493-494; *Siglo XIX,* August 29, 1857; Raymond C. Wheat, *Francisco Zarco, portavoz de la Reforma* (Mexico: Editorial Porrua, 1957), pp. 180-181.

Realizing this problem, Comonfort asked Congress for emergency powers in order to combat the conservative rebellions which had increased in number since the constitution had gone into effect. The powers were granted, though reluctantly, by liberal deputies who had used the occasion to heap abuse and criticism upon the President.[31]

In November of 1857, a group of his closest friends representing the moderate wing of the Liberal Party advised the President to stage a *golpe de estado* and carry on his program of moderate, progressive reform as a provisional president once more. Comonfort, however, rejected their advice and insisted on working to save the country by constitutional methods.[32]

Attempting to salvage the rapidly deteriorating situation, Comonfort prepared a list of amendments to the constitution which would strengthen his position. When these were presented to Congress the liberal outcry against him was tremendous. By their attitude and actions the extreme liberals implied that Comonfort was rejecting the constitution and had no wish to abide by it.[33] Once again they were misinterpreting the President's motives.

Then with terrifying swiftness the rug was virtually jerked out from under Comonfort. His most loyal supporters, the Zuoaga Brigade, the force which formed the nucleus for the defense of Mexico City, pronounced against the constitution with the *Plan de Tacubaya* on December 17, 1857.[34]

The President was now forced to examine his position carefully. The conservatives had opposed him since *Leyes Juarez* and *Lerdo* of the previous year. At the same time there was vociferous opposition by the extreme liberals in the Congress who could not stomach Comon-

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31 Dublán and Lozano, *Legislación mexicana,* VIII, pp. 644-645; Portilla *Méjico en* 1856 *y* 1857, pp. 274-279, 285; Comonfort, *Politica del General Comonfort,* p. 386.

32 Manuel Payno, *Memoria sobre la revolución de diciembre de* 1857 *y enero de* 1858 (Mexico: I. Cumplido, 1860), pp. 8-26, 59-62.

33 Felipe Buenrostro, *História del primer Congreso Constitucional de la República mexicana que funcionó en el año de* 1857 (2 vols. Mexico: I. Cumplido, 1874), I, 235-236.

34 *Siglo XIX,* December 17, 1857.

fort's moderate policies. Now, the President's main group of supporters, the *moderados,* apparently had deserted him for the *Plan de Tacubaya* and were urging him to join them in overthrowing the Constitution of 1857. Thus, Comonfort made the fateful decision to join what appeared to be a moderate coup. He felt that with the continued support of the moderates he might be able to crush the counter-revolution of the conservatives and still carry forward his program for the progress of the country. He signed the document with the bitter words, "I have changed the title of President for that of a miserable revolutionary."[35]

All was not as it seemed, however. The supposedly moderate Tacubaya coup was merely a facade for a conservative movement. Once again the conservatives had misunderstood Comonfort. They had assumed that if he sided with the Zuloaga Brigade against the Constitution of 1857 he must in essence be repudiating his ideas of liberal reform and would soon repeal the *Ley Juarez* and the *Ley Lerdo.* To compound the confusion, their cheers of triumph at having won over Comonfort to their side were loud enough to convince many moderates that this was exactly what had happened. For this reason the moderates misunderstood Comonfort's motives in supporting the *Plan de Tacubaya* and refused to support his provisional government. Instead they joined ranks with the extreme liberals in support of the Constitution.

It was soon evident to the conservatives that Comonfort had no intention of abandoning his program of moderate reform. On January 11, 1858, the Mexico City garrison staged another coup and declared against the provisional government of Comonfort.[36]

The end came swiftly. Comonfort's dwindling forces were soon defeated by the conservatives, and the Hero of Ayutla, who had triumphantly entered Mexico City the head of a victorious revolution against reaction and dictatorship, now left the same city two years later defeated by that same reaction. As he departed he was a target for

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[35] Manifesto of Comonfort to the Nation, Comonfort Papers, folder 17.; Comonfort, *Política del General Comonfort,* pp. 387-388; Payno, *Memoria,* pp. 83-84.

[36] Payno, *Memoria,* pp. 89-96, 100-104; Comonfort, *Política del General Comonfort,* pp. 387-389; Portilla, *Méjico en* 1856 *y* 1857, pp. 292-293, 297, 300-303, 306.

abusive and bitter criticism hurled at him by the very people he had striven so earnestly to serve.[37]

With the flight of the moderating force which had held them at bay now, the forces of liberalism now united under the banner of the Constitution of 1857, and the conservatives with their cry of *"religion y fueros"* (religion and privileges) could now begin Mexico's inevitable conflict. The blood bath known as the War of the Reform, which would settle which of the two political philosophies would soon decide the course of Mexico's destiny.

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[37] Payno, *Memoria,* 107-113; Description of events of January 20, 1858, Comonfort Papers, folder 17; Melchor Alvarez, *História documentada de la vida del Gral. Jose Justo Álvarez; o la verdad sobre algumos acontecimientos de importancia de la Guerra de Reforma,* (México: El Tiempo, 1905), 67, 70-74; *Siglo XIX,* January 21, 1858.

COMMENTARY ON MEXICO'S ENIGMATIC CAUDILLOS

By Stanley R. Ross*

Although some of my colleagues might differ with me, I have and continue to believe quite strongly that the "biographical" approach —in the sense of a study of key personalities and their relationship to their times and events—affords a very useful insight to historical development. This method seems particularly appropriate in Latin American history in which the role of the individual leader and the highly personalized following he attracts has loomed so large and influential. The very concept of the *"caudillo"* makes consideration of the character, motives and action of the individual leader of the utmost importance.

With variations of degree, our authors have focused on three individual leaders. We may all discover on reflection that we have been operating under false colors. This session was entitled "Mexico's Enigmatic Caudillos." Cortes, Vidaurri and Comonfort have been described and evaluated from a variety of points of view. They have not been regarded, by defenders or critics, as puzzling or perplexing. And our authors have sought to refine, revise or add dimension and understanding to our view of their subjects.

For the investigator to develop some feeling toward his biographical subject—hopefully after investigation—is to be anticipated. In most instances, this feeling tends to be one of partiality and sympathy, although occasionally a subject may be viewed unsympathetically. All of our essayists demonstrate a degree of partiality for their subject from mild admiration to the fullsome praise of the indomitable Cortes presented by Colonel Page.

Our first author emphasized Cortes' bravery, courage and determination. I only regret that he did not give as much attention to the conqueror's constructive labors—for Cortes was a builder as well as a

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conqueror. Our speaker's story of the finding of Cortes' remains, while accurate, leaves the impression of happenstance. Actually, it was in the 19th Century that the distinguished historian and leading conservative, Lucas Alaman, noted in the introduction of his multi-volume history, the general location of the conqueror's remains. However, it was at the time that Eulalia Guzman was creating a considerable stir with the recovery of what were purported to be the remains of Cuauhtemoc that conservative elements balanced the scales with the "discovery" of Cortes' resting place.

Colonel Page is quite correct when he relates that Cortes has not persisted as a father image—and this in a land where the father image is vital. Who can forget General Guadalupe Sanchez' telegram to Carranza as the latter prepared to flee from Mexico City in the fateful month of May, 1920: "President and Father—If there is but one who is loyal to you, I am that man." There are compelling reasons why, as Colonel Page notes, Cortes remains an alien, the stranger. For much of its history, Mexico has been struggling to liquidate the institutional and other remains of the conquest—and this has been particularly true of the Revolution beginning in 1910. Under these circumstances, the fate of the key Spanish conqueror was inevitable. In this spirit, one must view Diego Rivera's portrait of the malformed Cortes which he argued was based on medical examination and scientific measurements of the remains. The late Erna Fergusson told me of standing and watching a Mexican army colonel studying intently the new Cortes painted on the wall overlooking a patio of the National Palace. When she asked the Mexican officer what he thought of the new Cortes, he replied: "I wouldn't send that *bobo* into the *barrios* to handle the *chamacos*."

Several other matters discussed by Colonel Page are worthy of mention and some comment. He refers to Cortes' first loyalty being that to the Governor of Cuba—at least until the landing on the coast of Veracruz. However, the relationship had been altered earlier when Governor Velazquez endeavored to stop Cortes from sailing and to remove him from command of the expedition and Cortes hastened to sail before the Governor's change of heart could be translated into action.

In his discussion of sources, Colonel Page gives due importance to Cortes' own letters and Bernal Diaz del Castillo's "True History" (the true version of which has only been available in this century) which was intended as an answer to Gomara's writings. The former, our author correctly appraises as an effort to impress the Spanish rulers and to vindicate his conduct. While the strong religious sense noted certainly was part of the spirit of the conqueror, this, too, represented Cortes' shrewd sense in his appeal to their Catholic Majesties as well as a reflection of his appreciation of the role of religion as an effective element in the process of conquest and subjugation.

I regret that Colonel Page did not bring into his balance sheet the views of more modern biographers of Cortes—H. M. Robinson and H. D. Sedgwick—writers on the Spanish conquerors generally—I. B. Richmond and J. Descola—and that chronicler and defender of the rise of the Spanish Empire—Salvador de Madariaga. And for a view of the conqueror and the conquest from an entirely different perspective, reference might be made to Miguel Leon Portilla's *The Broken Spears* —the Aztec account of the conquest of Mexico.

Turning to Dr. Moseley's paper on Santiago Vidaurri, I realize that there may be some who would question the appropriateness of a "damn Yankee" from New York presuming to evaluate what an Alabaman has said about states' rights in front of an Atlanta audience—even if the states' rights in question refer to nineteenth century Mexico. While conceding that there is basis to the view of Vidaurri as a strong man interested in power, our speaker feels that this oversimplifies the case and tends to obscure the career of a powerful regional leader.

Before turning to the major thesis, I should comment on a few details involved in this paper which is well buttressed in contemporary documentary materials. It is true that the Revolt of Ayutla was primarily an assault against a dictatorship, but the liberal leaders did use the effort to overthrow Santa Anna as a stalking horse for the Reform movement. While one can argue—as Dr. Moseley does—that Vidaurri's victories in the north helped bring about Santa Anna's collapse, it might be equally convincingly advanced that Santa Anna's preoccupation elsewhere facilitated Vidaurri's ability to gain control in his state.

In the text of his paper, our author identifies the Saltillo opponents of the Nuevo Leon and Coahuila merger as associated with Santa Anna, but in his note he clarifies this by noting that labeling could reflect the jaundiced view of the source—a Vidaurri adherent and relative. His revisionist explanation of the reasons behind Vidaurri's acceptance of a truce with the central government in November, 1856 is very convincing.

In many ways, Vidaurri is the epitome of the regional *caudillo*—with strong local support and persuasive principles to justfy his conduct, our speaker clearly recognizes the self-serving nature of Vidaurri's proclaimed principles and rallying cries—will of the people, liberty, self-determination of local government and states' sovereignty. However, if Vidaurri is to stand as more than a regional *caudillo*—even conceding a man of certain principles, then one must ask where did he stand on the liberal concepts of the day other than states' rights? What were his relations with the liberal theorists on these issues? Under the circumstances, I find tantalizing the concluding sentence describing Vidaurri as remaining during the succeeding eight years as "the most powerful individual on the northern frontier and an untiring advocate of state sovereignty." While it is beyond the defined limits of the paper presented, I would wonder whether our author would consider Vidaurri's support of Maximilian as consistent with his past and his principles. I hope it will not be considered impolitic to reiterate that with the collapse of the Second Empire, Vidaurri was executed for treason.

In another well-documented paper, Professor Broussard views Ignacio Comonfort as a moderate, conciliatory man of good will, guided —or misguided—by an optimistic view of other men's natures. Our author is sympathetic, but confesses that his subject's political skill was not up to his sincerity as he endeavored to steer a middle course through contemporary extremes. I do not question the course Comonfort endeavored to steer amid extremist shoals nor that he had the best of intentions. However, it is at best hazardous to rely too heavily on a subject's own protestations and public avowals of high ideals.

For me it is difficult to reconcile Comonfort's adherence to the preamble of the Plan of Ayutla with its commitment to liberal institutions with the author's correct appraisal that his subject could get along

with either the *status quo* of the conservatives or the new order demanded by the liberals, but preferred a little of both. It is equally difficult to reconcile his issuance of or association with key liberal edicts and his act of joining the efforts of the signers of the Plan of Tacubaya to overthrow the liberal Constitution of 1857—a terrible miscalculation of both the the character of the movement and the consequences of his action.

It does seem that Professor Broussard is correct in noting that many of Comonfort's positions and actions were forced by circumstances and a reflection of the pressure of others. Or, perhaps, it might be better expressed in another way. Comonfort, a moderate, was out of tune with the dominant extremisms of his times. His efforts, granted Mexico's past history and the irreconcilable positions of the contending forces, could only serve as flimsy, delaying restraint as the Mexican body politic rushed to a bloody resolution of its differences. Under such circumstances, the consequences were predictable—as the apostle of moderation successively disenchanted both extremes and failed in his fundamental purpose.

These papers are important from two points of view. They represent serious scholar efforts which have placed the men and events studied in new light and have given us new understanding. As such, they represent important pieces in our efforts to recreate and comprehend the history of our neighbor to the south. They also help to explain the continued vitality and importance of the Southeast Conference on Latin American Studies. I have very much enjoyed being here to hear and comment—I hope constructively—on their efforts.

FARQUHAR: ECONOMIC STATESMAN IN AMAZONIA AND SOUTH BRAZIL

By Charles A. Gauld*

Percival Farquhar (1864-1953), a magnetic Pennsylvania Quaker, was by far the most forceful titan of development in Brazil from 1905 until 1952. At the height of his power in 1912, after investing $175,000,000 of private European capital, he was feared in Rio de Janeiro, Buenos Aires and Montevideo as a new Cecil Rhodes, an imperialistic octopus menacing national sovereignty. Again from 1920 to 1939 rabidly nationalistic foes, whom he considered to be "semi-Moorish," attacked Farquhar's $80,000,000 Itabira iron ore export project as a threat to the sovereignty of Brazil. By 1949, his fortune and influence gone, Farquhar was decorated by Brazil as an economic elder statesman whose plans the government was trying belatedly to execute.

The last of a titan breed, Farquhar was better educated and trained than such self-made tycoons as Vanderbilt, Carnegie, Ford and Rockefeller. Farquhar obtained a degree in engineering at Yale in 1884. In 1887 he was admitted to the bar in New York City after reading law in the offices of the father of John Dos Passos, author of several recent books on vast, varied Brazil. In 1898-1904, Farquhar got his start by promoting the electrification of the horsecars of Havana and constructing the Cuba Railroad that opened the eastern half of Cuba to development. He negotiated with President Manuel Estrada Cabrera of Guatemala for completion of the Guatemala Railway and obtained a grant of 50,000 acres of future banana lands for Minor C. Keith of United Fruit.

In 1904 Farquhar persuaded Fred S. Pearson, genius of the electric and transit systems of New York, Havana and Mexico City, and Pearson's Canadian financial associates to raise $3,000,000. Farquhar and

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his Wall Street associates raised $2,000,000. Together with Sir Alexander Mackenzie, manager for Canadian capitalists of the new (1899) Sao Paulo Tramway, Light Power Co., Farquhar formed the Rio de Janeiro Tramway, Light & Power Co. Farquhar had to frighten his and Pearson's reluctant backers into action by telling them that Rio's rich young Guinle brothers were about to act. Guilherme Guinle brashly told Farquhar in Rio in 1905 that he would suffer severely for having decided to make Brazil his oyster. As the decades passed, the prophecy proved correct. Ronald Hilton has written that the spirit of Gotterdammerung hangs over the epic of the last great American entrepreneur in Latin America.[1]

The life of Farquhar is virtually a cross-section of the history of Brazil in the first half of the twentieth Century.[2] There he met every president, countless cabinet ministers, directors of the National Departments of Transport and Public Works, and leaders in law, geology, engineering and politics. It was easy for Farquhar's representatives to bribe a sizable percentage of the tiny oligarchy. Without generous bribery, nothing important can be accomplished in tropical lands. This has apparently been the experience of all major foreign enterprises in the incurably corrupt Latin lands, according to the former associates of Farquhar whom the writer has interviewed. As a Quaker, Farquhar avoided direct contact with bribery.

Farquhar first saw Brazil in 1905 from a liner bearing him from Europe. In his pocket were titles to all the public utilities of Rio. From far out at sea he saw Rio's granite guardians—Sugar Loaf, Corcovado and in the mountains behind Rio the reclining figure of a giant. Every year since 1905, Farquhar quipped in 1952, some visiting writer has enthusiastically asserted that Giant Brazil has finally awakened. But the Giant regularly resumes his siesta. To his surprise, Farquhar saw that Rio, whose population then was about 720,000, lacked docks. In 1911 he used French capital to acquire all he beheld in Rio's emerging

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[1] Ronald Hilton in the book review section of *Hispanic American Report,* Stanford University, March 1964, p. 92.

[2] Charles A. Gauld, *The Last Titan: Percival Farquhar, American Entrepreneur in Latin America.* (Stanford, Calif., Institute of Hispanic American & Luso-Brazilian Studies, 1964.) 427 pp.

port district where British contractors were making a fill, seawall and warehouses such as Farquhar was to complete in 1912 in Belem. Rio in 1905 was a city with possibly 120 automobiles and 250 Americans. The 2,000 Britons were the preeminent foreigners until Britain was bled white in World War I.[3]

Among Farquhar's first acts with Mackenzie was to reorganize the crude little telephone company he had acquired in Berlin. He replaced the undependable male operators with young women after convincing their parents that they would not lose their virtue and chance to marry. Then he had the phone book list subscribers by last names instead of in the manner of Portugal, by first names. Early in 1906 the telephone building burned. Farquhar bought the only United States emergency switchboard. The day after it left New York for Rio on a freighter, San Francisco tried to get it after its fire.

In 1906 Farquhar was told by Rio's foremost editor, Jose Carlos Rodrigues, who had spent the 1870's in journalism in New York and had become a Protestant, that it might take Brazil centuries to overcome its ignorance, superstition and defects of character.[4] The successor to Rodrigues as Brazil's best-known editor, Assis Chateaubriand, regularly in his column in his score of dailies derided "Brazilian political and economic stupidity" such as the xenophobic attitudes toward national development through mutually beneficial cooperation with foreign investments and technology which Farquhar proposed. Chateaubriand constantly lauded Farquhar for his great contributions to Brazil's progress despite the opposition of rabidly nationalistic Brazilians of limited vision like Presidents Vargas (1930-1944) and Artur Bernades (1922-26).

Let us return to Farquhar's role in Rio in 1905-06. He participated in the city's spectacular transformation under the progressive but typically corrupt regime of President Francisco Rodrigues Alves and his

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[3] Alan K. Manchester. *British Preeminence in Brazil; its Rise and Decline.* (Chapel Hill, 1933.) 371 pp.

[4] Charles A. Gauld. "José Carlos Rodrigues; o Patriarca da Imprensa Carioca," *Revista da História* (Sao Paulo), ano 4, n° 16, Oct.-Dec. 1953, pp. 427-38.

appointed mayor, the fierce Francisco Pereira Passos[5]. The powerful utilites enterprise which Farquhar launched, since called the "Rio Light," supplied gas and electric illumination to make Rio's wide new Avenida Rio-Branco for years the world's best-lit boulevard. Rio journalists bought by the jealous Guinles branded the Rio Light "an octopus of Yankee imperialism" and called Brazilian officials "vassals of Yankee gold" brought by Farquhar.

As in Havana, Farquhar fearlessly risked death from dread yellow fever until his friend Dr. Osvaldo Cruz used methods pioneered in Havana by Dr. Walter Reed to eliminate mosquitos. In 1910 Farquhar sent Dr. Cruz to Belem and Porto Velho to eradicate malaria and yellow fever.

Farquhar failed to make the Rio Light an American company. He had found Wall Street uninterested and making too much money in Mexico. The company passed to Canadian control making the Rio and Sao Paulo Lights together the largest Canadian company abroad.[6]

In 1906 Farquhar formed the ill-fated Bahia Tramway, Light & Power Co. in picturesquely backward Salvador, Bahia, the biggest African city in the New World (pop. now 800,000). There his foes, the Guinles, though venal journalists and politicos in October 1909 incited a riot that damaged much of its property during an overheated political campaign. Mackenzie and American Ambassador Irving Dudley vainly tried to induce the biggest Bahiano in Rio, presidential candidate Rui Barbosa, to cable the do-nothing governor to protect Farquhar's property. Also vain were their efforts to get President Nilo Pecanha, a quadroon, to order federal troops in Bahia to act.

In his old age, Farquhar told the writer in many interviews that the Bahianos were "notoriously adroit and tricky, being almost Moorish in their venality, rascality and ability to sabotage." Farquhar was finally

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5 Farquhar recalled that elderly Mayor Pereira Passos of Rio retired, announcing plans to write his memoirs in Paris. But on the liner he had such a heavy affair with a lady that the strain killed both him and the planned memoirs.

6 Frederick Mulqueen. "A Canadian Enterprise Abroad," *Canadian Banker* (Toronto), winter, 1952, pp. 34-55. The Canadian typically slighted the roles of Americans in the Rio and Sao Paulo Light Companies.

able to sell his Bahia Light without too great a loss, but only after years of bedevilment by Guinle-bribed Bahianos who refused to respect his concession rights. In selling out, he used the services of the octoroon son of a Portugese priest, Geraldo Rocha (who once threatened the writer's life). Rocha was probably the most astutely corrupt Bahiano in recent Brazilian history. In the 1920s he stole millions from Farquhar's former Brazil Railway enterprises. Rocha acquired farms, newspapers and in 1929 erected Rio's first skyscraper, the Edificio "A Noite," on Praca Maua.

During the Panic of 1907, which paralyzed banks in New York and London, Farquhar discovered the money market in booming Paris was unaffected. There he raised millions for the Rio Light to complete its first dam, then the largest in South America, and to launch his own new Brazil Railway, which he capitalized at $50,000,000.

Farquhar's first venture as president of the Brazil Railway was to launch the Port of Para in Belem. Always incurably optimistic, he believed the Eldorado myth of Amazonia's allegedly fertile soil being able to feed 900,000,000 people. He was fascinated by the boom in wild rubber for the new electrical and automobile industries and the fact that Belem had no docks. Farquhar failed to hire veteran Dutch or British rubber planters and construction men with experience in Southeast Asia in his growing offices in London and Paris. Brazil's great nineteenth-century development genius, Viscount Maua, had died in 1889. There was no Brazilian economic statesman to advise him and to urge common-sense on impractical Brazilian officials and speculators who induced Farquhar to sign onerous development concessions on terms later ruinous to his shareholders.

In 1907-12 Farquhar invested $35,000,000 in the Port of Para and in a fleet of new river vessels built in Holland. He poured $33,000,000 of European capital and Brazilian Government money into the tragic Madeira-Mamore Railway. He envisioned a golden chain of profits starting at his docks in Belem and ascending the Amazon and Madeira on his river boats and railroad to the supposedly inexhaustible rubber forests and cattle plains of northern Mato Grosso and Bolivia. Farquher failed to learn in time of the rising threat to the world price

of rubber by the plantations of Malaya and Sumatra.[7]

In investing $175,000,000 in South America, Farquhar's biggest gamble was in tackling the "impossible" Madeira-Mamore Railway in the fever-ridden and annually flooded forest on the frontier of Brazil with barbarous Bolivia. The Treaty of Petropolis of 1903, in which the brilliant Foreign Minister Rio-Branco avoided a boundary war, obliged Brazil to build the line. It would permit Bolivians to ship fine rubber from millions of scattered wild rubber trees around 366 kilometers of river made perilous by 19 falls and rapids. Rio-Branco backed Farquhar and let him form his own police force under Brazilians in the violent region ruled "by the law of the rifle." The concession, which Farquhar avidly acquired from a notoriously corrupt Brazilian speculator, did not carry Brazil's customary guarantee of interest and payments per kilometer completed. Farquhar hoped to finish the line in only two years by using U. S. health and engineering methods perfected on the Panama Canal. He then planned to use the achievement as his "calling card" in Rio and European financial capitals.

In 1907 he sent his first party of engineers recruited in New York to a clearing at the head of navigation of the mile-wide Madeira 500 miles upstream. There he ordered them to lay out a company town which became Porto Velho, now a city of over 40,000 and capital of Rondonia Territory, which is the size of Oregon.

Farquhar threw more than 800 American engineers and technicians into the battle against the swamps and fevers of the silent, deadly selva. They were the officers of an army that came to total 30,000 laborers from Spain, Crete and many other lands, sent in batches of several thousands every few months. The men soon sickened; some 3,600 of them died; thousands were shipped out after three bouts of malignant malaria. As soon as he could, Farquhar opened a 300-bed hospital in Porto Velho, the best in savage Amazonia, with a dozen American doctors, plus nurses and excellent food by the shipload to keep his men going.

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[7] Charles E. Akers. *Report on the Amazon Valley, its Rubber Industry and Other Resources.* London, Waterlow, 1912. 190 pp.

The three American contractors, who had built the Cuba and Guatemala railroads for Farquhar, worked on a cost-be-damned basis. Farquhar was determined to make the Madeira-Mamore the world's greatest tropical achievement after the Panama Canal. It took until early 1913 to complete the line, one of the world's costliest per kilometer. Famed British author H. M. Tomlinson in *The Sea and the Jungle* described his visit in 1910 to Porto Velho and the unfinished line. He wrote of an Unknown Somebody in Wall Street and London recruiting thousands of men who would help build a section of line in the timeless forest and then die, impersonal pawns of progress. Porto Velho, an oasis of civilization in the largest rainforest on earth, has an Avenida Farquhar, with the tycoon's name misspelled. The visit there by this author in 1953 just after Farquhar died in New York influenced the territorial governor and the manager of the railroad, which became Brazilian in 1931, to hold a memorial service for the old Quaker in the Catholic cathedral. Such ecumenical gestures have long been common in religiously indifferent Brazil. Tribute was paid to Farquhar's vision and services to the region in Assis Chateaubriand's daily in Porto Velho. The rails are now scheduled to be removed and the roadbed paved as part of a highway to connect Brasilia and Lima. In 1938-53 Farquhar was honorary president of the Madeira-Mamore Association formed by its U. S. survivors.[8]

Farquhar was once called "the uncrowned king of the Amazon." The late historian William Lytle Schurz, who as a diplomat in Brazil in the 1920s knew Farquhar, wrote in 1961 in his splendid *Brazil, the Infinite Country,*

> "Generations of little men have nibbled, like mice, at the edges of Amazonia . . . Those who would solve the problem of its development must be possessed of superhuman imagination and boldness . . . They must be willing to forget much that is familiar and start anew as if on another planet. The man who came nearest to measuring up to these requirements of vision and daring was Percival Farquhar."

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[8] Frank Kravigny. *The Jungle Route.* New York, 1940. 297 pp. On how Americans bossed construction of the Madeira-Mamoré.

Retired historian J. Fred Rippy of Durham, North Carolina, commented in 1944 in his *Latin America in the Industrial Age* on Farquhar's "railroad to Eldorado." Rippy wrote that Amazonia would remain a myth until new men, techniques and products such as DDT combined to dominate the tantalizing Amazon Basin. What a tragedy for Farquhar and Brazil that he was not steered in 1907-12 away from the useless Madeira-Mamore and into developing the port and railroad to export millions of tons of rich Itabira iron ore, his project between world wars. Itabira was another gigantic case of Farquhar's being the victim of bad timing, bad luck and bad Brazilians. Farquhar hoped after 1920 to give Brazil an export to take the place of rubber, namely iron ore. Farquhar was not surprised after World War II when feudal-minded Congressman Artur Bernardes, who had killed his Itabira project as President in 1922-26 and as a congressman in 1934-37, denounced UNESCO's Hylean Amazonian Plan for international cooperation to develop the stagnant Amazon Basin. Bernardes branded it a menace to Brazilian sovereignty. This was also the cry in 1965 of able historian turned governor of the twice-Texas-size state of Amazonas in Manaus, Arthur C. Ferreira Reis.[9]

During his years of efforts in Amazonia, Farquhar was simultaneously making an even more titantic attempt to develop the southern half of Brazil and Mato Grosso. In 1907-12 he led there a dance of the millions. By 1912 he had in Paris a paper fortune of $25,000,000 in watered stock of his Brazil Railway. Sadly he did not then donate some sizable parks to Rio and Sao Paulo to counteract the press campaign against him as boss of 14,000,000 acres in land grants and immense cattle ranches plus key segments of the nation's transportation.

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9 Artur C. Ferreira Reis. *A Amazonia e a Cobica Internacional.* Sao Paulo, Editora Nacional, 1960. 258 pp. Historian Ferreira Reis as governor of Amazonas published in Manaus in 1964-66 a series of valuable studies on Amazonas history and development. Assis Chateaubriand, especially in 1965, opposed the ultranationalism about Amazonia of Governor Ferreira Reis. Chateaubriand in doing so in his column in his chain of dailies recalled Farquhar's epic achievements in the Amazon Basin. Chateaubriand plans to have his Edicoes O Cruzeiro in Rio publish my biography of Farquhar in Portugese with a foreword by the press lord. His chain of dailies, radio and television stations and magazines is described in the U.S. Army *Handbook for Brazil* (Washington, 1964), pp. 343-52.

Those cities were already beginning to spawn sprawling, unplanned, ugly industrial suburbs without parks or U. S.-type model public schools with big playgrounds. Farquhar thereby lost one of his great opportunities. Another was his failure to invest in industries more than a tiny part of the $100,000,000 of European capital he poured into South Brazil. Had he done so, he could have become by the 1940's richer than the Matarazzos with their scores of factories in Sao Paulo.[10]

Farquhar felt challenged to open large areas of the southern plateau in Brazil's generally empty interior. He accepted the myth of great fertility. He thought that by extending rails inland he could induce millions of land-hungry European peasants to pour into South Brazil as land was becoming expensive in Argentina and the United States. Farquhar was sure he could overcome the political and geographical barriers to developing huge, adolescent Brazil where others had failed. He saw the time ripe for Brazil to advance inland as had the USA in the mid-nineteenth century. But he underestimated the obstruction offered by Brazil's graft-hungry and unpatriotic elite. He discovered that a tired old Mediterranean culture and a semi-feudal, technically weak oligarchy dominated the enormous "new" land.

Farquhar learned the harsh lesson experienced by other Nordic would-be Gullivers among the Latin American Lilliputians—that new foreigners succeed in making fortunes in competition with shrewd, unscrupulous nationals. He was further handicapped by his unappreciated Quaker scruples and his visionary economic statesmanship. He could not get apathetic bureaucrats to change the archaic, graft-encouraging railroad subsidy law to permit him to avoid heavy losses by constructing shorter, solidly-built lines. Farquhar did so anyway for a while, until his French financial backers insisted on returning to the former practices of bribing Brazilian officials to approve outrageously padded kilometrage of jerry-built lines. His solid line in the Rio Peixe

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[10] Historian Richard M. Morse's brilliant 1958 book on Sao Paulo (University of Florida Press) is scheduled for publication soon in that overgrown, problem-filled metropolis. Morse wrote that its unplanned growth resulted from weak leaders badly bungling for decades. This is true of all major cities of Latin America, tragically lacking in sizable parks.

valley in Santa Catarina did not impress the delightful but exasperating Brazilians. On it he lost heavily for his idealism. Brazil foolishly permitted railroads of five gauges, as did progressive, Nordic Australia. Farquhar observed that Australia with its low birth-rate, high-quality population has attracted superior immigration and ample foreign capital. Australia has become a prosperous and powerful country with resources inferior to those of badly-governed Brazil.

Farquhar liked to explain how great a geographical obstacle to railroad construction was Brazil's Great Escarpment, 1500 miles long and generally rising steeply from a narrow coastal plain. He agreed with his friend geographer Preston E. James during visits in Rio that "there is no natural focus of routes", no Chicago or Buenos Aires in South Brazil.[11]

Farquhar was told that only the sickly, badly-built, unfinished Sao Paulo-Rio Grande Railroad traversed empty areas of good climate, pine forests and reportedly good soils and had large land grants. These totaled 6,000,000 acres. Without ordering surveys of soils and other resources, the land-hungry Farquhar hastily bought the line. He paid far too much of a speculator already rich from milking his country with the aid of corrupt Transport Ministry officials. Before Farquhar could rebuild several atrocious sections of that railroad, his empire crashed in 1914. Every president of Brazil has urged reconstruction of these sections plus broad-gauging of the entire line from Porto Alegre to Brasilia. Generally bankrupt, Brazil has yet to do so. Getting involved with the worthless SP-RG Railroad prevented Farquhar from expanding further inland across southern Sao Paulo and stumbling onto the really fertile "Norte do Parana." There Lord Lovat and his Scottish aides laid out Londrina and other boom towns in the 1930's and rode one of the world's great land rushes.

In promising South Brazil, which has long made the rest of the nation its colony, Farquhar completed and improved many railroads,

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[11] Preston E. James. *Latin America.* New York, Odyssey, 1959. Farquhar admired this monumental work by the top U. S. specialist on the fascinating geography of Brazil.

along with the jetties and port of Rio Grande do Sul. He projected a transcontinental line like the Canadian Pacific from ports south of Santos to Antofagasta, Chile, via Asuncion (where he controlled the utilities and the railroad to Buenos Aires), northern Argentina and his oil concession in eastern Bolivia. Then he hurriedly and expensively used unlimited and uncritical French capital to buy control of poor French-built lines in Uruguay and northeastern Argentina, hoping to unify, standardize and link them with his lines in South Brazil. Over them he carried touring ex-President Theodore Roosevelt, en route in 1913 to an Amazon trek on which the latter nearly died of hunger and an injury.

To make traffic for his transportation empire, Farquhar formed 30 subsidiaries, including Brazil's first meat-packing plant and biggest sawmill and for a few years the world's largest land and cattle company, all run by Americans. He imported a thousand fine Texas bulls to upbreed the 200,000 bony cattle on his 8,000,000 acres of ranches in Mato Grosso. In his old age, he realized that Texas is far more favored geographically than is Brazil.

In 1912-14 depression and then war caused Farquhar's empire in Brazil, with its tentacles into neighboring nations, to collapse into receivership under Boston millionaire W. Cameron Forbes, who had large tropical experience as Taft's governor in the Philippines. Brazil benefited greatly from Farquhar's vast investments, but the European investors lost heavily. With five more years of peace and further huge injections of European money, he might have succeeded brilliantly.

After being strenuously useful to Forbes in Brazil and New York in 1914-15, Farquhar resigned as president of the ill-fated Brazil Railway group of companies. In 1919 he accepted the invitation of President Epitacio Pessoa, visiting New York, to return to Brazil and attempt with presidential backing to develop the mountains of rich iron ore at Itabira. Farquhar was promised the backing in Wall Street of Clarence Dillon to finance his $80,000,000 Itabira port and ore railroad. From 1920 until early 1942, Farquhar failed despite amazing determination to overcome nationalistic opposition, especially in populous Minas Gerais State. The railroad was to use the unique Rio Doce waterlevel

route through the Great Escarpment. Economically blind leaders rejected his plan to export ore and transform the empty Dio Doce Valley into the Ruhr of South America, which it finally became after an enormous loss to Brazil in time and money.

In 1942 Brazil took the Itabira project from Farquhar with the backing of the U. S. and British Governments. But only after 1961 did Brazil fully adopt his plan and start exporting over 7,000,000 tons a year of its inexhaustible iron ore. At 80 Farquhar boldly organized with Brazilians the Acesita special steels mill near Itabira, earning at least Brazilian admiration as the grand old man of the mountains of iron. He was saddened by the failure of Vargas[12] and himself to win approval of Brazil's powerful military to seize a unique chance between world wars to give Brazil a major role in world iron ore exports. Farquhar wondered what would happen to Brazil if coffee goes the way of rubber, and whether the population explosion dooms Brazil to be another India. That is still the greatest unanswered question about Brazil.

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[12] John W. F. Dulles, historian of the University of Texas, is the author of a work just published there, *Vargas of Brazil, a Political Biography.*

Farquhar would have enjoyed an Argentine scholar bluntly blaming his nation's mess on bad leadership—Tomás Fillol, *Social Factors in Economic Development; the Argentine Case.* MIT Press, 1961. 118 pp. Farquhar would have smiled at the statement in Schurz's 1961 book that the Brazilians are the world's most promising people, just as he would have applauded historian Watt Stewart's recent biography of his associate in Guatemala in 1903-04, banana king Minor C. Keith.

See Henry Reuss, chairman, House Subcommittee on International Finance. *Food for Progress in Latin America. Washington,* GPO, 1967. 255 pp., for a study which throws light on U. S.-Brazilian efforts to prevent Brazil from becoming another India.

RUY BARBOSA—A GREAT BRAZILIAN

By Mrs. Florene J. Dunstan*

"Brazil has lost one of her greatest citizens, Dr. Ruy Barbosa, jurist, diplomat, and man of letters," editorialized the *New York Times* at the time of his death in 1923. The greatness of Ruy Barbosa cannot be defined in any one aspect of his life and personality, but the scope of his activities, his myriad-mindedness, and the different phases of his work can be seen in his contributions to the social, cultural, political, and juridical life of Brazil.

Ruy Barbosa belongs to that small aristocracy of fame who are known throughout Brazil by the first name, says Dr. Charles W. Turner in his biography entitled, *Ruy Barbosa,* and during "fifty years the short but significant name of 'Ruy' electrified audiences, scintillated upon the pages of Brazilian history, and projected the rays throughout the hemisphere and over to the shores of the Old World."[1] Dr. William Rex Crawford, in *A Century of Latin American Thought,* 1961, says, "Ruy Barbosa . . . was a world in himself, and amazed his disciples, as loyal and lyrical as those attracted by any Latin American thinker: for them he was the greatest writer, the greatest orator, the greatest linguist, and the greatest lawyer of his time."[2] Ruy's fame has grown since his death; some twenty different titles of his works have been published since 1940, including his *Obras Competas* in 1942; his name now appears in the *Encyclopedia Britannica, Enciclopedie LaRousse, and Encyclopedia Italiana.* Volume 14 of *Pensamiento de America* (*American Thought*), published in Mexico in 1944, is devoted entirely to selections from his published work, with a prologue by the Brazilian Renato de Mendonca, in which Ruy is discussed as a writer and literary critic.

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[1] Charles W. Turner, *Ruy Barbosa,* (New York, 1945), p. 173.

[2] (Cambridge, Mass., 1961), p. 190.

Ruy Barbosa was born in 1849, and in 1949 a grateful nation observed the centennial year with great pomp and ceremony. It was also the year of birth of Joaquim Nabuco, who, with Ruy and the Baron Rio Branco, formed the triumviate who contributed so much to their country in the latter part of the Empire and the first years of the Republic. The official celebration of the centenary of the birth of these two illustrious men began with a lecture by the person who was the equivalent of our Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. This function took place in Itamaraty, the beautiful building which at that time housed all the offices dealing with Brazil's foreign affairs, with Dr. Raul Fernandez, Minister of Foreign Affairs, as the host.[3] The lecture was attended by many of the leading writers and professional men and by the President Dutra of Brazil.

November 5th, Ruy's birthday, was declared a national holiday. A special monument was erected to him and streets in various cities were named for him.

During his lifetime Ruy Barbosa had his critics as well as his admirers. His insight into the basic principles of life and relationships and his outspoken courage in attacking any conditions which he considered an evil against society often represented unfamiliar concepts to those who would keep the *status quo*. His enemies accused him of being out of step with his generation. Ruy's lifework constituted an inescapable challenge to patriotism and his ideals included both the good of his own country and that of the world at large. Fernando Nery, in his book, *Ruy Barbosa,* stated that Ruy "was the man most defied and most slandered by his contemporaries."[4] His critics still exist. In 1964 Raimundo Magalhaes published his book, *Rui Barbosa, o Homen e o Mito* (*Ruy Barbosa, The Man and The Myth*) in which he attempted to debunk practically everything favorable previously written about Ruy, pointing up his weaknesses and overlooking his virtues. The purpose in writing this paper is to study Ruy Barbosa in the light of historical perspective and to suggest that his contribution to his country was substantial.

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[3] My sister and I attended as guests of Joaquim Nabuco's daughter, Carolina.

[4] Quoted by Turner, p. 58.

The life and accomplishments of Ruy Barbosa run parallel with the history of his country. Every reform, every attempt at any worthwhile reform, and the history of every forward movement, particularly in education, in Brazil during his lifetime must, if correctly related, be connected with his name. His literary activity was a reflection of his life and he used his literary talent, as did many other great figures, to lend force and efficacy to his efforts in his numerous crusades. He influenced profoundly other literary figures and greatly enriched his country's language and literature.

Ruy Barbosa "was a man of amazing erudition . . . steeped in the classics, the sciences, history, philosophy, and ancient and modern languages. Books were his tools, and through them he made friends with the ages."[5] A visit to the Casa Barbosa, today a national museum with the desk, books, and other furnishings owned by Ruy, reveals his extensive collection of over 40,000 volumes and gives an idea of the breadth of his intellectual grasp and the vast scope of his erudition. His library was his sanctuary, and he knew the exact position of every book as well as its contents. Rare is the book on those shelves that does not have annotations by him in the language in which the book was written. He wrote and spoke fluently English, French, Italian, and Spanish, and made idiomatic translations from German, Greek, and Latin. Brazilian schoolboys delight to remind their English visitors that Ruy Barbosa, when he was living in self-imposed exile in England, had a sign printed which read, "English Taught by a Brazilian."[6]

During this period of exile in England he became interested in the Dreyfus case from a legal standpoint, and was convinced of the lack of proof of guilt. Ruy had contracted with the *Jornal do Commercio* to write a series of letters giving his impressions and observations. The first of these *Cartas de Inglaterra* was a minute study of the charges against Dreyfus, with arguments pro and con. He made an urgent plea for justice in behalf of Dreyfus, a victim of hate and illegality. It was after his article that Emile Zola produced his formidable *J'Accuse* and forced the French government to restudy the

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[5] *Ibid,* pp. 41-42.

[6] *O Tempo,* Special Edition, January 15, 1924, p. 57.

case which led to the vindication of Dreyfus. Portuguese diplomat, Alberto Oliveira, declared that he had been in Geneva with Dreyfus and had heard him say that the first voice raised in his behalf was that of a Brazilian, Ruy Barbosa.[7]

Throughout his entire life Ruy was a crusader for freedom. "His idea of liberty was inclusive, all-embracing, for the whole man and all his relationships. He was the exponent of total human liberty, of all the freedoms which are meant to enrich the life of man and society. Civil liberty, religious liberty and political liberty, in all their fullness, complete the trilogy of the drama of his life's work."[8] Ruy Barbosa worked assiduously, along with Souza Dantas, Joaquim Nabuco, Castro Alves, and others for the abolition of slavery. Joaquim Nabuco is considered the outstanding symbol of the abolition movement, but Ruy Barbosa was the impassioned young writer and orator who contributed effectively to channeling popular thought into the new current by his impressive delivery and wealth of ideas.[9]

While still a law student in Sao Paulo, in 1868 at 19 he proposed that freedom should be granted to all slave offspring. He, along with Joaquim Nabuco and others, contributed articles to many newspapers and, on September 28, 1871, to satisfy public opinion, the government, headed by the Viscount of Rio Branco, promulgated the law of the *Ventre Livre*. This law, which promised freedom to all born after that date, was called the Rio Branco Law, although Ruy contributed greatly toward its passage. Further intensive efforts followed and in 1884 he drafted the abolitionist bill which called for the freeing of all slaves over sixty years of age. Unfortunately this bill was not passed, but the spirit of freedom was gaining supporters and when a new conservative ministry took office on March 10, 1888, they realized that public opinion would soon demand abolition. Total victory was gained by those working so diligently for abolition when the Emancipation Proclamation was signed on May 13, 1888. It was signed, not by the

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[7] *Ibid*, p. 27.

[8] Turner, p. 82.

[9] *Ibid*, p. 74.

Emperor, but by his daughter Princess Isabel, who was acting regent while her father, seriously ill, was in Europe for medical treatment.

Many Brazilians had contributed their best efforts in the struggle for emancipation of the slaves, but Dr. Turner states that it is to the eloquence and patriotism of Ruy Barbosa that the Negro race owes its greatest debt and he quotes Mozart Monteiro in *O Tempo* when he writes, "The abolition narrative is the fairest page in our history, and on that page shines the immortal name of Ruy Barbosa."[10]

Although the Emperor claimed to have a representative government in the Assembly, in the system the votes went through several hands before being counted, making many opportunities for corruption. Suffrage was based on property, and Ruy Barbosa contended that each person who could read and write should be allowed to place his vote in the ballot box with his own hands. He made forceful speeches in favor of direct election and was asked by Souza Dantas and Saraiva, two of the liberal leaders, to draft a bill for direct election which they wished to submit to the Emperor. Finally in 1881 the decree for direct elections was signed and Ruy was elected to represent a district of Bahia in the national assembly.

One of Ruy's chief concerns was the problem of education in Brazil. Realizing the seemingly insurmountable difficulties in a country such as Brazil, where population was sparsely scattered he repeatedly emphasized the need for adequate public education. In 1882, as national deputy from Bahia, he headed the Committee on Public Instruction appointed by the Chamber of Deputies. Two of his reports, "Project of Reform for Secondary and Higher Education" and "Reform for Primary Education" are particularly significant as an expression of his philosophy of education, and received favorable comment by English and French critics who hailed these works as an outstanding contribution to educational methods. As a result of these reports, the normal-school system was later established in Brazil.

At this time the separation of church and state became a burning issue and Ruy Barbosa, a deeply religious man, was found taking the

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[10] *Ibid,* p. 79.

lead in this struggle. His devotion to freedom of conscience and religious liberty bore fruit when, at the time of proclamation of the Republic, he penned the separation decree. He was also appointed to draft the first constitution for the Brazilian Republic and chose the constitution of the United States as a model, although he favored some aspects of England's parliamentary system. In addition, he also designed the Brazilian flag and coat-of-arms.

In 1907, Baron Rio Branco, Brazilian Minister of Foreign Affairs, invited Barbosa to accept the appointment of chief in his country's delegation to the Second Hague Peace Conference. From the beginning of the Conference Barbosa stood out personally. The entire European press was unanimous in speaking of the brilliant Brazilian leader as one of the forceful personalities of the Conference.[11] For the first time representatives of the Latin American republics were present at a worldwide international round table, but the predominant feeling was that rights, as such, belonged to the great powers, "and the smaller nations should be content to act as their satellites."[12] Ruy's speech on "The Equality of Sovereign States" was declared by the editor of *The Independent* to be the most notable document issuing from the Conference, so memorable that it has a place in history.

William T. Stead, a distinguished British journalist, whom, incidentally, Megalhaes in his volume debunking Ruy called a second rate journalist and whom Megelhaes translated incorrectly, wrote several articles on Ruy Barbosa. Mr. Stead, an authority on European affairs and an eyewitness at both the Hague conferences, wrote that it was the crusade of Barbosa at the Hague "which brought in its train the recognition by the powers of the legal equality of sovereign nations."[13] He stated that this distinctly Brazilian thesis was here for the first time given its permanent place in the records of international law.

Mr. Stead thought that the two greatest personal forces in the Conference were Baron Marshall von Bieberstein of Germany and Dr.

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[11] *O Tempo,* p. 21.

[12] Turner, p. 137.

[13] *Ibid,* p. 144.

Ruy Barbosa of Brazil. Behind Baron Marschall was the whole armed might of the German Empire, which was close at hand and constantly present before the eyes of all the delegates. "Behind Dr. Barbosa there was an unknown distant republic, incapable of taking any military action and with a fleet which had not yet left the stocks. Nevertheless, of the two men, Dr. Barbosa counted for more than Baron Marschall when the Conference ended."[14]

The Republic of Brazil was barely twenty years old when personal rivalries and factional ambitions brought a threat of a military regime which would mean the the triumph of might, even violence, over the civil rights of the people. Ruy Barbosa became once more the spokesman for law and order, civil rights, and justice. Concerning his campaign as a candidate for the presidency, it was said that "Never before or since has Brazil been thrilled from north to south and from the seaboard to the western limits of the hinterland by the words of a man as it was by the words and concepts of Ruy Barbosa during this intense crusade."[15] Singlehandedly Barbosa created a nation-wide civic consciousness. This remarkable electoral campaign goes down as one of the most notable periods in Brazil's history. For the first time an effort was made to have the vote of the people decide who would be president. It was carried out in true North American style, with speeches, electioneering visits to many parts of the country, and with enthusiastic meetings everywhere. So general was the enthusiasm that, as the time for the election arrived, it seemed clear that the *civilista* candidate (Barbosa) rather than the Army candidate, would secure an overwhelming majority. However, the political machine had evinced alarm at the nation-wide welcome accorded Ruy Barbosa and had made sure of the loyalty of the majority of state officials. "So while *civilismo* won decisively in the streets, it lost in the ballot boxes."[16] Marshall Hermes da Fonseca was declared president at least five days before the count of the votes had been completed.

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[14] William Stead, *Brazil at the Hague*, p. 12, quoted by Turner, p. 145.

[15] Turner, p. 150.

[16] *Ibid*, p. 154.

Disappointed, dismayed, but not discouraged, Ruy continued his unwearying defense of justice and liberty and was an implacable enemy of tyranny and violence. When, in 1915, Germany announced to the world that international commitments pertaining to warfare were no more than scraps of paper, Ruy denounced Germany and led in urging Brazil to revoke its neutrality. Following the lead of her friend, the United States, Brazil revoked her neutrality and on October 26, 1917, declared that a state of war existed between herself and Germany. Brazil aided the Allies in many ways.

In these later years Ruy Barbosa became president of the Brazilian Senate, the Brazilian National Library, and the Brazilian Academy of Letters. In 1921 he was named one of the eleven judges on the Permanent Court for International Justice.

In attempting to summarize the life and accomplishments of Ruy Barbosa perhaps the tribute paid him by the *New York Times* (March 3, 1923), will shed some light on the effectiveness of his endeavors.

> Brazil has lost one of her greatest citizens in Dr. Ruy Barbosa, jurist, diplomat, and man of letters. Versatility such as his is more frequently met with in Latin America than among us, but talents such as his are rare in any land. Mathematics, science, even medicine were among his subsidiary interests; finance, the law and diplomacy absorbed most of his attention. He was never President of Brazil . . . But he had been President of the Senate, President of the Academy of Letters, and delegate to the second Hague Conference; and he ended his life as one of the judges of the new Permanent Court at the Hague.
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> In the *Civilista Party*, organized to fight the military clique which controlled Brazil in the 90's and was still strong enough to make an unsuccessful attempt to seize the government last June [1922], he was one of the leaders and contributed largely to the establishment of constitutional government in his country. But his greatest service was rendered in the war, and it was due chiefly to him that Brazil led the American

> Powers in the formation of the final coalition against Germany, and thereby found a way open to a larger part in world affairs than any Latin-American Power had played before. He founded the Brazilian League for the Allies in 1915, and in his subsequent service as Ambassador (to the Argentine celebration of the centenary of Argentine independence) his fiery eloquence did much to strengthen the pro-Ally party in that country as well as in Brazil. He was a Wilsonian, in the 1918 sense, at least two years earlier than Wilson.[17]

In the light of historical perspective it may be seen that with his powerful intellect, devotion to principle, and his patriotism and idealism, Ruy Barbosa "accomplished a creative and abiding work in national and international affairs, a work such as few men in the Western Hemisphere have handed down to posterity."[18]

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[17] *O Tempo,* p. 83.

[18] Turner, p. 170.

SOME NOTES ON THE LIFE & WORK OF A. P. FIGUEIREDO

By T. Lynn Smith*

It may appear a bit ironical to all of us that a sociologist should be writing on this topic. Sociologists in general and myself in particular are not noted for their contributions in the field of biography. In what probably was an unguarded moment, however, Dr. Huck invited me to appear on this program to talk about the life and work of some Latin American I greatly admired, such as A. P. Figueiredo of Recife, Pernambuco, Brazil or Salvador Camacho Roldan of Columbia[1]; and perhaps somewhat irresponsibly I accepted the invitation. As Dr. Huck's plans for the program developed it seemed preferable to him that I speak about Figueiredo, and so you are "stuck" with the results. I trust, however, that you will bear with me for a few moments.

I first became acquainted with some of the ideas of Antonio Pedro de Figueiredo in 1942 when I read Gilberto Freyre's *Nordeste*[2], then only five years off the press. The Master of Apipucos identified Figueiredo as a "mulatto free-thinker of Recife," a person who had been associated with "the Lyceu of Pernambuco," as editor-in-chief of the review *O Progresso,* and as an important figure whose career belonged mostly to the first half of the nineteenth century but extended into the second half as well. Freyre indicated at the age of twenty Figueiredo had translated a work on philosophy by Victor Cousin from French to Portuguese and that he (Figueiredo) also had been strongly influenced by the thinking of socialists such as Robert Owen, Fourier, and especially Saint-Simon.

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1. Earlier I had dedicated my small volume on *Agrarian Reform in Latin America,* New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1965, to the memory of Figueiredo and Camacho Roldan.

2 (Rio de Janeiro: Livraria Jose Olympio Editora, 1937), pp. 150-156.

Since I was working upon the chapter dealing with "Size of Holdings" for the first edition of my *Brazil: People and Institutions*[3] at the time, I was able to draw upon the materials reprinted by Freyre and to translate and use two short paragraphs of Figueiredo's writings in the analysis and description of the effects of the large landed estate in Brazil. To Freyre I also gave credit for the reproduction of the original text of a lengthy extract on the same subject from the newspaper article by Abdulah-el-Kratif which I also translated and used in my own book.[4] Freyre gave no indication in *Nordeste* that he knew that Abdulah-el-Kratif was Figueiredo's pen name, and I myself learned that fact only in 1953 when I received through the graciousness of Sr. Amaro Quintas a copy of the re-issue of *O Progresso* he had published, a volume in which he had included as a preface a comprehensive biography of Figueiredo. Freyre did indicate, however, that he was familiar with the cognomen of Cousin Fusco (apparently meaning dark or sad Cousin) that frequently was applied to Figueiredo, and Quintas makes it abundantly clear that the author of *Casa Grande e Senzala* was the one who first called his own attention to the importance of studying the life and work of Figueiredo.[5]

Biographical Data

That relatively little is known with respect to the origins and early life of Figueiredo is not strange. On the contrary, it would be quite remarkable if in any society characterized by the "monoculture, latifundismo, slavocracy and even monosexuality" which Freyre attributes to Recife and its environs in the nineteenth century,[6] much would be known about the early life of any young mulatto who early left his rural home to seek a better life in the capital. It seems, however, that he was born in Iguarassu, a village some 30 miles north of Recife. Henry Koster, whose descriptions of social organization in the plantation districts of northeastern Brazil are second to none, indicates that the vil-

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[3] (Baton Rouge:1946), p. 492.

[4] *Ibid.*, pp. 492-94.

[5] See his "Prefacio" to the re-issue of *O Progresso: Revista Social, Litteraria e Scientifica,* (Recife: Impressa Oficial, 1950,) pp. II-III.

[6] Freyre, *Nordeste*, p. 11.

lage was in a decadent condition and had only about 800 inhabitants when he visited it repeatedly in 1809 and 1810.[7] Quintas disposes of matters respecting Figueiredo's origins and birthplace with the following succinct statements:

> His origins are obscure. About all we know is that they were humble. The small news sheets of the time mention a mulatto Basilio as being his father. This is what *O Volcao* of August 30, 1847, says: ". . . the ridiculous *Cousin fusco,* son of the mulatto "Brazilio there in Iguarassu, where he always lived by cleaning the saddle shop of his father, and by catching crabs and junk fish [*bodioes*]."[8]

Even the date of Figueiredo's birth is not known, although it seems firmly established that he died of a cerebral hemorrhage on August 22, 1859. Quintas indicates that Pereira da Costa, in the *Dicionario Biografico de Pernambucanos Celebres,* p. 145, gives the date of birth as being May 22, 1822, a datum that he (Quintas) finds unacceptable. Rather, reasoning from the information given in the obituaries published in Recife's newspapers following Figueiredo's death, which state that he was 45 years old when he died, Quintas places the year of birth as 1814.[9]

Like so many of his fellows, in his early youth Figueiredo sought to better his lot by moving to Recife. Apparently he was disappointed in the amount of assistance given him by a friend, on whom he had counted for food and shelter, and eventually he took up his abode with the friars in the Monastery of Carmo. There he certainly found the books on which he feasted and possibly unusually fine instruction as well. Eventually he came to be a teacher in the Ginasio Pernambucano and one of the editors of a small paper called *A Carteira;* and, in the pattern that has been general among Brazilian intellectuals from those days to the present, he wrote copiously for the various other newspapers published in Recife.

Sometime early in his career Figueiredo came to know and to be

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[7] *Travels in Brazil,* (Philadelphia, 1817), Vol. I, pp. 32-35, 62-64.
[8] Quintas, p. iv.
[9] *Ibid.,* p. iii.

strongly influenced by a French Engineer, Louis Vautier, who was largely responsible for the introduction into Brazil of the works and ideas of European socialists and of an interest in the pragmatic study of social and economic questions.[10]

Figueiredo as a Forerunner of Brazilian Sociology

From the sociological standpoint much of Figueiredo's work must be evaluated as among the more important intellectual productions made in Brazil, or in all of Latin America for that matter, in the course of the nineteenth century. As also is true of his early twentieth-century successors in Brazil, such as Euclydes de Cunha, Oliveira Vianna, Gilberto Freyre, A. Carneiro Leao, and Fernando de Azevedo,[11] and in sharp contrast with the preoccupations of Spanish Americans who developed a concern about social matters, Figueiredo chose to avoid fiction as the medium in which his thoughts were to be expressed. Therefore, one can make use of his works for purposes of documentation without being handicapped by the possibility that the more incisive paragraphs in his writings represent the figments of his imagination and not his endeavor to portray realities.

The bulk of the sociological materials produced by Figueiredo that have been uncovered and made available to those not privileged to have access to files of the newspapers published in Recife over a century ago, are those contained in the re-issue of *O Progresso*. He published the first number of this review in July, 1846, and continued it until September, 1848, for a total of 920 pages richly stocked with an assortment of literary, political, and sociological matters from his own pen and that of his contemporaries. It is evident that some of the more significant analyses of social structures, social systems, and social problems first had been presented as political speeches, then redone as articles in the local newspapers, and finally republished in *O Progresso*.

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[10] Gilberto Freyre, *Um Engenheiro Francés no Brasil*, (Rio de Janeiro: Livraria José Olympio Editora, 1940), pp. 147-148.

[11] For brief comments about those who pioneered in the sociological study of rural society in Brazil, who also for the most part represent the early beginnings of sociology in general in that huge half-continent, see T. Lynn Smith, *Sociologia Rural*, Maracaibo, Venezuela: Universidad del Zulia, Facultad de Agronomia, 1963, pp. 33-36.

The world is especially fortunate that Figueiredo's socialistic orientation and challenge to observe and analyze the social system prevailing in the sugar-cane plantation area of Pernambuco during the first half of the nineteenth century came before Karl Marx had become the patron saint of those who style themselves as socialists. After Marx, with his abysmal ignorance of everything rural and agricultural, had generated the foggy ideas that still becloud much of mankind's thinking about rural social and economic organization, it probably would have been impossible for any socialist to have determined precisely and set forth clearly the nature of Pernambuco's difficulties. Certainly one of them could not have isolated and described concisely the causes of the basic problems; and it is unlikely that none of them would have suggested the use of the power to tax as a means of correcting the ills from which the province was suffering.

My own high regard for Figueiredo's writings is based chiefly upon the penetrating analyses he has given us of the over-all social system which dominated Pernambuco, and most other parts of Brazil as well, a century ago.[12]

For this reason I drew upon his cogent analyses when I was preparing one of the chapters for my book on Brazil, and I found his materials all the more significant, and indeed in a class of their own, when I was searching for any early writing by Latin Americans that would throw light on the backgrounds of agrarian reform movements in Brazil and Spanish America. Those familiar with my little volume on this subject, and to which reference is made above, will have noted that I translated and used extensive extracts from Figueiredo's works

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[12] This social system has by no means been eliminated by the urban patterns of social organization that have developed largely since 1940 nor by the emergence in a few areas of a system in which substantial, highly-commercialized family-sized farms play a role somewhat comparable to that which they have in the Midwestern part of the United States and some parts of Western Europe. For an analysis and description of the two sharply-contrasting rural and social systems, one based upon large establishments, such as those Figueiredo found enmeshing society in Pernambuco, and the other receiving its integration and energy from family-sized farms typical of Iowa and her neighbors, see T. Lynn Smith, *Sociological Studies of Rural Development in Latin America,* University of Florida Social Sciences Monograph No. 33, Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1967, Chapter II.

in connection with each of the three major subdivisions of the subject, namely, indicators of the need for agrarian reform, the objectives of agrarian reform, and the methods or techniques to be used in effecting agrarian reform. His statements pertaining to these I evaluated at the time, as I do now, in the following words: "This man's analyses and proposals were fully 100 years ahead of his time, and they dealt with the situation in northeastern Brazil, which continues to be the greatest problem area in Brazil and possibly in all of Latin America."[13] It seems fitting that we repeat here a few sentences drawn from the extracts we have translated and used.

We should take note of the fact that he sets the stage in an empirical and pragmatic manner by depicting the extent to which the children of couples in humble circumstances abandoned the country districts and flocked into Recife where life was a severe struggle for all of them. All this, of course, was highly autobiographical. Then he pointed to the scarcity of inhabitants in large areas that were richly endowed with fertile soil and which were favorably located with respect to the seacoast and the capital: "In our coastal plains, in the areas about our great population centers, there are vast expanses of land, most of it fertile, of which only a tenth, and frequently a hundredth, is cultivated." Next come some of the most incisive inquestions. Why don't the offspring of the least-favored families, those of whom "the turbulent class of our population was formed," make use of these extensive areas of excellent soil? "Why don't they become agriculturists? Why, unless they are forced to do so, don't the inhabitants of the forested zones cultivate the soil? Why do their children seek out the towns? For all of these questions there is only one answer, and unfortunately it is fully complete." This answer given in 1846 is the same as it was a century later in 1946, and even today, in 1967: "Agriculture and commerce, and especially agriculture, are encircled by a barrier that cannot be surmounted by a man of slight means . . . And what is that barrier? It is the large landed estate." "But the owners refuse to sell these lands [the extensive areas of rich, unused soil], or even to rent them. If one is wealthy he can buy an engenho; but if his means are

[13] *Agrarian Reform*, p. 65.

slight and he wishes to buy or rent a few acres of land, he will not find them. This is what creates the unproductive population of the cities."

Measures to correct the situation should not be based on the thesis that individual large landowners are to blame. They are merely "obeying the law of necessity." "In order for one *senhor de engenho* to be able, without endangering himself, to sell or rent a part of his lands and in this way to diminish the number of his vassals, it is necessary that his neighbors do the same. Because of this, gentlemen, it is essential that all of them simultaneously be exposed to a superior force. This force, gentlemen, is not to be found except in the direct imposition, promised by our Constitution, of the tax upon the land. The establishment of this tax in proportion to the area possessed, and if necessary by making it weigh more heavily upon unused lands than upon those that are cultivated, will force the large landowners to sell or lease those immense tracts of fertile land which today are lost to agriculture and give work to only a small number of hands . . ." "Our population will find abundant means of existence and we will not be forced to say, as we are today, [i.e., in 1846] that Brazil is over-populated."

Finally, in addition to his highly perceptive analyses of the nature, defects, and needed reform of the great rural social system that is generated by and energized by the large landed estate, the pages of *O Progresso* supply many other advanced ideas with respect to the true sociological study of society. For example, in setting forth the editorial policies of the review in its first number he specifically indicates that it will follow no "line" except that of the freedom of expression (p. 3), and that "For us, then, the policy is that the science of social organization is the only way of achieving the happiness of individuals; and . . . for our country of Brazil at present the policy should be principally economic and industrial and above all should follow the path of material progress." (p. 7) Observations relating to social organization and reform proposals in France, England, Switzerland, and the United States (pp. 335 ff.) are of more than passing interest, and many could read with interest and profit what he reports upon German communism in Europe and America (pp. 339 ff.). Some of the difficulties connected with unwise alienation of land in the United States

are summarized, and note is taken of the formation of the Agrarian League in 1844. Among the proposals it made, of course, is that which led eventually to the *Homestead Act*: "Any man, or any head of a family, who did not already own land should have a right to a farm of 160 acres, provided he himself or his children cultivate and make use of it" (p. 409). Not the least interesting and challenging of his strictly sociological ideas are the thoughts that administrative sub-divisions should constitute what in effect are genuine communities, and that since rivers unite while mountain crests divide, only the latter should be employed as boundaries for political subdivisions (p. 424).

NOTES ON THE STUDY OF BRAZILIAN ELITES

I

The disclaimer voiced by Professor Smith prior to his treatment of the life and work of A. P. Figueiredo must also apply to myself. Consequently, I have decided to analyze the three papers indirectly, by indicating how a political scientist would utilize political biographies. The relevance of political biographies to the development of political system models is that political scientists must generate, on the basis of empirical data, political types who are actors in the political system. The conceptualization and definition of political role types are the result of aggregate analysis of political biography. I have worked out a preliminary model of the Brazilian political system for the years 1946-1964. In developing the outlines of such a model I have drawn heavily on the work of, Scott, Lucas and Lucas, *Simulation and National Development,* and A. F. K. Organski *The Stages of Political Development.*[1] In the latter work Organski describes four general classes of political system models: (1) the Politics of Unification, (2) the Politics of Industrialization, and (3) the Politics of National Welfare, and (4) the Politics of Abundance. Brazil, moreover, is clearly a case of the politics of industrialization. Brazil's industrial achievements since 1930 need not be recounted here. I will briefly describe the model, and as I do, I think that the relevance of the study of political elites and political recruitment, or aggregate biography, will become apparent.

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[1] Andrew M. Scott, William A. Lucas and Trudi M. Lucas, *Simulation and National Development* (New York, 1966), Chapters iii & iv; A. F. K. Organski, *The Stages of Political Development* (New York, 1965).

II

THE "DEVELOPMENTAL SYSTEM MODEL, 1946-1966."

I. Structure of the System.

A. Elites. (Tentative Observations)

1. The political elite system is differentiated from the non-elite culture at both the levels of (1) personality and (2) social structure. The political elite culture has as its boundaries the lowest strata of the middle class. This elite culture is very narrow, then, in relation to the total population.

2. Populist leaders tend to be recruited from the rural sectors of the political elite.

3. Liberal-cosmopolitan leaders tend to be of the elite culture of the more developed regions.

4. Developmentalist intellectuals in government and industry tend to be of the same areas of the elite subculture as the liberal-cosmopolitans.

5. The educational system tends to maintain the relative small political elite subculture.

B. Regime Structure.

1. Governing coalitions of the period tend to be coalitions of the various national public authorities, e.g.: the executive including the ministries, the military, and the state executives; all in combination with certain advanced sectors of industry and agriculture.

2. Congress is only important as its members are attached to the governing coalition.

3. The only significant observation to be made about the formal party system is that the governing coalition usually, but not always, overlaps with the PTB-PSD, and the UDN tends to represent the liberal-cosmopolitans of the more in-

dustrialized regions. The PTB is the only party with the potential to be a mass based political movement.

C. The main conflict cleavage is between the populist-developmentalists and the liberal-traditionalists. Within the rules of the system outlined below, the populist-developmentalists usually form the government.

D. Political cleavages are manifest by positions taken on the following issues.

1. Land reform.
2. Industrialization.
3. Political mobilization of the population.
4. Foreign policy.

E. So long as the internal and external system rules are maintained, the populist-developmentalist policy position is the position of the government.

II. Rules of the Game of Politics.

A. Internal System Rules.

1. Changes in governments and policy is usually accomplished through constitutional means.
2. Populist leaders to be effective must have military support.
3. Labor organizations must function through regime channels.
4. The agrarian elite's power position must not be changed rapidly.
5. The military must be allocated a disproportionate share of the budget.
6. Illiterates must not be politically mobilized.

7. Agitation among the agrarian proletariat should be kept at a minimum.

8. The lower military ranks are not political.

9. Credit through the public banks must be expanded at a constant rate proportionate with the growth of the monetary economy and the demands of industry.

10. The government is expected to provide jobs and subsidies to both individuals and groups.

B. External System Rules.

1. To minimize tension and maximize development, a favorable balance of payments must be maintained. Therefore, relations with the U. S. must be "good."

2. Alignment with revolutionary regimes would conflict with rule number 1a above.

3. It is at all times necessary to negotiate for favorable terms of trade.

III

To further elaborate such a model as I have outlined above, the study of political elites and elite recruitment is essential. An American political scientist, Robert A. Packenham, has reviewed the status of political science research in Brazil. With reference to the problem of political recruitment, he concludes that: "for all practical purposes, systematic studies of the social antecedents of national politicians do not exist . . . "[2] Research undertaken so far deals principally with the occupational backgrounds of state and local politicians. Such studies are few in number and little attention is given to the relationship of empirical generalization and general political theory. Perhaps the diffi-

[2] Robert A. Packenham, "A Pesquisa Política no Brasil: Ponto de Vista de um Norte-Americano," *Revista de Direito Público e Ciencia Politica*, VIII (January-April, 1965), p. 17.

culties encountered in survey research projects accounts in part for the lack of interest in political recruitment research.

As a step in the direction of describing the composition of political elites and the structures performing the political recruitment function in Brazil, I plan to start a data file organized by categories of elites with subject codes for each category. I see such a project as a long term concern and one that would ultimately provide the data base for generalization concerning the representation of various social and economic types within the Brazilian political system. Many untapped sources of reliable data exist. These data sources, while certainly not as useful as certain classes of survey data, could serve as the data base for: (1) the development of elite profiles, (2) identification of changes in elite composition through time, and (3) provide some insight into the groups involved in the process of political recruitment or the "real" party system.

The first step would be to specify the relevant elite categories. One might well begin with civil and military elites. Civilian elites could then be classified as governmental and nongovernmental. Civil-governmental elites could then be subclassified by position, level, and branch of government or party. This would be followed by developing a series of subject codes around the categories of: (1) social and economic background, (2) education, (3) place of birth, (4) age, (5) group membership, (6) civil/military career, (7) political career, (8) party and faction affiliation, and (9) policy orientation—when known.

In order to further conceptualize the elite structure of Brazil, I have developed a conspectus of Brazilian political elites and masses that may be of some interest to those present at this meeting.

Data sources for the study of Brazilian political elites include: (1) published biographies and autobiographies, (2) biographical directories, (3) official documents, and (4) newspapers. Biographies and autobiographies are perhaps the most valuable source of political recruitment data. There are many biographical directories available in Brazil. In a two volume work entitled *Brasil e Brasileiros de Hoje,* are some 7,000 subject entries listing biographical data for politicians, ad-

ministrators, industrialists, military leaders, intellectuals, and others. The five volume work, *Enciclopedia da Industria Brasileira,* contains a number of biographical entries. Candidates for public office in Brazil must supply their age, place of birth, and profession when registering as a candidate. Candidate registration petitions and party directorate registrations are preserved in the files of the Regional Electoral Courts and at the Supreme Electoral Court in Brasilia. While in Brazil, several years ago, I was allowed to examine candidate petitions at the Regional Electoral Court of Guanabara. With reference to the "Old Republic," the following sources contain much valuable data:

Augusto Tavares de Lyra, "O Senado da Republica, de 1890, a 1930," *Revista do Instituto Historico e Geographico Brasileiro,* N°. 210(January-March, 1951), pp.3-102.

Joao Dunshee de Abranches Moura, *Governos e Congressos da Republica*: 1889-1917. Rio: 1918.

Once coded and run onto computer tapes, such aggregate biographical data could be used to generate hypotheses concerning the representation of social and economic groups in the political system—an aspect of political recruitment that is usually treated in an impressionistic fashion. By comparing the distribution of social and economic types within governing elites it may be possible to predict the direction of future system change.

ELITES AND MASSES IN THE BRAZILIAN SYSTEM

Industrial

1. Foreign
   a. Mining
   b. Manufacturing
   c. Banking
   d. Import/Export
2. National
   a. Import/Export
   b. Manufacturing
   c. Mining
   d. Banking

Elite

Agrarian

1. Exporters
2. Bankers
3. Latifundistas
   a. Coffee
   b. Sugar
   c. Cattle
   d. Other

Authorities

Civilian (Church)

1. Liberals
2. Developmentalists
3. Populists
4. Latifundistas

Military

Left	*Right*
Reformist	Reformist
Nationalist	Nationalist
Populist	Elitist
Legalist	Authoritarian

1. Liberal Professions
2. Technicians
3. Students
4. White Collar
   a. Governmental
   b. Extra-legal

1. Well-to-do small farmers
2. Managers

1. Unionized Workers
   a. Legal
   b. Extra-legal
2. Army/Navy/Air Force Troops
3. Unorganized urban mass

Mass

1. Subsistence Farmers
2. Agrarian Prols
   a. Peasant Leagues
      1. Catholic
      2. Socialist

Adapted from A. F. K. Organski, *The Stages of Political Development*, p. 126.

LINCOLN'S SCHOLARLY DIPLOMAT IN ECUADOR: FRIEDRICH HASSAUREK

By C. Harvey Gardiner*

I must confess that as soon as I heard of the three-way theme for this meeting, I thought in terms of going for the jackpot. You have all heard of that irresistible triple-decker that found the author maximizing his reader appeal by writing about Lincoln's doctor's dog—or should I, in this geographic setting, compound the irresistible of Robert E. Lee's horse's doctor? At any rate, I have gone all out for a a man who is simultaneously scoundrel, statesman and scholar. That person is Friedrich Hassaurek[1]—whose wife labeled him scoundrel as she pinned an adultery charge on him in a divorce action; whose superior, Secretary of State Seward, heaped encomium upon him for his demonstrated diplomatic skill; and whose book regarding his South American experience is, I say without fear of contradiction, the finest appraisal of nineteenth-century Ecuador by a foreigner. So, briefly put, Friedrich Hassaurek is all of those things—scoundrel, statesman and scholar. But who, I almost hear you ask, was Friedrich Hassaurek?

Journalist, politician, and diplomat, as well as "Cincinnati's leading forty-eighter," as Carl Wittke aptly labels him,[2] Friedrich Hassaurek was born in Vienna, Austria, on October 9, 1832. His father, a merchant-banker-writer, another personality split three-ways, died impoverished when young Friedrich was but four years of age. However, a step-father provided the boy with a proper education. Sixteen years of age, and editing a school publication when the revolution broke in

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[1] This paper is closely related to the Introduction in the forthcoming volume *Four Years Among the Ecuadorians* (Carbondale, 1967).

[2] Carl Wittke, "Friedrich Hassaurek: Cincinnati's Leading Forty-Eighter," *The Ohio Historical Quarterly,* LXVIII (January, 1959), pp. 1-17.

1848, Friedrich responded to its radical ideas by joining the Student Legion of the University of Vienna. Involved in skirmishes with the imperial troops in and about the capital, he suffered slight wounds on two occasions. Upon the reimposition of imperial authority, young Hassaurek fled his homeland, heading for Cincinnati and reunion with his mother who, once again, was a widow.

Less than seventeen years old at the time of his arrival in the Ohio city in April, 1849, Friedrich immediately entered upon a career in journalism. Some of his earliest German-language articles, discussions of recent events in Vienna, attracted considerable attention. His challenge to earlier and more conservative leaders of Cincinnati's sizable German element focused attention upon him. Simultaneously Hassaurek quickly advanced from a $3.50-per-week translator and assistant editor of the *Ohio Staatszeitung* to owner-editor of the weekly *Hochwachter*.

In the columns of that "organ for intellectual enlightenment and social reform," Hassaurek's advocacy of socialism and anti-clericalism angered many of the older Germans of Cincinnati. Quickly becoming bilingual, Hassaurek did not limit the expression of his ideas to the German printed word, but soon became widely known as a vigorous public speaker in his adopted English. In 1852 he was party to "a week of public debates on the morality and rationality of Christianity." The following year he lashed out most violently at a visitor to Cincinnati, the papal nuncio, because of that churchman's identification with conservative elements in Austria and Italy. Before this episode subsided, Hassaurek was arrested for inciting a riot which had resulted in gunfire and death. On another occasion the rabid Austrian's feud with a competitor promised a duel until a restraining order provided a much-needed cooling-off period.

Among the constructive programs that helped catapult Hassaurek into municipal politics were his part in helping to found a German theater in Cincinnati and his unceasing campaign against those promoters and agencies that routinely swindled German immigrants. In 1855, as an independent, he won a seat on the Cincinnati City Council. But even the Queen City and journalism could not absorb all his energies.

Well known for his lectures to German-Americans throughout the Midwest in support of the Republican nominees of 1856, Hassaurek simultaneously was studying law and winning admission to the Ohio bar. In 1857 he sold the *Hochwachter* and in the course of putting journalism aside, he also shed some of his radical outlook.

Inclined, in part, to the philosophy of the young Republican Party because of his abolitionist stands, Hassaurek was one of that party's founding fathers in Cincinnati. During the closing years of the 1850's his service on the Cincinnati City Council continued and his popularity with his fellow German-Americans resulted in a highly remunerative law practice. His orations not only deepened his identification with the party, they also increased the number of German-Americans in Republican ranks. A delegate to the Chicago convention that nominated Lincoln, Hassaurek spoke throughout Ohio in behalf of Lincoln's candidacy. The 28-year-old Cincinnatian, politically intimate with Chase, Wade, Cox, Sherman and other prominent Ohioans, had his claims upon the victorious party and rightly expected some significant reward.

Because of his European background and command of languages, Hassaurek hoped to be named American minister to Switzerland. To support his bid for that post, the Ohio legislature sent petitions to Washington. Additional support, a petition signed by governor and legislators, came out of Indiana. A number of Ohio newspapermen also backed Hassaurek. He failed, however, to win the Swiss assignment and, urged to consider a South American post, he next indicated a desire to go to Chile. In the course of exchanges between Secretary of Treasury Salmon P. Chase and Secretary of State William H. Seward, a further shift developed and Hassaurek was offered and accepted the "highest" office in South America, his legation at Quito being situated some 9,300 feet above sea-level.

Late in April, 1861, Hassaurek, his thin face sporting moustache and goatee, and his wavy hair parted on the right, proceeded to Washington for instructions. Sixty-eight days after his departure from that place, he arrived in Quito, where, on July 15, he presented his credentials to President Gabriel Garcia Moreno.[3]

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[3] Friedrich Hassaurek to William H. Seward, Quito, July 19, 1861, in National Archives, Records of the Department of State, (hereafter NADS), Diplomatic Despatches, Ecuador.

In many respects the tall Ecuadorian with the wide forehead and penetrating eyes was the antithesis of the liberal, democratic republican Hassaurek. Born in Guayaquil and educated in Quito, Garcia Moreno, having witnessed the revolutions of '48 that confirmed Hassaurek's liberalism, returned to Ecuador an arch-conservative. Positive that he and Catholicism would be the salvation of Ecuador, Garcia Moreno was busy consolidating the authority he had seized in 1860, the authority he would wield for full fifteen years. In 1861 the new strongman dictated a constitution for his country. Two years later he would proclaim a concordat with the Papacy that created, in Ecuador, the most theocratic state in American history, one which gave the Church powers and privileges it had never exercised previously beyond the Atlantic.

In time Garcia Moreno came to advocate improved agricultural methods and inaugurate a long-term program of road construction. He fought regional caudillos and enlarged the measure of internal security. He desired an efficient treasury, currency reform, foreign investment and other innovations. Schools, under church control, mushroomed throughout much of Ecudor. Brooking no opposition, the iron-willed civilian perpetuated his authority by eliminating the prospective freedom of speech and freedom of the press and assembly and the meaningful congressional activity that his enemies, the Liberals, espoused. It was this man, whose personality and administration were so pregnant with long-term significance for Ecuador,[4] that Friedrich Hassaurek had to fathom.

Not unexpectedly a thoughtful portrait of Garcia Moreno was penned in the earliest years of that unusual dictatorship by the American minister. On January 4, 1862, in a dispatch to Secretary of State Seward, Hassaurek wrote, "Notwithstanding his impulsiveness and violent and arbitrary disposition, the President is a man of a great deal of public spirit and extraordinary energy. He is anxious to promote the material welfare, and to develop the internal resources of the country, and labors incessantly in pursuit of these objects. He is honest, a quality which cannot be said to be very general . . . He is very ambitious, and as intolerant in religious matters as vindictive against political opponents."

[4] For a detailed appraisal, see Richard Pattee, *Gabriel García Moreno y el Ecuador de su Tiempo* (Quito, 1941).

Hassaurek stamped Garcia Moreno "a mixture of strange elements;" a man who "wants to do right in his own way . . . looking on the members of his cabinet as on his clerks, not his constitutional advisers." Thirty months later, in mid-1864,, Hassaurek told Seward, "his [Garcia Moreno's] unpopularity notwithstanding, he is the only man in the country who can maintain domestic order and tranquility."[5]

Meanwhile, immediately upon arrival, Hassaurek had plunged into the sea of diplomacy with characteristic exuberance and energy. For one thing—and his quickly attained fluency in Spanish helped him immeasurably—he wanted to study public opinion and the probable position of Ecuador in regard to the Confederacy. After repeated conversations with Foreign Minister Carvajal, to whom he explained "the entire causelessness of the southern rebellion," Hassaurek was able to inform Seward that "The position of Ecuador . . . will henceforward be what it has always been, one of cordial friendship with the United States."[6]

Proof that this is not mere bombast from the facile pen of a journalist-turned-diplomat is evident in one of Seward's communications to Hassaurek. "The President," wrote the American secretary of state, "is favorably impressed with the ability, sagacity and patriotism which your correspondence displays in the conduct of your mission."[7] Indeed, as a writer of diplomatic dispatches, Hassaurek was systematic and logical in his consideration of problems—the rumored annexation of Ecuador to France,[8] the theatened outbreak of hostilities between Ecuador and Peru, or any other issue.

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5 Friedrich Hassaurek to William H. Seward, Quito, January 4, 1862, and Quito, July 1, 1864, NADS, Diplomatic Despatches, Ecuador.

6 Hassaurek to Seward, Quito, August 1, 1861, *ibid.*

7 Seward to Hassaurek, Washington, September 16, 1861, NADS, Diplomatic Instructions, Ecuador.

8 For García Moreno's orientation toward Europe, see G. F. Howe, "García Moreno's Efforts to Unite Ecuador and France," *Hispanic American Historical Review,* XVI (May, 1936), pp. 257-262 and W. S. Robertson, "García Moreno's Dream of a European Protectorate," *Contribuciones para el Estudio de la Historia de América. Homenaje al Dr. Emilio Ravignani* (Buenos Aires, 1941), pp. 125-143.

In addition to encouraging Ecuador's benevolent neutrality toward the Lincoln government during our Civil War, Hassaurek faced and handled a succession of other issues. Indeed the first instruction received from his superiors in Washington informed the new minister that he had inherited a file of claims by United States citizens against Ecuador, some of which had been pending, so Seward told him, "for an unreasonably long time."[9] In line with this unfinished business was the most important thing accomplished by Hassaurek, the creation and operation of a mixed commission to handle Ecuadorian and American claims. As early as mid-1862 he began to press this matter. In due time a convention was drawn up, the ratifications of it exchanged, and the commission established, with Hassaurek the first American member.[10]

But all matters to which the diplomat turned his hand were not long-term ones, nor were they productive of significant precedents. In the autumn of 1862 the threatened invasion by expresident Urbina from a Peruvian base hurried Hassaurek down from Quito to Guayaquil, "for the purpose," he informed Seward, "of preventing, by my personal presence and influence, any depredations that might otherwise be committed on American property there."[11] When the invasion fizzled and all alarms had subsided, Hassaurek made the wearying trip back to the capital.

A Peruvian land owner, in search of a better-disciplined labor force for his plantations, initiated a suggestion which was more interesting than successful. Senor Malo's request for free Negroes from the United States, led Hassaurek to introduce the issue into his correspondence with Secretary Seward. When the latter referred the matter to the President Lincoln indicated that nothing would be done unless the government of Ecuador officially endorsed the idea of admitting numbers

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9 Seward to Hassaurek, Washington, April 30, 1861, NADS, Diplomatic Instructions, Ecuador.

10 For Hassaurek's labors regarding the mixed commission, see his despatches # 30, 37, 47, 49, 134, 140, 142, 145, 149, 178 which, dated variously between July 18, 1862, and August 18, 1865, from both Quito and Guayaquil, are in NADS, Diplomatic Despatches, Ecuador.

11 Hassaurek to Seward, Quito, November 12, 1862, NADS, Diplomatic Despatches, Ecuador.

of American Negroes as colonists. Next Hassaurek turned to Ecuadorian authorities for official reaction. That official attitude was crisp and negative when Garcia Moreno issued a decree which prohibited the landing of such immigrants.[12] Accordingly what had started out as the private proposal of one Ecuadorian citizen never became a significant piece of official business for Minister Hassaurek.

One suggestion from Seward, namely that he try to conclude a postal convention with Ecuador, never challenged Hassaurek's enthusiasm and energy. On the other hand, the young diplomat became deeply interested in something on which he had no instructions, namely asylum. The prospect of Hassaurek's playing host to the families of prominent politicians during a revolutionary flurry in 1864 encouraged him to write, "I take the liberty of suggesting that it would perhaps save many an embarrassment or trouble, if the Department were to send instructions to our Ministers in the Spanish-American states on the subject of granting asylum."[13] Hassaurek was a party to what has become commonplace. Today we all know that the question of asylum has produced a mass of international law and episodes too numerous to relate regarding Latin America.

Between July 1861 and January 1866, with time out for a trip to the United States in 1864 when he tried to win the release of a half-brother from a Confederate prison camp and when also he campaigned in behalf of Lincoln's reelection, Hassaurek had ably represented the United States in the west coast South American country. Old issues, such as claims, moved toward resolutions and new problems born of the Civil War were settled satisfactorily. At the end of his diplomatic tour, as had been the case early in it, Hassaurek deserved commendation from his superiors.

Meanwhile, in his private life, that moment that labels him scoundrel had arrived. In June, 1862, Mrs. Hassaurek and her daughter by a previous marriage left Ecuador for Cincinnati. There she instituted

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[12] For the position of the U. S. government on this issue, see the instructions # 23, 32, 66, 71 and 73 from Seward to Hassaurek in 1863-64, NADS, Diplomatic Instructions, Ecuador.

[13] Hassaurek to Seward, Quito, July 20, 1864, NADS, Diplomatic Despatches, Ecuador.

divorce proceedings, charging the diplomat with adultery. He countered that it was she who had been adulterous. The resultant court action might well have been the news sensation of early 1863 in straight-laced Cincinnati had not Hassaurek's friend Judge W. M. Dickson, with whom he had read law, quieted the matter in newspaper circles.[14] Mrs. Hassaurek won her divorce; and the Minister won the measure of consideration that spared him the necessity of resigning his diplomatic post.

Even before his return to the States early in 1866, the writer, in Hassaurek's nature, began to eclipse the diplomat. His interest in Andean history led him, in 1865, to publish an article entitled "Tupac Amaru, the Indian Martyr of Peru."[15]

Immediately upon his return to Cincinnati, Hassaurek plunged into the book-length statement of his own experience in Ecuador. Then, as now, Ecuador was neither a burning political theme nor a popular literary subject with the American public. Accordingly the eager author found it necessary to subsidize, to the extent of $500, the 1867 edition, the first printing of the book *Four Years Among Spanish-Americans.* The blow-by-blow account of the unseemly hasle that developed between Hassaurek and his New York publisher, like the colorful divorce action to which he had been a party, can be found in the Hassaurek Papers in The Ohio Historical Society.

Four Years Among Spanish-Americans, which more accurately could have been titled *Four Years Among the Ecuadorians,* is the basis of Hassaurek's claim to a reputation as a scholar. For many reasons, only a few of which I shall attempt to develop for you now, the book is peculiarly interesting. In point of time it coincides with the opening years of a significant era in Ecuadorian life. In point of subject-matter it exhibits remarkable balance between the land and the people, between trifles of the moment and imperishable fundamentals. On at least three counts certain portions of the book are predictable on the basis of the author's nature. The ex-Austrian's love of mountains is

[14] Hassaurek to [Judge W. M. Dickson], Quito, March 6, 1863, Friedrich Hassaurek Papers, The Ohio Historical Society offers a candid and full statement of the marital troubles of the Hassaureks.

[15] *Gazlay's Pacific Monthly,* II No. 1 (July, 1865), pp. 9-19.

lavished on Chimborazo, Cotopaxi, Antisana and scores of lesser peaks. His love of the United States manifests itself when he compares the two countries politically and economically. The civilian and journalist in him shines through when he deplores the shortage of printing presses and the abundance of military barracks. The ardent democrat in his nature caused Hassaurek to shake his head disapprovingly at the Ecuadorian emphasis on personalities at the expense of principles.

Because he liked people and also because he noted that most previous writers had concentrated on the landscape of Ecuador, Hassaurek focused on "the character, the social and domestic life, the political institutions and troubles of the inhabitants."[16] With the lot of the Indian, he sympathized. "The Indian does more work than all the other races together," Hassaurek insisted, "but his position in the social scale is in an inverse proportion to his usefulness . . . The word Indian is a term of contempt, even among Indians themselves . . ."[17]

At times Hassaurek's writing is simple narrative, as when he describes the colorful Otavalo Indians or the pesky fleas. On other occasions he introduces his reader to complex and interlocking issues, as when he wrote, "In the lowlands, the great and almost insurmountable drawback is the want of laborers, owing to the thinness of the population, the enervating effects of the climate, the system of peonage and the unsettled state of the country with continual revolutions and impressments."[18]

All in all, Hassaurek's *Four Years Among Spanish-Americans* is a happy combination of observation and reflection, of the general and the specific, of the land and the people, of the social, the economic and the political. Its thematic construction attests considerable labor on the author's part. As though to compensate for the occasional tediously long sentence—possibly telltale evidence of his Austrian origins—Hassaurek's writing reeks with colorful adjectives and precise planning. The book is, I submit, easily the best travel assessment of nineteenth-century Ecuador by a citizen of the United States. Today, 100 years

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[16] F. Hassaurek, *Four Years Among Spanish-Americans* (New York, 1867), iii.

[17] *Ibid.*, p. 188.

[18] *Ibid.*, pp. 16-17.

after its initial publication, Hassaurek's volume offers help to the student of Ecuadorian life, whether his interest be geography, government, society, history, economics or literature.

While in South America, Hassaurek had nosed about in more than one Ecuadorian archive, hoping that the materials he rounded up would support the writing of several significant historical studies. On one occasion, unsuccessfully, he asked Secretary of State Seward to shift him from the post in Quito to that in Lima, because he had sifted the Ecuadorian archives and wanted access to those of Peru.[19] However, Hassaurek's plans to produce a history of the Spanish colonial system and a biography of Simon Bolivar never materialized. Two of the insurmountable obstacles that beset his onetime enthusiasm for those major projects were the following: the less than enthusiastic reception accorded the volume of his own experiences, which, you will recall, had been attended by prolonged bickering with his publisher, and, secondly, Hassaurek's reimmersion in the task of supporting himself, which meant a return to journalism. Still, though, the man who had known a memorable South American experience could not dismiss that region completely from his thinking. Accordingly a third by-product of his stay in Ecuador emerged in 1879, in the form of a romance, when he published the *The Secret of the Andes*.[20]

Meanwhile, reestablished in Cincinnati and publishing another German-language newspaper, Hassaurek became a bitter critic of Republican Reconstruction policies. While on a honeymoon trip to Europe, with his third wife, in 1885, he died in Paris.

Living on, down to this moment, for you and me, is the fact that Hassaurek the diplomat was a linguistically able man, a culturally tolerant person, a man interested in building meaningful bridges of cooperation between Latin and Anglo-America. Hassaurek the scholar, casting light into the corners of abysmal ignorance which beset his fellow-Americans on the subject of Spanish America, made a meaningful contribution toward hemispheric understanding. For these reasons, I have submitted these remarks about Friedrich Hassaurek to you on this day, April 14, Pan American Day.

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[19] Hassaurek to Seward, Guayaquil, May 1, 1865, NADS, Diplomatic Despatches, Ecuador.

[20] The setting for this tedious and sentimental work, which ran to 466 pages, was Quito, 1592.

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SOCIAL SCIENTISTS SPEAK ON COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT

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FOREWORD

This volume marks the seventh year of a cooperative program started by the late Professor J. Carson Pritchard of West Georgia College and Mr. Clyde D. Ware of the Sears-Roebuck Foundation. The purpose of the project is to make available recent thoughts, plans and information about the Social Sciences to a concerned public.

The circumstances surrounding the papers contained herein are explained in the first article by Harry Frank of the Department of Adult Education. The conception and execution of the sessions which took several social scientists to ten counties in western Georgia was done by Professor Collus O. Johnson, Department of Adult Education, West Georgia College.

A special note of appreciation is due to the Sears-Roebuck Foundation for their encouragement, the members of the West Georgia College faculty who contributed articles and efforts and to Gail Adams, Division Secretary, for her editorial assistance.

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COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT IN WEST GEORGIA: AN INTRODUCTORY NOTE

By Harry E. Frank*

An innovative approach to community development in the West Georgia area was initiated last year by the Department of Continuing Education, West Georgia College.[1] This program was carried out by utilizing West Georgia College faculty who visited various communities in an adjoining ten-county area. Follow-up courses emphasizing county and community problems were instituted as a second phase of community development. The lectures delivered form the base for this bulletin.

The community development program was directed toward assisting local citizens to look at the overall picture of the various activities in the community. As a result it was expected that the citizenry would become more aware of their local problems and possible solutions. It was assumed that any progress made in community development would depend upon individual action in groups with common beliefs, values and goals. Furthermore, it was recognized at the outset that the individuals participating would have different perceptions of community situations. The course was structured so that the varying knowledge of local persons could be utilized to supplement the theoretical concepts and generalizations brought to the group by the college consultants.

Some degree of continuity was maintained by persons from the Department of Continuing Education at West Georgia College. These persons attempted to orient the audience for each meeting by relating some of the previous meeting activities and by developing an adult atmosphere conducive to investigation of the problems relating to their community. These specialists also acted as moderators in panel discussions.

*Assistant Professor of Adult Education.

[1] Financed in part under Title I of the Higher Education Act of 1965, the funds of which were administered by the University of Georgia.

The course in each community consisted of an initial session on understanding the broad implications of community development. Other sessions focused on the study of physical features, history, economy, government, education, social conditions and community organization.

Following these sessions, one meeting was devoted to "bringing about a better community." This meeting consisted of a symposium of local persons knowledgeable in subject areas already discussed in previous meetings. Following the symposium, the participants were given the opportunity to express their perceptions of a number of items relating to community development in terms of favorable and unfavorable aspects existing in the community. They registered these opinions on a five-point continuum in each direction to indicate perceptions which were then combined for a consensus of perceptions relating to the items considered. The specific community development items considered in several community courses were: safety, human development, health, housing, human relations, business development, transportation, employment, education, recreation, religion, industrial development, community organization and coorporation, natural resources, services and government. The participants also listed what they considered to be major problem areas and possible solutions.

The disparities between the favorable and unfavorable aspects of each item considered as being important to community development and the relative frequency of major problem areas did provide an order of priorities. The results of the self-evaluation by the community participants assisted in designing programs for community improvement, recognizing that many of the problems mentioned by the participants were beyond the scope of immediate action. Preliminary steps that might lead to desirable change in the community were considered and some steps were taken toward initiating activities toward solving the most pressing problems.

The problem-solving approach to community development was used throughout these courses. The particular problem area to be considered in the session was carefully phrased, clearly defined and located in the community context. The situation was then analyzed in terms of symptoms, history, causes and trends in general and specific cases. Solutions were usually suggested and evaluated. Finally, plans for

implementation of programs to bring about the solution were discussed by the group.

A basic concept underlying the community development program was that behavior in a task situation is related to the perceptions of the task by the members involved. Many social scientists agree that perceptual differences are the result of the interaction of both environment and personal influences. Krech, Crutchfield, and Ballachey support this contention by stating that each person has an individualized image as a product of his physical and social environment, his physiological structures, his wants and goals and past experiences. Each person, therefore, has an individualized image or map of the world.[2] Hilgard stated: "Certainly one of the factors (influencing perception) and indeed an important one, is the variation in previous life experiences."[3] Bonner mentioned the importance of past experiences on perception with the following statement: "Although experience is not the sole determinent of perception, it appears valid to assume that what a person perceives is significantly influenced by his previous life experiences."[4]

The community development program was designed to be an experience for the individuals who participated. It might be considered logical that this similar experience would influence the perceptions of the individuals on the conditions that exist and therefore provide a basis for common effort to solve community problems. Krech, Crutchfield, and Ballachey give a basis for expecting similar perception from persons classified in similar experience groups by the following quotation:

> Although no two persons have precisely the same conception of the world there are many common features in the world images of all people. This is true because they have similar nervous systems, share common wants, and cope with common problems. The cognitive worlds of the members of the certain

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2 David Krech, Richard Crutchfield, and Egerton Ballachey, *Individual in Society* (New York: McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1962), p. 17.

3 Earnest R. Hilgard, *Introduction to Psychology* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1957), p. 587.

4 Herbert Bonner, *Social Psychology: An Interdisciplinary Approach* (New York: American Book Company, 1953), p. 96.

culture group are similar to an even greater degree because of the great similarity of their wants and goals in the physical and social environment to which they are exposed and in their learning experiences.[5]

The learning experiences in this course were designed to encourage perceptual change by providing additional information and supporting interaction of participants in a favorable learning climate. This change was desired to bring about improvements in the community through the development of similar perceptions, wants, goals and desires. The direction and degree of attitude change are often deciding factors in the success of action programs to bring about community improvements. Such changes may be induced by additional information and group interaction under proper learning conditions.

Based upon group learning principles a number of conditions were fulfilled. The situational factors, source, medium and content were directed toward making cognitive information more acceptable to the participants. The advantages, therefore, of having group meetings under the auspicies of the college could be justified on the basis of recognized expertise. This expertise was extended to the local situation by involvement of locally accepted experts who served as reaction panel members and group discussion participants. Community group meetings were conducted in order to capitalize on the additional influence of additudinal development in groups. [6] It has been accepted by leading authorities that attitudes developed in groups tend to agree with group attitudes.[7] Commitments by individuals in the group also tend to fix the attitudes of that individual so that he is resistant to change. The group meetings also allowed more face-to-face presentation of information which has been found to be of more importance in bringing about perceptual change than mass media presentations.

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[5] Krech, Crutchfield and Ballachey, *Individual in Society,* p. 18.

[6] Floyd L. Ruch, *Psychology and Life,* (Glenville, Illinois: Scott Foresman and Company, 1967), p. 558.

[7] Muzofer Sherif, "Group Influences on the Formation of Norms and Attitudes" in Joseph F. Perez, Richard C. Sprinthall, George S. Grosser and Paul J. Anderson (eds.), *Selected Readings in General Psychology* (Princeton, New Jersey: Van Nostrand, Inc., 1967) pp. 391-393.

The form and content of the information provided at these meetings by the college consultants was well organized and the content was related to a particular geographic area and a particular group of citizens. This style therefore made the information more acceptable to participants and more conducive to perceptual change.

Participants utilized as resource persons and participants entering the discussion developed some degree of responsibility toward the group as a semi-official of that group. This assumption of a leadership position tended to increase the acceptance of the group perceptions by these individuals and therefore increased the effectiveness of the group in instituting community development activities based upon consensus.

In summary, it seems that the programs were effective in bringing to the attention of persons in the community various prospects of community development. This was accomplished through a presentation of generalization by the consultants from West Georgia College and then focusing upon local situations that were brought to the attention of the group by knowledgeable individuals in the community. The prestige of the faculty members and knowledgeable persons in the community assisted in the acceptance of the information presented. The content presented and procedures followed seem to help solidify perceptions of problems of importance in the community. Specific problem areas that needed attention in community development were identified and priority ratings of the items to be worked upon determined. The entire program seemed to bring about a change in the perceptions of the major problems relating to community development by the citizens in the area. This course has been followed by development activities such as Group Leadership Training and the formation of the local study groups. These activities have developed to further investigate problem items and make plans for future programs to bring about community improvement. Although a series of eight two-hour meetings could not be expected to bring about great changes in community development, the purpose of stimulating inquiry into the local community, the development of skills in bringing about effective local participation and an understanding of the overall view of the processes of community development seemed to have been accomplished.

A RATIONALE FOR COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT

By J. Mark Miller*

For the past decade there has been a great deal of talk about and some action taken on community development. However, before a discussion and action can begin, one needs an understanding of what is meant by community development.

Since words, things, and objects take on a meaning only as a person attaches meaning from his own experiences and his own frame of reference, people view things differently. Thus, several "definitions" of community development seem appropriate. According to one writer community development includes, "any action taken by an agency and primarily designed to benefit the community."[1] Others have said that, "community development is a social process by which human beings can become more competent to live with and gain some control over local aspects of a frustrating and changing world."[2] Community development can also be considered as a process or as "a planned and organized effort to assist individuals to acquire the attitudes, skills, and concepts required for their democratic participation in the effective solution of as wide a range of community improvement problems as possible. . ."[3] A somewhat similar definition is that community development is ". . . a movement designed to promote better living for the whole community with the active participation and the initiative of the community."[4]

*Chairman, Division of Business and Economic Studies.

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[1] T. R. Batten, *Communities and Their Development,* (London: Oxford University Press, 1957), p. 2.

[2] William W. and Toureide Biddle, *The Community Development Process, The Rediscovery of Local Initiative,* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1965), p. 78.

[3] J. D. Mezirow, "Community Development as an Educational Process," *Community Development* (Washington: National Training Laboratories, 1961), p. 16.

[4] A Study Conference at Hartwell House, Aylesbury, Buckinghamshire, England, September, 1957, *Community Development* (London: Her Majesty's Stationary Office, 1958), p. 2.

Although the foregoing definitions are quite comprehensive, they do not seem to emphasize one main point. That point is the *totality* of community development. Thus, a more comprehensive definition appears desirable. From the point of view of this paper, community development is a continual social process through which the total resources are developed, utilized and maintained for the betterment of the community. From this definition it can be seen that the process calls for continuous plans, programs, and action involving the human, natural, physical, and capital resources. This definition should emphasize that the development must be continuous.

Although community development begins with an understanding of its meaning, the community will never develop unless it starts with people—people interacting for the good of the community. Regardless of the abundance of the mineral resources and natural resources or of the physical and capital resources, no community can begin to develop unless there are people. Thus, the greatest resource in the world is people. For effective community development, people must get involved. They must study, discuss, and *work* together.[5]

For the past several years many may have felt that in certain areas of development, the world has been going backward rather than moving ahead. Many have lost touch in participating in community affairs. This becomes especially true as government grows larger. Yet, most believe in democracy and would do anything to keep free government by the people. It may even be true that democracy is suffering because many people in their own communities have not taken the opportunity to practice it. Some who have had the opportunity have abdicated their responsibility. They need to regain the sense of working together.

Consider the man who has read a great deal about golf. He would like to play and he thinks he could. He also knows that all the books about golf will not make him a golfer. Talking with golfers will not make him one. He has to get some clubs and balls and a course on which to play. He also needs to match up with other men and play the

[5] The main ideas here are from Hartwell Daley, *Gateways to Growth: A Study Course on Community and Area Resources Development,* Division of Research Department of Industry and Natural Resources, (Charlottetown, Prince Edward Isle, Canada, n.d.), pp. 1-8.

game. Only then will he have the real satisfaction of clouting the ball. Many people today seem to be ready to make democracy more than high-sounding phrases about freedom. They are ready to get the feeling of playing the game.

Some time ago a citizen said to one of his neighbors, 'This is an awful thing to say, but I wish the war might be continued.' Of course the neighbor thought the citizen was kidding. But the citizen went on to say, 'During the war my neighbors and I got together several evenings a week to learn to be wardens, fire fighters, first-aid people and airplane spotters. We got to know each other for the first time and we learned to work together. True, the war hung over us like a black cloud. But for the first time most of us felt really useful.'[6] These people got the feel of working together for a common cause. They felt useful and they were useful. One way in which people can work together to be useful is through community development. They can put democracy to work at their own community level.

Looking back into history, one holds the forefathers in awe as he thinks about frontiers that had to be conquered. There must have been something romantic about conquering early frontiers. For many, it seems that the frontiers have vanished. There are those that feel that adventure went out with the frontier. In some ways this might be true, in other ways it is not. Each individual has a frontier all his own. There are new possibilities about which to learn. Every community has frontiers of its own. It can create new programs, add new responsibilities and develop new resources. To venture into community development is to journey into new adventures and new frontiers. Today's frontiers are just as exciting and rewarding as those of yesteryear.

Although the place to start community development is with people many people will not do much unless they see a need for action. Before looking for a need, it would be well if some commonplace notions were dispelled. One such notion is that some communities do not need to be improved. Most would admit that utopias are rare. Those who feel that their communities are good enough use this as an excuse for inaction. There are few communities that cannot stand toning up.

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[6] *Ibid.*, p. 2.

Secondly, some people might say that even if a community needs improving, there is nothing that can be done about it. There is no truth in the statement that communities cannot change. There are hundreds of visible examples. To begin programs of community development individuals can assure themselves that communities can be improved. Consider the following case history.[7]

McCleary is a small town in the state of Washington. It was "on the way out" as a place to live and work. In 1955, the people of McCleary decided to see if anything could be done. A large group of people studied the town and discussed its problems. Objectives were set, committees were organized and plans were developed. At the end of the first year the *Seattle Times* noted that McCleary had collected enough money to finish the Mark E. Reed Hospital. The town cemetery had been cleared and fenced by volunteers. An old hotel had been transformed into modern apartments. A new supermarket was being built and dozens of homes had been painted and otherwise improved.

In the next few years the town completed an addition to a school building, replaced the town hall shack with a $90,000 structure, erected a new Veterans of Foreign Wars hall where an old warehouse had been torn down and created new jobs at a new woodworking mill. All of this in a short period of time in a community which the *Seattle Times* called "The Town that Wouldn't be Buried." At the end of the first year one of McCleary's local leaders, Ellsworth Curran, chairman of the community development group, stated,

> We have rejuvenated the basic principles of democracy. We have learned by joining together in sharing our thinking and our own efforts we are able to take our destiny into our own hands and mold it ourselves. We have learned that each of us, regardless of age, wealth, religion, or station in life, is an important part of his community. No longer is it necessary to sit idly by hoping for some outside force to create the changes we would have—now we can do them for ourselves.[8]

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[7] *Ibid.*, pp. 7-8.
[8] *Ibid.*, p. 8.

The moral to prove, if it indeed needed to be proved, is that the greatest need in any community is for people who believe that the thoughts and the efforts of local people are the best instruments for starting change for the better. The people who live and work in an area or community have within their power to make the kind of community they want. Of course, this does not mean that experts and specialists from the outside cannot be helpful and necessary. They can and may be. It does mean, however, that there is not one who will benefit more from improvements than the people who live and work in a community. There is none who has greater interest. And there is none who more thoroughly understands the strengths and weaknesses of the community.

Experience has shown that the greatest community need is for people who are concerned enough to work with other people to bring about improvements. Communities are going to change. Whether the change is for better depends upon concerned people working together to bring about the development, utilization, and maintenance of the total resources.

THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT IN COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT

By Doyle Mathis*

Whether community development is to be attempted, and to what extent, are matters for the citizens of each community to decide. However, whatever the problems or whatever the goals concerning community development, it is very likely that government—either local, state, or national—will play a big part in any successful action undertaken. The purpose of this paper is to discuss matters concerning government that usually assist in community development, if development is desired by the citizens of the community.

Americans expect and even demand much from government, and if these expectations and demands are not met by local governments the people then look to state and national governments for action. "The ever increasing urbanization of our Nation, and the constant demand for more and better governmental services have placed new and heavy burdens on all governments, but especially on local governments."[1] Many problems are carried to Washington simply because lower levels of government have failed to take effective measures.[2] Local governments should be able to solve many community problems but they are often too weak to accomplish much.

If local governments are to be really effective in community development they must be strengthened extensively. Senator Edmund S. Muskie of Maine states, "If federalism, as we know it, is to continue, it is essential that we have strong, active State and local governments."[3] The Chamber of Commerce of the United States contends that, "Unless local government is revitalized, our political and economic systems, as

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[1] *Congressional Record,* 90 Cong., 1 Sess., Vol. 113, No. 152 (Sept. 26, 1967).

[2] Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, *Metropolitan America: Challenge to Federalism* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1966), pp. 117-18; V. O. Key, Jr., *Politics, Parties, and Pressure Groups* (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Co., 1964), p. 311.

[3] *Congressional Record,* 90 Cong., 1 Sess., Vol. 113, No. 209 (Jan. 2, 1968).

we now know them, will have little chance to solve public problems effectively. Governments of yesteryear must be remodeled to fit not only today's, but also tomorrow's needs."[4]

The Chamber suggests that the effectiveness of local political systems should be measured by considering the following questions:

1. Are local governments large enough in area and population to act effectively on community problems and opportunities?
2. Are they willing and able to raise sufficient revenue equitably?
3. Are they willing and able to adjust boundaries to meet changing conditions?
4. Are they organized to handle effectively a variety of functions?
5. Are they accessible to and controllable by the people they serve?
6. Are they able to attract qualified public servants?

"NO" answers to these questions can mean serious governmental problems. In that case, action is needed.[5]

If Americans really believe in local control of essentially local activities, local governments must be strengthened. The best way to bring about centralization of governmental activities at the state and national level is to allow local governments to remain weak. On the other hand, the best way to prevent centralization of governmental activities is to strengthen local governments and show more interest in local political affairs. Voter turnout for local elections is quite low in relation to state and especially presidential elections.[6] If local governments are to be strengthened there needs to be a marked increase in citizen interest and support.

Some may say that our local governments have served "satisfactorily" for a long time but who is to say that we could not have done better. It now appears very likely that what has been "good enough" in the past will not be nearly adequate for the future, or even at present,

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[4] Chamber of Commerce of the United States, *Modernizing Local Government* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1967), p. 6.

[5] *Ibid.*, p. 9.

[6] V. O. Key, *Politics, Parties, and Pressure Groups,* (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Co., 1964), pp. 579-80.

in this fast changing world. The world is unlikely to slow down to allow us to keep up. Therefore, we must be ready to move with the times, while the opportunities are available. Three possible ways to strengthen local governments for more efficient and effective handling of problems are through *political unification, consolidation of functions,* and *administrative reforms.*

First, political unification needs to be accomplished. A major problem throughout most of the United States is an excessive number of small, weak local governments. In Georgia much of the problem rests on the large number of counties, second only to Texas, and the fact that so many activities and services are established along county boundaries. Many of the 159 counties have so few people and so few resources, and therefore are so weak, that they are able to accomplish very little for their citizens.

One of the best ways to strengthen local governments is to decrease the number of local governmental units—consolidate. Large areas often have the same or similar problems and goals. There seems to be little reason why the several local governments of these areas can not be brought together as a single political unit.

A second way of strengthening local governments is through the consolidation of certain activities and services. This is not to form a larger political unit but is a milder form of unification. Already in Georgia regional health centers and regional libraries have been established. Provision has been made for the possible consolidation of school systems across county lines with voter approval. Consolidation of functions among local governments could well be used in numerous other areas, such as streets and highways, water, fire protection, police protection, zoning, industrial parks, and renewal.

Either type of consolidation should help to develop more workable programs, obtain more qualified personnel, and achieve better results. Political unification is probably the better method but functional consolidation might be more acceptable to the citizens.

A third way by which local governments could be much strengthened from within is through administrative reforms. Often, there is no single individual to provide unity—no chief executive or chief adminis-

trator. This is especially true in most county governments and in commission form municipal governments. There is often no unity among different officers or departments. It may not be clearly known who is responsible for certain activities. Local government records are usually scattered in several locations rather than having a central record center where newer technology and procedures could be utilized. What if businesses were run this way?

In a democracy, the chief policy-making or law-making body should be elected by and responsible to the electorate. Then, there should be a chief executive either elected by the people or appointed by and responsible to the policy-making body. In the case of a city or county manager, the policy-making body should be able to employ and dismiss the administrator. The legislative body elected by the people should establish policies only and leave administration, the responsibility of carrying out the policies, to the administrator.

The activities and services of the local governments should be divided into departments, and most, if not all, current officers and activities should be placed in regular departments. Most employees should be chosen through a merit system, ordinarily in competition with others. They should then be assigned to the departments and placed under the supervision of a single department head, who in turn would be responsible to the chief administrator.

Through this line of authority all ultimately would be responsible to the people. The electorate would choose the policy-making body, this group or the electorate would choose the chief executive, and other employees would be responsible to that administrator. This line of authority, resting on the people, places all citizens in a very important position. Because of this important position the citizenry should be well informed on political matters and should participate in political activities such as discussing issues, voting, campaigning and running for office.

To have efficient and effective work, employees should be of high caliber, paid well, and given reason to be well satisfied and proud of their positions. Police departments could bring prestige for their positions through recruitment of good men and the taking of pride in doing an outstanding job. Good pay and excellent training are essential

for good police departments today. Law enforcement officials must become familiar with new techniques of crime prevention and detection and also new legal requirements placed on them by the courts, as the courts attempt to insure the individual rights of those accused of crime.

Once our local governments have been improved by some of the ways mentioned they should be given the authority to act decisively on the problems at hand. Even when local governments are ready to meet a problem we often find that they do not have the resources or the legal authority to act. They must then go to the state for support or authority, even to the point of making many amendments to the state constitution. In general, local governments should be given home rule to take actions not in violation of specific provisions of the state constitution or state law. There is a special need to provide local governments with greater financial resources.

> Strong local government, responsive to the needs of its citizens, is the foundation of an enduring federal form of government; and . . . sound and adequate finances are an essential ingredient of governmental strength. Since states create local governments and determine their share of the governing role, they must see to it that local governments possess financial resources to match their responsibilities.[7]

Strong local governments should be able to meet many of the problems which hamper communities throughout the nation. Among the problems faced are the deterioration of homes and businesses and the haphazard spread of homes, businesses, and industry into suburban and rural areas. Slum houses, vacant stores, offices, and factories are not only eye-sores and result in losses to the property owners but they also mean losses in taxes for the support of local governments. Local government planning and action can do much to alleviate these conditions through building codes, zoning, renewal, and meeting traffic and parking problems. As homes, businesses, and industries begin to locate in suburban and former rural areas, planning, zoning, and building codes should be developed by counties or larger areas.

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[7] Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, 1966 *State Legislative Program* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1965), p. 1.

One of the problems causing the deterioration of towns and cities is the relocation of middle class families outside city limits. In most cases, this problem could and should be settled by the expansion of the city limits. It is not fair to allow people to work and shop in the cities using city streets and services and pay so little for the upkeep of the city. There could be a city sales tax, payroll tax, or other charges levied on such persons but city expansion seems to be a practical solution. If the largest city or town in an area deteriorates the entire area may be ruined.

An accompanying problem of some areas is the ownership of slums by rather wealthy persons. Stricter housing codes should be able to solve much of this problem.

In many areas, some local persons do not want to develop their communities. They do not seem to realize that development will ordinarily improve conditions for them rather than crowd them out through competition providing these persons are meeting satisfactory standards. If they are not meeting satisfactory standards it will be to the advantage of the community for them to be forced by competition to change.

It is expected that local governments will provide numerous services in the communities. In order to grow or even to maintain population, to bring in business and industry, or to bring people to fill positions, many services are desirable. Where these services are already provided in towns and cities there may be a need to extend them into suburban and rural areas. Among the services that may be needed are: adequate educational opportunities, streets, highways, and parking areas, police protection, fire protection, water, garbage collection, parks and recreation facilities, public transportation systems and industrial parks.

Businesses, industries, and people looking for new homes are often interested in the services and activities of local governments. However, some of the better companies do not want a lot for nothing and it is sometimes risky and imprudent to grant extensive tax exemptions or free services to attract industry. In any case, businesses and industries should be required to meet at least minimum health and safety standards. Local governments could make the desirable services available and help

create a climate suitable for the properous growth and development of both new and old businesses and industries.

The services expected of local governments are often quite expensive. Therefore, one of the big problems of these governments is to find and tap the financial resources necessary to pay for the desired activities. Tax equalization and re-evaluation are two desired sources. Many communities may not be able to afford all the services they would like to have their local governments provide. In this case, they will need to consider what they are willing to pay and then choose those activities they want most. Although good services cost much they often pay off in time. For example, a good school system is usually considered well worth the expense.

In summary, nine steps that might be taken to modernize local governments have been recommended.

1. The number of local governments in the United States, now about 80,000, should be reduced by at least 80 per cent.
2. The number of overlapping layers of local government found in most states should be severely curtailed.
3. Popular election should be confined to members of the policy-making body, and to the chief executive in those governments where the "strong mayor" form is preferred to the "council-manager" plan.
4. Each local unit should have a single chief executive, either elected by the people or appointed by the local legislative body, with all administrative agencies and personnel fully responsible to him; election of department heads should be halted.
5. Personnel practices based on merit and professional competence should replace the personal or partisan "spoils" systems found in most countries and local units.
6. County modernization should be pressed with special vigor, since counties—everywhere except in New England—have high but undeveloped potential for solving the problems of rural, urban, and most metropolitan communities.
7. Once modernized, local governments should be entrusted with broad legal powers permitting them to plan, finance, and

execute programs suited to the special needs, interests, and desires of their citizens.

8. The 50 state constitutions should be revamped—either by legislative amendment or through constitutional conventions concentrating on local government modernization—to provide for boundary revisions, extensions of legal authority, and elimination of needless overlapping layers.
9. The terms and conditions of federal and state grants-in-aid should be revised to encourage the changes recommended in this statement.[8]

Many people tend to complain when government takes on additional activities, but then government often is blamed when things seem to go wrong—even though no government may have been given the authority or support to act. If given sufficient support, the government can do much for a community, but we should not expect government to successfully meet all of our problems.

[8] Committee for Economic Development, *Modernizing Local Government* (New York, 1966), pp. 17-19.

THE ROLE OF ECONOMICS IN COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT

By James W. Adams*

The development of the local economy represents a major facet of the overall task of community development. Many of the problems and decisions encountered in community development activity revolve around considerations of costs and benefits and thus address themselves, either in part or in entirety, to economics. Economics is a tool to be applied in the solution of community development problems and its role is vital.

The treatment here can not be exhaustive by any means. Many considerations important to the problem of community development have been omitted or were treated quite briefly in an attempt to adapt the subject material to the scope and objective of this particular presentation. Some fundamental considerations and principles of general applicability in the economic problem of community development have been dealt with here. Only in the case of industrial development is a particular type of resource development given special treatment. This seems warranted because of the overwhelming emphasis upon industrial development generally in the overall economic development effort. In all other cases—even that of tourism, which is receiving increasing attention because of its community development potential—the specifics of resource development are subsumed under the treatment of resource development in general.

In an attempt to treat the economic problems in community development one begins by gathering relevant facts concerning the economy. The Committee for Economic Development has pointed out: "The first step toward meeting the public problems of an area is detailed knowledge of its economic base. Knowledge about the economic base is essential to sound public decisions . . ."[1] Since the task of economic development of the community is largely that of achieving the most

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[1] Charles M. Tiebout, *The Community Economic Base Study, Supplementary Paper No.* 16 (Washington: Committee for Economic Development, December, 1962), p. 11.

efficient utilization of the community's resources, a study of the community economy is necessary to determine what its resources are and how they are being utilized. Such a study is commonly called an economic base study.

A community's economic base may be described as consisting of those activities which result from the utilization of the community's resources, from which are derived the basic unemployment and income upon which the rest of the local economy depends.[2] The primary objective of an economic base study is to develop information which can be used by the community in solving local problems and in making better decisions about matters which will improve the welfare of the community's citizens and enhance their economic opportunities. The base study must attempt to identify basic sources of employment and income and provide an understanding of the source and level of all employment and income in the community. This entails, of course, the identification of the community's resources and an evaluation of the efficiency of their utilization.

The relevant economic factors deserving study and evaluation of any community or area development effort fall basically into those which are quantitative and those which are largely qualitative. The quantitative factors describe the level of economic activity within an area; the qualitative factors describe the structure and quality of the area's economic base. To provide a well-balanced perspective of a community's economic base, no study can afford to over-emphasize one of these two categories to the neglect of the other.

The former has reference to those factors which are measurable. These are economic indicators or statistical indices of the economic behavior of an area. Examples are figures such as per capita income, total wages and salaries, employment level, retail sales, local tax revenues, expenditures, bank time and demand deposits, agricultural production, industrial production, measurable volumes of certain resources such as timber, land, ores (if known) and electrical power capacity. Periodic study of these quantitative measures is vital to the

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 9.

understanding of community needs and problems because they describe the economic well-being (welfare) of the citizens and the volume of economic activity which indicates the economic health of the business community.

The qualitative factors in the community's economic base can not be measured but are, nonetheless, important economic factors which must be appraised or assessed. Examples are adequacy of labor supply other than quantity, character of leadership, transportation services, proximity to metropolitan or urban areas, prevailing political climate, climatic conditions, character or adequacy of certain of the quantifiable factors (for example, fertility of soil, type of timber, etc.) and available social overhead capital in the form of community services and facilities such as adequacy of sewage systems, water systems, streets and roads, police and fire protection, extent and adequacy of educational facilities and services.

While the economic problems of a community often appear to be couched in terms of employment and income, these are merely symptoms of more fundamental problems. Generally, the problems of community development may be traced to the quantity and quality of resources available for the community's use and to certain long-prevailing conditions such as the composition of the economic activities in the community. Thus the economic development of the community is concerned primarily with efficient resource utilization in the community.

If one is to improve resource utilizaton he must understand that the resource base of the community economy may be divided into three categories: (1) physical resources, (2) human resources, and (3) capital resources. These correspond roughly to the traditional division of resources in economics, namely, land, labor, and capital.

The employment of these resources tends to be determined by our system of markets and prices. They will be employed in those uses where their owners receive the greatest reward. This tendency, the result of fundamental economic forces, suggests what is frequently the basis of the community's economic problem, that is, the "most profitable employment" of the community's resources is often outside the community. This explains why many communities are losing their best-trained, most promising young people, as well as other valuable resources.

Their employment in the community is simply not as rewarding as it is somewhere else outside of the community. As long as this situation prevails, the community can only expect to lose these resources. Although this resource exodus might be construed as favorable and economically justifiable from the perspective of overall economic activity on an interregional level, it contributes to the slow death of a particular small community. Why should these resources not move elsewhere seeking a higher return when the alternative offered by the community is nothing more than unemployment or underemployment?

An unemployed resource is one which is lying idle. An underemployed resource is one which, while being used in productive employment, is not being used to the full extent of its productive potential. For example, a college-trained accountant wishing to remain in his home community finds he must accept a clerical job in the payroll office of the local lumber company. If he were willing to move away he would have an opportunity to make full use of his skill and training and earn a much higher return. This represents a gross underutilization of resources, but one not at all uncommon to communities where the potential for full resource employment does not exist.

In the process of production, resources have a complementary relationship. Virtually no product is the result of a single resource used in the production process. For example, we cannot use our timber in production without using labor and capital, and vice-versa. Recognition of this complementary relationship suggests a possible approach to the solution of the resource unemployment-underemployment delemma. If a community possesses competent and trained labor, efforts should be concentrated upon the development of other resources, heretofore idle. Joint use might permit an employment of the labor at least as profitable as competing employment outside the community.

Here, then, is established a basic case for seeking new industry and thus concern with the whole field of activity termed industrial development. By seeking and obtaining new industry, a community may bring in highly essential capital resources which may now result in a much more efficient utilization of heretofore unutilized or underutilized human and physical resources in the community. Community leaders might concentrate on capital resources to implement the sound investment ideas which will enhance economic development.

Setting the stage for this better utilization of resources might entail the encouragement of more diversity in economic activity among product lines or among industrial operations in general. Also, the improvement of transportation systems and facilities will greatly enhance resource use. Certainly improvements in the public sector are obviously in the interest of better resource use. Some of these are public services such as schools, libraries, fire and police protection, improved streets, sewage and water systems and administration of available funds. A community which undertakes to increase its stock of such social overhead capital can expect to realize a much greater return on the other resources employed.

The economic standard of efficiency may be applied in establishing orders or priorities among the types of community improvements possible to improve its social overhead capital. Obviously, that improvement which would provide the greatest benefit to the community should be undertaken first and continued as long as the project will yield more benefit to the community than the next most beneficial project. Theoretically, maximum benefit, efficiency and equilibrium is reached when an "ounce of effort" yields no more on any one project than it does on any other,—that is, the benefit to effort ratio of each category of improvement is equal to each other one.[3]

For example, community leaders may feel that the most beneficial community improvement project would be water and sewage projects. But, there is a point beyond which additional efforts spent in improving water and sewage systems will yield less benefit for the community than the same effort would yield when spent in some other type of improvement such as, say, a recreational facility.

Generally speaking, the greater the use of local resources in local business activities, the greater the benefit to the community through a larger volume of income flow providing the same services can not be purchased outside the area at a lower price. For example, if the capital to build a new factory is provided from outside the area, then payments to the owners of that capital will flow outside the area and, therefore,

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[3] Gene A. Bramlett, "The Community Economy," A paper presented to the Community Development Workshop (University of Georgia Center for Continuing Education, Athens,Georgia, September 5-15, 1967).

not be available for local consumption, saving, or investment. The more services and products the community affords locally for purchase with the payments from the resources used locally, the greater will be the income flow and the healthier the community economy.

The simple mechanics of the development of the community economy may be shown by adapting Charles M. Tiebout's simple model illustrating the "local multiplier" effect.[4] Assume a hypothetical town, Minetown. Obviously, before Minetown existed, the income stream is zero. Then someone discovers a copper vein, and Minetown has its economic origins. At first, ore is exported and receipts are used to import mining equipment and consumer goods. Dollars gained in production are lost to purchase necessary imports. Eventually the grocer, the hardware merchant, the barber, the tavern keeper, and other local service enterprises arrive. Now both the size and destination of the income flow are affected. Whereas dollars previously flowed out of Minetown, they now go to local merchants. As more dollars change hands, the income stream swells somewhat but does not expand by the total amount of the purchases made locally. In turn, there is an outflow of many of the sales dollars taken in by merchants to pay for the goods sold. Significantly enough, however, the income stream has risen. This rise in the income stream is generated by the multiplier effect. For example, suppose $.50 of the local income dollar is spent in Minetown. All of this $.50 will not be retained, however, since merchants and others who receive it will also spend some of it outside; say they keep $.40. This means that $.50 x .40 = $.20 will ultimately remain in Minetown and $.80 of each dollar will ultimately flow out. The ratio of the income dollar ultimately lost to that ultimately retained is $.80 to $.20 or 4 to 1. A 4 to 1 ratio means that for each four dollars entering the local income stream, a one-dollar net increase will result; or for each one dollar, 25 cents will be added. Now, in the true sense of the word, a community economy exists. "To the extent that local services are provided in production thereby providing income to residents, and goods and services are available locally to spend the income, it is to that extent that there will be a community economy."[5]

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[4] Tiebout, pp. 27-28.

[5] Bramlett, "The Economic Community."

While economic development in its broader sense concerns itself with all phases of the community's economic activity, it is true that the overwhelming emphasis in economic development is increasingly upon industrial development activity. The promotion of regional economic growth or development is concerned with efforts to get new manufacturing or processing plants established or with encouragement for expansion of existing plants.

Why should this be true when many communities have long been characterized by agrarian. Should such communities continue to be concentrating their economic development efforts on agriculture and related activities rather than on industrial development? Industrial development is preferred because a given expenditure in this type of economic activity will tend to result in a greater contribution to the income stream than would be the case if expended in agricultural development. Also, it permits a diversification in the local economy and removes some of the vulnerability resulting from dependence upon a single type of economic activity.

Sampson and Farris, in discussing aspects of economic development in *Domestic Transportation,* observe:

> This emphasis on industrialization, which has almost made industrialization synonomous with growth or development, apparently is based on two assumptions. One, relative demand factors or terms of trade are such that more value is added by manufacturing than by agriculture or extractive enterprises, thus more manufacturing means more regional income. Two, more economic diversification means regional stability or less susceptibility to cyclical economic fluctuations or the impacts of particular declining industries.[6]

With its acceleration, industrial development activity in recent years has very rapidly become highly technical. No longer can local communities expect to compete for new industry on a "catch as catch can" basis. Effecting a wedding between a community's offer and an industry's needs is both an art and a science, requiring professional

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[6] Roy J. Sampson and Martin T. Farris, *Domestic Transportation: Practice Theory and Policy* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1966), p. 212.

expertise. More and more communities are employing professionals in this area or using the services and technical staff of some outside industrial development group.

In the existing competitive struggle for new industry community leaders can ill afford not to use professional assistance. The cost of ineptitude can be high. One industry lost because of the lack of expertise in selling the prospect on the potential location can be extremely costly to the community in potential employment and income. Unless they possess skill and experience in this particular activity, community development leaders tend to insist on selling the thing about the community which they like best rather than what the industrialists want. In the words of one professional industrial developer, "the industrialist buys with his eyes rather than with his ears,"[7] and thus is no easy prey to a community's sales pitch.

Failure to take advantage of professional assistance in attempting to locate new industry is hardly excusable. Liberal assistance in consulting in providing contacts with prospective industrialists as well as in development planning can be readily obtained. Such organizations as the State Chamber of Commerce and, in Georgia, the Department of Industry and Trade, the several University System-maintained community and industrial development organizations, and the various area planning and development commissions are available for aid. Public utility companies, railroads, and some large banks maintain staffs of specialists in industrial development whose services can be utilized for local assistance.

W. Paul Brann, Vice-President, First Arkansas Development Corporation, a recognized expert in economic development, suggests three criteria of primary concern to industrialists seeking plant locations. The first must measure the *quality* of a community and includes schools, government stability, taxes, planning and zoning, housing, community facilities and services, character of community as reflected by leadership organization and aggressiveness. The second is concerned with strategic advantage. This relates to available buildings, sites, resources, markets.

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[7] Penn Worden, "Industrial Development in Georgia," A paper presented to the Community Development Workshop (University of Georgia Center for Continuing Education, Athens, Georgia, September 5-15, 1967).

and labor. The third criteria concerns negotiating ability or bargaining power. Examples of such factors are financing, taxation, sites, buildings, to be provided by the community as an inducement for location, or research.

When community developers have gotten, to their satisfaction, a clear-cut idea concerning what industry is seeking in terms of location on the one hand and what their community has to offer on the other hand, they must realistically face up to a decision concerning whether industry-seeking would be a worthwhile endeavor. In the light of the current race to bring in industry, the consideration of such a question might appear somewhat unorthodox but, if an objective evaluation reveals that the community is currently in no position to meet the needs of additional industry, to continue exerting effort in this direction is a mere waste of energy and resources. The effort might best be diverted to changing the conditions which seem to limit further industry expansion.

In addition to the discouraging effect of inadequate community services and public facilities, a less recognizable, but no less important, hindrance to successful industrial development activity is poor rapport between community leaders and leaders of existing industry. To be more specific, many communities spend too much time and money seeking new industry and too little time and money nourishing the industry they already have. The result is that new industrial prospects may be discouraged from locating in the community by talking to existing industrialists who have been neglected or taken for granted by the community leaders in their race to locate new ones. Other evidence of a lack of rapport between these two elements is the existence of a notable gap between what the community leadership say that their community offers industry and what existing industries say that it offers. Until the views of the two groups can become reasonably compatible, there is little justification for seeking new industry.

Mr. Penn Worden of the Georgia State Chamber of Commerce has presented what he terms a "pattern of action" for local industrial development.[8] It consists of the following actions:

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[8] Penn Worden, "Industrial Development in Georgia."

1. Determine that the community wants industry.
2. Organize a hard-core action team.
3. Gather community facts and keep them up to date.
4. Seek expert assistance.
5. Take action to remedy weaknesses and capitalize on assets.
6. Put all assets in saleable condition.
7. Analyze the area economy.
8. Have the package ready for the industrial prospect.

This appears to be a sound and workable procedure for undertaking industrial development. It should merit serious consideration for possible adoption by community development leaders seeking to avoid the pitfalls of inexperience and achieve success in industrial development efforts.

DOES THE BUSINESSMAN HAVE A VESTED INTEREST IN COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENTS?

By Warren A. Walker*

The question is often raised whether in fact the businessman does have a vested interest in community developments.

What does the word *businessman* mean? Is he merely the retail merchant or should the concept be broadened to encompass wholesale distributors and anyone who provides services to the community including the professional doctor, dentist, or attorney.

I submit to you that the term businessman refers to every man or woman who draws his livelihood from the activities of a particular community. Using this concept it becomes clear that the term businessman really embraces virtually everyone even the very young and the very old who draw all or part of their livelihood from the local community, either directly or indirectly.

The dictionary tells us that the word *vested* means anything that is settled or secured in the possession of a person or persons as a complete right. This interest is sometimes possessory, sometimes in the future, but it has substance because of its relative certainty. Here are some examples of vested interest.

In the case of the merchandiser or manufacturer, he has actual monetary investments. Sometimes these investments represent quite substantial amounts particularly in relation to his personal assets. This is true because regardless of the amount in dollars and cents, it is typically a substantial percentage of his total assets.

In the case of those who provide services, at whatever level, rights have become settled and hopefully secured by the development of ones reputation within the community. Even though he might move his personal equipment elsewhere, his reputation, that is to say this person to person identification, would be left behind.

*Assistant Professor of Business Administration

In the case of the very young, it is true that their livelihood derives indirectly from the community through their parents or guardians. It is none the less true that even the very young achieve a localized identification through their schoolmates, through their church-school activities, athletic events, and with those for whom they do odd jobs.

One of the definitions of interest is regard for one's own advantage or self interest. It should be noted that even the very root of this word "inter" means between, among, mutually, reciprocally, or together. From this we can see that essentially the word interest does mean regard for one's own advantage alone, but from the standpoint of his relationship between himself and others.

In regard to the term *community,* in the usual sense it means a social group of any size whose members reside in a specific geographic locality. A less familiar definition is that it also means joint possession, enjoyment, and liability. Essentially to *develop* means to bring out capabilities or possibilities, or to bring to a more advanced or efficient state or to cause to grow or expand. This brings us to the inescapable conclusion that the businessman *does* have a vested interest in community development.

There are those who would prefer to remain in the quiet back waters of the tide of progress. There was a time when our national economy was more agrarian in character that this objective remained largely possible. One has only to look at some of the older homes and partially abandoned facilities to recapture the mood of this period in history. Agriculture is no longer the sun about which the economy moves. The economic frontier moves on broad fronts and in many directions. The community today must move with the march of progress or be crushed by it.

All of us have heard of the ghost town of the west, but did you know that there are ghost towns all over the United States, some less than an hour's drive from one's home. Some have been completely abandoned; some still have a few remaining people. Some of these towns have died because they were mining towns and the veins ran out. Some have died because of the changing patterns of agriculture. Some for any of a dozen reasons. The important thing is that all these towns

and all of these reasons have a common thread. The economic reason for the town's existence ceased to be. All could have survived had they changed with the changing times.

It would be hard to tell one of the former businessmen that his interest was not vested. His problem now, to use two accounting terms, is that his investment has not only become "sunk" but "written-off" as well. I suggest that whenever your interest in community development wanes you visit an abandoned community. It will be a very sobering experience. You will suddenly be overwhelmed with the conception of how *really* vested your interests are.

At this point we have examined the question we asked initially. We have accepted the conclusion that we must answer the question in the affirmative. Another question which naturally arises is: What does the businessman do about his vested interest? The simple answer to this question is that he feels an obligation to preserve his vested interests. There is no easy answer as to the manner in which to preserve these vested interests but there is a systematic way in which an effort can be made. About all it involves is a modest amount of effort, and some straight, constructive thinking on the part of those most immediately involved.

The question as to how to preserve these vested interests and the manner in which to further community development divides itself rather easily into three component parts. The solution is additionally facilitated by the fact that either can be worked on independently or together. The three questions which naturally present themselves in turn are: what resources do I now have, under what circumstances did I come to have these resources, and what can now be done to expand these resources?

It is a fact well known to those who have worked with community development that virtually every community has many resources and assets that they have never regarded in the light of resources at all. The task of those concerned with community development is to seek out data on these assets that the community already has and to begin to develop from this point.

Of these, perhaps the most useful starting point resembles a community inventory. This includes such questions as: How many

people have what level of education? How many people have particular types of labor skills? Actually much of this material does not have to be researched directly, but is available either from the census reports or from the labor department. Unfortunately, the census figures have the characteristic that the older they are, the less useful they become, since the census comes every ten years (1950, 1960, etc.) and the utility of these figures is somewhat diminished by the end of the decade. Relatively current figures are usually available either locally or from the state capital.

If you seek community development through the channels of selling your town to new industries, then of course, the perfectly general approach is valueless. Industrialists are not interested in pretty pictures in the usual sense of the word. They are interested in specific things necessary for the conduct of their business. Such things as the quantity of natural gas available, and under what conditions? What capacity of electricity is available? How much fresh water is available? What convenient facilities are there available for the disposal of industrial waste? These related with our earlier two questions all tie in with what the potential industrialist in your area wants to know.

Whatever the composition of your eventual plans for community development may take, the avenue of expanded industrial activity cannot be ignored because it possesses obviously inherent advantages. By its very nature it provides increased tax revenues, it balances local seasonal industries with new ones which complement them. It diversifies the community's economic base, and within limits, it provides job opportunities for the unemployed. Obviously too great a dependence on only one company, or even type of industry, makes for an unstable economic base.

Looking at the other side of the coin, it must be recognized that while new industry offers many advantages, it also brings with it associated problems. One of these is the burden of the community providing for increased school enrollment, and a greater burden on existing school facilities. In our mobile age, it also brings about greater traffic and parking problems. We have already mentioned the questions of water supply and sewage and other public services; these requirements will also be increased. All of these potentialities must be recognized in any comprehensive plan of community development.

We have observed earlier that agriculture is no longer the sun about which the economy revolves. It would be an equally great mistake to ignore the influence of the surrounding farm areas and their influence on the local economy. The farming community forms a market for various commercial and industrial enterprises within the area. The income of farmers varies from time to time, both with the market and weather conditions. These variations in farm income have an important effect within the community, such as the store owners, banks and public welfare departments.

Let us now turn from our first question to the second, namely how did the community happen to have the resources that it does have? We are not interested in geneologies or historical minutiae. What we are really interested in are those economic forces which shaped the community into the form which it now has. Carrollton, Georgia, for example, was initially important as a cotton trading center. In a local bank are murals showing the present square crowded with wagons loaded with already baled cotton. Certainly one would be surprised to see a similar setting today. Cotton has been largely supplanted by synthetic fibers. Its economic importance has substantially declined. With its decline, the related functions of storage, sales, brokerage, have also declined. Carrollton has been more fortunate than many communities in that as the cotton trade declined, new activities came to take its place. This was not true in all Georgia communities, and a resulting economic impact has been extremely unfortunate. Through the years, Carrollton has gradually acquired industries dealing with metal pressing, wire processing, and other operations that have little to do with textiles. At an earlier period in Carrollton history, the only industries were those related to textile processing of one sort or another.

The question remains, where can definite statistical information on resources be obtained? Actually, almost every area already has public histories and records available. Sometimes, it must be admitted that historical information is not usable in the form that is required, or sometimes a more ambitious effort is proposed than can be marshalled. If this is the case, there are a variety of other sources of information that may be readily accessable including early city directories, early, maps, atlases, and gazateers and the accounts of travelers in the area. These by no means exhaust the possibilities. Oftentimes there are

manuscripts or typed copies of anniversary addresses, sermons, early photographs and paintings which give a clue to the manner in which the community grew. If this still does not suffice, there are other available records such as collections of private letters, old account books, diaries of early residents, sometimes newspapers and early periodicals are available, and of course, the earlier United States census reports continue to be available. All of these are useful in their own way. Finally there are many of the older businesses having records over a considerable period of time. In general, they are perfectly willing to make these available for legitimate research.

It must be recognized such an examination of the past provides more than a mere chronology of economic development. It also provides an insight into local traditions, customs, practices, and bits of legend. It is of this substance that the local folklore, and the local mores are developed. It establishes the tone of the community. And though some of these institutions and some of these practices may now be past, many of them survive into the present day, and these are part of the resources that you must now deal with.

All have heard such expressions as "We don't do that sort of thing in this community," or "Someone suggested that a long while back and nothing ever came of it," or "We don't normally hire that sort of person on this job." This is the framework in which you must operate. It is true that we have various pieces of legislation about this type of thing at this time. We have the Fair Employment Practices Act, and we have other legislation relating to nondiscriminatory practices. But we all recognize that the law does not make the fact. Certainly it does not achieve it within the shortrun. As business men who have a vested interest in community development one must recognize that limitations can be formidable and yet plans for development must be within this framework.

The third question of the shape of things to come, must now be considered. This question must be resolved by those who would develop their communities. It is up to those businessmen who do have vested interests. It is they who must do the groundwork, create the framework within which growth can occur, set the pattern of what they want within the resources available.

This paper barely touches the high points of the problem. Its purpose was not to give a complete plan which in the final analysis is up to those who are concerned. One hopes that the recognition that the businessman does have a vested interest in community development was established and second, that it is possible to protect this vested interest through planning, research, and recognition of his community potentialities.

PRACTICAL CONTRIBUTIONS OF GEOGRAPHY TO LOCAL PLANNING

By Jack L. Jewell*

The discipline of geography has valuable contributions to make to the development and execution of local community development plans. However, due to the popular misconception of geography as an elementary school survey of "far away places with strange sounding names," the important role of academic geographical research in solving local and specific problems has often been overlooked. By nature, geography addresses itself to the understanding of the spatial attributes of the earth's surface in whole and in part. "The objective of geographic study is to portray and interpret the patterns of man's occupancy of the earth. At an elementary level this means concern with the 'where' of countries, cities, rivers and mountains . . . At a more advanced level geography is concerned with understanding how and why the human race has organized the earth's surface as it has."[1]

The basic relationship between geography and planning is that the geographer seeks to understand the total environment as it has evolved to the present and is changing at the present, whereas, "the planner is concerned with value judgments in the course of making decisions to change the environment."[2] To say it another way, "the value system of the planner differs from that of the geographer particularly in that the planner is committed to active intervention in social and natural processes while the geographer is not."[3] The task of regional planning involves value judgments as to " . . . the *best* location for economic activities, the *proper* complement of public capital investments to support and facilitate economic growth, the *de-*

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[1] A. K. Philbrick, *This Human World* (New York: Wiley, 1963) preface.

[2] John N. Jackson, "Geography and Planning: Two Subjects or One?" in *Canadian Geographer,* Vol. XI (1967), p. 359.

[3] Robert B. McNee, "The Structure of Geography and It's Potential Contribution to Generalist Education for planning", in *Professional Geographer,* Vol. XVIII (March, 1966), p. 67.

sirable pattern of private and public land uses, and the *proper* scope and role for urbanization."[4] Planning is committed to the practical human end of what should be, is a practical science as opposed to a theoretical science, and fulfills social rather than scientific goals. It is more closely related to applied geographic studies than to theoretical geography.[5] Geography includes several technical skills applicable to regional and urban planning. Notable among these are map representation, aerial photo interpretation and field research methods. However, a greater contribution of geography to planning is the geographic methodology which views specific and diverse landscape elements as part of one integrated whole. Therefore, geography aids planning as it seeks to encompass the entire city or region which may be undergoing constant internal and functional changes.[6]

The role of geography, as viewed in this essay then, is not to develop comprehensive plans for future land use but to analyze the interrelationships of the present-day landscape as to form and function. An understanding of present spatial conditions in a city, town, or region is necessary if comprehensive plans for future development are to be successfully executed. Spatial conditions involve physical, cultural, and human distributional patterns. Physical spatial conditions include climate, soils, topography, drainage, and natural vegetation. Cultural spatial conditions include population distribution, transportation networks, utility, industrial, commercial and professional distributional patterns, institutional facilities, recreational facilities, and various types of residential distributional patterns. Human spatial conditions involve population age and sex ratio distributional patterns, and race, religion, and political distributional patterns. All of these, and perhaps other elements, are viewed by the geographer as interwoven to form the fabric of the ever-changing local landscape. Ef-

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[4] Gerald Hodge, "The New Vista for Regional Planning: What Role for the Geographer", in *Canadian Geographer,* Vol. IX (1965), p. 124.

[5] Sherwin H. Cooper, "Theoretical Geography, Applied Geography, and Planning," in *Professional Geographer,* Vol. XVIII (January, 1966), pp. 1-2; see also Harold Mayer, "Geography and Urban Planning: Theory and Application," in *Economic Geography,* Vol. XLII (October, 1966), p. 283.

[6] Donald W. Griffin, "Some Comments on Urban Planning and the Geographer," in *Professional Geographer,* Vol. XVII (January, 1965), pp. 4-6.

fective planning must account for each geographic element in its spatial context and in its relation to the whole community.

Notable among recent community self-study aids by planners and geographers are works by Melvin,[7] by Warren,[8] and by Gross.[9] Local Georgia communities may receive aid for self-analysis and planning from several area development and planning commissions. The address of the nearest of these agencies may be obtained from the telephone directory of any sizable town in the state. In addition, the University of Georgia Institute of Community and Area Development in Athens and the Georgia Institute of Technology Industrial Development in Atlanta are available for assistance. Local planning commissions have been established by several Georgia cities and counties. Many of these agencies have indicated a desire to serve the planning needs of West Georgia communities, yet, in many communities they do not serve simply because they have not been engaged to serve.

An element common to all planning endeavors is that planning for future land use must be based on spatial circumstances of present land use. T. W. Freeman in his book, *Georgraphy and Planning* says, "Planning has an inescapable geographical basis . . . It is essential to the planner's work, for the planner must understand the existing landscape before he tries to reform it both in town and country."[10] An initial step in planning, then, is either to make a thorough analysis of all available maps or to prepare maps of the specific areas for which planning is to be undertaken. Applebaum has developed an easy and inexpensive method of gathering initial data of this sort for specific cities by using the *Sanborn Atlas* and the city directory.[11]

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[7] Ernest E. Melvin, *Community Self Assistance* (Athens, Georgia: Institute of Community and Area Development, University of Georgia, 1963).

[8] Roland L. Warren, *Studying Your Community* (New York: The Free Press, 1965).

[9] H. H. Gross, *The Home Community* (Chicago: National Council for Geographic Education, 1965).

[10] T. W. Freeman, *Geography and Planning* (Hutchinson, Kansas: Hutchinson University Library, 1958), p. 13.

[11] William Applebaum, "A Technique for Constructing a Population and Urban Land Use Map," in *Economic Geography*, Vol. XXVIII (July, 1952), pp. 240-243.

Mapping is one of the few undisputed tasks of the geographer and a *good* geographer has an uncanny ability to observe a landscape, sort through the myriad elements composing the landscape, and select and map the proper elements which portray the essence of the planning problems under consideration. An excellent example of the role of maps in the formation and execution of land use plans is the work of Robert Brengle of the Troup County Planning Commission in LaGrange, Georgia. Brengle has prepared a set of maps and transparent overlays showing various combinations of physical, cultural, or human spatial characteristics relating to specific planning problems. Distributional data are plotted for any city block of LaGrange as to zoning, present land occupance, present and projected utility services, present traffic flow, maximum traffic flow the streets will carry, and slope or other physical characteristics of the block. In a matter of minutes one can observe any point in the city and ascertain the population density of the immediate area, the quality of housing, the size of the water mains and sewer lines, the volume of traffic and the maximum traffic volume that the street will safely carry, the size of electrical power lines and transformers, kinds of commercial, professional, and institutional establishments in the immediate vicinity, and several other pertinent spatial elements which blend to make up the specific areal personality of that section of the city. Each element is mapped separately on transparent overlays and can be analyzed individually or simultaneously with the others.

The geographer-planner, by using maps, aerial photographs, field observations, interviews, and other geographical field method techniques, attempts to understand present land use. But, this merely introduces the land-planning process. What of the subsequent stages of spatial development? Predictions of future land use conditions may be based on studies of the sequence of spatial change in the recent past and assumptions formulated as to emerging future spatial conditions. Stability of land value, tendencies of physical and cultural erosion, and capacity of movement and flow of traffic volumes are some of the characteristics which must be analyzed as to recent developments. Based on these sorts of data projections can be made as to future spatial trends. If data are not available for a specific area under study, projections can emerge from studies of comparable conditions elsewhere.

In looking to the future, the geographer-planner will envisage a variety of different possibilities which may emerge from the present spatial circumstances of the landscape. For example, urban expansion may be expected to follow recent "leapfrogging" trends or, it may become necessary to attempt to structure future urban growth so as to minimize costs of extending utilities to suburbia, to preserve valuable and productive agricultural land, or to develop scenic and recreational facilities. When several optional possibilities of land use and development are envisaged, each must be evaluated as to cost, developmental feasibility, and maximum benefit to the population. Planning policies must be formulated which will lead to the desired results in land use. In this phase of planning the geographer only seeks to help the planner understand the present landscape and to anticipate the variety of circumstances which may be expected to emerge from present spatial conditions. If future spatial conditions are to be structured it is the role of the planner, not the geographer, to attempt to establish policies under which future conditions will emerge.

In summary, geography as a discipline brings to planning a tradition of analyzing specific areal and spatial conditions in light of their role in the total physical, cultural, and human environment. The broad approach of the geographer contributes to the understanding of how the local scene relates to the total environment. The techniques and methodology of geography in analyzing and mapping spatial phenomena contribute to the understanding of present areal conditions and how these conditions may co-vary in the future. A knowledge of present landscape conditions is imperative if future land use plans are to be formulated and executed. In planning, the political scientist may focus on political conditions, the sociologist on social considerations, and the economist on economic developments, but the geographer's forte is as purveyor of knowledge about how phenomena co-vary in geographical space and time. As the bulk of community development planning relates to the arrangement, or rearrangement of spatial conditions, geography contributes greatly toward planning for a better tomorrow.

THE ROLE OF EDUCATION IN COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT

By Tom J. Lightsey*

Community development is an undertaking that has many facets. The role that education plays in our lives today is so crucially important to the total development and progress of our entire society and culture that one should look at some changes that are occurring in our modern, fast-moving society with some implications for education.

Today, we are living in the fastest-changing times that man has ever known. Everything is speeding forward at an ever-accelerating pace. Scientific know-how and technological development have snatched us from horse-and-buggy days and thrust us into the space age in less than two generations. Rural electrification, the miracle that did more to transform rural life than any other one thing for thousands of years, is only thirty years old. Many things we use today were not known just a few years ago.

Time has, for a very long period, been measured in Ages. The Stone Age lasted some 12,500 years, the Bronze Age some 2,500 years, the Iron and Steel Ages some 3,000 years ,the Atomic Age 23 years and the present Space Age some twelve years. When we realize that most Ages lasted for thousands of years, it is frightening to think that a young person only 23 years old has lived in three distinct Ages. He was born in the Steel Age, moved into the Atomic Age in 1945, and was ushered into the Space Age with the launching of Sputnik in 1957.

The technological developments have, on the one hand, brought to a large majority of the citizens of our country the highest standard of living the world has ever known; while on the other hand, we still have so many citizens that are shackled by poverty and near-poverty. How can this be true in such a society and culture as ours? Is this not the land of opportunity? The real answers to this problem lie in rapid change and the adjustment of educational level of the people to cope with it.

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Each September, more than fifty million people enter some kind of school, and this number is growing each year. Yet, today, more than fifty per cent of our adult population has not graduated from high school, and many have not attended a high school.[1] There has been a continuing development of all kinds of scientific, industrial, technological, agricultural and other types of occupations that constantly move toward displacement of the unskilled segment of the labor force. Ditches and postholes are mechanically dug and much garbage is collected by machines today. The economy of Georgia is no longer an agricultural-industrial economy, but has recently moved to an industrial-agricultural economy. This, coupled with the increasing mechanization of agriculture, is causing the displacement of large numbers of former agricultural workers, many of whom have little educational training or needed skills for industry.

In addition, we have a serious dropout problem in our schools. Progress is being made in the holding power of our schools, but much more must be done to meet the educational needs of *all* of our young people, plus the needs of so many of our adult citizens who do not have skills that make them employable in worthwhile jobs. So many school dropouts and unskilled adults are the last to be hired and the first to be fired when seeking ways to make a living. Too many potential workers' hands are tied by the lack of skills. To alleviate these problems and to raise the total economic and social standing of our people we must support educational advancement at all levels.

Education is the key to a better way of life for all of our citizens. Far too long have we allowed too many of our less affluent citizens to be deprived of better education and training. We must act hurriedly to ensure that we stop the drain in skill and brains that has caused us so much trouble and so great a loss in personal and mutual returns. Better educational programs can bring us far greater development at the local, state, national, and international levels. Community development programs can pay untold dividends.

A rather concrete example of the value of education can be noted in the prospective lifetime earnings of American men. The average

[1] James Monroe Hughes, *Education in America* (New York: Harper and Row, 1965), p. 3.

lifetime earning is $200,000. A man with a grade school education earns an average of $182,000, or $18,000 less than the overall average. A high school graduate earns $258,000. A college graduate jumps drastically and earns an average of some $435,000. Each year of college training is worth about $45,000 in lifetime earning power. Equivalent training in the trades and skills pays similar dividends.

The best known and most widely accepted definition of the role of education is that American education should make all of our people worthwhile citizens in our democratic society. If this role is to be implemented fully, it is going to take a much more thorough undertaking at all levels of educational endeavor. A major reason for the necessity of more involvement in education has been the understanding that education has become one of the principal avenues of opportunity in Twentieth-century America. College education is needed for upper middle-class occupations and high school education for most of the lower middle-class occupations. Education leads to economic opportunity. Young people, through education, secure higher status jobs than their fathers had. With the greater incomes, young adults from lower-status families tend to associate with persons of higher status and learn and adopt their ways. It may be concluded, consequently, that education provides the channel not only to better socioeconomic status, but also to social mobility in the broader sense.[2]

The past few years have brought much more involvement in educational matters from all governmental levels, more especially at the federal level. When we look at the Georgia scene, we find the state spending much larger sums for educational development. In addition, the state is requiring local school systems to make much larger investments in education. This increased educational development is helping many more communities become better communities. A commonly used educational slogan is that better schools make better communities. One of the first things that businesses or industries look for when contemplating locating in a new community is the educational program of the community. A great plus on the side of a community in recruiting new business or industry is a good school program.

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[2] Robert J. Havighurst and Bernice L. Neugarten, *Society and Education,* (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, Inc., 1967), pp. 70-71.

The role that education plays in community development cannot be overemphasized. Communities that have effective school programs have better communities economically, socially and generally. Education is really a major key to all other phases or facets of community development. All citizens should be vitally concerned with education and its relationship to the entire community in that every citizen is either a student, parent, or taxpayer.

Educational authorities can help community leaders in identifying community problems in various ways. They might help conduct surveys of interest to all citizens of the community. They can keep the public as well as potential business and industry informed about both the current and long-range educational programs and plans. On the other hand, potential industry can work with educational leaders in planning special programs to meet community needs. Educational needs and future plans can be supplied to all community leaders when overall tax plans are made. The schools are often the focal points when considering development of programs to better facilitate racial and social harmony.[3]

There are related educational problems in many communities. They need attention by those who would improve their community. Typical problems relate to:

1. Ways to finance new programs for local schools—which methods have been successful and which have not?
2. How to meet the needs of new industry that must have manpower with special skills. (Many industries cannot locate in our state because they cannot find the trained and skilled labor force to staff their plants. The area vocational-technical school is a step in the right direction toward solving this problem as are adult and continuing education programs and special training programs of some industries.)
3. How to deal with the school dropout problem.
4. How to meet the needs of both the college-bound and non-college-bound students.

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[3] Sam P. Kelly, "Know Your Community," *American School Board Journal*, Vol. CXV (May, 1968), pp. 14-15.

5. How to provide adult education programs.

When considering ways that some of these problems can be solved, financing new programs is imperative. Since the cost of education has been going up at a rapid rate in recent years at all levels, new programs that require considerable new financial outlays can be unpopular unless the public is thoroughly convinced of the need of the new program. It is very essential that the entire school community be given all information that is needed for a complete understanding of the proposed project. One supporting a new program should secure the aid of news media, civic leaders and clubs in getting basic information to everyone. A positive approach in selling should be planned. Preparation and distribution of leaflets and brochures should take place so that the voters can actually study the merits of the proposal. Good public relations is essential and all educational leaders may need to work overtime in such a program. School bond issues are often passed as a result of good selling jobs and much of the sting is removed from increased tax levies by letting the people know.

In order to help solve the problem of manpower with special skills it is often necessary to set up a special training program in cooperation with both the industry and a vocational-technical school or a college. If a vocational or technical school is available locally or if there is a college nearby training of initial personnel can be arranged. If this is not possible help might be secured from the state vocational-technical schools. As a final possibility a crash program can be undertaken to establish a vocational-technical school.

The school dropout problem is a very serious one that is not easy to solve. Georgia has the highest rate of school dropouts in the United States—a position that no other state desires. Part of the dropout problem can be attributed to the fact that so many of our schools are not gearing their programs to meet the real needs of the students. Far too little is being done to hold potential dropouts in school.

Many of the high schools in Georgia are trying to meet the needs of the college-bound student, while in 1966 only twenty-eight out of every one hundred college-age Georgians were enrolled in college. This compares with fifty-one out of every one hundred for the nation, while the average for the South is thirty-eight out of every one

hundred. According to information from the Georgia Educational Improvement Council, only South Carolina has a lower percentage than Georgia.[4] Our schools *must* come nearer to meeting the needs of all of our students. We must develop plans that are attractive enough to to hold potential dropouts in school in addition to meeting the needs of those who plan to attend college. It might be wise to offer a good vocational offering beginning at the seventh grade level as this is a good place to identify potential dropouts. A good vocational program for younger students will hold large numbers of students in school who would otherwise not stay. It must be understood that vocational offerings are not the total answer, as there are other causes for dropouts such as economic needs of family, failure in school work, school program not meeting needs, increase in pregnancies of teenagers, to seek employment, and general disillusionment with school. However, vocational training is among the best answers we have.

We must develop programs to meet the needs of the seventy-two percent of our college-age citizens who are not in college, plus the vast numbers of our unskilled adult population. Vocational programs are vital in this endeavor. Our goal should be to bring every Georgia citizen up to the optimum level of his potential, regardless of whether it is in an academic or non-academic educational program.

The role of education in community development may be summarized by saying that educational development is a key that will unlock innumerable doors to almost every kind of development. Education is the force that can prepare all of our people for a richer and higher type of life regardless of their occupational or professional pursuits. Education can help individuals and communities in reaching their goals. In keeping these thoughts in mind, we must agree with Gnagey that education is a continuing process from cradle to grave.[5]

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[4] Georgia Educational Development Fact Sheet, "College Enrollment," Georgia Educational Improvement Council, Atlanta. n.d.

[5] Theodore P. Gnagey, "The Coming Revolution in Education," *Adult Education,* Vol. XV, No. 4 (Autumn, 1964), p. 9.

THE COMMUNITY AS A SOCIAL SYSTEM

By Fred Parsons*

Working as a generalist in two professional activities—sociology and social work—can be interesting, enriching and rewarding. There are clearly defined and limited areas within both sociology and social work, but these areas seem minimal to those in which complementary relationships predominate. Basically sociology is seen by some as "the science of society," while social work is seen as the practice area within society which implements or interprets knowledge, research and techniques in the agency, city or community. It is inconceivable to make a worthwhile scientific investigation without some awareness that the study *per se* will influence the society in some way. Certainly the spending of time and resources in making a scientific study seems to demand application. Likewise, the attempt to modify or enhance the development of a community without some knowledge, facts and professional bias seems inconsistent.

The community has been studied by the early and contemporary sociologists. The studies *Yankee Town, Middletown* and *Middletown in Transition* are examples of early studies by community sociologists.[1] Today the community is viewed as the ghetto, slums, megopolis and urban areas. The influence of the mass media and improvements in transportation are studied by sociologists. Other areas of sociological interest are population characteristics, ecological processes of man's relationship to his environment and institutional changes and people's efforts to maintain the *status quo*. The community practitioner needs to understand these aspects of the community if he wishes to isolate behavioral patterns, or to modify the community along some predetermined pattern.

The use of the sociologist's professional objectivity and ways of looking at human behavior seems to offer an excellent opportunity to

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[1] W. Lloyd Warner, *Yankee Town* (New Haven: Yale, 1963), Robert and Helen Lynd, *Middletown* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1929) and Robert and Helen Lynd, *Middletown in Transition* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1937).

identify community problems. If we follow the Talcott Parsons theoretical reference of society as a social system,[2] then smaller portions of society can be understood at different levels. An example of this view is seen in the following chart by Sanders.[3] The emphasis should be made that each portion of a social system is made up of certain forms and activities. Since all of these are interrelated the change or lack of it in a given unit can be seen in terms of some modification of the relationships of the system.

COMMUNITY SYSTEM (Reference is made to communal properties of these major systems)	Family	Economy	Government	Religion	Education
MAJOR SYSTEM (Institutionalized unit meeting basic human needs)	Family	Economy	Government	Religion	Education and Public Information
SUBSYSTEM (Widespread social network)		Transportation Banking Industry Commerce Agriculture Medicine Organized labor	Political Party Officialdom	Various religious bodies	School Press Radio and TV
SOCIAL GROUPING (Categories of people with common characteristics)	Parents with pre-school children	Cotton growing farmers Homeowners	Aliens	Churchgoers	University graduates
SOCIAL GROUP (3 or more people in social contact)	The household	A hospital staff A construction crew Members of a law firm	Local League of Women Voters	Ministerial association	Members of adult education course
SOCIAL RELATIONSHIPS (2 people or units in social contact)	Parent-Child	Merchant-consumer	Official-citizen	Clergyman-member	Teacher-pupil
THE PERSON (As a type)	Parent	Consumer	Citizen	Member or adherent	Teacher

[2] Talcott Parsons, *The Social System* (New York: MacMillan, 1952).
[3] Irwin T. Sanders, *The Community: An Introduction to a Social System* (New York: The Ronald Press Company, 1966), p. 31.

A second method of understanding community problems is the institutional study of the community. Five of the institutions are shown on the above chart. Each social institution is said to cluster around essential activities. The family serves a procreation function. The economy functions in the creation and distribution of goods and wealth. Government regulates each of the other functions, attempts to provide for the national security, the international relationships, and the social welfare of the members of a community. The church explains unknown factors in a society and meets the religious needs of man. Lastly, the education program is carried on by the family and attempts to teach individuals how to live comfortably and efficiently within their environment.

Viewing the community in its entirety, it is easy to see that sociology is equally concerned about children as aged people, with illness and health, with illegitimacy and church membership, about education as well as employment. The list is endless due to the "wholeness" or generalizing nature of sociological studies and interests.

The development of a community offers the social scientist numerous areas of study. Some areas getting the most attention at present are poverty, crime, race relations, family changes, and religious values. How can different rates of reported crime between urban areas and rural areas be explained? Why does poverty exist in America, and what can be done to allay the long term damages of poverty? Why do people still meet monthly in Carrollton, Georgia, to trade dogs, guns, knives, and other items? How do you explain more people attending formal educational programs for longer periods? While there can be no single cause or explanation of any of the above phenomenon, they can be studied in terms of changes within the social system or the institutional functions.

It has been speculated that society is becoming more "task and thing-oriented" rather than "person-oriented." Studies have shown that groups may teach various ethnocentric biases, or prejudices which are not subject to reason or facts, but rather to attitudes and feelings. W. F. Ogburn states that a cultural lag exists when the material aspects

of society outdistance the social or non-material aspects of a community.[4]

Using the family as an example of understanding community development, it can be readily seen that the family behaviors influence the community, and the community the family. Children are born within a family and much of the future expectations for the child has been based on the social position of the parents. What the child learns is clearly built upon the interests, behaviors, values, personalities, and number of persons living in and around the child. The child is taught what to work for, not to work, how to speak, and what behaviors are rewarded by the family and community.

As the child is taught to function in his family group, it becomes increasingly clear that other institutionalized programs of the community share in the socialization of the new member. The family, by teaching the child how to behave in church is helping the child and the church to develop an arrangement which will benefit the entire community. The school, now starting as day care centers, shows clearly the concern which society has with teaching social values, skills, and other cultural facts. The education process does not stop with the formal schooling but continues throughout the life of the individual.

Other portions of the community which are concerned with the development of each new member, and the skills of community residents are the occupational or economic structures. The employment of individuals, their income, how the family spends its money, and how to encourage further spending and distribution are very complex situations of greatest concern to each member of a community.

Government is of continuing importance to the individual and as society becomes more complex tends to increase in control and complexity. Historically, government was the last institution to develop the control factors which it now enjoys. Political sociologists are constantly studying the mechanics of government, voting behavior, and the influences which cause the changes in this area. It is in government and the general welfare of the population that many of the studies

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[4] W. F. Ogburn and Meyer F. Nimkoff, *Sociology* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1964), pp. 659-695.

about the individual, the family and the community are financed and supported. The most meaningful data for sociological research is found in the governmental-supported census. The birth of a new member is recorded by governmental agencies, the diseases and skills, as well as the death are reported to the government, and information evaluated by the governments.[5]

Sociology is concerned with people who do not become a conforming part of the community. When people are physically, mentally, socially, or economically different, interesting studies can be made. The services to these categories of people and the evaluation of the community development in serving these people are equally in the domain of the social scientist and practitioner.

One of the most fruitful and involved areas of the social sciences today is that of social change which implies development. There are several theories of change at the current time, one which most popular being that explained by Lippitt.[6] He envisions change through both sociological and psychological means. The self explanatory Phases in this process are shown below:

Phase 1: The client system discovers the need for help, sometimes with stimulation by the change agent.

Phase 2: The helping relationship is established and defined.

Phase 3: The change problem is identified and clarified.

Phase 4: Alternative possibilities for change are examined and change goals or intentions are established.

Phase 5: Change efforts in the reality situation are attempted.

Phase 6: Change is generalized and stabilized.

Phase 7: The helping relationship ends or a different type of continuing relationship is defined.

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[5] Further information can be found in J. O. Hertzler, *American Social Institutions: A Sociological Analysis.* (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, Inc., 1961)

[6] Ronald Lippitt, Jeanne Watson, and Bruce Westley, *The Dynamics of Planned Change* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1958), pp. 122-123.

Utilizing the above frame of reference it is possible to enhance community development or clarify with the community the need to plan change. This is based on an attempt to show that a community is not static and that change is inevitable. Conversely, not all change in a given community can be viewed as progress. The need to study ourselves, our community, and our decision making processes to facilitate studied, planned, and structured change appears to be a cultural imperative.

THE LOCAL COMMUNITY AND MENTAL HEALTH

By Kenneth R. Whittemore*

The development of adequate community-based mental health programs has recently become a priority health effort at both the federal and state levels. For several years the recognition has been growing that many mentally ill persons will respond to treatment better if such treatment is available in a local setting, than they will if they are removed from their local communities and sent some distance away to a state mental institution. In response to this knowledge, the Public Health Department of the State of Georgia has begun the construction of several regional mental health institutions located throughout the state.

Further, the Georgia Department of Public Health has divided the state into thirty-one designated planning areas. Carroll County is included in Planning Area 14 along with Harris, Troup, Haralson, Heard and Coweta Counties. LaGrange is designated as the center of this area and is seen as the site of the future location of Comprehensive Community Mental Health Services for the area. Area 14 ranks sixth in construction priority for such services out of the thirty-one areas. It is noted further that Carrollton, " . . . extends some influence in the northern part of the area."[1]

In a preliminary survey conducted by the Division of Mental Health of the Georgia Department of Public Health in 1965, it was estimated that 361 persons resident in Carroll County had received benefit of psychiatric services during the year 1963. It was also estimated that private physicians in Carroll County saw a total of 405 patients with mental health problems during a typical week.[2] Given

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[1] "Plan for the Construction of Community Mental Health Centers and Facilities for the Mentally Retarded—1967." (Georgia Department of Public Health, Division of Mental Health), p. 25.

[2] "A Comprehensive Mental Health Plan for Georgia." (Georgia Department of Public Health, Division of Mental Health, 1965), p. 100.

such a realization of the extent of treated prevalence alone, it is easily understood that the development of local mental health services is an imperative.

The thrust toward community based mental health services is motivated by far more than simple need, however. The development of local mental health programs has received strong motivation from the development of theory and principles within the rapidly expanding field of community psychiatry. One noted authority sees the development of community psychiatry as no less than a major revolution in the historical development of psychiatry itself. Community psychiatry has as one of its basic guiding principles " . . . the resolve to view the individual's psychiatric problems within the frame of reference of the community and vice-versa."[3]

There is growing recognition that "mental illness does not entirely reside within the individual (since) . . . the degree of psychosis is related to the social and interpersonal setting of the patient."[4] It has also been noted that, "A significant aspect of this development (community psychiatry) has been the involvement of the community and its members in the concern for its own mental health. The citizen as well as the mental health professional must play an active role in the mental health of the community."[5]

Indeed, the increasing involvement of members of the community in a direct manifestation of their concern with the mental health of the community is necessitated by the shortage of traditionally trained mental health professionals, if for no other reason. There simply are not now and will not be enough mental health professionals to staff the developing local programs in a traditional manner.

The State of Georgia has a particularly acute shortage of trained mental health professionals of all kinds. The state ranks 42nd out of

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[3] L. Bellak, editor, *Handbook of Community Psychiatry and Community Mental Health,* (New York: Grune and Stratton, 1964), p. 5.

[4] Matthew Dumont, *The Absurd Healer: Perspectivees of a Community Psychiatrist.* (New York: Science House, 1968), p. 29.

[5] S. M. Heilig, Norman L. Farberow, and R. E. Litman, "The Role of Non-Professional Volunteers in a Suicide Prevention Center." (Los Angeles Suicide Prevention Center, Los Angeles, California), mimeograph, undated.

the 50 in the numbers of psychiatrists per one-hundred-thousand population. If the number of psychiatrists in the state were immediately doubled, we would still fall far short of the national average. Of the 159 counties in Georgia, 148 of them are without a resident psychiatrist and Carroll County is among them. The shortage of clinical psychologists and social workers is similarly acute.

Such statistics as the above make it increasingly obvious that we need to provide in-service training and experience in mental health for "non-professionals," both paid and volunteer. We also need to start new academic and technical training programs for whole new occupational careers in the "middle-level" between the psychiatric aide (who needs to work under the supervision of a professional), and the now existing "upper level" professionals mentioned in the paragraph above.

There is further need which I believe to be equally urgent and which requires the effort of all concerned citizens. All of us need to become as concerned with providing services for any person "having trouble" as we are with handling those persons whose symptoms have become so manifest that they are "giving us trouble." We need to see each mentally ill person as a measure of the breakdown of community and institutional organizations. This will give us valuable insight into needed changes in the social system at large, as well as seeing such a person as an individual in need of treatment.

The successful use of non-professionals as counselors in suicide prevention centers and emergency mental health services throughout the country has demonstrated that the average citizen, given some training in basic counseling techniques, can effectively function as a first line resource in crisis situations. It is essential that such a person have a thorough knowledge of community resources which are available to persons in crisis, both helping persons and helping agencies. Since the initial contact of the person in question can be assumed to demonstrate a felt rapport between the caller and the person called to render help and counsel, the person so contacted can use this rapport to help define the nature and circumstance of the crisis. He can then refer or transfer the case to the most appropriate available resource.

Initial referrals will most often be made to non-mental health professionals within the community who are identified as known helpers; such as physicians, clergymen, social workers, etc. It is well within the competence of such persons to successfully handle the majority of cases brought to their attention provided such persons have access to the back-up support and counsel of an established mental health professional.

A broadly based community mental health program, working within the realistic limitations imposed by the shortage of trained mental health professionals, is then envisioned as consisting of at least three levels or stages:

1. an informed citizenry with some basic training in the handling of persons in stressful situations and with a thorough knowledge of sources of help available within the community to which persons in need of assistance are referred;
2. more fully trained non-mental health professionals who will handle the persons in stress and crisis with the support and counsel, if necessary, of
3. a trained mental health professional such as a psychiatrist, clinical psychologist, psychiatric nurse, or clinically trained social worker.

It is obvious upon analyzing the above article that the author has largely rejected the concept of mental "illness" associated with persons manifesting signs of emotional or mental disturbance in times of stress and crisis. It is quite normal to become emotionally upset in times of stress and such upset is not necessarily a symptom of underlying pathology. The handling of the crisis focuses on defining the immediate precipitating cause and relieving the stressful condition.

It should be equally obvious that the above model accepts the traditional medical model of division of labor and task specialization. In a medical setting it is often the nurses aid who provides the majority of the care of the patient under the supervision of a nurse who dispenses prescription medicines under the instructions of a physician in charge and ultimately responsible for the treatment program. It is suggested here that the psychiatrists' most appropriate function should

be similar, he should supervise the persons who are counseling the patients or clients, rather than seeing persons in need of care directly himself in one-to-one therapy. The utilization of the trained mental health professional in the manner suggested above seems to be logical and most efficient use of such persons especially when there exists such a shortage of trained professionals. All of us need to expand our horizons and become as concerned with the development of a positive environment for mental health in our communities as we are with the need to provide treatment and services for those already mentally ill. The first task of any community mental health program should be the prevention of mental illness by eliminating those stress factors present in a community which often serve to bring the illness about.

HISTORY'S RELATION TO SOCIOLOGY AND COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT

By Theodore B. Fitz-Simons*

It is far easier to make a firm positive assertion of the value of history as a discipline in community development than it is to describe and assess the value of this role. One of the most apparent reasons for this difficulty is the lack of communication between the social sciences and the consequent mutual misapprehension of their respective natures. Even though at some point in his career the student of history must consider the relation of his subject to the other social sciences and may even be exposed to some of them in survey courses, specialization in his own field allows little time for further exploration.[1] The result is at worst a stereotyped concept and at best an ineffective effort to update old impressions. This is probably true to varying degrees in the companion disciplines. Since community development is sometimes identified with sociology, it becomes necessary at the outset to clear away some of the misunderstandings which seem to obscure the meaningful relationship between history and sociology in this matter.

Sociology is probably remembered as that social science which considers man and his role in the group, the relation of one group to another, and the whole process of socialization and change in society. The sociologist is more concerned with man here and now and often relies on the historian for "a description of any social act

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[1] In anticipation of objections on the part of historians to the classification of history as a social science the writer is well aware that "Many historians . . . do not think that the study of man is a science. The historian's material . . .is often limited; he frequently lacks the factual data, such as the statistical runs employed by the social scientist. History, therefore, is not a science per se, although it often employs the disciplined techniques of the scientific method." Call them what you will the interdependence of the 'social sciences' still exists. Donald B. Cole and Thomas Pressly, *Preparation of Secondary-School History Teachers* (Washington: American History Association Committee on Teaching, 1968), p. 12.

that does not occur within immediate experience . . . "[2] As for community development it is likely to mean all things to all men. It is new industry to the Chamber of Commerce, a successful revival to a minister, renovation of commercial property to the merchant and realtor, urban renewal to a councilman, a new community center to a civic club, or a Headstart program to a VISTA volunteer. To most people, including the historian, it probably has a vague connotation of progress. Let the historian venture first into the realm of community development as seen by the sociologist.

It becomes immediately apparent that sociologists are by no means completely agreed on what community development is nor on the best way of bringing it about. At the same time it is obvious that in spite of differences, sociologists have some rather definite ideas on what constitutes community development and that these do not necessarily coincide with those of the historian. This makes it essential to modify the general rather nebulous definition before attempting to appraise the value of his discipline in this field.

Existing differences among sociologists appear to be largely centered on the scope of the community development process. Irwin T. Sanders in his text on the community as a social system, sees it as a large "umbrella" under which all interested in community organization and change can gather. Advocates of planned change, sponsors of adult education, city planners, agricultural extension personnel and civic club leaders as well as social workers would be included. Sanders is quick to note, however, that this definition does not suit all and carefully points out that some community developers are inclined to divorce themselves from the concepts of community organization and social work.[3]

William W. and Loureide J. Biddle favor this more restricted approach. The Biddles feel that the most effective community development comes not as a result of planned change effected through a

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[2] Caroline B. Rose, *Sociology: The Study of Man in Society* (Columbus, Ohio: Charles E. Merrill Books, Inc., 1965), pp. 1-3, 43-58.

[3] Irwin T. Sanders, *The Community An Introduction to a Social System* (New York: The Ronald Press Company, 1966), pp. 504-509.

marshalling of the support of members of the power structure who have been identified as integrally involved in the desired change. They feel that community development comes through the recognition on the part of the underprivileged of the need for change and active involvement in it. Interested parties on all levels are encouraged to recognize the need and community initiative must work in the direction of what hopefully will be a beneficial change. The desire for change should be subtly developed by a catalyst in the person of one who is called an "encourager" and who plays the role of an informal associate guiding wherever possible but without intruding as a dominating leader. Community development in this case is an intangible idea or spirit as opposed to the material and tangible results evidenced by the building of a clinic, for example.[4]

Even though sociologists see community development as seeking "to bring about growth in competence more than alleviation of misery" and feel that "it needs to maintain its own identity as a discipline," they do not reject aid from other sources.[5] Adult education is recognized as among the earlier of the "helping professions" in the field, but it cannot serve all of the needs of the community developer. Children are also "included within the scope" of their activity "even though . . . served by other, more formal educational processes and institutions." These services and this formal education are the responsibility of institutions from the public school to the university. The community developer in this narrower sense of the term does not become a teacher or an instructor but rather prefers to call in experts in specific fields as the need arises.[6] With respect to history the Biddle study has this interesting observation. A sense of history is important—not so much that entombed in books, but more the kind which is lived. The in-

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[4] William W. and Loureide J. Biddle, *The Community Development Process: The Rediscovery of Local Initiative* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1966), pp. 221, 223.

[5] *Ibid.*, p. 221. "Basically, *community development is a social process by which human beings can become more competent to live with and gain some control over local aspects of a frustrating and changing world* . . . It calls for the utilization of all helping professions and agencies (from local to international), that can assist in problem solving. But personality growth through group responsibility for the local common good is the focus." *Ibid.*, p. 78.

[6] Biddle and Biddle, *The Community Development Process*, pp. 243, 244, 247.

dividual's experience of development can be discussed as part of the history that is recorded in books. And even the small processes of change in a nucleus or neighborhood can take on significance as a part of great flows of events into the future.[7] The implications of this statement for the sociologist and historian can be more appropriately considered later. At this point it will be fitting to conclude the sociologists' views of community development with a brief critical evaluation by one other authority in the field.

Professor Roland L. Warren,[8] in considering the matter of community change identifies specifically the various methods, including the "enabler model" which the Biddle study would prefer to call the "encourager" model.[9] He notes the increasing complexity of planned change and sees the "goal-oriented model of change agent (as being) more appropriate than that of the enabler model, particularly in the larger communities . . . " The entrance of government agencies in a "massive and deliberate singling out of the poor and culturally deprived" who are not ordinarily members of organizations and usually not responsive to community meetings makes the enabler model a helpful approach.[10] It might be well to suggest at this point that there is probably a significant number of people in the community who while neither culturally deprived nor poor by community standards are disinterested if not apathetic to such meetings. This perhaps should be more explicitly expanded to include those who are dubious of the motives and effectiveness of 'do-gooders and uplifters' as well as those whose conservatism opposes any sort of 'tampering' with things as they are.

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7 *Ibid.*, p. 209.

8 Professor Warren is Professor of Community Theory in the Florence Heller Graduate School for Advanced Studies in Social Welfare at Brandeis University.

9 The Biddles mention the enabler model, but they give specific reasons for their preference for the term encourager as opposed to a number of others including enabler. Their objective is to use as informal an approach in stimulating community initiative as possible, hence they shun words such as teacher, leader, etc., in preference to their own term. Biddle and Biddle, *The Community Development Process*, pp. 243, 244, 247.

10 Roland L. Warren, "Community Changes: Planned and Otherwise" copied from a typewritten speech by Ronald L. Warren presented as a University Assembly lecture sponsored by the Department of Community Development, University of Missouri, May 7, 1965.

Reflecting on the studies consulted the historian's role is partially revealed and some of the problems are identified. The sociologists concerned with community development all stress education and directly or indirectly involve history, even though they may differ with respect to methods to be used. Acknowledging the fact that the historian can be of help to the research sociologist in achieving a better understanding of the present in terms of the past, how can he deal with the culturally deprived or the materially prosperous but culturally unaware? How does the sociologist view the historian's potential as an ally? The historian can profit from the words of the poet Burns as he says,

> Oh wad some power the giftie gie us
> To see oursels as others see us!
> It wad frae monie a blunder free us . . .

No historian could be labeled as overly sensitive if he were stung by the implications contained in the Biddles' reference to the role of history in community development. Does the sociologist see the historian as a grave digger for facts? To what extent does the historian, wittingly or unwittingly, formalize and "entomb" his discipline? Has the point been reached at which history has lost contact with everyday life and reduced itself thereby to an esoteric study in which historians write articles and books purely for the consumption of their colleagues? Just what is the discipline's objectives? Is it justified at all? Let the historian now refresh the sociologist's memory in the hope of achieving a mutual appreciation of interdependence.

It is trite but nonetheless true to say that there are as many definitions of history as there are historians. For the purposes of this paper, however, what Philip D. Jordan refers to as the "common properties . . . inherent in all history" will serve to establish the general nature of the historical process. First of all, history, like sociology, is man-centered, be it man the individual or as a part of a group or culture. The historian is more than a record keeper, for he "must attempt to describe institutions created by man and to explain why his social inventions and techniques take the form they do." The "concept of change" is vital to the historian. He must ask why a particular change has come about and what its meaning is? His study of his

topic is hopefully an objective one which leads him to a valid conclusion and an interpretation which become a part of a longer and broader stream of history.[11] History must ever be a dynamic study and never a static one. It is dynamic in the sense that it is constantly being made and more important in the sense that continuing study and research give new and different meaning to the past. History is creative in that it requires conscious thought. Discovery and analysis of new material give it life.[12] It is always in the act of "becoming". It is the "seemingly paradoxical strands of perpetual change and never ending continuity."[13] If this is not enough to overawe the historian with immensity of his task, let a few final words from Norman A. Graebner provide the finishing touch. "A nation that attempts to live without history is in the same position as the man who each morning cannot remember what occurred on the previous day." He finds the lesson of history to be that the lesson has not been learned. "For all of this the historian must share the responsibility, for so much of the effort of historians fails to instruct." Professor Graebner sees the challenge "to record and analyze" as one facing the local historians and teachers of history.[14] Implicit in this approach is the idea that history must have meaning for the present, it must be relevant whether written or taught and that this is the obligation of the historian which he should not ignore.

This is not to say, however, that relevance should be stressed to the point of eliminating the study of the history of man. All history is relevant when well-written or taught and has meaning for

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[11] Philip D. Jordan, *The Nature and Practice of State and Local History* (Washington: American Historical Association Service Center for Teachers of History, 1958), Pub. No. 14, pp. vi-viii.

[12] Jordan, *The Nature and Practice of State and Local History,* p. iv; Walter T. K. Nugent, *Creative History An Introduction to Historical Study* (New York: J. B. Lippincott, 1967), p. 10; Norman A. Graebner, "The Importance and Meaning of History," in Louis Leonard Tucker, ed., *The Chalenge of Local History* (Albany, 1968), p. 1. The last work is the published report of "A Conference designed to broaden the interests of New York State local historians in scholarly history" and is published by the Office of State History of the State Education Department of the University of the State of New York.

[13] Constance McLaughlin Green, "Changes in the Community," in Louis Leonard Tucker, ed., *The Challenge of Local History* (Albany, 1968), p. 16.

[14] Graebner, "The Importance and Meaning of History," pp. 3-4.

the present. Thus the individual through study becomes aware of himself in community, state, nation, and world as a descendant of the earliest civilizations.

Assume for the moment that historians could communicate this idea of history to the members of a community, what would it hold for them? Ideally the individual would become aware of his participation in the making of history. He would have a better understanding of how he and his community came to be where they are as well as have a realization that change is ever with them. He would see his life as a part of an historical continuity that is anchored in the past but pointed to the future by way of the present. He would apprehend that change can mean progress when the community of individuals sees the need and works to produce it or at least acquiesces in it.

Were it true, it would be a valuable asset to the community developer, but unfortunately the assumption is apparently not valid. For the man on the community street, history may seem to be a static, cut and dried record that lives only through repetition. The repetition has been further drained of vitality by the destruction of any idea of continuity or relevance. It may tend to become a series of isolated events, usually either glorious or gory, which are quite unrelated and closed to further question or investigation—interesting stories to be retold. In the decade now nearing its end, a Civil War Centennial has been celebrated with what one authority refers to as "a burst of commercialism and ill-conceived hoopla."[15] Nationwide interest in the Civil War period has generally focused on the political and military aspects of the struggle as opposed to the social and economic. The conflict stands as an island in the nineteenth century stream of history, a romantic memorial to the 'sacrifices' and the 'glory' of its participants. The case is closed! There has been no enthusiastic rush on the part of the public to investigate and ponder its social and economic causes. Its isolation is significantly emphasized by the fact that some four years of the Reconstruction centennial have passed with no noticeable demand for a commemoration. The current struggle over civil rights

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[15] Russell W. Fridley, "The Uses of State and Local History," in *History News*, (Nashville, Tennessee: American Association for State and Local History), XXIII, No. 12, p. 240.

hardly qualifies as such. The continuity of cause and effect have again been ignored as the Reconstruction era which remains an emotion-laden story lifted from the historical context of the nineteenth century to justify the expression 'damyankee.' It is devoid of relevance to both an older and a younger generation even though it is fairly bursting with implications for our own troubled times.

The individuals in any given community who hold such distorted views of history might vary widely. Obviously the Civil war buff might well be one to whom history means qualification for membership in a patriotic organization. On the other hand any number of ordinary citizens whose only contact with history was in a high school course could have distorted views. Distortion might be evident in the mind of a member of a minority group whose contact with secondary education served only to turn him against a history with which he could not identify. The inability to appreciate the nature of history and the consequent failure to see oneself and his community as a meaningful part of the historical process is tragic.

How is the situation to be accounted for when history of state, nation, and world is taught on every educational level from elementary to graduate school? How can it exist when there are over two thousand local historical societies in the United States as well as a number of regional, sectional, and national organizations? It would be a grave mistake to look for a scapegoat and naive to assume that once the problems are identified that they would be susceptible to immediate and complete solution. There can be no harm in discussing them and suggesting possible changes. There are a number of factors, attitudes and individuals involved, and the manner and degree of involvement will be affected not only by variation in individual personalities but also by the rural or urban nature of the community. The approach must be general and flexibility in the application of possible remedies is anticipated.

It would be well to begin by recognizing an inherited disposition to view history as primarily political in nature and concerned only with the memorization of dates and facts. This attitude is perpetuated as it is unconsciously handed down from father to son. If change is expected the cycle must be broken. There are programs of adult educa-

tion which are specifically concerned with community development which might well be utilized to modify this attitude. In practice, programs implemented and funded in Georgia under Title I of the Higher Education Act of 1965 follow the planned change approach recommended by Professor Warren. Local leaders are encouraged to utilize the aid of specialists from colleges and universities in identifying problems and seeking intelligent and practical plans of action on the part of the community concerned in the interest of its general welfare.[16] The limitations of such programs have been suggested by Professor Warren and efforts to reach the culturally deprived who would not ordinarily attend such meetings might put the enabler approach of the Biddles to use. The historian should be willing to make his contribution in either case when called upon to do so.

The public school system provides an avenue of approach to the community's children on all levels. It is here that a foundation can be laid for an understanding of history. The way in which history is taught should be carefully examined and constructive criticism offered where needed. The college teacher is prone to complain about the inadequate background of his freshmen students. This area is an extremely sensitive one which demands tact because "Secondary school history teachers naturally resent the criticism by university historians . . . when they remember . . . dull, lifeless, and ineffective lectures by these same university historians."[17] The critic will do well to remember that the freshmen he receives are his own students once removed.

Another weakness stems from the public school administrative attitude that history is designed to teach citizenship and since this is

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[16] A number of reports, informal notes, and summaries dealing with community development in Georgia have been examined. In addition to this, material dealing specifically with Northwest Georgia has been consulted. The latter would include a "Report of the Area Planning Conference, Northwest Georgia area," a "Summary of Presentation in the Group Leadership Training Course," held at Turin, Georgia, April 14 through May 23, 1967, "Report: A Course in Community Development Bartow County," September 18 through November 6, 1967, and a projected plan for a similar course in the Rockmart area. This material is in the files of Department of Continuing Education at West Georgia College and was made available by Professor Collus O. Johnson of that Department.

[17] Cole and Pressly, *Preparation of Secondary-School History Teachers*, p. 24.

common sense, anyone can do it. This is compounded by the submerging of history in a social studies curriculum in which none of the social studies are actually identified in the process of teaching, and finally there is the non-scholarly atmosphere of the school in which there is little emphasis on further study for teachers."[18]

It should be noted immediately that these are general areas of weakness that have been identified and do not constitute a blanket indictment of teachers and administrators. Happily the trend seems to be in the direction of frank examination and recognition of problems that exist. The endorsement of a substantial subject matter curriculum for teachers and an effort to see that secondary teachers are well prepared has been recommended by the Service Center for Teachers of the American Historical Association. In addition to this, the high school history teacher is being encouraged to consider himself a professional historian while the university professor is being urged to accept and indeed to cultivate a professional group that extends to all levels of teaching.[19] "The National Defense Education Act has made funds available for university-based programs of teacher training in history," which give the secondary school teacher the opportunity to keep up with his field and to learn new techniques of presentation.[20]

In still another way the public school can make a contribution to the understanding of history and to community development. It has been suggested that "community history" be instituted in the fourth grade of school as a means of introducing the student to history by means of that which is more familiar. As the student tries to find himself in his community it can be pointed out to him that history cannot be confined to a locality and that he must go beyond. On the sixth grade level he should be introduced to state history at which

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[18] *Ibid.*, pp. 5, 20, 21.

[19] Cole and Pressly, *Preparation of Secondary-School History Teachers,* pp.9-13; W. Stull Holt, *The Historical Profession on the United States,* (Washington: American Historical Association Service Center for Teachers of History, 1963), Pub. No. 52, pp. 10-35.

[20] Cole and Pressly, *Preparation of Secondary-School History Teachers,* pp. 22-23. West Georgia College as a branch of the University System of Georgia has for three consecutive years conducted history institutes for high school teachers.

time he will come to understand, if taught properly, that the history of the state is bound up in that of the nation. In all of this, the child should be encouraged to write and study the object being "not only to put life into history, but (to) . . . put history into the life of the pupil."[21]

These activities take on added importance when it is realized that the opportunity is afforded to reach students black and white from all social and economic levels. No historian will be so naive as to think that the beneficial results of such a program will come overnight or that there will be an immediate or overwhelming change for the good of the community. The teacher on whatever level he teaches needs foresight, imagination and above all patience since it might well be a generation before the change is noticeable. A recent reference to Walter Prescott Webb might be appropriately quoted:

> . . . he believed that teachers do not reap the harvest of the seeds they plant because they plant for posterity and mankind. And on at least one occasion he said General William Booth's borrowed quotation should be . . . framed over the desk of every teacher and administrator: 'Sow the seeds and fear not the birds for the harvest is not to yours.'[22]

community. Every community has its official or unofficial historian. as an ally in establishing a better understanding of history within the community. Every community has its official or unofficial historian. The professonal historian is sometimes inclined to look askance at his efforts and to dismiss him as a hopeless antiquarian. It is not so much his reason for doing this as his wisdom in doing it that is to be questioned. Indeed the gulf that separates the two is widened as the local historian returns the professional's disdain and considers his accuser as a pompous, ivory-towered, footnote worshipper. Both are right to a point. The local historian is often an antiquarian with an outdated notion of history whose scorn for the profession stems partially from his own frustrations in handling the mechanics of writing

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21 Jordan, *The Nature and Practice of State and Local History,* pp. 17-23.

22 Wilbur R. Jacobs, John W. Caughey, and Joe B. Frantz, *Turner, Bolton, and Webb, Three Historians of the American Frontier* (Seattle: University of Washington, 1965), p. 102.

local history. The professional on the other hand can be pompous and his condescending attitude toward the amateur is perhaps the more intense because he knows that the amateur has a wealth of valuable material that he will never see. Obviously some rapport needs to be established between the amateur and the professional and it is up to the latter to make the first move. The need has been recognized and action taken in some cases, but there are probably too many who feel it beneath their dignity or beyond their responsibility to become involved.

In the first place the local historian should be encouraged to write. As Philip D. Jordan says, "Don't fence them in and don't look down your nose at them." They need to learn, as does the professional that he must "live *with* footnotes, but he does not have to live *for* them."[23] The state of New York has a law which requires the appointment of local historians. Recently under the sponsorship of the National Endowment for the Humanities, that state has begun a program to encourage them in scholarly history by means of a conference with leading authorities. This was no attempt to cover up the animosities which divide the amateur and professional but rather a realistic attempt to illustrate interdependence and to broaden the outlook of the local historian. No glittering claims have been made for the success of the experiment but it was a beginning.[24]

Interest in local history in Georgia has led to the founding of the Georgia League of Historical Societies. The League is interested in the organization of local historical societies and encourages them to write and publish their own material. Conferences give members the opportunity to learn about publication and writing of local history as well as acquainting them with the activities of the various local organizations. The League has the support of the Georgia Department of Archives and History as well as that of the Georgia Historical Commission and hopefully will do much to increase interest and improve the quality of local history in the state. Community development stands to benefit from any effort which leads to the identification of community and a better understanding of the groups that make it up.

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[23] Jordan, *The Nature and Practice of State and Local History*, pp. 34-35.
[24] Tucker, *The Challenge of Local History*, pp. iii-iv.

While it now seems clear that both disciplines, history and sociology, have some areas of common interest, among them the local community, this is not to say that the historian is a social worker or a community developer. He is not. It must be frankly admitted that there are indeed historians who write primarily for other historians, who study history for the sake of knowledge alone and who deplore the very idea of any responsibility for writing or teaching what might be called consciously relevant history. The fact is that history when well-written or taught is relevant whether the historian would have it so or not. Even the cloistered scholar's work will probably reach the public in a text or through a teacher's exposition.

The historian would probably prefer to see himself in an indirect role. He would prefer to feel that he is developing in his students the capacity to be critical and analytical rather than indoctrinating them or becoming involved in the community itself, although this is not always the case. Each individual historian must find his own place whether it be writing history for others to use, teaching and preparing elementary or secondary teachers who will be more directly involved with the community, or instilling a critical appreciation of history in those who will become members of communities. Some historians will play a somewhat more direct role in community development ranging from direct involvement as 'amateur community developers' to the less direct but equally important tasks of aiding in community studies, working with public school teachers, and cooperating with community or local historians. Success is dependent on the historian's ability and willingness to see his role, acknowledge his responsibility, and act. A certain amount of humility is a necessary quality in that he must recognize that he cannot do it alone nor can he accomplish a great deal with an antagonistic attitude toward other disciplines or other levels of his own discipline. If his chosen field has any meaning for him he will find his job and make his contribution.

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SOME ASPECTS of BLACK CULTURE

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FOREWORD

The articles on the following pages are based upon lectures delivered at the Conference on Teaching History which the Division of Social Sciences presented at West Georgia College on May 8, 1969. This Conference, in turn, was a result of interest generated through a weekly lecture and discussion series on Afro-American culture during the preceding February and March. Both programs were conceived and directed by Robert Claxton, Assistant Professor of History, West Georgia College.

Several ideas were fundamental to both the Conference and the earlier lecture series. Since contemporary university controversies and the staggering problems of American cities relate in part to racial difficulties, informed citizens, especially potential teachers, need historical background information regarding such crucial matters. Because our knowledge of history is too often limited to western Europe and the United States a full and realistic appreciation of the non-western world, notably African cultures, is essential today. Furthermore, much can be learned through comparative history as in the case of examining the role black people have played in Latin American development. Finally, the resources of several disciplines, including fine arts and literature, can enrich our understanding of history which should be the study of the record of all human achievement and activity.

A special note of appreciation is due to Professor Collus O. Johnson of the Department of Continuing Education at West Georgia College and to Mr. Clyde D. Ware of the Sears Roebuck Foundation. Mr. Johnson's department arranged for the publicity on the Afro-American culture lectures while Mr. Ware's Sears Roebuck Foundation sponsored this publication. Of course, thanks go to the contributors, their audiences and all who worked with both programs. As in all joint works the authors views are their own.

Eugene R. Huck, Editor
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BLACK POETRY FOR HIGH SCHOOLS AND COLLEGES

BY SAUNDERS E. WALKER

That the Social Science Division of West Georgia College would consult an English teacher about poetry to offer in high schools and colleges suggests respect for inderdepartmental consultation. That the division would request a Negro to recommend black poetry for students suggests the concern of that division in helping to solve some of the numerous social problems. The request is indeed salutary; it is one that both teachers and students would appreciate.

The person asked to recommend poetry by black writers is one who was educated in the public schools of a large Southern City and in a predominantly Negro liberal arts college, also in the South. In large measure this means that the courses he studied and the books he read were about the same as those used by white students. It follows that his acquisition of knowledge of Negro poetry was as limited as that of his white contemporaries. Whatever ascendency he may have acquired over these white contemporaries is attributable, first, to a sensitiveness to the dearth of materials devoted to Negro literature and, second, to his will to take full advantage of the few available printed sources. This determination in the early years of his career no doubt prepared him to teach a course called Negro history and literature in the high school from which he had graduated. For the same school, he wrote and directed a pageant, titled "The Spirit of the American Negro."

In ascribing reasons for the omission of Negro achievement in the literature studied in high schools and colleges, one must be rational. Teachers familiar with the content and organization of textbooks and with the approaches to the several forms of literary expression know well the practices followed. They know that authors and editors have not concerned themselves with writers merely as representatives of particular ethnic groups. In American literature they have been uniform in selecting representative men and women of letters. These the textbook writers have not extolled merely because of racial identification.

That the literary selections have seldom included the achievement of black writers, despite the plan and organization of the book adopted, has constituted a grave offense. Chief among those offended are the black American students and those of other nationalities who in increasing numbers are crusaders for the full emancipation of the black man.

To such offended people Crevecoeur's striking imagery of America as a land where "individuals of all nations are melted into a new race of men" remains an unrealized ideal. The offended see the literary output of black Americans as a missing ingredient from the social melting pot. They loudly demand that this ingredient be added. What the offenders do not realize is that those who stir the literary pot do not know the appropriate ingredients to add.

Frantic but sincere, makers of textbooks for literature classes are turning to black Americans for recommended selections. Too often the recommendations offered have included Negro poets singing on only one key, namely, protest. The recommenders feel that the only significant poetry and, certainly, the only significant prose, are composed by protesting authors. They believe that the literary achievement of the American Negro must reflect the temper of the present time; unequivocally that temper is protest. This insistence has caused readers, Negro and white, to expect black writers to produce only an ebony literature slanted toward complaints and castigations.

The insistence upon protest literature makes for nonrecognition of the merits of other forms of expression. Writers dealing only with protest are vulnerable to misunderstanding, if not to violent objection. A black poet who responds to the tender clasp of a baby's smile or to the dimples of a coy maiden is a potential traitor to the black man's cause.

Coupled with castigating the black poet for treating universal sentiments is the readiness of black militants to daub the term "middle class" upon Negroes who read such poetry. They employ this label without considering the trials, sacrifices and persistence shown by those who have reached the imagined middle position. They assail their own people for having had ambition and the will to rise above injustices and racial bitterness. They seem never to have realized that failure to recognize good achievement might be spurs to lofty goals reached by thousands of American Negroes.

In other words, exponents of literary protest have given scant attention to the positive protest. By this term is meant the employment of high quality workmanship and acumen sufficient to induce logical thinking, or thinking tinted by neither emotion nor inaccuracy. Protest, sustained to a point of diminishing returns, impairs thinking and warps personalities. When this is done, the antagonists are in ascendancy.

A sane point of view is to realize that literary militancy is not new. It has been a motif followed by writers over wide spans of time. The teachings of ancient philosophers, even the pages of the Bible, offer evidence of the protesting pen. Editors Woodward and Clark support this observation through selections from a wide range of rebels in American literature.[1] Their listing, fortunately, includes five Negroes: Martin Luther King, Jr., Stokeley Carmichael, Charles V. Hamilton, James Baldwin and Leroi Jones. It is good to see these black writers grouped with other writers treating the theme of social rebellion. Students using a book such as this one will appreciate the effort of the editors to give full consideration to black writers.

Though the plight of youth may appear irrational, it demands a sympathetic appraisal. It springs from the humiliation suffered too long by black people compelled to face the literary vacuum resulting from a deliberate omission of their own talented writers. In these moments of humiliation they have lost sight of certain problems faced by many writers.

Foremost among the problems the black literati have faced are those of sustaining the writer while his work is in progress. Even when the financial ends are met, the black writer has felt insecure in finding a publisher to accept his manuscript. Aware that state governments, systems of education, and even public libraries have been known to ban stories treating white rabbits having contacts with brown rabbits, Negroes have shunned the precariousness of publication. If white writers have lost prestige and suffered embarrassment for even an accidental effort to promote integration, Negroes know that their effort along similar lines would be doomed from the beginning.

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1 Robert H. Woodward and James J. Clark. *The Social Rebel in American Literature* (New York: The Odyssey Press, 1968).

What is needed is to face the matter with calmness and to realize that all ethnic groups are innately sensitive to matters of heredity; they are more sensitive when they and their elders have been objects of both scorn and invisibility. With a sane point of view will come the realization that the black militants have understandable rights to demand recognition of their literary achievement in all forms of expression. The great danger of such recognition is concluding that Negroes as well as those who write about them regard protest as the only approved genre. Such acceptance seems to say that the black man has no capacity for responding to beauty or to the nobility of character found in people in spite of discord and racial enmity.

One proposed alleviation is to allow for fuller coverage of Negro poets in courses taught in both high schools and colleges. If a unit of study is flanked by colonial America, one might direct attention to Phillis Wheatley, a coy slave brought from Senegal to Boston, where John Wheatley, a wealthy tailor purchased her as a maid for his wife. The Wheatleys, recognizing the intrinsic worth of their servant, her poise and brilliant mind, spared no opportunity of teaching her to read and of exposing her to classical and modern literature. In time Phillis was writing poems showing the influence of Alexander Pope. An ardent admirer of George Washington, she wrote of him as "first in peace and honours," an epithet that was to be heard again in the resolutions drawn up by the House of Representatives following Washington's death in 1799:

> "To the memory of the Man, first in war, first in peace, and first in the hearts of his countrymen."

At times when students are imbibing the lyrics of poets of other hues, lines from Georgia Douglas Johnson (1886-1965) whose poem "I want to Die While You Love Me" might be injected as follows:

> I want to die while you love me,
> While yet you hold me fair,
> While laughter lies upon my lips
> And lights are in my hair.
>
> I want to die while you love me.
> I could not bear to see,
> The glory of this perfect day,
> Grow dim—or cease to be.

I want to die while you love me.
Oh! who would care to live
Till love has nothing more to ask,
And nothing more to give.

I want to die while you love me,
And bear to that still bed
Your kisses, turbulent, unspent,
To warm me when I'm dead.

Readers of Negro poetry think of Paul Laurence Dunbar (1872-1906) as the poet of Negro dialect, a form of expression which must be handled with care less it offend the sensitive minds of young Negroes. That Dunbar wrote in another key is attested by the following:

Because I had loved so deeply,
Because I had loved so long,
God in his great compassion
Gave me the gift of song.

From "Compensation"

Dunbar's "My Sort O' Man" echoes the immortal lines of Robert Burns "A Man's a Man for A That," as the following excerpt will indicate:

But I jedge no man by his clothes,—
  Nor gentleman nor tramp;
The man that wears the finest suit
  May be the biggest scamp,
An' he whose limbs are clad in rags
  That make a mournful sight,
In life's great battle may have proved
  A hero in the fight.

If the aim of a given assignment is to illustrate the poetic imagery, classes in American literature on both the high school and college levels would find rewards in poetry by Langston Hughes (1902-1967), from whose "The Negro Speaks of Rivers" the following are selected:

I've known rivers:
I've known rivers ancient as the world and
  older than the flow of human blood in
  human veins.

My soul has grown deep like the rivers

I bathed in the Euphrates when dawns were young.
I built my hut near the Congo and it lulled me
to sleep.

I looked upon the Nile and raised the pyramids
above it.
I heard the singing of the Mississippi when
Abe Lincoln went down to New Orleans, and
I've seen its muddy bosom turn all golden
in the sunset.

I've known rivers:
Ancient, dusky rivers.

My soul has grown deep like the rivers.

Langston Hughes wrote poems meeting the requirements of the positive protest. They convey an awareness of existing evils but inject a sense of determination, self assurance, and victory. "I, Too," a short poem which identifies the poet with the very heart of America, despite the scorns black Americans have suffered.

I, too, sing America.

I am the darker brother.
They send me to eat in the kitchen
When company comes,
But I laugh,
And eat well,
And grow strong.

Tomorrow,
I'll be at the table
When company comes.
Nobody'll dare
Say to me,
"Eat in the Kitchen,"
Then.

Besides,
They'll see how beautiful I am
And be ashamed—

I, too, am America.

It is from Langston Hughes also that one might assign lines whose protest is subtle but elevating, as noted in "I Dream a World."

I dream a world where man
No other will scorn,
Where love will bless the earth
And peace its paths adorn.
I dream a world where all
Will know sweet freedom's way,
Where greed no longer saps the soul
Nor avarice blights our day.
A world I dream where black or white,
Whatever race you be,
Will share the bounties of the earth
And every man is free,
Where wretchedness will hang its head,
And joy, like a pearl,
Attend the needs of all mankind.
Of such I dream—
Our world!

History records numerable protests, crusades; even revolutions. Often these have been catalysts to progress and better living, peace and serenity. Literary history would hardly disclose a time when all writers felt impelled to cry out in disdain. In all epochs somebody has used his pen to raise minds above existing chaos. It must be hoped that sufficient writings, poetry included, will be preserved to meet the needs of people when demands and demonstrations have run their courses.

Across America young people, though alive and though vociferous in many quarters, seem sound asleep to universal truths. The literature of inspired souls, whether black or white, might be the road returning them to harmony and serenity. Most teachers and most students await the dawn to a new day.

An angel, robed in spotless white,
Bent down and kissed the sleeping Night,
Night woke to blush; the sprite was gone.
Men saw the blush and called it Dawn.

"Dawn" By Paul Laurence Dunbar

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NEGRO SLAVERY AND THE EMERGENCE OF THE SOUTH AS A DISTINCT DISTRICT PRIOR TO 1850

BY ROBERT C. HERSCH

Historians have often been intrigued by the regional peculiarities of the American South. One of these was Dixie's almost obsessive retention of human bondage, long after its virtual demise on the rest of the continent. Slavery, an unfortunate but hardy perennial in the history of the race, helped shape the South's character and people, and contributed heavily to her emergence as a distinct region.

Slavery had the unfortunate effect of insulating the South from the rest of the nation. Much of the lower South still presents a picture of bleak isolation, and inhabitants of farming communities retain parochial and traditionalist viewpoints. Black servitude increased the isolation endemic to rural regions.

Black labor contributed immeasurably to the development of the plantation system, to the point where planters considered its employment almost necessary for significantly profitable staple cultivation. As indentured servitude declined in importance, the cost of Negros had to be reckoned in the capitalization of almost any such venture. Land was generally cheap and available, while labor was not.

Negro slavery helped make the rise of cotton cultivation possible in the Old South, thus widening the crevice between the already distinct Northern and Southern economies. As cotton and other staple producers moved into the piedmont, slaves journeyed west with planters. From 1800 to 1840, the black population of Mississippi grew by 306,391, coinciding with a sharp rise in white settlement.[1]

Cotton could be and was cultivated by free labor in antebellum times. In the absence of machinery, however, slaves could be easily utilized for the routinized labor involved.

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1 Charles S. Sydnor, *Slavery in Mississippi* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1966) p. 186.

and planters found the gang system suitable for the task.[2] Southerners therefore associated slavery with the booming Southwestern cotton economy which developed after the War of 1812. By 1850, raw cotton accounted for nearly half of all American exports.[3] Ulrich B. Phillips has noted a strong correlation between slave and cotton prices in major markets.[4] Since blacks were easily movable, a vigorous internal slave trade developed. Planters in tidewater areas, faced with depleted soils and economic competition from newer areas, sold their surplus to developing regions further west. The scarcity of labor in the Southwest and frequent availability of cheap new lands fostered economic dependence on slavery. Planters in older sections profited handsomely from the sale of their chattels. This produced a simultaneous expansion and integration of the slave system, increasing its importance in the Southern economy. Slaves proved susceptable to good management, and became increasingly efficient in the cultivation of cotton. From 1800 to 1840, man hours expended in the production of one bale dropped from 601 to 439.[5] During the same period, cotton production increased nearly ten times.[6] Planters apparently profited in times of economic health, given a continuous demand for cotton and other staples in the world market. Smaller slave-holders often employed additional blacks to increase the size of their holdings. By 1850, coalescence between slavery and agriculture marked the South as an economically discrete section.

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2 Clement Eaton, *The Growth of Southern Civilization: 1790-1860* (New York: Harper & Row, 1961) p. 27; Lewis Cecil Gray, *History of Agriculture in the Southern United States to 1860,* Vol. I (Washington, D.C.: The Carnegie Institution, 1933) p. 479.

3 Allan Nevins, *Ordeal of the Union,* Vol. I: *The Fruits of Manifest Destiny* (New York: Charles Scribners Sons, 1947) p. 466.

4 Ulrich Bonnell Phillips, *American Negro Slavery: A Survey of the Supply, Employment and Control of Negro Labor As Determined by the Plantation Regime* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1966) pp. 370-372.

5 U. S. Bureau of the Census, *Historical Statistics of the United States, Colonial Times to 1957* (Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1960) p. 281.

6 *Slavery in Mississippi,* p. 185.

Slaves raised staple crops which produced a major part of Southern income. Blacks were not only gears in the sectional economic machine, but required a heavy capital investment which did not immediately appreciate. Southerners failed to put a significant proportion of their wealth into circulation, and this freezing of capital had an unfortunate effect on the entire regional economy. It checked investment in industry and commerce, and the high initial cost of chattels led to overborrowing by many. This created an element of instability in the economy, reflected in the vulnerability of many nascent Southern credit institutions. Under such circumstances, Southerners made relatively little venture capital available for the financing of local commerce, and in many cases tended to operate their plantations or farms as self-contained economic units, utilizing few manufactured goods and making the rest by hand. Slaves often functioned as artisans in such cases. The entire plantation economy was based on the extensive cultivation of one crop for export, and the planter found it unnecessary to patronize local markets, except to secure cheap cloth and foodstuffs for his slaves. Farmers owning relatively few or no chattels generally produced crops for little more than their own subsistance and occasional trade to neighbors. It was only in the border states that farmers developed a significant local market for their produce.[7] But the economic isolation of the self-sufficient plantation bred an economic parochialism, aggravated by lack of money. Under these circumstances, some commercial transactions degenerated into mere barter.[8]

Lack of capital and the drive towards plantation self-sufficiency limited the home market. In Mississippi for instance, cloth of local factories had to compete with both imported products and homespun manufacture. One agent for a textile factory plaintively advertised in 1852, "It is hoped that all

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7 This discussion is based on several sources. See Eugene D. Genovese, *The Political Economy of Slavery: Studies in the Economy and Society of the Slave South*, (New York: Vintage Books, 1967); *American Negro Slavery*, pp. 344-401; *The Growth of Southern Civilization*, pp. 49-71; Harold D. Woodman, "The Profitability of Slavery: A Historical Perennial," as reprinted in, Allen Weinstein and Frank O. Gatell, eds., *American Negro Slavery: A Modern Reader* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1968) pp. 259-275.

8 A weekly "trade day" still exists in the hamlet of Collinsville, Alabama. It is probably a survival of antebellum times. Mary Jane Baker, Centre, Alabama· letter, 31 August 1969, to the author.

friends of Southern enterprise will at least call and look at these goods." [9]

Southern industrialists, however, generally refused to decry slavery. They counted plantation owners among their natural allies, because few other Southerners possessed the resources necessary for investment in native manufacturers.[10] Their enterprises were often raw material extractive or processing industries, either utilizing slave labor at some point or dependent upon slave grown products. Blacks twisted plantation-produced Kentucky hemp on primitive ropewalks. Their product was used to bind cotton bales in Alabama. Even in Richmond's famous Tredegar Iron Works, chattels labored beside free men in skilled operations.[11] The employment of blacks meant decreased job opportunities for white mechanics, and was a cause of social and economic tension before the Civil War.

Lack of native capital also meant underdevelopment of local credit sources. Many Southerners had to depend upon the financial expertise of New York merchants, who had the worldwide contracts so necessary in international trade. Plantation products were generally shipped to Europe via New York. From the end of colonial times until the 1850's, most Southern ports assumed secondary roles.[12] Consumers in Charleston had to pay significantly higher prices for imported goods than those in Philadelphia.[13] Southern cities functioned a little more than outlets for plantation products. This situation combined with the failure to develop sufficient home industry to retard urban development. The plantation remailed isolated, a victim of its own economy.

One-crop agriculture utilizing slaves also detracted from the Southern economy by helping produce soil exhaustion. By 1850, the average value of land in the South was $5.34 per acre compared with $11.39 in the Northwest.[14] Black

9 *The Southern Reveille*, Port Gibson, Miss., Nov. 3, 1852, as quoted in *Slavery in Mississippi*, p. 25.

10 *The Political Economy of Slavery*, p. 181.

11 Richard C. Wade, *Slavery in the Cities: The South, 1820-1860* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967) p. 35.

12 *The Growth of Southern Civilization*, pp. 197-198.

13 *Historical Statistics of the United States*, pp. 119-122. Price indices for several American cities are listed herein.

14 *Ordeal of the Union*, I, p. 492.

labor did not cause soil depletion, but as Charles Sydnor noted, "It did not pay to use an $800 slave in ditching, terracing, or manuring $8 an acre land, especially when more could be bought whenever it was exhausted."[15] By forcing a westward movement, soil depletion contributed to population dispersal and a slackening of population growth in seaboard regions. Such unstable tenure gave much of the South the character of a transient frontier, which it retained until the Civil War. While slavery contributed to the South's economic development, it also rendered it incomplete.

Human bondage had an even greater influence on the development of a distinct Southern society. Thomas P. Govan noted that slavery was ". . . not so much an economic system as a social order to permit two unlike peoples to live together."[16] The slave's dependence on the Southerner and the Southerner's on the slave produced a cross cultural interchange despite mutual tensions. The farmer or planter often lived in closer proximity to his blacks than he cared to admit. Men were vexed with the constant care of dealing with their slaves, putting them to work profitably, preventing them from running away or revolting, ensuring their fecundity, and making them believe that they were members of an inferior caste, somewhere between animal and human. Numerous Southerners also suffered from the moral conflict involved in keeping another human being in social and psychological fetters.

The planter was generally victimized by an isolation produced by engrossment of contiguous lands, poorly developed transportation, and lack of urban centers. This circumstance often fostered close contracts between master and slave. Frederick Law Olmstead, a tireless contemporary reporter of the mores of the slave states, was ". . . struck with the close cohabitation of black and white."[17] By the time of the Civil War, Africanisms such as *yam*, *tote*, and *goober* had become part of the regional vocabulary. Black speech pat-

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15 *Slavery in Mississippi*, p. 192.

16 Thomas P. Govan, "Was Plantation Slavery Profitable?" *Southern Historical Review* (November, 1942) p. 513.

17 Frederick Law Olmstead, *A Journey in the Seaboard Slave States, With Remarks on Their Economy* (New York: Dix and Edwards, 1856) p. 17.

terns surely contributed to the formation of a distinctive Southern accent. Even before the Revolution, planter's ladies "talk (ed) like negroes" in the Carolinas.[18]

But slaveholders often sought escape from the fears and frustrations involved in governing human beings. They developed elaborate visiting patterns, in part copied from Great Britain, but also an indigenous response to their lonely existence.[19]

Practically the only other external diversion the planter had was religion. After the rise of cotton cultivation, he eschewed Jeffersonian deism. During the early years of the Nineteenth century, a vigorous evangelical movement swept the South.[20] The emotionalism of revival drained off interest in the doctrine of natural rights. Successful missioners enfolded numerous slaves and slaveowners, and worship often became a common bond between the two. During the preceding century, many slaveholders felt religion would make slaves restive, but they eventually realized its value in producing tractable chattels. The slaves received a version which emphasized the homily "servants obey your masters;" preaching about freedom and equality was considered dangerous.[21] The planter's aim was to reconcile the slave to his servile status, and thus decrease the problem of control. Acquiescing to this doctrinal twist must have added to the master's own religious conservatism. After 1830, Southerners increasingly equated religious liberalism with abolitionism. Since the North seemed to be a hot-bed of radical new sects, their hostility to things Northern increased. Fifteen years later, both the Baptist and Methodist churches split into Northern and Southern wings over questions involving slavery. Thomas R. Dew and other religious luminaries developed a defense of slavery which de-

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18 Lorenzo Turner, as cited in Lerone Bennett, Jr., *Before the Mayflower: A History of the Negro in America, 1619-1964* (Baltimore, Md.: Penguin Books, 1966) p. 28; St. George Tucker, Diary, 1774, Tucker Papers (Colonial Williamsburg, Inc.) as quoted in Carl Bridenbaugh, *Myths and Realities: Societies in the Colonial South* (New York: Atheneum, 1962) p. 73.

19 *Myths and Realities,* p. 27.

20 *Growth of Southern Civilization,* p. 14.

21 Ulrich Bonnell Phillips, *Life and Labor in the Old South* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1963) p. 202.

pended on the Bible for its sanction. This suited many Southerners, who literally believed in divine law as revealed in the Old Testament.[22]

The slaveholder's contention that tyranny was a social good if it curbed potential anarchy produced a profound conservatism and a contempt for civil liberties. Southerners of the Revolutionary era often realized the hollowness of preaching freedom for some while keeping black slaves in bondage. Thomas Jefferson solved this dilemma by concluding that the Negro was wholly inferior to the white. After 1830, a new generation put such doubts aside, and turned to the powerful weapons at hand to legally enforce Negro inferiority. They found a series of black codes which provided harsh penalties for any indication that a human being questioned his servile status. To some courts, the slave was a passive piece of property transferable at will, and almost completely deprived of Constitutional rights. But all Southerners had not divested themselves of humanitarianism. As one Tennessee judge bluntly stated, "A slave is not in the condition of a horse. . . ."[23] This fundamental contradiction continued to pose an insoluble problem for Dixie legalists, and helped produce a significant differentiation between Northern and Southern law. Ultimately the civil liberties of white as well as black suffered. The stricture that slaves could not testify against whites under any circumstances limited legal redress for men of both races.[24] After 1830, the slave codes furnished a justification for the transference of Southern hysteria over the renewed abolitionist movement to strictures on freedom of the press and speech. After that date, private citizens increasingly constituted themselves as vigilante bodies, thus

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22 Clement Eaton, *The Freedom of Thought Struggle in the Old South* (New York: Harper & Row, 1964) p. 312; Charles S. Sydnor, The Development of Southern Sectionalism, 1819-1848, Vol. V of *A History of the South*, eds. Wendell Holmes Stephenson and E. Merton Coulter (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1968) pp. 294-300; Charles S. Sydnor, "The Southerner and the Laws," as reprinted in Abraham S. Eisenstadt, ed., *American History: Recent Interpretations, Book I: To 1877* (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1962) p. 404.

23 Kenneth M. Stampp, *The Peculiar Institution: Slavery in the Ante-Bellum South* (New York: Vintage Books, 1956) p. 217.

24 "The Southerner and the Laws," p. 407.

honoring an old Southern custom. In 1845, such a group forced Cassius M. Clay, abolitionist editor of the *True American,* to leave Louisville, Kentucky. [25]

Above all, Southerners feared servile revolt, a fear particularly acute in areas where blacks constituted a high proportion of the population. Many slaves were apparently crushed into a childlike mold in which they unconsciously parodied their masters.[26] Others appeared to do so while nursing a sullen hatred for the slaveowner. Still others, their spirits unbroken, engaged in individual and group acts of defiance ranging from inefficiency at work to full scale revolt. Those choosing the latter course, such as Gabriel Prosser and Nat Turner, excited whites to violent and sometimes hysterical reprisals, since Negro revolt threatened to turn the rigid black and white caste division bottom up. The problem was particularly acute in urban areas and towns, where restraints tended to break down as blacks increased their social contract with free men, and decreased those with their masters. Under these circumstances, local governments devised slave patrols and militias. In the absence of strong formal government, men in outlying regions sometimes took matters into their hands and formed vigilance committees. These groups added to the violence and militarism endemic in Southern society.

But the basic unit of Southern law was the individual slaveholder. On both plantation and farm his word superseded that of the state. As Bridenbaugh has remarked, the slaveowner lived "... in a sort of fearful isolation among ... negro slaves."[27] The interplay of command, fear and mutual dependence helped produce the distinctive personality noted by de Tocqueville:

> ... the first notion he acquires in life is, that he was born to command, and the first habit he contracts is ruling without resistance. His education tends, then, to give him the character of a haughty and hasty man—irascible, violent, ardent in his desires .... [28]

25 *The Freedom of Thought Struggle,* pp. 185-189.

26 I have tentatively accepted Stanley M. Elkins's controversial theories on slave personality. See Stanley M. Elkins, *Slavery: A Problem in American Institutional and Intellectual Life* (New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1963) pp. 81-139.

27 *Myths and Realities,* p. 21.

28 Alexis de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America* (New York, 1898) I, 507-508, as cited in John Hope Franklin, *The Militant South, 1800-1861* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1964) p. 67.

The command of slaves was only a step to the command of whites. Slaveholders constituted the most prestigious group in the Old South, and status was often partly reckoned by the number of slaves a man held. A manufactured aristocracy copied from Virginia was unsuited to the frenetic new cotton regions of the Nineteenth Century, where an abundance of cheap land helped produce a relatively high degree of physical and social mobility. Under these circumstances, family counted for less than visible wealth. In back areas where there were few slaves, prestige did not always depend on ownership of blacks.[29] Moreover, small farmers hoped to become planters, and were often related to plantation owners. Poor whites developed a virulent prejudice towards blacks, based on fears of possible social and economic competition in case of abolition. J. D. B. De Bow and other planter spokesmen stressed that there were no class lines in Southern society except those of color.[30] This view masked the real distance which existed between the wealthy and poor in many areas in the Old South, but it does point to the very real thread of equalitarianism which ran through Southern society.

In 1850, large planters still enjoyed a pre-eminent position in society and hence in sectional and national politics. The Virginia aristocracy, connected by ties of family and interest, maintained a high position during the early national period. Movement of population westward due to soil exhaustion and cotton cultivation diminished their prestige, and contributed to the rise of democratic forces in the West. In the entire seaboard South except Florida, the back country challenged the coast for political leadership. The new democratizers were not against slavery, and often defended it more vehemently than the older politicos. The seaboard planters had accumulated their slaves and were content, as long as no force threatened to deprive them of their property. The men of the back country ambitiously sought more chattels, and hence more political, social and economic status. Slavery helped create a tenuous bond between back country and coastal regions, and between new states and old.

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29 Edward W. Phifer, "Slavery in Microcosm: Burke County, North Carolina" as reprinted in *American Negro Slavery: A Modern Reader*, p. 82.

30 J. D. B. De Bow, *The Interest in Slavery of the Southern Non-Slaveholder* (Charleston, 1860) pp. 3, 5, 8-10, as cited in *The Militant South*, p. 85.

Various other slave related issues united Southerners. One of the most widely discussed was expansion. New lands, they reasoned, would provide fertile soil for wasteful plantation agriculture, lessen the possibility of servile revolts by removing the black population from areas of high concentration, and redress the growing political imbalance between North and South.[31] They both stated and acted on their views in such imbroglios as the Talmadge amendment, the Missouri Compromise, the Mexican War, the Texas debate, and the Wilmot Proviso.

The decade of the 1830's was the critical point for the formation of a true feeling of Southern sectionalism. Southerners felt they were losing their influence in national politics but were not entirely correct, for the South retained its grip upon presidential politics. But scarcely had the nullification crisis subsided when a renewed and vehement abolitionist movement sent many Dixie politicians scurrying to their oratorical storm shelters. They feared that Garrisonian crusaders would spark slave rebellion, and the Turner revolt seemed to translate their worst thoughts into bloody action. The millenium of Southern consciousness had finally arrived. John C. Calhoun succinctly expressed the change in sectional thought:

> Many in the South once believed that it (slavery) was a moral and political evil. That folly and delusion are gone. We see it now in its true light and regard it as the most safe and stable basis for free institutions in the World.[32]

Slavery had indeed contributed to the development of a unique socioeconomic milieu in the South, but it was one which exuded crippling financial and human waste. The South isolated herself within the prison of human servitude and therefore became estranged from the rest of the Nation.

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31 *The Militant South*, p. 97.

32 Richard K. Cralle, ed., *The Works of John C. Calhoun* (New York, 1853), III, 180, as quoted in *The Growth of Southern Civilization*, p. 307.

TEACHING BLACK HISTORY IN AMERICA: WHAT ARE THE PROBLEMS?

BY MELVIN DRIMMER

Black History and Black Studies are in a chaotic state at the present time and will be so for some years to come. After years of disinterest and neglect, one finds that universities and colleges are falling over themselves to develop Black History programs regardless of their own resources and the needs of the black community. Schools which hardly ever saw a Negro—from Reed College in the wilds of Oregon, to Oshkosh State in the wilds of Wisconsin, to the newly founded York College in the wilds of Queens—are now trying to come up with Black History programs. Harvard's Black Studies program has already crumbled—a failure from the start by some predictors. Now Yale's Afro-American program is awaited and although it looks good on paper it may fail unless they can get some dynamic and radical black teachers to run the program. And when one considers the San Francisco State exotic program one realizes that it is still tentative, pending funding by California Regents and reopening stabilization by that spunky scholar and gentleman, Dr. S. I. Hayakawa. So one must wait while, in the words of another Asian gentleman, "a hundred flowers blossom." After a shake down period it will be easier to know which program or programs will succeed. It might be useful to see a couple of hundred colleges try various programs—based on the needs of their student body, the Black Student Alliances, the community in which they are situated, and their own resources.

There is no one formula which can be applied to all schools. That concept would be the most dangerous idea which college educators could accept. The Atlanta University Center, with six thousand black students, must devise a very different program from the one which might be used at Reed College with its thirty-five black students. There also may be a need for two different curriculas, one for black and one for white students. When this idea was suggested in

Atlanta to the Afro-American Studies Conference all hell broke loose among the whites attending. Having taught Afro-American history to blacks at Spelman, and to whites at New York University, it seems that blacks and whites bring various levels of awareness and knowledge to the basic course. White students must be brought along slower, realizing (and not to be patronizing) that they are culturally deprived. To whites every little thing must be explained and proved. The six black students who took my course at N. Y. U. were outraged and angered by the naivete of the thirty-six white students. On the other hand, I found in observing the white high school teachers who participated in the two NDEA Institutes in Negro History at Spelman in 1966 and 1968 that they felt too embarrassed and somewhat intimidated to ask questions and to participate in classes held by C. Eric Lincoln and Vincent Harding. In these classes the level of discussion, teaching and argumentation between the instructors and the majority of black teachers was very intense. The black teachers, many of whom had taught Negro history in their high schools and communities, were personally involved in the nature, meaning and future of black people in this country. The whites, who had never heard blacks express themselves too forcefully before were impressed but were too embarrassed to ask questions, and generally were lost. As an expedient solution a track system might be needed for whites and blacks, possibly with white instructors teaching the whites and black instructors the blacks. This could be done in the same school and in the same department. Certainly, if many of the major universities can have more than one expert in certain fields in their departments, there is no reason why there cannot be a few professors teaching Afro-American history.

While one must wait and see which programs succeed, there is a danger of every school having a fully developed Afro-American program at the present time due to the limited teaching personnel available. This does not mean that every college should not teach Afro-American history. There are in every community, black high school teachers in the social sciences who could meet the needs of teaching a course or two in Black Studies at the college level. Certainly the caliber of black high school teachers who attended NDEA Institutes would indicate that there is a wealth of under-used talent in school systems around America.

The real future of Black History and Studies does not lie in spreading university-trained talent around the country but in developing a dozen or more centers for the teaching and study of Black History. It is rather ironic and sad that while there are at present over a dozen major centers for African Studies in the United States, there is not one for the teaching of Afro-American Studies. This is an indictment of the academic community and the major foundations of this try. The Foundations, in particular, have poured millions into African study, but have given very little for Afro-American programs. Of course, African Studies was looked upon as an adjunct to American foreign policy during the Cold War, and, therefore, money was available. Now that we have a hot war in our ghettos and the country is trying to save the cities, and the blacks are viewing themselves as people of another country, we have a foreign policy crisis at home, and therefore, Foundation money will soon be available.

Although logic has little to do with Foundation grants, some say there are two logical places for the development of Black Studies. The first place is with those schools which already have African Studies Centers: U. C. L. A., Wisconsin, Northwestern, Indiana, Boston, Columbia, and so on. The other place is the black colleges, particularly the Atlanta University Center, Fisk, Howard, Lincoln, and Morgan State. The black schools have the students, the faculty, the basis of good library facilities and collections, and the traditions of black scholarship. It is worthwhile to remember that black scholarship in America was supported and kept alive at black schools, despite tremendous financial hardships which the schools faced, and the ever watchful eye of reactionary and racist state governments. Major works of W. E. B. Du Bois, Charles Johnson, Horace Mann Bond, Rayford Logan, Alain Locke, Ira Reid, A. A. Taylor, Lorenzo Green, Monroe Work, J. Saunders Redding, William Leo Hansberry, Charles Wesley, John Hope Franklin, Benjamin Quarles, and C. Eric Lincoln, to name just a few, came out of black schools. Yet, there is concern among many that now that Black History is fashionable, the best faculty will be lured away from black Southern colleges by Northern institutions, and Foundations will overlook Negro colleges for major developmental grants. They will be in a sense, raped and forgotten. In fact, it is immoral that white schools which never so much as lifted a paternalistic

finger to help blacks, are now throwing thousands of dollars into the faces of black faculty in an attempt to lure them up to their schools to teach their token enrollments of black students. This is a complete disregard for the hundreds of thousands of students that that man or woman presently serves in the black community. It would seem to me that a better solution would be to send black students down to the Atlanta University Center or other black schools for a year or so on a meaningful exchange rather than continue the present policy of raiding black schools.

Another remark regarding the development of Black History and Studies program is that there are dangers of overselling Black History. The way some speak of Black History one would think it is a panacea for all the ills besetting the black community and American society. Black History in itself will not put bread on the table, eliminate white racism, solve the problems of the cities, end the war in Viet Nam or reorient national priorities. It might even be argued that Black History may have a negative effect on blacks. As Frederick Nietzsche observed, history, by telling us what the past has done, limits our sights on what we might achieve in the future. History limits our goals by saying future objectives cannot be reached because it failed or had not been tried in the past. It may be that by showing how deeply ingrained racism is in American history and how hard whites have fought to keep blacks down, Black History courses would discourage blacks from fighting to change a system which they view as impregnable. To argue, as some blacks do, that all whites are devils and are to be distrusted may have the effect of seeing a unity in white society where none exists. It may, therefore, discourage blacks from opposing an order where they see themselves facing a united front of ten whites for every one black, which to oppose might cause them to face certain extinction.

The real problem is not to segregate Black History from the basic American history programs but to build the black vision and experience into the American experience so that a completely new version of American history emerges. This is the revolutionary potential of Black History. It not only teaches black pride to blacks, but it will, and I have seen this happen, reorient the whites. To see the black experience in America as central to the history of this country would be to revolutionize a whole generation of white American students.

Once whites have learned that almost all of the traditional American history has been a pack of half-truths or outright lies they will become alienated from the traditional myths which go by the name of American history. It would be like telling a son that his father has a mistress, or mistreats his workers, or is dishonest. This is why Black History should be taught to every student, from engineer to elementary education major, from ROTC recruit to home economics student. One reason why white America has had to hide Black History from its own children is because it has not been willing to face up to what it has done to blacks or to Indians or Mexican-Americans for that matter.

Let us not make Black History too glamorous for whites—with only tales of freedom fighters, heroes, African kings, and all the others who triumphed over great odds. Let us not forget to mention the past millions who were crushed, exploited, physically and psychologically mamed, and cut off from the main stream of economic and social development. Let us not prettify the story of the Afro-American so that white students will forget what it has meant to be a black man in white America. And let us remember that Black History is not only a way for blacks to see themselves but a way for whites to see themselves as well. Above all, we must see Black History as central to the meaning of the American experience. Take away the black man from the American experience and one sees a totally different history. This country has developed from its Euro-Afro-Indian roots. Once we understand this then we can realize the significance of W.E.B. Du Bois' question: "Would America be America without her Negro people?" This is what Afro-American history is all about. "I, too, sing America," wrote Langston Hughes. "I am the darker brother."

A LATIN AMERICAN ALTERNATIVE TO RACISM: SOME ASPECTS OF THE THOUGHT OF EUGENIO MARIA DE HOSTOS

BY ROBERT H. CLAXTON

Eugenio Maria de Hostes y Bonilla was distinguished as a traveler, a writer on a surprising variety of subjects, an educator, and a representative of incipient Puerto Rican nationalism.[1] The son of a Creole functionary of the Spanish government, Hostos was born in 1839 near Mayaguez, Puerto Rico. After completing his primary schooling, Hostos continued his education in Spain. During the time he was studying for a law degree in Madrid, Spain passed through a period of turmoil culminating in her first republican experiment. Never enthusiastic about becoming a lawyer and disappointed that the Spanish republicans were not as interested in reforming colonial administration as he was, Hostos abandoned Spain and went to New York. There he attempted to join with Cuban exiles, but he found them hopelessly divided by factionalism.

Hostos decided to organize support in various Latin American countries for the liberation of the Spanish Antilles. During the early 1870's, Hostos resided in Colombia, Peru, Chile, Argentina, and Brazil. The would-be liberator established Cuban auxiliary societies, turned to journalism and literary pursuits, and supported himself through teaching. He tried again in 1874 and in 1875 to cooperate with Cuban exiles in New York and in the Dominican Republic, but his efforts were futile. Consequently, Hostos thereafter concentrated on being more of an educator than a liberator.

He then served as a school administrator in Venezuela and, subsequently, introduced educational reforms into the Dominican Republic. In 1888, he accepted an invitation from the Chilean government to improve that nation's schools. While

[1] This article is based upon the author's "Inter-American Relations in the Thought of Eugenio María de Hostos y Bonilla" (unpublished master's thesis, State University of New York at Buffalo, 1964), a study directed by Professor George A. Brubaker.

he was in Chile, the Spanish-American War broke out. Having been sent by the Chilean authorities to the United States to investigate educational methods, Hostos used the occasion to register with President William McKinley his objection to the North American occupation of his homeland. Disillusioned concerning prospects for Puerto Rican independence, Hostos returned to the Dominican Republic where he died in 1903.

During his extensive travel, Hostos developed his thought concerning human relations. Convinced of the decadence of the Old World, he glorified the New World Indian "noble savage" and condemned Negro slavery in the Spanish Caribbean. He regarded society as an organism of essentially rational men and he believed that the fusion of races and cultures was ideal. In fact, Hostos suggested that the Caribbean peoples had a special destiny in assisting humanity toward attaining that goal.

Hostos looked upon the condition of Europe as an impediment to the progress of man. He observed that emigration to the New World was increasing in his time and he reasoned that, beneath all European appearances of progress, luxury, and wealth, there were gangrenous sores upon its society. Moreover, it was especially disgusting to Hostos to find European monarchy in Brazil and a people in Buenos Aires bent on imitating European tastes. Why, he wondered, should nations destined to exemplify cultural fusion in the world want to copy the exclusivism of Europe? Hostos left Europe as the Franco-Prussian War was being fought. He hoped that the coming of peace would bring a new era for Europe. But for him it was the New World which held the promise of a better future. [2]

In addition, the educator-liberator found something mystically wonderful about the very appearance of scenes in the New World. Puerto Rico became a "most precious jewel,"

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2 Eugenio María de Hostos y Bonilla, October 31, 1869 entry, *Diario: tomo I. Obras Completas* [hereafter OC] (20 vols.; Havana, 1939), I, 166; December 26, 1873 entry, *Diario: tomo II*, OC, II, 67; *Mi viaje al sur*, OC, VI, 90 and 483; "La Latina América," in *Temas sudamericanos*, OC, VII, 10-12; "Tres Repúblicas," *ibid.*, p. 94; "Memoria de la exposición," *ibid.*, pp. 218-219; *La peregrinación de Boyoán*, OC, VIII, 61, 168, and 177; *Tratado de moral*, OC, XVI, 404; "Geografía política universal," in *Ensayos didácticos: tomo III*, OC, XX, 287.

an emerald, while Cuba was the "pearl of the Antilles." The beauty of the countryside near Cartagena, Colombia, reminded him of the "primitive nature that smiled innocently upon her violators."[3] Nevertheless, the New World came to represent progress for humanity, according to Hostos. Speculations of learned theologians notwithstanding, Columbus discovered America, a triumph of experimentation over scholasticism. The early nineteenth-century revolutions, moreover, meant the beginning of a break with the errors of the past and a new and unstained alignment with freedom, order, and progress. For Hostos, the civilization of the New World by reason of its varied bases seemed more complete than the narrowness of Europe. He believed that, in the New World, there would be a new race, the product of the fusion of all races, and a new and superior civilization as well.[4]

A natural ramification of a tendancy to think in terms of European decadence and New World potential was an idealization of the Indian past. Before Europe discovered gunpowder and the use of the printing press, even before the birth of Christ, there was, Hostos pointed out, civilization in the New World. Hostos declared that the pre-Columbian Indians of the Caribbean had agriculture, elementary crafts, religion, music, a form of government, and a division of labor into specializations. Along with that innocent race there was the intelligent civilization of Mexico whose art and architectural forms were advanced. Furthermore, the Incan culture represented a major achievement in social and economic planning as far as Hostos was concerned. Hostos described Pedro Valdivia, who attempted to conquer Chile, in terms of ignorance and cruelty. In contrast, he glorified the Araucanians of the region in terms of their nobility and heroism.

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3 Quoted from *Mi Viaje al sur,* OC, VI, 23-24; "...Cuba tiene más enemigos que Puerto Rico...," in Eugenio Carlos Hostos (ed.), *España y América* (Paris, 1954), p. 211; *La peregrinación de Boyoán,* OC, VIII, 143.

4 "El descubrimiento y el descubridor," in *La cuna de América,* OC, X, 37, 39, and 107; "La reforma de enseñanza," in *Forjando el porvenir americano: tomo I,* OC, XII, 98; *Tratado de moral,* OC, XVI, 421 and 437; "España y América," in *España y América,* 267.

Finally, he admired the "robust, beautiful, intelligent, and heroic Guarani race."[5]

As a student, Hostos found one of Spain's most vicious and disgusting policies to be the maintaining of the anachronistic institution of slavery. Abolition became a basic demand since Hostos attributed lack of progress in the Caribbean to this one factor. He reasoned that to enslave the Negro was to enslave the Antilles; to free the Negro was to liberate the entire population. He pointed out that other nations had prospered after emancipation. Hostos felt that all America needed immigrants to develop its resources. Free immigrants did not care to compete with slaves. Therefore, he contended that, with the end of slavery, labor would seem more honorable, the political equality of all men would become more feasible, and poverty would turn into prosperity for the Caribbean masses.[6] Hostos charged that Spain had been very uncooperative with British efforts to end the slave trade and that Spanish administrators in Cuba, he complained, had enriched themselves in this traffic. Consequently, the abuse of the Negro continued and the Caribbean isles remained in subjugation.[7]

Hostos based his regard for the New World's non-European people on his total view of human relationships. By no means the originator of the idea, Hostos described society as an organism, "and like all organisms, it consists of component organs, fulfills duties, carries on business, it has and it satisfies needs."[8] As theorists in the biological sciences explained

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5 Quoted from "Tres Repúblicas," in *Temas sudamericanos*, OC, VII, 79-80; "Memoria de la exposición," *ibid.*, pp. 304-305; *Mi viaje al sur*, OC, VI, 115-117, 233, and 236-237; "El descubrimiento y el descubridor," in *La cuna de America*, OC, X, 15; *Tratado de moral*, OC, XVI, 434-435; "Historia de pedagogía," in *Ensayos didácticos: tomo I*, OC, XVIII, 51.

6 May 7, 1870 entry, *Diario: tomo I*, OC, I, 273-274; April 2, 1874 entry, *Diario: tomo II*, OC, II, 90; *Mi viaje al sur*, OC, VI, 39; "Plácido," in *Temas cubanos*, OC, IX, 46; "Las reformas en las Antillas," in *España y América*, 141; "La abolición de la esclavitud en Puerto Rico," *ibid.*, p. 297.

7 *La peregrinación de Boyoán*, OC, VIII, 145; "Plácido," in *Temas cubanos*, OC, IX, 25 and 73-74; "El problema de Cuba," *ibid.*, p. 213; "Las reformas en las Antillas," in *España y América*, 133; "La isla de Cuba," *ibid.*, p. 186.

8 Quoted from *Lecciones de derecho constitucional*, OC, XV, 17; "Memoria de la exposición," in *Temas sudamericanos*, OC, VII, 254-255; *Tratado de sociología*, OC, XVII, 178; "Nociones de derecho constitucional," in *Ensayos didácticos: tomo I*, OC, XVIII, 350.

evolution in terms of the functional union of cells, so Hostos distinguished five societal organs evolving from the social cell, the rational individual. These were the family, the municipality (clan), the region or province (tribe), the nation, and the family of nations or humanity as a whole. [9]

Hostos supported this analogy in several ways. He noted that within a single organism the inter-relationship among individual organs was in accord with unchanging processes. In a similar way, explained Hostos, social relationships ought to be governed by definite principles. No organ, furthermore, could live disconnected from other living organs; neither could an individual human, observed Hostos, have all his needs satisfied if he lived in total isolation. Likewise, just as individual persons developed from infants into mature adults, so nations and the whole of humanity would grow, according to the interpretation of Hostos. Similarly, as in the animal world, like functional components (social institutions) universally appeared in every body (culture). Finally, Hostos supposed that singleness of thought or unanimity of sentiment among diverse members of one social body should exist as it did within any one rational individual.[10]

In his description of society, the individual was the most important factor. "The individual is an essential element of society; so essential that, should individuality not exist, society itself could not exist," he explained. [11] Hostos presumed that man was basically "good," rational, and the determiner of his own fate. He often spoke of the dignity of man and the equality of all men by reason of natural rights. At one point he described "man which God made" as being not fundamentally evil but rather "born rational in nature . . . (and) compelled to seek truth . . . ."[12] Hostos declared that it was through com-

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9 *Lecciones de derecho constitucional,* OC, XV, 18; *Tratado de sociología,* OC, XVII, 123, 132, and 154-156; *Tratado de Moral,* OC, XVI, 112.

10 *Tratado de moral,* OC, XVI, 9 and 109; "El Programa de los independientes," in *Diario: tomo II,* OC, II, 222 and 234; *Tratado de sociología,* OC, XVII, 90-91; "Nociones de derecho constitucional," in *Ensayos didácticos: tomo I,* OC, XVIII, 352.

11 Quoted from *Lecciones de derecho constitucional,* OC, XV, 32; *Tratado de moral,* OC, XVII, 123, 147, and 233.

12 Quoted from "La estadística criminal de Puerto Rico," in *España y América,* 230; "El Programa de los independientes," in *Diario: tomo II,* OC, II, 241, 243-244.

mon sense, reason, and conscience that moral knowledge came to man.[13]

Because he maintained that man was essentially rational, Hostos believed that the best way to a better society was through education. If ignorance were the basis of corruption, then contrariwise, "the moral security of society is principally in the home and in the school."[14] It was logical therefore that Hostos dedicated so much of his life to educational reform. Confidently viewing man's development as evolution from savagery, to barbarism and semicivilization, and finally to civilization itself, Hostos contemplated "a humanity more rational than that which exists today."[15]

The basic belief that society, as an organism, ought to exist as a healthy creature led Hostos to shun the use of force and violence, to insist upon autonomy for the individual, and to assume natural mutuality among the organs of society. Hostos believed that the ideal cooperative society would assure personal liberty through basic law.[16] Nevertheless, to Hostos, personal liberty by no means meant isolation or anarchy. He complemented his abomination of force and coercion with a belief in mutual respect and voluntary assistance as the foundation of interpersonal and international order: mutually dependent organs living within one body.[17] Among those traits which Hostos considered to be social virtues were tolerance, benevolence, kindness, mutual encourage-

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13 *Tratado de moral,* OC, XVI, 15-19.

14 Quoted from "La educación en contra de las males costumbres," in *Forjando el porvenir americano: tomo II,* OC, XIII, 240; August 6, 1892 letter to his sister, in *Páginas íntimas,* OC, III, 394; "La proclama de Cuba," in *Temas cubanos,* OC, IX 223; "Lo que suele ser el poder electoral," in *Hombres e ideas,* OC, XIV, 355; *Tratado de sociología,* OC, XVII, 139; "Nociones de ciencias de la pedagogía," in *Ensayos didácticos: tomo I,* OC, XVIII, 115.

15 Quoted from *Mi viaje al sur,* OC, VI, 201; January 26, 1870 entry, *Diario: tomo I,* OC, I, 239; *Tratado de sociología,* OC, XVII, 89 and 140.

16 "Estatutos de la Liga," in *Diario: tomo II,* OC, II, 228; *Mi viaje al sur,* OC, VI, 10; "La noticia de la muerte de Maceo," in *Temas cubanos,* OC, IX, 473; "Lo que suele ser el poder electoral," in *Hombres e ideas,* OC, XIV, 349; "Nociones de derecho constitucional," in *Ensayos didácticos: tomo I,* OC, XVIII, 357.

17 May 1, 1903 entry, *Diario: tomo II,* OC, II, 403; "Respeto a vida," in *Forjando al porvenir americano: tomo II,* OC, XIII, 258.

ment, impartiality, prudent use of liberty of action, unanimity, humility, and respect. Relationships in society were, according to Hostos, based upon necessity, gratitude, utility, law, and duty. This was as true of personal relationships as it was of the organic relationships among nations. Hostos saw the peoples of his day becoming linked to one another through commercial, industrial, economic, political, scientific, and artistic ties. Liberty, but not isolation; self-determination, but also cooperation, were basic to the thought of Hostos on interpersonal and international relations.[18]

Most essential to the fulfillment of the duties of social ethics delineated by Hostos was a fundamental belief in the equality of all races. To Hostos, regardless of whether a person was Caucasian, Mongolian, Ethiopian, American Indian, or Polynesian, he was basically a rational human being and entitled to personal liberty.[19] Hostos, for example, spoke of "this noble race" when referring to Negroes; his seriousness in that matter did not allow him to appreciate the private humor of his fellow reformers which contradicted principles they expressed in public. Hostos, furthermore, catagorized as ridiculous the notion that liberated Cuba should be partitioned in terms of racial segregation. Rather, he insisted that the absolute equality of every man before the law should be guaranteed in a written constitution. Likewise, while in Chile, Hostos felt obliged to defend Chinese laborers from exploitation.[20]

Hostos repeatedly stated that mutual respect among men, based upon the concept of the worth of the individual, ought to lead to peaceful cooperation among peoples. From such cooperation would come mutual cultural interchange and a final amalgamation of races and differing ways of life. As he

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18 "Tolerancia," *ibid.*, p. 254; *Tratado de moral*, OC, XVI, 32-53, 122, 125-126, and 133-134.

19 January 9, 1870 entry, *Diario: tomo I*, OC, I, 216; "El programa de los independientes," in *Diario: tomo II*, OC, II, 241; *Mi viaje al sur*, OC, VI, 43; "Plácido," in *Temas cubanos*, OC, IX, 5; "El siglo XX," in *Hombres e ideas*, OC, XIV, 423; "La soberanía nacional," in *España y América*, 106.

20 January 2, 1870 entry, *Diario: tomo I*, OC, I, 198; September 19, 1874 entry, *Diario: tomo II*, OC, II, 157; "Estatutos de la Liga," *ibid.*, p. 229; *Mi viaje al sur*, OC, VI, 380; "El chino," in *Temas sudamericanos*, OC, VII, 150; "Los chinos," *ibid.*, 174; "Cuba y los Estados Unidos," in *Temas cubanos*, OC, IX, 289; "La isla de Cuba," in *España y América*, 184.

traveled from country to country in the New World, he observed such a process taking place. When he reflected upon its implications for the future, he identified his beloved Caribbean islands as the focal point of this mingling and blending phenomenon.

Hostos made specific observations of human relations in the United States. In addition to admiring Anglo-Saxon freedom and ingenuity and the North American religious heritage with its beneficial social effects, Hostos did not overlook cultural fusion in the United States. When Hostos first visited the northern republic, slavery had recently been abolished whereas it persisted in Spanish Middle America and, as a "monstrous dissonant," in Brazil. Hostos expected greater African contributions to New World culture when the freedom of the Negro was universal. Had not the establishment of Liberia, he asked, been an attempt to show that a man of color was as capable of nation-building as a white man? It was an inspiration to Hostos to see free Negroes in New York.[21] Another ethnic element was to be found among European immigrants. On July 4, 1870, Hostos witnessed a multitude of "men, women, youth, children, old people, Negroes, and Europeans . . . celebrating a past event, the greatest event in modern times . . . ."[22] For Hostos, the population of the United States was proof that diverse elements could live together in harmony. Hostos, however, felt it was unfortunate that the North American Indian policy left much to be desired.[23]

When Hostos made his Latin American tour in the 1870's, he was very much aware of other examples of racial and cultural fusion. Having seen and having undoubtedly reflected upon the immigrant groups in New York, Hostos saw the solu-

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21 Quoted from *Mi viaje al sur*, OC, VI, 250; *ibid.*, pp.79 and 380-381; January 2 and June 29, 1870 entries, *Diario: tomo I*, OC, I, 197-198 and 322-323; "El programa de los independientes," in *Diario: tomo II*, OC, II, 244; "Plácido," in *Temas cubanos*, OC, IX, 75 and 86; "Los fusilados en Cuba," *ibid.*, p. 273; "Geografía política universal," in *Ensayos didácticos: tomo III*, OC, XX, 221.

22 July 5, 1870 entry, *Diario: tomo I*, OC, I, 342.

23 June 13 and July 2, 1870 entries, *ibid.*, 285 and 338; "El programa de los independientes," in *Diario: tomo II*, OC, II, 251 (footnote); "Los Estados Unidos de America," in *España y América*, 322.

tion to Peru's situation in which the Indian and the European coexisted separately. He suggested that when definitive fusion was complete, the mestizo would be the true Peruvian. Hostos was pleased to see evidence of such amalgamation already begun in Callao and Lima. Of the considerable number of immigrants in Argentina, Hostos had several comments to make. Argentina, he once remarked, had manifested the most elevated attitude of all the South American republics on this matter. Basques, Italians, Swiss, Germans, and even Englishmen were living in contiguous territory with Bolivians and Chileans. Not even religious differences successfully divided the people among themselves. Hostos, then, concluded that a public school system would complete the cultural unification process. Likewise, Hostos recalled walking through a beautiful public garden in Brazil in which pure whites and Negroes, as well as mulattoes, appeared to regard each other as equals, the institution of slavery albeit persisting. Somewhat later, Hostos recommended that the Dominican Republic welcome persecuted minorities. Indeed, Hostos declared, America ought to be a universal homeland for all strangers.[24]

One of the basic premises of Hostos was that racial and cultural blending was a positive good. The more cosmopolitan the population, Hostos concluded, the more developed the territory. Moreover, was not the high civilization of the Creeks a product of centuries of fusion? He observed that immigration was bringing a very obvious increment of wealth to Argentina and North America, not to mention an enrichment of culture itself. It occurred to Hostos that, rather than producing an atavistic nightmare as some speculated, the progeny of interracial marriage might well retain only the best attributes of all races. Racial and cultural fusion was, therefore, to be considered prerequisite for progress. Hostos identified the New World as the place where this "enlargement upon progress due to the unification of races" would most likely begin.[25]

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24 September 28, 1873 entry, *Diario: tomo II*, OC, II, 65; *Mi viaje al sur*, OC, VI, 101, 118-119, 132, 245, 266, 332, 368, and 395; "El Perú," in *Temas sudamericanos*, OC, VII, 117; "Memoria de la exposición," *ibid.*, pp. 269 and 274; "Inmigración y colonización," in *La cuna de América*, OC, X, 370 and 375-376; "Geografía política universal," in *Ensayos didácticos: tomo III*, OC, XX, 352.

25 Quoted from the September 28, 1869 entry, *Diario: tomo I*, OC, I, 147; "El programa de los independientes," in *Diario: tomo II*, OC, II, 250-251; *Mi viaje al sur*, OC, VI, 133 and 263; "Federación argentina," in *Temas*

The providential destiny of Middle America in particular in relation to the matter of cultural interchange and synthesis was a recurrent theme in the writings of Hostos. Of all the areas of the New World, the Caribbean seemed to him to be best suited to initiate the fusion process if certain policies were followed. The strategic position of those islands made them likely stations of world commerce and appropriate conductors of civilization between two continents. The Caribbean peoples might well speed the process of admixture and assimilation by forgetting Spanish exclusivism and standing open to the flow of all human thought. An inter-continental university in the Antilles seemed most appropriate to Hostos.[26] The key word in understanding the role Hostos expected the Caribbean to play in international relations and in cultural interchange was *balance*. The peoples of Middle America had been in active contact with the peoples of both North and South America for years. Hostos remarked that the southern continent gave those peoples their origin, character, morality, and intellectual disposition; the northern continent gave them commercial and industrial connections. Hostos reasoned, moreover, that once a union of Latin nations had been established, the Anglo-Saxon spirit of liberty might be imitated by the Latins. The North Americans would also bring a fusion of European types and the South Americans would contribute an Indian-Negro-Iberian ethnic composite to the "gigantic federation of the future."[27] Such union clearly depended upon a flow of people, products, and ideas through the Caribbean region whose populations would balance the forces of two cultures acting upon each other.

Filled with exuberant nationalism, Eugenio Maria de Hostos y Bonilla found the Old World moribund and the New World much more alive to progress. Because of this belief,

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sudamericanos, OC, VII, 98; "El cholo," *ibid.*, pp. 152-154; "Chile en la Guerra Pacífico," *ibid.*, pp. 329-330; "Plácido," in *Temas cubanos*, OC, IX, 13-15; "Centro de inmigración y colonias agrícolas," in *La cuna de América*, OC, X, 383; "Inmigración," *ibid.*, p. 390; *Tratado de moral*, OC, XVI, 423.

26 September 25, 1869 entry, *Diario: tomo I*, OC, I, 147; August 30, 1873 entry, *Diario: tomo II*, OC, II, 59; "El programa de los independientes," *ibid.*, p. 257; *Mi viaje al sur*, OC, VI, 276.

27 Quoted from the March 26, 1870 entry, *Diario: tomo I*, OC, I, 285; "El programa de los independientes," in *Diario: tomo II*, OC, II, 253; *Mi viaje al sur*, OC, VI, 79 and 84; September 19, 1887 letter to Guillermo Matta, in *Temas cubanos*, OC, IX, 359.

he romanticized the Indian cultures and objected to the continuing existence of Negro slavery. With unbounded faith in human nature, Hostos described society as an organism composed of individually important cells. His message was one of natural and beneficial voluntary cooperation among rational persons which would lead to racial fusion and to social unity. The thought of Hostos on human relations indicates that an attitude of racial superiority need not be regarded as inevitable.

SOME AMERICAN NEGRO ARTISTS

BY ELAINE F. THOMAS

When a few American Negroes, less than three generations ago, began to paint and sculpture and aspire to be "artists," most people thought theirs was the Negro's first attempt at art. The Western world had not yet realized that primitive civilization not only had its artists but also had produced a great art and that the many types of primitive art now known were yet to be discovered. There is an artistic tradition and skill in all the major crafts running back for generations and even centuries among the principal African tribes. Factually, pioneer American black artists were starting the Negro's second career in art and unconsciously were trying to recapture a lost artistic heritage. Thus, the task of the early Negro artist was to prove to a skeptical world that the black could produce genuine art. He proved his point. That doubtful world did not know that the African had been a capable artist in his native culture and that independent of European culture he had built up his own techniques and traditions.

One must not expect the work of the Negro artist to be too different from that of his fellow artists of other races. Product of the same social and cultural soil, his art has an equal right and obligation to be typically American at the same time that it strived to be typically Negro. The work of Negro artists is found in many galleries and private collections from New York to Los Angeles. It is clear that Negro artists have never belonged to any one school but have responded to all the currents moving through American and European art history. Many black artists have naturally concerned themselves with Negro subject matter but today they are mostly in the international mainstreams. Whether they choose to call themselves Negro, black, or Afro-American, these talented individuals ask to be judged only on their merits.

The purpose of this paper is to briefly cite a few dozen Negro artists whose lives span the two hundred years to the present. Their styles range from primitive to sophisticated with examples of landscapes and portraits, academic realism, and abstract expressionism. Their general high level of quality

is one thing they have in common in addition to being Negro art. It is hoped that this catalog will be a point of departure for other researchers.

Three Negro painters works are known from the Eighteenth Century. It is believed that the first portrait of a black by a Negro was pastel of Richard Allen at the age of twenty-five. It was done in 1785 by G. W. Hobbs, then a minister in Baltimore. Scipio Moorhead of Boston was painting before 1773, as we know from a poem by Phillis Wheatley. It is believed that he engraved the cover design for her volume of poems published in 1773. Patrick Reason, who actively associated with the Anti-Slavery Society, is relatively well known as an engraver and lithographer in New York City.

The Nineteenth Century produced an interesting and expanded group of Afro-American artists. Joshua Johnston, of Baltimore, who was active from 1796 to 1824, was the best known Afro-American painter of this period. He was noted for his portraits of well-to-do Maryland families.

A Scotch-Canadian Negro artist named Robert S. Duncanson (1817-1872), was born in New York, educated in Canada, and was a resident of Cincinnati. He was commissioned by the Longworths and other prominent families of that city to paint portraits and landscapes. His murals still adorn the stately Longworth mansions now called the Taft Museum. Duncanson, traveling in Europe on an award, enjoyed the hospitality of Alfred Lord Tennyson while in England. Tennyson is reported to have remarked that Duncanson had truly captured the spirit of his poem, "The Lotus Eater," in his painting of that subject.

Two other Nineteenth Century American Negro artists, a painter and a sculptress, were Edward M. Bannister (1828-1901) and Edmonia Lewis (1845-1890). It is said that in 1867 a statement in the New York *Herald* which denied that Negroes could create art urged Bannister to prove the contrary. He was moved by a deeply rooted love for woods and waters of which landscape painting was a part. His first great success came in 1876 at the Centennial Exhibition in Philadelphia where his large landscape, *Under the Oaks*, was awarded a medal. This painting sold in Boston for $1500 which, at that time, was considered a high price for a work by a living artist and which helped to compensate for a hard early life.

Edmonia Lewis, a petite, brown-skinned orphan girl of Negro-Indian extraction found support for a short period of schooling at Oberlin College. Later in Boston she opened her own studio with eight dollars. That she was dedicated to the great struggle for freedom was evident in her exhibited sculpture. Her work began with a medallion of John Brown and Colonel Robert Shaw, the latter having died leading the first all-Negro regiment during the Civil War. Only six weeks earlier on 28 May, 1863, Edmonia had seen Shaw at the head of a ceremonial parade. Mrs. Shaw bought the bust of which hundreds of copies were quickly sold. The proceeds took Edmonia Lewis to Rome before she was twenty where she created neo-classical busts and statues related to her dual racial heritage. At the Carver Museum in Tuskegee, Alabama are two marble sculptures by her. One is entitled *Awake*, and the other is *The Arrow Maker*. Two other women sculptresses, Meta Warrick Fuller and May Howard Jackson, followed Edmonia Lewis' example.

Beginning the Twentieth Century, Henry O. Tanner (1859-1937) emerged as an outstanding artist of international reputation who achieved substantial success during his lifetime. In very recent years his work has begun to enjoy renewed interest. Tanner studied at the Pennsylvania Academy of Fine Arts with the noted Thomas Eakins and journeyed to Paris to continue his studies where he was awarded the Legion of Honor by the government. He developed a distinctive style—restrained, mystical and scientific—in its attention to detail. Tanner received support from his father, a bishop of the African Methodist Episcopal Church, although the father did not approve his son's choice of art as a career. Most of young Tanner's paintings portray a Bibical theme. His *Banjo Lesson* indicated at last that Negro life could inspire a Negro painter. An oil by Tanner entitled *Flight into Egypt* hangs in the Carver Museum's collection.

Two younger talents who were influenced by Tanner were William A. Harper of Chicago, and William E. Scott of Indianapolis. Harper's early death at twenty-seven in 1910 was a great loss in that he was approaching maturity after much promise. He left only a small collection of his paintings including *Autumn Landscape* now at the Carver Museum. A portrait of Dr. Booker T. Washington by William Scott also hangs there.

The 1920's produced a new black movement, sometimes referred to as the Negro Renaissance. This was a period of great social and intellectual ferment, and Afro-Americans were very much a part of it. In the black community dozens of literary art publications appeared, and for the first time in American history a cultural racialism developed among Negroes. The spirit of this movement was concisely stated by the poet Langston Hughes: "We, the younger Negro artists, intend to express our individual dark-skinned selves without fear or shame."

During this period of the 1920's a substantial number of Afro-American artists began to consider Negro subject matter and themes a proper concern for artistic exploration. Negro Renaissance painters such as Aaron Douglas, retired chairman of the Art Department of Fisk University, and Archibald Motley helped to raise the level of Negro portraiture to a respectable standard. Renewed interest in Negro history and mural painting attracted Douglas, Hale Woodruff, and others to that epic medium. Hale Woodruff's gift for design has lost none of its vitality through his many duties as Professor of Art Education at New York University. Richmond Barthe emerged as the preeminent black sculptor of the new Negro movement. Thousands of the visitors at the Carver Museum are attracted by the bronze bust of Dr. George Washington Carver by Richmond Barthe. The versatile Lois M. Jones, Professor of Art at Howard University, initially captivated by the French landscape, fell in love with Haiti—that Africa in the New World which has held a special fascination for many Afro-American artists. Charles Dawson made a remarkable contribution as illustrator, portrait and figure painter, designer and engraver. As the first curator of the Carver Museum at Tuskegee Institute, Dawson became the designer of the basic interior plans and arrangements of the American Negro Exposition of 1940 which was sponsored by the State of Illinois. He also co-supervised the construction of the historical dioramas which were presented to Tuskegee Institute as a permanent exhibit through the courtesy of Illinois Governor Dwight H. Green.

The next generation of artists was confronted by the lean years of the Depression. The Federal Arts Project rescued many of them and made available better opportunities than would otherwise have existed. Some of the best known Afro-

American artists of today emerged during the 1930's and 1940's. Recently the Smithsonian Institution presented to the Carver Museum twenty paintings by William H. Johnson which is shared with other communities as a traveling exhibition. Hughie Lee Smith's dignified, isolated men and women have a surrealistic touch, expressing man's lonely and confused condition in a complex technological age. Romare Bearden's skillful use of the collage penetrates the Afro-American life and conveys man's oppressed condition. Ernest Crichlow has been consistent in his social commentary on black life. Both Charles Alston and Norma Lewis have maintained a vital interest and proficiency in abstract painting. Elizabeth Catlett, long resident of Mexico, is a sculptress of considerable power. Mention of this period would not be complete without recalling the extraordinary work of the late Horace Pippin, of Pennsylvania, one of the finest of the Twentieth Century self-taught American artists.

Since the end of World War II the number of Afro-American artists has greatly increased and a considerable number have earned international reputations. Although there are so many a few must be singled out. The work of Professor John Biggers of Texas Southern University in Houston, reflects a growing interest in Africa and the superb colorist and landscapist, Richard Mayhew, must be mentioned for his distinctive use of restrained color to transmit feeling and mood. Richard Hunt, the Chicago sculptor, fashions metal abstract forms from themes suggested by nature. Sam Gilliams' experiments with new materials, forms, and techniques place him among the noted of American artists. The lyrical abstract paintings of Bernie Casey, a professional football player with the Los Angeles Rams, and the promising work of Philip Hampton, Gregory Ridley, and Oubre reveal a wide range of style and technique, all stamped by the artists' individual personalities.

With such a distinctive past and such a promising present, what is the future of Negro art? Any future is a matter of time and patient waiting. However, we can note three trends that seem to point toward three desirable goals. One is the encouraging growth of the number of Negro artists, another is the vital promotion of Negro art, and a third indicates the development of the Negro theme and subject as a vital phase of the artistic expression of native American life. The net

results of what we have already reviewed show that at least the Negro and his works are definitely upon the artistic map and negritude with all that it implies seems destined to come to the foreground.

OBSERVATIONS ON THE AFRICAN "WORLD-VIEW" AND ITS ENCOUNTER WITH CHRISTIANITY

BY ERNST M. BJERKEROT

During recent years scholars have become increasingly interested in what can be called "the African world-view" or African philosophy. Unfortunately, this interest has as yet not resulted in any great amount of publicized material on the subject. Among the books available, three works appear more important than others, namely *La Philosophie Bantoue* by Father Placide Tempels, *The Primal Vision* by the Rev. John V. Taylor, and *African Religion and Philosophy* by Professor John S. Mbiti. It is rather significant that two of these books were written by white missionaries. During many decades Africans have been indoctrinated that their old culture was inferior and that they had to accept Western ways in order to fit into modern society. However, with the growth of African nationalism and political independence, a number of educated Africans have made a conscious efforts to regain their ancient culture.

In order to avoid misunderstanding, it must here be made clear that the term "African" here refers to "black Africans" and not to the Arab and Ethiopian population of the northern and north-eastern part of the continent. Excluded also are such groups as the pygmies of Central Africa and the Bushmen and Hottentots in the south.

An old West African myth says that when God withdrew from the world because of the sin of man, he entrusted the world to a power called *bunsi* or *mhissi-nsi*. This is the central principle in the primal world-view and is best known to the West under its Melanesian name of *mana*. It is a potency present in every element and in every living being. It is not only present in living man, but is also present in a much greater intensity in the dead.[1] It is, consequently, impossible for an African to visualize the individual man cut off from the inanimate forces surrounding him existing only for himself.

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1 John V. Taylor, *The Primal Vision*. (London: Student Christian Movement Press, 1963), p. 73.

Man is not only a living being, but he also is a vital force existing in conjunction with other forces, influencing those forces at the same time as he is influenced by them. Tempels actually says, that the human being has no existence, in the conceptions of the Africans, apart from the ontological hierarchy and the interaction of forces.[2]

The ontological question—the question about the nature of being—is therefore important in African philosophy. The concept is difficult for a Westerner to comprehend but it must in the first place be emphasized that for the African the concepts of "being" and "force" and interchangeable, and they therefore speak, act and live as if for them beings were forces. Force is not merely an attribute to being, as it is for us, but force is the nature of being—being is force and force is being. Consequently, when the Westerner thinks in the concept of being the African thinks in the concept of force, and here one sees concrete beings, the other sees concrete forces. Of course, not all forces are identical. There is a definite difference in the essence, or nature, of forces. Divine forces are thus different from animal or mineral forces, human forces are different from vegetable forces, and so on. Force is, however, present everywhere, as all being is force, and exists only as force, and the category "force" must include all that is regarded as "being"—God, living and departed men, animals, plants and minerals. [3]

Man needs force, vital force, in his encounter with the forces of nature. Supreme happiness, the only kind of good fortune that is important, is the possession of the fullest vital potency. The only kind of misfortune that matters is the loss or diminution of this power. Every sickness, affliction or adversity, each injustice and every frustration is regarded and described by the Bantu as a diminution of the vital force. It should be noted, however, that the African does not regard himself to opposed to the forces surrounding him, and he does not try to seek greater happiness by grasping the life-force latent in other beings. A man is really happy when he is in harmony with the cosmic totality. This means that the greatest good is achieved when everything goes well.

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2 Placide Tempels, *La Philosophie Bantoue* (Paris: Presence Africaine, 1959), pp. 68 f.

3 *Ibid.* pp. 33 ff.

On the other hand, if something goes wrong, if he has a spell of bad luck, the African feels that the totality has become hostile, and he falls prey to acute insecurity and anxiety. He then turns to the *nyanga*, the diviner, for help.

It is not difficult to observe the similarity between the traditional African world-view and ancient Semitic religion according to which nature is alive with powers that can be directly experienced by man. Nothing is inanimate. Man conceives of himself as living in the kingdom of a throbbing, personal nature, that is, in the kingdom of the holy gods. His life must be integrated in the interplay of the gigantic forces of nature. [4]

Even if the African feels himself a vital force in actual, intimate and permanent *rapport* with the other forces, he recognizes an important difference between human beings and the rest of creation. The uniqueness in the human force lies in the possession of creative intelligence by which a human being can directly strengthen or weaken the life-force of another person. It is this creative intelligence which lies behind the use of herbal medicines and of magic, the knowledge of a diviner and the power of a witch.[5] But the same unique force is in operation in whatever a man does. Therefore, sowing is not sufficient by itself to make the corn germinate and grow. Speech, song and prayer must be added, for it is the proper ritual that makes the grasses germinate, the fruits grow, and the cow to make milk or bear a calf. Even handicraft needs the ritual if it is to succeed.

Thus the African conceives of religion not merely as one element in the whole system of social life, but as controlling, permeating, penetrating and influencing every part of it. Religion is therefore not only a system of beliefs and creeds with personal application attached, but is also a system of fixed traditional practices, rites and ceremonies which man has to go through systematically and invariably. Thus it is demanded of each individual that he participate with intensity and devotion in the rituals of the family or clan.

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4 G. Ernest Wright, *The Old Testament Against its Environment*, (London: Student Christian Movement Press, 1961), p. 275.

5 Taylor, p. 78.

Bishop Bengt Sundkler refers to the traditional African society as being "the clan community of the Living and the Dead." [6] There are two important factors involved in this statement.

The first is that African traditional life in the past regarded the clan or the kinship group, the tribe, or, in a few instances, the nation, as a unit. It was the duty of every member of such a group to support and help other members, but there was no obligation to help those outside the group. For instance, a Tshwa from Mozambique has to help others from the same clan, but he was under no obligation to help members of another clan, even if that clan belonged to the same tribe. A Zulu, on the other hand, has a moral and religious obligation to help all other Zulus.

Religious rituals were never carried out by isolated individuals, but community worship was the practice. Most common was the family worship, always carried out by the head of the family, who thus acted as priest. Certain rituals, such as the first-fruit rites, were always carried out at the clan level, with the chief, as the head of the clan family, acting as priest. Among Africans with a sense of the tribe as a nation, such as the Zulus, the Swazis and the Ndebele, certain festivals are held at the national level, and here the paramount chief acted as priest in his capacity as father of the tribe.

The second factor related to the interaction of the dead and the living is that the African family today is still a single, continuing unit, and is not conscious of any radical distinction between the living and the dead. An intimate relationship is maintained by sharing food with the departed who are believed to be present at the meal, not as a distinct group, but as members of the community. One difference between the living and the dead, possibly the most important, is summed up in Alexis Kagame's epigram: "The living man is happier than the departed, because he is alive. But the departed are more powerful." [7]

The head of a family is the only person who can approach the ancestors directly. He thus is the mediator between the

6 Bengt Sundkler, *The Christian Ministry in Africa*. (London: Student Christian Movement Press, 1960), p. 282.

7 Quoted by Taylor, p. 156.

living and the dead. This conforms with the African custom that no one makes a request directly to the head of a family or a chief. Instead, one always asks the person next in rank under the chief to act as mediator. The family-head is considered next in rank to the ancestors, since he is the oldest member of the family and probably will be the next to join them. The ancestor thus supplicated can either give the assistance asked for, or he can transmit the request to one of his own ancestors who, in turn, can help if he has the power; otherwise, he can send it further, until it reaches the first ancestor, the *uNkukunkuku* of the Zulus, the most powerful member of the lineage. His power is actually so great, that in some tribes—the Zulu, Tshwa, Tsonga and Ronga of Southern Africa—he has taken the place of the Supreme Being and the first ancestor of the clan, the "Abraham" of the tribe, can petition him, but only on very rare occasions does this Creator intervene. Generally speaking, he is a withdrawn God, a *Deus Remotus.*

Most Africans recognize that all men have a common nature, that they are ultimately the descendants of a common ancestor, but this concept does not seem to be significant. The Africans are still building their psychic, political and religious security on the old, narrow claim: "We have Abraham to our father." When Adam is introduced to the African world, he can cause a revolution, at the same time that he is strengthening the traditional world-view. In the opening chapters of the Bible the African can find the charter for human solidarity, a character needed in these days, when tribal and kinship ties are being destroyed. They who share a common ancestor must also share a common destiny and the end, like the beginning, must be God's creation. It should also be noted that the African is able to understand the curse of Cain much better than can a Westerner. The curse laid upon Cain was that he was to be cut off from the soil and from society, and this was more than Cain could bear.[8] To "be cut off from his people" was a very severe punishment, given only for serious offenses, both in the Old Testament society and in the African. The reason is that both the Bible and the African world-view recognize that one becomes a real person only in and through his relations with other persons. The individual self has no

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8 Genesis 4:11-14.

independent existence which gives it power to enter into relationships with other selves. Only through living intercourse with other selves can it become a self at all.

This is not the only similarity between Biblical and African concepts of life and society. On the contrary, the civilization described in the Bible is similar to the traditional African culture and the African recognizes this. One author noted that an African reading the Bible is happy to find in it a civilization which moves in the same rhythm as his own. Life is quite simple as it unfolds in its tragedy, its hopes, its slow rhythm and its cruelties. There is no obsession with efficiency here. The events of the life of Christ are rarely fastened to any date and although the Westerners attempt to map out the life of Christ with some historical guideposts this is foreign to the Africans. The African views the message as more important than the statistical data.

Into this African world, with its strong sense of the individual's responsibility to society, the Protestant mission entered with a message of the individual's salvation, a message based to a large extent on Western individualistic philosophy. Fortunately, the traditional world-view is reflected continually in thoughts and attitudes of Christian Africans, as is observed by Michael Gelfand, a medical doctor with a lot of anthropological knowledge. He found that an African can believe in his own religion without necessarily practising it, and at the same time be a practising Christian.[9]

The encounter between the African world-view and Christianity has not been an easy one. At first many Africans accepted Western teaching without questioning. After all, the white man did possess a superior technology, and it was therefore believed that he also possessed more vital force than the Africans. However, as the Africans experienced the wholesale condemnation of their old culture they became increasingly uneasy about the situation. As a result thousands of so called Independent African churches have come into being, churches which try to combine the best element of Christianity with traditional African philosophy. Many have succeeded in an amazing degree, and it has been said that a new Reformation is taking place in Africa at the moment, a Reformation during which the Biblical message is translated to the concepts of the existential African situation.

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9 Michael Gelfand, *Shona Ritual.* (Cape Town: Juta & Co., 1959), p. 2.

THE BLACK IN BRAZILIAN HISTORY: AN EXPLORATORY ESSAY

BY E. BRADFORD BURNS

The blacks predominated numerically during most of the history of Brazil. In the three centuries before the abolition of the slave trade in 1850, nearly four million Africans entered Brazil, many times the number of Portuguese who immigrated to the New World. When Brazil declared its independence in 1822, for example, the population numbered approximately 3-1/2 million of whom more than two-thirds were "men of color." The commerce in slaves, trade in other products (Brazilian tobacco, sugar, manioc, beans and spirits for African palm oil, rice, ivory, and gold), religious dependence (the Bishop of Angola was suffragan to the Archbishop of Bahia, for example), and the exchange of governmental officials between Brazil and Portuguese Africa created an intimate relationship across the South Atlantic. Only after the termination of the slave trade and the influx of European immigrants, 1870-1930, did those ties loosen and the racial composition of Brazil alter appreciably. Still, in the mid-twentieth century, the well known social historian of Brazil, Gilberto Freyre, could observe, "Every Brazilian, even the fairest blond, bears in his soul, if not in his soul and body—for there are many in Brazil whose whiteness hides a tint of black dye—the shadow, or at least the imprint, of the Negro." [1]

Despite the presence of formidable numbers of Africans and their descendants, there still is no history of the blacks in Brazil nor a full account of their contributions to Brazilian history. The major historians of Brazil, native and foreign, all have been white. They have consulted only white sources. Obviously, then, in any study of Brazilian history the white point of view prevails. When the historians have shown any interest at all in the Africans' role in the evolution of Brazil, they have concentrated their attention almost exclusively on

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[1] Quoted by Jose Honorio Rodrigues, "The Influence of Africa on Brazil and of Brazil on Africa," *Journal of African History*, III, 1 (1962), p. 52.

the institution of slavery. In effect, the black, a major component of Brazil's population, has been written out of the nation's history.

The Visconde de Porto Alegre once remarked, "To know the biographies of all the outstanding men of a period is to know the history of those times." Much of Brazil's historiography reflects that view complementary to the white patrician class. One of Porto Alegre's contemporaries, George Eliot, suggested an alternative approach to history in her novel *Middlemarch*: "The growing good of the world is partly dependent upon unhistoric acts; and that things are not so ill with you and me as they might have been, is half owing to the number who lived faithfully a hidden life, and rest in unvisited tombs." The unnamed, too, deserve their place in history. It was not only princes, prelates, and politicians who built Brazil but the anonymous *bandeirantes* who explored, conquered, and opened up vast tracts of the interior; the tireless missionaries who infused European church-centered civilization into the New World; and the forgotten Negro slaves upon whose skill and muscle the development of Brazil depended. Heroes appear as they must, but they serve to illustrate and to particularize broad trends of their times. Most often historians of Brazil have so emphasized the individual, that trends or groups have been slighted. No group has been more slighted in Brazilian history than the great black masses.

If the historian has neglected the black in Brazilian history, the anthropologists and sociologists have been busy during the past few decades studying certain African contributions to Brazilian civilization. Precisely here is a good place to begin the study of the blacks in Brazil. Their numerical preponderance suggests the influence they exerted over the Indo-Portuguese society into which they were forcibly injected. Indeed, they modified and reshaped that society, changing it just as they were changed by it. The social scientists point out the black's influence on Roman Catholicism—that fundamental matrix of Iberian civilization. On the one hand, he enlivened church-going with festivals, street dances, and folk plays, and on the other he developed a syncretized Afro-Brazilian religion heavily under Yoruba influence. Known as Candomble in Bahia, Xango in Pernambuco, and Macumba in Rio de Janeiro, it combined the beliefs found in the religions brought from Africa with the Christianity imported into the

New World by the ruling class. The African contributed significantly to the creation of a Brazilian cuisine by introducing into the diet new stables such as red peppers, black beans, okras, cola nuts, yams and palm oil, new culinary concoctions such as *efo, vatapa, caruru* and various rice and bean dishes, as well as by introducing into the kitchen new utinsels such as the wooden spoon and the pestle and mortar. That the Portuguese language spoken in South America differs from that heard in Lisbon is owing partly to African influence. The black softened the pronunciation and simplified verb forms. He infused many African words into the vocabulary of which *bengala, bunda, cachaca, mocambo, moleque, quilombo, samba,* and *senzala* serve as examples.

Brazil's distinctive music, both popular and classic, owes much to Africa. The foremost classical composers of this century, Francisco Mignone, Camargo Guarnieri, Jose Siqueira, and Heitor Villa-Lobos, all have turned to African themes for inspiration. The lively samba tunes issuing from every radio testify to the African predominance in popular music. A wide variety of musical instruments, the drum, reco-reco, marimba, marimbau, and tambourine, to mention only the most obvious, have migrated across the South Atlantic to enliven Brazilian music. Folklore, too, bears the stamp of Africa thanks to the black's imagination and his memory of proverbs, riddles, tales, and myths from another continent. These contributions have been vital to the formation of Brazilian civilization, but they by no means exhaust the importance of the black.

Still to be defined is the historical role of the black in Brazil. Much research remains to be done, but at this point it seems safe to suggest that the conquest, settlement, and development of Brazil were a joint Afro-European enterprise. Neither race could have accomplished those tasks alone.

To that joint enterprise, the African applied above all else his labor and his skill. His contributions and influence began on the large plantations. The blacks farmed the land drawing the immense riches from the fertile soil. Cacao, cotton, tobacco, rice, and—above all else—sugar provided the capital for the development of Brazil. From the fields the black influence spread quickly to the manor house. There

the African women left their imprint on the formation of Brazil as cooks, wet nurses, and as companions of the lady of the house. African influence permeated the nascent towns where the blacks worked as domestic servants, peddlers, mechanics, and artisans. Unlike his brother in North America who for the most part was barred from exercising trades, the Brazilian blacks were about the only ones available for those occupations. Wood-carving, basketry, weaving, and iron-working were but a few of the skills the African brought to Brazil. His long experience in gold washing and cattle herding were extremely important for the development of the economy. In Brazil, then, the black put to use the many skills which he already had mastered in Africa and quickly learned new ones from the European. One American visitor to Brazil in the mid-nineteenth century, Thomas Ewbank, marvelled at the variety of skills the Blacks displayed. He noted:

> I have now seen slaves working as carpenters, masons, pavers, painters, sign and ornamental painters, carriage and cabinet makers, fabricators of military ornaments, lamp-makers, silversmiths, jewelers, and lithographers. It is also a fact that sculptures in stone and saintly images in wood are often done admirably by slaves and free blacks. . . . *All* kinds of trades are carried on by black journeymen and boys. [2]

Information on the slave auctions was equally explicit detailing the many and varied skills and trades possessed or acquired by the blacks.

If the African gave of his mind and body to Brazil, he also contributed his blood. European and Amerindian and blacks mixed extensively. Miscegenation began early and still continues. Nowhere has it been more complete than in the vast interior of Brazil. Historians and sociologists customarily refer to that region as the melting pot of the races. There the African continued to fuse his blood with the European's and began to miscegenate with the Indian. The slave owner encouraged the mating with Indian women in order to claim the offspring as his slave. Many fugitive blacks who

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2 Thomas Ewbank, *Life in Brazil* (New York, 1856), p. 195. More recent scholarship confirms the conclusion that the blacks filled the ranks of the artisan and mechanical classes in Brazil. See Margaret V. Nelson, "The Negro in Brazil as seen through the Chronicles of Travellers, 1800-1868," *Journal of Negro History*, XXX (1945), 212-213; and Donald Pierson, *Negroes in Brazil* (Carbondale, Illinois, 1967), pp. 38-39.

roamed and inhabited the interior took up with Indian women and in that way accelerated racial mixing. The subsequent crossing of the three races over the course of centuries produced a homogeneous Brazilian. One of the most perceptive visitors into the hinterlands, Euclides da Cunha, observed in his classic *Os Sertoes* that as one moved inland from the coast the distinct races disappeared. The pure white, pure black, and pure Indian became rarer. He noted first men of a variety of different shadings; then he came upon that "indefinable compound," the Brazilian. He considered the amalgamated man of the backlands as the "bedrock" of the Brazilian "race," a new race created in the New World by the confluence of African, Portuguese, and Indian.[3]

That new race made possible territorial expansion, one of the most dynamic aspects of Brazilian history. Portugal responded defensively to foreign threats and interlopers in the New World by establishing tiny, isolated, agricultural nuclei along the coast. Olinda in the north, Salvador da Bahia in the center, and Sao Vicente in the south were the first settlements of strategic and commercial importance. In due course, men from the coastal settlements penetrated the interior to explore and to search for wealth in the form of precious metals and Indian slaves. By exploring new territory, opening new routes of communication, and claiming new regions for the crown, they hoped for the rewards of royal recognition and preferment. Inland expansion began timidly in the Sixteenth Century, became the marked characteristic of the last half of the Seventeenth and the first half of the Eighteenth Centuries and in certain phases lasted until the early Twentieth Century when Brazil acquired Acre, its westernmost state, and reached its present gargantuan size of three and a quarter million square miles to be the fifth largest nation in the world. That spectacular expansion resulted from the activities of hardy adventurers known in Portuguese as *bandeirantes.*

All races contributed to the *bandeirante* expansion. *Mamelucos*, the offspring of Indians and Portuguese, composed the majority of the rank and leadership of the expeditions, but blacks—in their status as either slave or freedmen—

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[3] *Os Sertoes* was published in English in 1902 as *Rebellion in the Backlands.* In particular see his "Note V," of the Chicago, 1957 edition, p. 481.

took an active part as well. Mulattoes on occasion led some of the expeditions. The African participation in the epic sweep across a continent from the shores of the Atlantic to the foothills of the Andes thus far has been neglected. Nonetheless, the blacks participated—and not only in the conquest of the hinterlands but in their settlement and development as well. In 1776, the first calculation of the population of Minas Gerais, the most important captaincy of the interior, revealed the presence of 60,000 whites, 82,000 mulattoes, and 164,000 blacks. [4]

The cattlemen followed on the heels of the *bandeirantes* to use the newly explored and opened territories for their herds. The cattle industry, notable for an insatiable appetite for large tracts of land, radiated outward into the *Sertao* from Pernambuco, Bahia, and Sao Paulo. In those diverse regions, the sinewy cowboy of mixed Indian, African, and European blood, settled and held the frontier. The black had much to teach his fellow cowboys. In his former home he had been a skilled cattle raiser and in the New World he shared this knowledge.

Gold mining was another important occupation of the interior at which the black worked. The discovery of gold in Minas Gerais in 1695 enticed thousands of eager prospectors from Portugal and the Brazilian coast into the South American interior. From practically zero at the time of the discovery, the population of Minas Gerais climbed to 30,000 by 1709 and zoomed to half a million by the end of the century. The mania for gold quickly propelled the prospectors farther west. In 1718 gold was discovered in Cuiaba, Mato Grosso, a seven months' river journey from Sao Paulo. The diggings were shallow there and they were exhausted more rapidly than those in Minas Gerais, but that did not prevent a rush into Mato Grosso to exploit the new finds. In 1725, Goias witnessed the discovery of gold and the familiar pattern of rush and boom ensued. The new arrivals into the interior brought with them the maximum number of African slaves they could afford, and the black was put to work to extract gold. Again he worked at a job with which he was already familiar. He had extracted and processed gold in Africa. Transferring that experience to the New World, he introduced into Brazil the

4 Various useful population figures are given by Aires da Mata Machado Filho, *O Negro e o Garimpo em Minas Gerais* (Rio de Janeiro, 1964), pp. 23-25.

wooden pan for gold washing. Throughout the Eighteenth Century approximately two million pounds of gold were produced legally, which meant that Brazil provided about eighty percent of the world's gold supply in that century. The riches from the gold regions of Brazil's interior which momentarily enlivened the Portuguese empire resulted from the skill and labor of the Blacks. One Brazilian historian of the West, Cassiano Ricardo, flatly asserted, "without the Negro, there would have been no gold."[5]

The blacks brought into the interior many other essential skills in addition to their knowledge of gold washing and processing. They made up the ranks of the artisan and mechanic classes just as they had along the coast. In short, it was the black who introduced the essential services and skills required to maintain settlement in the backlands. The records reveal, for example, that one Fernando Dias Falcao left Sao Paulo in 1719 for the interior with forty blacks, among whom were "iron workers, carpenters, and tailors," to add to others he already had at his inland settlement.[6]

There can be no more cogent testimony to the vital role played by the blacks in the Brazilian interior than the plea sent by the governor of the Captaincy of Sao Paulo e Minas do Ouro to the king in 1713. In it, he emphasized the captaincy's desperate need for more blacks: "They are essential, not only to cultivate the land and to exploit the new mines, but also to continue making new discoveries which cannot be done without these slaves."[7] Exploration and exploitation of the vast interior depended then on the presence and participation of the Blacks.

The governor might well have added that the blacks were also needed to defend the interior. From the time of their arrival, they were called upon to protect Brazil from attacks and incursions by pirates, European interlopers, Indians, and Spanish-speaking neighbors. Brazil's longest armed struggle was to expel the Dutch from the sugar rich Northeast, an area the Dutch held from 1630 until 1654. The Indians, blacks, and Luso-Brazilians all contributed soldiers to the campaign. From

5 Cassiano Richardo, "O Negro no Bandeirismo Paulista," *Revista do Arquivo Municipal* (Sao Paulo), XLVII (1938), 37.

6. *Ibid.*, 21.

7 Quoted in Sergio Buarque de Holland a (ed.), *Historia Geral da Civilizacao Brasileira* (Sao Paulo, 1960), II, 187.

the long guerrilla struggles the leader of the black regiments, Henrique Dias, emerged a hero. He was a freedman whose parents had been born in Africa and shipped as slaves to Brazil. The Crown lauded his services and conferred many honors on him, not least of which was the coveted Order of Christ. Alas, once the Luso-Brazilians had wrested the Northeast from the Dutch, the Portuguese monarch conveniently forgot the black hero.

One historian of the wars against the Dutch, C. R. Boxer, observed that on at least one occasion the blacks displayed a greater loyalty to the Brazilian cause than did the white plantation owners. Concerning a call to revolt against the Dutch sounded by Joao Fernandes Vieira in mid-1645 in Pernambuco, Boxer revealed, "About 150 men, mostly mulattoes and Negroes, answered his summons on the first day, and others rallied to him daily; but the bulk of the *moradores* remained quiescent, evidently waiting to see who would win the first round before they irrevocably committed themselves." [8] The blacks responded to other emergencies as well. In 1711, when the French sacked Rio de Janeiro, the Governor of Minas Gerais rushed to aid the city with 1,500 horsemen and 6,000 armed blacks. Again, in 1763, when war threatened on the Guapore River between the Spainards and the Portuguese, the Portuguese force at Conceicao consisted of 244 men of whom "114 were armed Negro slaves." Black militia regiments were formed and trained during the colonial period for the defense of Brazil. The traveler Henry Koster observed one of these in the early nineteenth century and left these impressions of it:

> There are two of these regiments for the province of Pernambuco. . .distinguished from each other by the names Old Henriques and New Henriques. . . . I have seen some portion of one of these regiments in Recife . . . . They were dressed in white cloth uniforms, turned up with scarlet: and they looked very soldier-like. They were in tolerable discipline. . . . They acted with an appearance of zeal and the desire of excelling. Those of which I speak formed a finer body of men than any of her soldiers which I had an opportunity of seeing

8 C. R. Boxer, *The Dutch in Brazil, 1624-1654* (Oxford, 1957), p. 166.

9 Arthur Ramos discusses the Negro as a soldier in *O Negro na Civilizacao Brasileira* (Rio de Janeiro, 1956), pp. 167-180.

> in that country. . . . These men received no pay, so that their neat appearance on such occasions bespeaks a certain degree of wealth among them. [10]

Black regiments also fought valiantly against the Paraguayans in the protracted War of the Triple Alliance, 1865-1870. Black soldiers distinguished themselves, but the tendency to eulogize only leaders means that praise for generals and admirals—even the most ordinary ones—eclipsed the part played by men in the ranks. The bravery of black heroes such as Cezario Alves da Costa, Antonio Francisco de Mello, and Marcilio Dias still remains to be told in the detail that their gallantry merits.

Largely unstudied is the long struggle of the blacks for their own freedom, an epic of a different genre. The struggle assumed two aspects: one peaceful, the other bloody. The slaves revolted, murdered their masters, or committed suicide. In Bahia alone nine such revolts disturbed the province between 1807 and 1835. Other slaves fled from the plantations to establish their own communities in the hinterlands, the *quilombos*. Scholars have identified thus far ten such major *quilombos* which florished in colonial Brazil. [11] The most famous of them, Palmares, existed throughout most of the Seventeenth Century and serves as the principal example of the Blacks setting up in Brazil their own state following African patterns. The omnipresent fear of physical slave protest infused a feeling of constant tension among the population. One student of the institution of slavery in mid-nineteenth century Brazil, Agostinho Marques Perdigao Malheiros, referred to the slave as "a domestic enemy" and "a public enemy" and warned, "He is a volcano that constantly threatens society, a mine ready to explode at the least spark." [12]

At the same time many blacks worked peacefully to end slavery. They banded together to form cooperative associations which facilitated the slaves' purchase of their own freedom. Many blacks joined the abolitionist movement in the

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10 Henry Koster, *Travels in Brazil* (London, 1816), II, pp. 182-183.

11 One of the best discussions of *quilombos* is R. K. Kent, "Palmares: An African State in Brazil," *Journal of African History*, VI, 2 (1965), 161-175.

12 Agostinho Marques Perdigao Malheiros wrote a three volume study of slavery in Brazil, *A Escravidao no Brasil—Ensaio Juridico, Historico, Social* (Rio de Janeiro, 1866). Particularly pertinent for this essay was Volume Three.

nineteenth century and labored to free the remaining slaves. Some talented black abolitionist leaders emerged to impress the nation with their dedication and ability. Jose Carlos do Patrocinio, a persuasive journalist, wrote ceaselessly for the cause and became a symbol of the campaign. Andre Reboucas organized abolitionist clubs and spoke and wrote profusely in support of the cause. Luis Gonzaga de Pinto Gama spent his own youth as a slave and later became a distinguished lawyer who specialized in defending slaves in court. He claimed credit for freeing 500 slaves through the courts. A fiery advocate of immediate abolition, he declared, "Every slave who kills his master, no matter what the circumstances may be, kills in self-defense." [13] He also preached "the right of insurrection." Another Black lawyer, Jose Ferreira de Menezes, earned fame as a polished and persuasive speaker for the abolitionist cause. These black leaders campaigned vigorously for the rights of their race and triumphed in 1888 when slavery was finally abolished in Brazil.

Bernardo de Vasconcelos, a statesman of the first half of the Nineteenth Century, once exclaimed in the Chamber of Dupities that Brazil owed its civilization to Africa because it was the black who produced the nation's wealth and provided the leisure for the aristocracy to pursue the arts and to govern. He thus indicated the tribute which should be paid to the black in the formation of Brazil.

Expanding on that tribute, this essay has tried to suggest the historical role of the blacks in Brazil. They constitute a sizeable portion of the population; indeed, for most of Brazil's history they formed the majority. Not surpirsingly, therefore, their skill, muscle, and blood shaped that nation. They helped to explore, conquer, settle, and defend it. Together with the Indians and Europeans, they helped to build the social, economic, and political structures of the nation. In general, the black made his contributions silently; he lived a "hidden life;" he rests in an "unvisited tomb." Yet, without him, Brazil could not have developed.

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13 Lucio de Mendonca, "Luis Gama," *Revista da Academia Brasileira,* Vol. 41, No. 135 (Jan., 1933), 336.

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FOREWORD

With the exception of the Spaak essay which was delivered at the Parents Day address, May, 1968, the enclosed papers were delivered at a conference, entitled "The U.S. and World Affairs: Old Myths and New Realities," at West Georgia College, Saturday, May 9, 1970. Sponsored by the West Georgia College Department of History and Division of Education, the West Georgia Educational Development Program and the Service Center for Teachers of History of the American Historical Association, the sessions were designed to familiarize high school teachers, interested college teachers and graduate students with some of the complexities of American foreign policy in the Cold War Era. Two of the papers were cast in a historiographical mold to demonstrate to the teacher the important fact that history is, in the final analysis, a dialogue and that no one is capable of writing the ultimate history. The program was organized and directed by Dr. Thomas A. Bryson of the Department of History.

Readers and contributors may be interested in knowing that this journal is circulated free of charge upon request to institutions of higher learning everywhere from the University of Washington to Yale University. Foreign requests include, among others, Central America and Moscow. The regular distribution is to all institutions of higher learning in Georgia; the five largest universities in each southern state; other universities in the nation by request; about a hundred high schools in Georgia (West Georgia area and the larger institutions). It is sold to individuals for $1.50.

Appreciation goes to Clyde D. Ware and his Sears Roebuck Foundation for their continued financial and moral support. Of course, thanks are due to the contributors, their audiences and all who worked with this program. As in all joint works the authors' views are their own.

Eugene R. Huck, Editor
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THE CRISIS OF THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE

BY PAUL-HENRI SPAAK*

In order to understand the nature of the crisis through which the Atlantic Alliance is passing and in order to measure its importance, one must return to the origins and remember how this Alliance was born, what has been its evolution and what were its original objectives.

The Atlantic Alliance, at the end of the Second World War, was not envisaged by the statesmen responsible for Western policy. Their desire was to maintain their co-operation with the U.S.S.R. What they sought, was to entrust to a World Organization the care of making and maintaining peace. Within this organization, the Great Powers, through the right of veto, had granted to themselves special powers which obliged them to act in concert, since the opposition of any one of them rendered impossible any decision.

The creation of the United Nations represented the crowning point of the policy which led to the Anglo-Soviet Treaty, to the Franco-Soviet Treaty and to the Yalta Conference, where Anglo-Saxons and Soviets reached an agreement concerning the shape of the world to come after the Second World War. This policy was valid. Its success could have ensured peace. If it failed, it was due to the Russians' fault.

It was very soon quite clear that Stalin did not want to collaborate with the West. It was only circumstances which had led him to a rapprochement. In 1939, he had concluded with Hitler the pact which had given to the latter the possibility of waging war against Poland. For two years, he fulfilled his duties as an ally, supplying Germany, rejoicing in her successes, dealing with her in order to obtain his share of Europe. By following that policy, he was caught in his own trap and Hitler's attack of U.S.S.R. in 1941 surprised him completely.

He was forced to join the Western democracies by the events and not at all because of his own free will or because he felt solidarity with them. From this alliance, which was but temporary for him, he was determined to derive the maximum benefit. One can but say that he succeeded.

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*Ministre d'Etat (Belgium) and Former Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

The U.S.S.R. was the only country which realized territorial conquests from the war, when the three Baltic states, a part of Poland, of Finland, of Rumania, of Germany, came under Soviet domination. Millions of men and women were obliged to live, against their will, under Soviet laws. Stalin, not satisfied with these conquests, cleverly pursued a policy of internal subversion and external pressure and succeeded in establishing in most of the Balkan countries, in Central and East Europe, Communist governments under Russian influence. From the Soviet viewpoint, these were incontestable successes. Soon, it appeared that Stalin's ambitions went even further. In Iran, in Turkey, in Greece, he attempted to make predominate his influence and, in the United Nations using and abusing of his right of veto, he systematically prevented the functioning of the organization and ruined all the hopes which it had inspired. For several years, the leaders of the Western world refused to accept the evidence. They clutched at their desire of cooperation.

In 1947, after his visit to Europe, General George C. Marshall proposed to all European countries, Communist included, that they meet and prepare proposals to the United States in order to obtain the assistance which could save them from distress.

Molotov, speaking for the Soviet Union, refused in terms so brutal and so violent that Bevin and Bidault, at that time Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Great Britain and France, understood that nothing further could be expected in the way of collaboration with the U.S.S.R. They took then the decision of organizing Europe and the Western world.

At the beginning of 1948, Bevin made, in the House of Commons, a speech in which he described his disillusionment and expressed his anxiety concerning the policy pursued by the U.S.S.R. He proposed, in formal terms, a union of the countries of Western Europe and suggested the possibility of an alliance with the United States. He was successful, and one month after his speech, Great Britain, France, and the Benelux countries (Holland, Belgium, and the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg) signed the Treaty of Brussels.

The same day, President Truman announced that the United States would give its support to the alliance that had been created. The United States abandoned its traditional policy and, in peace time, took commitments to ensure her security and that of her allies. Isolationism and the Monroe Doctrine had become obsolete. One year later, on April 4, 1949, the Treaty of Washington was signed. The Atlantic Alliance was

born together with a new concept of world policy for the democratic countries.

* * *

What were the objectives of the signatories of the Treaty of Washington? In the first place, they wished to secure themselves against an eventual aggression of the U.S.S.R. and to ensure the defense of Europe. Secondly, and this is quite as important, they wanted to unite the forces of the Free World so as to give them the possibility of defending, in common, certain forms of life and government. At that time, the Western democracies were definitely conscious of the Communist peril. Together, they wanted to resist it.

The first objective of the Treaty—to organize the defense of Europe and to halt in Europe the advance of Soviet power—has been fully achieved. This must be stressed and repeated. It is extremely rare to see a diplomatic undertaking reach so completely its objective. Nobody can contest that, since 1949, no country of Europe has been submitted to the destiny of the countries of Central, Balkan, or Eastern Europe. Peace has been secured on the European continent. The break-out of war in Europe is, today, practically impossible and this, notwithstanding the German problems which still demand a solution. Sheltered in this peace, democratic Europe has accomplished an economic and social development without precedent in its history. This is definitely "on the credit side" of the Alliance.

This success allows me to assert firmly that it would be a grievous fault to destroy or even to weaken a system which has been so successful. This fault would become a folly when one cannot propose any substitute policy! The Atlantic Alliance's destruction would only represent disorder and chaos for Europe.

And yet, notwithstanding this success, the Atlantic Alliance is living in a crisis which could become extremely dangerous because Western Europe, the United States and Canada no longer show the same 1949 solidarity.

During the first years of its life, the Atlantic Alliance exerted itself, first of all to solve the military problems, obviously its most urgent task. But very soon those who had the responsibility of the Alliance became conscious of two truths: (1) that between allies, a common defense requires also a common foreign policy; and (2) that it is difficult to be allied in one area of the world and to be opposed in another. An alliance, if not total, runs a serious risk of becoming void.

Already in 1955, the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the fifteen members of the Alliance after seven years' experience, judged it necessary to determine precisely what the Alliance should be. For this object, they appointed three of their members, Lange, Pearson, and Martino, respectively Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Norway, Canada, and Italy, and asked them to make a report on the non-military aspects of the co-operation. This report was published in 1957, and in the NATO language, it is called the "Report of the Three Wise Men." It is a very important document, and its conclusions are definitely plain and clear.

They can be summed up as follows:

1. the policy of defense against eventual aggression must be maintained. The changes which have taken place in the U.S.S.R. since the death of Stalin do not allow a relaxation of the West's vigilance;
2. the Alliance can only be maintained if its members pursue together a political and economic policy;
3. such a policy is only possible if, above and apart from the fear of aggression which was at the origin of the Alliance, the participants accept to group the sister nations of the Atlantic and of Western Europe for ends other than strictly defensive and—this is particularly audacious—to put in common a part of their national sovereignty;
4. the development of such a community implies a permanent association of the free peoples of the North Atlantic, attempting to reinforce their unity, to defend and serve their common interests and civilization;
5. such a policy has for purpose to resist the threat which communism, as a political doctrine, represents for the world; and
6. finally, such a policy cannot be limited to a part of the world only. It must be general.

In other words, the Atlantic Alliance, created in order to resist an eventual Soviet agression, should tend to become, a little at a time, a military, political and economic Atlantic Community. This report of the Committee of Three was, in December, 1956, adopted unanimously by the fifteen Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Alliance. At that time, it showed a common opinion, a similar vision and a same ideal.

Ten years have gone by. We can but now seek to find out why this ideal has not been reached and why, on the contrary, the cohesion, the

solidarity in the Alliance has diminished. I would like to examine three causes, one at a time, and these are, in my opinion:

1. a man, General de Gaulle;
2. a mistake of the United States, its nuclear policy;
3. the weaknesses, the illusions and the complexes of Europe.

* * *

Looking at the first cause, it seems obvious that one cannot understand the history of Europe and that of the Atlantic Alliance during the recent years without taking into account the personality of General de Gaulle. I really do not think that he is a great man. Very little will remain of what he has done. Notwithstanding the role which he has played, he is but an accident in the history of France. He is not the continuation of anybody. He is not a man of days gone by. Contrary to what his admirers say, he has no clear view of the future.

The essence of his thoughts is an out of date nationalism. Whilst in the period which we live, only co-operation between countries can solve the existing problems, General de Gaulle advocates the disengagement of France. It is in herself alone, he reasons, that she must find the forces which will allow her to adapt to the modern world. To my point of view, this is absurd. An isolated France does not have the possibilities of ensuring her security. This withdrawal gives no hope to her for the development of her economy and social progress.

This fundamentally erroneous idea is still augmented by the personality of the General. He is haughty, proud, convinced of his intellectual superiority, and, at the same time, is a man full of resentment, never forgetting a failure or a lack of consideration. His feelings and his reactions play an essential role in his policy. That is why what he *is*, is more important than what he *does*. When one wants to understand his actions, one must always keep in mind his psychology.

His nationalism has led him to a morbid anti-American feeling. He can never forget or pardon the United States for the position it occupies in the world and the role it plays. He is under the feeling that something has been stolen from his country and from himself—which for him, in any case, is the same thing because of his propensity to identify himself with France.

He is a man who cannot admit that things can be decided without him. He wants events to bear the hallmark of his personality. He was out of power for some twelve years, which were very important in the

history of France, those of reconstruction and new options. General de Gaulle does not want to accept this international equilibrium resulting from the Atlantic Alliance, nor the unity of Europe as it was conceived while he lived in a resentful retreat at Colombey les Deux Eglises.

Since his return to power in 1958, he is bent on a re-shaping of the world and pursues different or even contradictory policies, with his sole object the assertion of his personality. In 1967, he left NATO, and one is inclined to fear that in 1969 he will perhaps withdraw completely from the Atlantic Alliance. He follows a policy of neutrality, although ten years earlier he offered a triumvirate concept to have the Americans and to the British join him conducting world affairs in the name of the West. He has never forgiven the refusal—and very rightly so—because the accepting of his proposal would have lead to the destruction of the Atlantic Alliance. From that day his decision was taken. Since the Anglo-Saxons refused to organize the world as he had proposed, he would take his stand against them; against the United States within the Atlantic Alliance, against Great Britain within the European Community.

His fixed ideas prevent him from seeing things as they are. He does not understand the necessity of remaining the ally of the United States, nor the necessity for the democratic countries to pursue a common policy toward communism, nor the necessity for Europe of accepting Great Britain in the European Community.

His neutralism alienates more and more all the natural and traditional allies of France. To their friendship he prefers that of certain under-developed countries to whom, in any case, he is not in a position to give efficacious assistance.

Fortunately, it seems that abroad and even in France, people are more and more awakening to the actual situation. His legend, partly justified by his actions in 1940 and by the fact that he probably managed to avert for his country a civil war in 1958, is being dispelled.

As he becomes older, his faults become more and more visible. He was long considered as a clever and astute diplomat, and this was true. His haughtiness—not to say arrogance—his brutality, the equivocal situations which he has created impressed his opponents and also his partners, but it seems that he can no longer measure the real extent of his forces.

In the interval of a few weeks in 1967, he committed two mistakes which have made him lose, in France itself, a part of his authority. His compatriots, even those which admire him, cannot understand the

position which he has adopted towards Israel and can even less approve his extraordinary attitude in Canada.

His popularity is on the decline. That is a fact. And yet one cannot base oneself too much on this element since de Gaulle is not the sort of man who bends to the general will of the population. He is a man who can live alone, and he has a bizarre attraction for unhappiness. His strength of character and the conviction he has of his superiority find an encouraging element in his solitude and even in the hostility he has to meet. As long as he can, he will clutch to power. His last speeches show that his satisfaction of his work increases in proportion with the rising criticisms.

With this man, one can but stand fast, never yield and not permit the irreparable. His rule cannot continue for long. Perhaps it will end before the most nefarious consequences of his policy mature.*

* * *

For the reason which I just listed, the crisis of the Atlantic Alliance is essentially due to General de Gaulle. Does this mean that the policy followed in relation with him was faultless? Alas! No. The impossibility of the Atlantic Alliance to solve the problem of nuclear armament has greatly incited the General in the pursuit of his own policy. He cannot accept the idea that the most efficacious arms in an eventual modern war, in the Western world, belong to the United States. The fact that the British possess also some of these arms is far from improving the situation.

From his return to power in 1958, General de Gaulle made clear his position on nuclear power. His argument is simple. It can be summed up in a syllogism. A Great Power must possess atomic arms. France is a Great Power. Consequently, she must have atomic arms. Against for what is evidence for him, there is nothing to be done. Perhaps one should try to understand him and attempt, when it was still time, to find a solution. The refusal of the United States to assist him in building up his own *force de frappe* was one of the greatest subjects of dissatisfaction to the General and one of the essential elements of his hostility towards the Atlantic Alliance. The General's atomic policy is

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*Ed. note: Charles de Gaulle resigned from his Premiership on April 28, 1969, as a result of the defeat of a referendum on local matters (provincial reorganization). The vote of no confidence obligated him to honor an earlier resignation promise he had made.

not a wise one. It is expensive for France and does not reinforce the West, but it is a fact which has to be taken into account.

During the 1960's, it was possible for the United States to give some assistance to France in the building of her *force de frappe* and take profit from the circumstances to reinforce common defense in the Atlantic framework. For many reasons, lack of imagination and perhaps also lack of confidence, the United States let escape both the time and the occasions. The General sought to become independent. Personally, I do not think that he succeeded and that his *force de frappe* is not valid, but that is not his opinion. He considers that even weak as it is, he can utilize it, so as to involve his allies in a nuclear war.

France's refusal to sign the Treaty of Moscow, her hostility towards the treaty of non-proliferation, her refusal to participate within NATO to any serious survey concerning atomic strategy, show the gap.

* * *

A third cause of the Atlantic crisis is the weaknesses, the complexes and the illusions of Europe. In 1949, at the time of the signature of the Treaty of Washington, Europe had hardly emerged from the immense difficulties caused by its reconstruction. Politically, she lived in fear of Communism and Soviet agression. Under these circumstances, Europe could not but accept with gratitude the assistance given by the United States and, within the framework of the Atlantic Alliance, the so-called leadership of the U. S. A.

I would, on this matter, clearly define my position. It would be ridiculous to say that the United States has not played a role of the very first importance in the Atlantic Alliance. During many years, it has assured practically all the defense of the West, through its atomic monopoly and by the considerable amounts of money which it has given or lent to the European countries to allow them to re-build their armies. While admitting this fact, I owe to truth to say that in the framework of the Alliance, the United States has never attempted to profit from this *position de force* to impose a policy contrary to Europe's own ideas.

Concerning European problems such as the unification of Germany, the status of Berlin, the organization of defense, and, more generally speaking, those of relations with the Communist countries of the East, there has never been any serious disagreement between the European countries and the United States. The policy followed in these various fields has been decided with all members in full agreement. It represented the common will. The United States has always agreed to discuss

subjects fully and loyally and has never tried to impose its views by taking advantage of the fact that force was on its side. All discussions concerning American leadership and the complaint made now seem to me to be arbitrary and unfair.

By 1967, the psychological state of Europe had greatly changed. For several years now, its economic prosperity is relatively stable. Social progress in several countries has been considerable. Six among them, united in the Common Market, have become conscious of their importance. At the same time, the policy of the U.S.S.R. appears as less dangerous. Consequently, they support with more difficulty the so-called American leadership.

Among the reasons I have touched upon, one must take into special account the modifications of the Soviet policy in Europe. It is obvious that this policy has ceased to be so aggressive. There can be no doubt that for the time being the U.S.S.R. has renounced conquests in Europe. It is also less interested than it was some twenty years ago in supporting subversive movements.

In my opinion, these positive modifications are due, to a considerable extent, to the existence itself of the Atlantic Alliance. Nobody can foresee what Soviet policy would be if the Alliance disappeared. Such a disappearance would cause political disorder, a loss of confidence, possibilities of plottings and pressures. The stability which Europe has enjoyed for some twenty-five years and of which it has so greatly benefitted materially would be destroyed.

We must also ask ourselves if that policy of *detente* has given better results than that of the cold war. To reply to this question we must remember how it came about and what it means for the Communists. The origin and explanation of the "Cold War" are to be found in a speech made by Khrushchev in January, 1960, at Moscow. The Soviet leader observed with pride that never had the U.S.S.R. been so powerful militarily. It posessed arms which gave it the possibility of destroying all its enemies. He added, however, with humility that notwithstanding this power, he could not guarantee to shelter his country and his people from an attack or a retaliatory action of his opponents. It was perhaps the first time in history that such a confession was made.

Khrushchev drew the logical consequences of this statement: Communism cannot hope to establish itself in the world by force. It must renounce this method. It must thus propose to the world a system of peaceful co-existence. Peaceful co-existence is not a policy freely

chosen by the Communists; it is a policy which is imposed upon them because of the existence of atomic arms.

Khrushchev said: "the atomic bomb ignores the class struggle." And yet the Soviet leader did not renounce his convictions and his ambitions. He continued to believe that Communism was a valid regime for all the peoples of the world and that, finally, it would be imposed on all. He simply admitted that it would not be done by war.

For him, peaceful co-existence is a struggle between the Communist and the capitalist world in the political, economic, and cultural fields, but not the military. Apart from all doctrinal discussions, peaceful co-existence represented a hope welcomed by the Western world. Such a policy, rare for the Communists, met the deep aspiration of the democracies and the foundations of Western civilization.

Here resides the ambiguity of peaceful co-existence. It is, for the Communists, the expression of a policy imposed by facts and for the Western democracies, the application of their principles. Seven years after Khrushchev's speech, one can draw up the balance sheet of this new policy.

One thing is certain: peaceful co-existence has given the possibility of an intensification of commercial and human relations between the democratic and the Communist countries. The exchanges of goods as well as the cultural exchanges have increased considerably. This is really a very good thing. It is all the more a good thing that we have nothing to fear from a comparison with the situation in the Communist countries. Not only is our standard of living much higher, but the way in which we live is infinitely more agreeable and more attractive. Very few people go over from the West to the East. Very numerous pass from East to West, and still more of them would like to do so. The Wall of Berlin is a proof. It is also a symbol.

But these results represent the limits of the positive elements of the peaceful co-existence. In Europe, the Soviets have not reduced even slightly their military efforts. They maintain the same number of divisions in occupation of Eastern Europe. Politically, the U.S.S.R. and its allies have not made the slightest concession concerning the German problem.* On the contrary, more and more the Federal Republic be-

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*Ed. note: In August, 1970, Willy Brandt, Chancellor of West Germany traveled to Moscow to sign a treaty of non-aggression and friendship thus indicating a fruitful result of the peaceful co-existence policy.

comes conciliatory, more and more of the Communist countries—Rumania excepted and perhaps Czechoslovakia—show greater suspicion and hostility.

In the rest of the world, one can but say that Soviet policy is not so bad or as aggressive as could have been feared. In Vietnam, in the Middle East, and in Africa it is unlikely that it could have been more harmful. Although their activities are far from being favorable to Western interests, it must be admitted that they are exercised with a certain moderation.

But this is due to a second fact which cannot leave the Soviets indifferent. It is the dangerous hostility manifested against them by Red China. The atomic bomb has led the Soviets to renounce any form of armed aggression against the West. Chinese policy might lead the Russians to request one day the assistance of the West. They know it and reserve this possibility.

These are the realities that the Europeans, in their prosperity and in their joy of finding themselves less directly threatened than twenty years ago, do not evaluate exactly. It is also certain, on the other hand, that the Americans have to meet a very difficult situation. The policy they pursued since 1948 and which was logical, after their participation in the Second World War, is extremely expensive for them. It demands also an extraordinary continuity of their effort. The United States now possesses a power never equalled in the history of the world. Its responsibilities are greater than those assumed by France or Great Britain at the time when they were at the top of their power. In 1939, the United States followed a policy of isolationism. In 1967, it became, by force of circumstances, the policeman of the world against Communist subversion. The Americans have completely succeeded in Western Europe. The Marshall Plan and the Atlantic Alliance have sheltered this part of the continent. But the struggle is much more difficult in the rest of the world. The distress of the populations, the weakness of the governments and, in too many cases, the corruption of the leaders complicate terribly their task.

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To those Europeans who criticize American leadership, there is but one reply. This leadership is the result of their own weakness. Within the Atlantic Alliance, the Europeans could be valid partners for the United States if they joined their forces, if they succeeded in making a

united Europe, unanimous in the expression of its ideas and ready to take its responsibilities in the world.

Certainly, they have made an attempt to make a united Europe. They have made certain progress but have not managed to reach the decisive stages. This united Europe was desired by the Americans. They did everything in their power to assist in its realization. No reproach can be made to them at this point of view.

The Western world which united in 1949 would be terribly mistaken if it relaxed its bonds of solidarity. This solidarity is more necessary than ever and its expression—the Atlantic Alliance—must be maintained in the spirit in which it was created. But it should, also, enlarge its action. It is no longer sufficient to reach an agreement on the settlement of European problems. An agreement must also be reached concerning the other problems. It is impossible to divide the world into compartments, to do what is necessary in one of them and to take no further interest in what is happening in the others.

At the same time, the Atlantic Alliance may not confine itself exclusively to military preoccupations. Our security, certainly, must remain its main objective, but the Alliance must also prove that it could be in Europe an important factor of the East-West rapproachement. Far from being a cause of war, the great alliances are factors of equilibrium which must lead to negotiations on progressive disarmament and to a closer political understanding between states and different forms of government. Such are the tasks, suitable to today's necessities, for which the Atlantic Alliance should strive.

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These are the considerations the crisis of the Atlantic Alliance suggests to me.

When I speak of these problems, I am undoubtedly not quite impartial and objective. I realize that I am defending a policy to which I have collaborated during a quarter of a century. I know perfectly well that the situation is no longer exactly the same as it was just after the Second World War, but I cannot understand why fundamental changes are necessary nor what organization or system could be set up in its place. On the contrary, the more I think about it, the more I believe that the Alliance remains valid and that the only thing that can be done is to pursue its activities and to develop them with all their consequences.

I remain deeply convinced that there exist nowadays two essential problems linked together: the Atlantic and the European problems. The

defense of Western civilization is deeply impregnated by Christianity, based on the respect of human dignity and the love of freedom, of which democracy is the political expression. This society, this mode of living, this civilization are threatened by the totalitarian spirit which appears as well in the dictatorships of the right as in those of the left.

This defense implies the alliance of all those who live the same sort of life, and are inspired by the same principles. The framework of this essential solidarity is the Atlantic Alliance. It implies a united Europe which, alone, can be a real partner for the United States. It implies for this united Europe the will to play again a role at a world scale, sharing its part of responsibilities, while rejecting any kind of selfishness.

It also implies for the United States an effort which is quite as great. It must not be blinded because of its present power, and it must realize that, in the long run, alone, they are as incapable as a divided Europe, to solve the problems. Perhaps only a little more time will be necessary to make these facts clear.

Notwithstanding the difficulties of the present time, the misunderstandings, the reciprocal criticisms, the situation is not desperate. The crisis of the Atlantic Alliance can be overcome in two phases.

One, which is immediate, is a short term program which can cope with France's defection, comprising a certain number of precise objectives such as European security, partial disarmament, and a common policy towards the U.S.S.R. and the Communist countries of the East. The other, at a much longer term, would include the definition of a world equilibrium, the sharing-out of the tasks between the United States and a united Europe and a common effort to meet the claims of the underdeveloped countries.

The effort to be made is considerable. It is not impossible, but there is no time to lose. We want audacious political leaders. They must have a great ideal extending farther than the national framework and leading to a general conception of the world. In a democratic regime, people have the leaders they deserve. This implies for each of us the conscience of our duties as the will to fulfill them.

We live in a difficult period. We are perhaps at a very decisive time in the history of mankind. We must be aware of that. Each one of us must contribute to the solutions which have to be reached. It is our future, the future of our civilization, which is in the balance.

THE MIDDLE EAST: THE LAST CRUSADE

BY JAMES GIDNEY*

Since the title theme contrasts old myths and new realities, we may as well start with the myth—not entirely mythical—that spared us during much of our national life from the obligation to concern ourselves with the kind of problem now concerning us. I refer of course to the myth that the sun never set on the British empire. Reliance on the British to maintain order over a large part of the earth, one of the greatest protections of our young and rapidly growing republic, has now failed us. Perhaps one of the results of that failure is that we can no longer so easily regard ourselves as an exceptionally moral nation, almost providentially chosen to show others the way. Today we are no longer exempt from the pains of unsatisfactory political choices that are the lot of a great power. The present crisis in the Middle East is a good example of our legacy from the British Empire. Seen from today's perspective, the most striking thing about our policy in that area is that, until World War I, we had none.

If we define the Middle East as the Arabic-speaking portions of Asia plus Egypt, Turkey, and Iran it is clear that the two Moslem but non-Arabic-speaking countries are not critical areas for the United States at this time. With Turkey and Iran the United States maintains diplomatic and commercial relations which are normal and generally friendly. Occasionally, as in Iran's efforts to nationalize the foreign oil companies or in Turkey's conflict with Greece over Cyprus, relations may become strained, even hostile, but such episodes have been brief. In the main, the United States has been supportive rather than antagonistic toward these states. Turkey has been a valuable ally in the Cold War, while successive administrations have regarded a stable, moderately progressive government in Iran as desirable in containing the spread of Communism.

Turkey and Iran then hardly justify special treatment. We are left, then, with the remainder of the area I have defined. In other words, the "Middle East" is just what you thought it was—Israel and the Arabs.

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The behavior of the United States toward the Israeli-Arab quarrel has been frequently criticized, but the quarrel itself was none of our making. A series of developments had rendered it virtually insoluble by the time of United States involvement. Paramount among them were the simultaneous rise of political Zionism and Arab nationalism. Had only one of these movements achieved its objective, the other would have been one of history's smaller footnotes and whatever the state of the Middle East today, the present conflict would be no part of it. Conflict has arisen from the astonishing success which created in a single generation a cluster of self-governing Arab states around a self-governing Jewish state.

That the two movements would grow and clash was rendered more probable by the diplomatic pronouncements and agreements during the first World War that earned for Palestine the title of "the *over-promised* land." Within two years the British government had divided all of the Arabic-speaking lands north of the peninsula with France in the Sykes-Picot Agreement, promised all of them except southern Iraq to the Arabs in the Hussein-McMahon correspondence and awarded the already twice-promised Palestine to the Jews as a "national home" in the Balfour Declaration.[1]

These were wartime promises and may not have meant much to those who made them. In diplomacy saying things does not make them so. Nonetheless, if the saying is official and emanates from the winning side, it becomes one of the coefficients of future decisions. The British declarations reenforced the determination of both Jews and Arabs to have Palestine by assuring each side that it had a strong legal and moral claim to the country. This surely increased the probability that two bodies were going to try to occupy the same space.

By the Treaty of Sevres and by acts of the League of Nations the Arab lands of the Fertile Crescent were divided into mandated territories, close to the lines of the Sykes-Picot Agreement. Great Britain received Iraq and Palestine; France received Syria and Lebanon. The national home was recognized in the award of the Palestine mandate by the League of Nations, which imposed on the mandatory the duty of

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[1] Sykes-Picot Agreement in J. C. Hurewitz, *Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East: A Documentary Record*, 2 vols. (Princeton: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1956), II, 18-22; Hussein-McMahon correspondence, *ibid.*, 13-17; Balfour Declaration, *ibid.*, 26.

fostering it and authorized the creation of a Jewish agency to be responsible for relations with the mandatory.[2]

None of this was the doing of Americans nor was the Middle East of much concern to our people. The King-Crane Commission, which President Wilson sent to the area in 1919, recommended a curtailment of the Zionist program,[3] but it is not known yet whether Wilson ever read its report. It certainly had no effect on American policy.

Opposition to Jewish immigration appeared early among the Arabs—indeed had already appeared at the time of the King-Crane visit—and some clashes took place. However, it did not appear in the 1920's that co-existence of the two peoples was impossible. During that decade immigration did not exceed the absorptive capacity of the country.[4] Moreover the Arabs were reassured by statements such as that of Winston Churchill in 1922 that His Majesty's Government had no intention of making Palestine a wholly Jewish country.[5]

The persecution of the Jews under Nazi Germany made some showdown inevitable. A gentle flow of immigration became a flood. The Jewish population of Palestine increased by 452 per cent from 1922 to 1940; the total population increased only 128 per cent.[6] In a country the size of Massachusetts the time would come when there would not be room for all. To the Zionists this was perhaps no insoluble problem, for they had believed all along that most of the Arabs had to go. But the Arabs could hardly be expected to see it that way.

Someone had to say it would not work. In 1937 the Peel Commission said publicly for the first time that the promises made to Jews and

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[2] *Ibid.*, 107-11.

[3] U. S. Department of State, *Papers relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States: Paris Peace Conference 1919*, 13 vols. (Washington: Government Printing Office) XII, 792-95.

[4] Population figures for Palestine under the mandate in John H. Davis, *The Elusive Peace* (London: John Murray, 1968), p. 23.

[5] *Ibid.*, p. 22.

[6] *Ibid.*, p. 23.

Arabs were irreconcilable and that the only way out of the difficulty was to divide the country between them.[7]

The British government, fearful of approaching war and eager to keep the Middle East calm, reacted with the White Paper of 1939, which stated that the British objective was the creation of a Palestinian state in ten years. In that interval the country was to become gradually self-governing. Immigration would be limited to 75,000 for the first five years and none without Arab permission after that. Moreover, further acquisition of land by Jews was to be restricted. The result of this policy would be a country two-thirds Arab when it became self-governing in ten years' time. The British government did not pretend ignorance of what it was doing. The White Paper stated bluntly: "His Majesty's Government now declares unequivocally that it is not part of their policy that Palestine should become part of a Jewish state."[8]

The White Paper was a crushing blow to the Zionists. To the Arabs it should have been victory, for a two-thirds majority was enough to control the state in any case in which the two peoples disagreed. Yet, inspired by the leadership of the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem, the Arabs spurned the opportunity and rejected the White Paper on principle. They never got another such chance.

While the plight of European Jewry in the 1930's caused an emotional involvement with Zionism on the part of large numbers of American Jews not felt before, the United States was not officially implicated. An overt step was taken in 1942 when the American Zionist Organization sponsored a conference at New York's Biltmore Hotel, which brought six hundred Zionists. They called for vesting control of immigration into Palestine in the Jewish Agency and the conversion of Palestine into a Jewish state.[9] While the Biltmore Resolution did not make the United States a party to the Palestine dispute, it transferred leadership of the international Zionist movement to America. Zionists, like other lobby groups, would put pressure on our government and they do it better than most.

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[7] Great Britain: Palestine Royal Commission, *Report*, Cmd. 5479 (London: H. M. Stationery Office, 1937).

[8] Great Britain: *Statement of Policy*, Cmd. 6019 (H. M. Stationery Office, 1939).

[9] Hurewitz, II, 234-35.

Admitted that as the Zionists put the case before the American public there was little concern for the welfare or opinions of those "non-Jewish populations" of Palestine whose rights had supposedly been safeguarded in the Balfour Declaration. But when World War II ended, there was little opportunity to worry about the Arabs. The remnants of Europe's Jewry wanted to—in most cases, had to—leave Europe. There was no open door for them in the United States, Great Britain, France, Australia, or in Brazil. In short, no one who could say "no" said "yes." But the Arabs were not a self-governing people, so the world, led by the United States, said "yes" for them. Americans, despite the increasing secularism of the age, still found it easy to identify Jews with Palestine.

I am speaking now of popular opinion, not of official policy, but popular opinion of such intensity can hardly fail to get into partisan politics. Between 1945 and 1948 major parties in the United States vied with one another in expressing devotion to Zionism. This provoked disgust and anger among those in Great Britain charged with responsibility for the mandate, yet the British agreed in 1946 to the appointment of an Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry. The commission's recommendations were somewhat more favorable to the Jews than the White Paper had been.[10] The British, however, would not attempt to put them into effect without the help of the United States, which they could not get. What they got instead was a demand by President Truman on October 4, 1946 (Yom Kippur) for the immediate admission of 100,000 Jews into Palestine,[11] a figure that was later matched by Governor Thomas Dewey who wanted to be president.[12]

Palestine was of course still a British charge. We bore no responsibility for a permanent solution or even for temporary maintenance of order. In 1947, however, this relatively happy state of affairs came to an end. That was the year the British began shedding global responsibilities. The Indian subcontinent was turned over to India and Pakistan and the protection of Greece and Turkey against the Soviet menace was handed to the United States. On April 2 the British government asked that the future of Palestine be placed on the agenda of the General Assembly of the United Nations and that a special committee should study the question and prepare recommendations for the fall meeting.

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[10] *Ibid.*, 264-66.

[11] *New York Times*, Oct. 4, 1946, pp. 1,2.

[12] *Ibid.*, Oct. 7, 1946, pp. 1,5.

At the end of August the U.N. Special Committee recommended that the mandate be terminated as soon as possible. The British agreed to end it by August 1, 1948 and later moved the date up to May 15, 1948. The committee's majority asked for partition of the country into a Jewish state and an Arab state with a U.N. trusteeship for Holy Places. The British were to remain for two years to supervise the transition.[13]

Perhaps there was merit in the proposal but how was it to be carried out? The British refused to put into effect any proposal which was not acceptable to both Arabs and Jews. There could be no such proposal. Between a non-negotiable Arab Palestine in which Jewish immigrants would be welcome only as a minority and a non-negotiable Palestine "as Jewish as England is English," the talents of Henry Clay himself could not have found an accommodation in 1947, nor can they find one now.

The Zionists, however, were willing to accept the partition plan as at least a step in the direction of their objectives; the Arabs, standing firmly on the principle of self-determination of nations, were not.[14] Intense efforts were made to influence votes at the U.N.—on this, I am persuaded, much of the story is still untold. On November 29, 1947 the majority resolution was voted on favorably by 33-13 with ten abstentions. The United States and the Soviet Union voted with the majority; Great Britain abstained.

The result was a victory for Zionism and in a sense for the United States. Yet an analysis of the vote suggests trouble ahead. Outside of the European-American world only Liberia and the Philippines voted for partition. Voting against were twelve Arab and Asian nations and Cuba. The British were joined in abstention by Ethiopia, Yugoslavia, Chiang-Kai-shek's China and six Latin American nations. It ought to have been evident then, as it certainly is now, that while the western community thought of the Jewish state as a triumph of liberal, humanitarian ideals, the non-western communities thought of it as the last writhing of the imperialist dragon.

However, the resolution had clearly carried. The British prepared to leave Palestine. Their withdrawal led to two small wars, the first, ending in May, 1948, between Arabs and Jews in Palestine, the second

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[13] *Ibid.*, Sep. 1, 1947, pp. 1-3.

[14] *Ibid.*

between Israel and the neighboring Arab states. During these conflicts many Arabs left Israel—willingly, say the Israelis; forced out, say the Arabs. Israel was left in control not only of the territory assigned to it by the U.N. resolution, but of West Galilee, assigned by the U.N. to the Arabs, as well. But perhaps the greatest triumph of Zionism came on May 14, 1948, when the American president recognized the existence of the newly declared state of Israel, confounding everyone at the U.N., including the American ambassador who was still working for the majority resolution which the United States and thirty-two other nations had voted for the preceding November.

By this time who could doubt that the United States was involved in the fate of the Jews in Palestine? But we were involved on the other side as well, not only because we must have known, although we never admitted it, that we were in part responsible for the Arab refugees, but because American oil companies had begun moving into the Middle East. Our allies needed the oil and the mideast was a convenient source. Without necessarily being opposed to the Jews, the oil companies had a vital stake in friendship with the Arabs.

All might have still been well for the United States if the Arabs had accepted their defeat. While some Zionists would never had been satisfied with anything less than all of Palestine—and some not even with that—it is at least possible that, had partition been accepted, the bulk of the Israeli population would have been grateful for the creation of a Jewish state and made the best of it while the Arabs' antagonism could have been gradually softened in various ways, not least by the foreign aid for which President Truman asked Congress early in the next year.

But the Arabs never accepted defeat nor the existence of Israel. Those who had been exiled harassed the new state by raids over its borders. The Arab states imposed a boycott, bringing pressure on Arab firms to do no business with foreigners who traded with Israel. Naturally there were numerous violent incidents resulting in death and injury on both sides. The Arabs' resentment against the United States did not disappear—it probably increased. We gave as much foreign aid to two-million Israelis as to thirty-million Arabs, while American press coverage was heavily weighted on the Israeli side.

There were some who thought our policy might become more impartial with the inauguration of a Republican president in 1953. However, the efforts of Secretary John Foster Dulles in that direction were rather unproductive until 1956 when they became spectacularly counter-

productive, moving the Egyptians to buy arms from the Communist bloc and to seize the Suez Canal from its foreign owners.

Dulles partially redeemed his failure by his insistence that Great Britain, France, and Israel give up their armed attack on Egypt in October. Most significantly, he did this just before the presidential election in which the Republican administration was returned to office by a larger margin than it had enjoyed in 1952. The election returns did not mean that the American people were pro-Arab; they probably did mean that although a majority continued to sympathize with Israel, it had no intention on being plunged into another world war on Israel's behalf.

There seemed therefore to exist, as President Eisenhower started his second term, a real opportunity to make another try. While far from giving up on Israel, the United States had shown that it was not totally committed to Israel nor totally antagonistic toward the Arabs. We were the only signatory of the Tri-partite Pact of 1950[15] to honor it. The others had intervened to violate it. Could we not, taking advantage of our momentarily altered image in the eyes of the Arabs, embark on a program of aid and friendship to them while attempting to bring them to accept the existence of Israel and live at peace with their new neighbors?

In retrospect we can see that there was no such chance. We had waited too long and Secretary Dulles had bungled too monstrously. The chief beneficiary of 1956 was the Soviet Union. Pushing southward since the time of Peter the Great, thrown back from the Turkish Straits, which they thought they had finally won by the Constantinople Agreement of 1915,[16] the Russian Empire and its successor state had never abandoned the hope of reaching the Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf. In 1956 it saw a chance to realize its old ambition by vaulting over Turkey and Iran and gaining the seas by supporting the Arabs.

The Suez invasion did not settle anything between Israel and her neighbors. They returned to the kind of uneasy peace which had prevailed before the crisis and there things remained until 1967 when Egypt threatened to interrupt the passage of Israeli ships through the Straits of Tiran. The Suez Canal had been closed to Israel since 1956; hence the Straits represented their only outlet to the Indian Ocean. This, more than anything else, appears to have touched off the brief war that

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[15] Hurewitz, II, 308-9.

[16] *Ibid.*, pp. 7-11.

erupted early in June, 1967. The third trial at arms resulted in a quick, overwhelming victory for the Israelis. When it was over they were in control of all of Palestine. Partition had been ended by conquest of the entire country. Moreover, Israel occupied Egypt's Sinai Peninsula to the Suez Canal and the Golan Heights in Syria.

The outcome of their Blitzkrieg was far more sweeping than the victory of 1948 but paradoxically, not more conclusive. The very one-sidedness of the clash finally brought home to the Palestinian Arabs the futility of waiting for salvation from the Arab states. Far from sinking into apathy and despair, they found a new life in relying chiefly upon themselves. At the same time the Israelis felt that at last their Arab neighbors must realize they were beaten and had no choice but to come to terms. Instead, Israel was harassed by stepped-up guerrilla warfare. Although this warfare is incapable of seriously damaging Israel in the near future, it can and does make life endlessly miserable. Nor is there any suggestion that the Arabs are moving closer to conceding anything. The Israeli victory, far from bringing peace, has only involved Israel again in the hardest kind of war.

Moreover, Israel has slipped somewhat in world opinion.[17] Some of the change must be ascribed to improved Arab public relations. There was a time when *all* the propaganda was on the Israeli side. From the Arabs we got only threats to "drive the Jews into the sea." Most Americans have not lived among Arabs and do not know how to discount their exuberant rhetoric. Nonetheless, it still remains incomprehensible to me that the Arab leaders could not anticipate the effect this would have on a western generation which will never get over its guilt for the destruction of Europe's Jews. Today, with slogans like "We want to go home" and with assurances that Palestine can be home for all its people, including Jews,[18] the Palestinians are getting the world's ear and many people who have supported Israel are beginning to show sympathy for the refugees. Increasingly, Jewish voices are being raised against some of Israel's policies, including one eloquent one in the Knesset.[19] As the third anniversary of the Six-day War approaches, Israel is still far

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[17] *The Christian Science Monitor*, Apr. 23, 1970, p. 5.

[18] *Ibid.*, Mar. 10, 1970, p. 1.

[19] Uri Avnery, editor-in-chief of *Ha'olam Hazeh* and author of books and articles published in the west.

more powerful than its neighbors, yet does it not seem that, as compared to three years ago, the Arabs' situation is more hopeful, the Israelis' more worrisome?

What does this mean for American foreign policy? Obviously we are not suffering as the participants are, but we seem almost as frustrated. We have been fortunate in our dealings with other nations. Our history has given us a taste for quick solutions and an assumption that we can get them. It has also bred in us a conviction that we live on a higher plane than the rest of the world, that when we participate in its ruckuses, it is either to defend a clearcut and obviously reasonable American position or to straighten things out for somebody—sometimes for everybody—and then go home. If people are so stubborn and benighted as not to accept our ministrations as the answer to their problems, we hear demands that unless we are prepared to blast somebody or something into oblivion, we should "pull out." The frequency of this demand in our interventions in Korea and Vietnam suggests that we would be urged to pull out of the Middle East but for our deeper emotional involvements there.

Apparently we can not pull out. But no more can we persuade or compel the parties to the conflict to become reconciled. We still look, it seems to me, for some kind of "solution" that just has to be there. What I am arguing is that it just is not there.*

We cannot persuade the parties to make peace because neither side wants to give up the struggle, and neither feels obliged to. Israel has been hurt by the hostility of its Arab neighbors and by that of the Soviet Union. It has been hurt, although not much, by the attacks of the guerrillas and saboteurs. Continued fighting and continued armed isolation will hurt more. Today the state spends twenty-one per cent of its gross national product on defense.[20] At the same time, our government and the American Zionists seem still willing to pay the bills. Militarily, injuries inflicted on Israel's people by Arabs have been fewer in number than those caused by automobile accidents.[21] Psychologically, the

*Ed. note: At press time (August, 1970) U. N. Mediator Gunnar Jarring was beginning his meetings with representatives of both sides (exclusive of guerrillas) in New York City following what has become known as the United States Peace Plan, the elements of which have been endorsed by most interested nations.

[20] Don Peretz, "Israel's 1969 Election Issues: The Visible and the Invisible" in *The Middle East Journal*, XXIV, no. 1 (Winter, 1970), 42.

[21] *Ibid.*

damage may be greater but there are psychological gains, too, in standing up to danger together. Israel is neither obliged to nor disposed to give up.

Neither are the Arabs. Granting that their actions have so far been relatively ineffective, there are indications that they are getting better. The Israeli military budget testifies that they are not to be as lightly dismissed as some official pronouncements might have led us to believe, and indeed we do not seem to be hearing so many of those pronouncements. At least one report says that in recent fighting in the Golan Heights the Syrian troops performed notably better than in the past.[22] Moreover, the Arabs do not have to be as good as the Israelis. A writer in *The New Statesman,* strongly pro-Israel, made the point recently that Israel can not afford to lose a battle, while the Arabs can afford to lose another war.[23] They are getting more sympathy overseas than at any time since 1948, they are well backed financially, and their morale appears to be high. There is no reason why they should give up.

If neither side will give up, what are the chances they may come to some agreement? We hear frequent hints that some kind of peace talks are in the offing. It may even be true that positions are softening among some people—but are they the people who can make peace? Nasser *may* be willing to come to terms but the guerrillas are not and it is by no means sure that Nasser could stay in power if he did. The point is clearer in the case of King Hussein. It is quite evident he wants to come to terms with Israel, but the guerrillas have exposed the weakness of his position by preventing an American assistant secretary of state from visiting his capital.[24]

On the Israeli side, some may want to let Nahum Goldmann, President of the World Jewish Congress, talk to Nasser but the government

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[22] *The Christian Science Monitor,* Apr. 4-6, 1970, pp. 1,3.

[23] Paul Johnson, "Israel: The Militant Peacemaker," reprinted in *Middle East Information Series*, no. 10 (Oct., 1969), p. 26. Curiously, this view is echoed by an official of Israel's *Mapai* Party, Hannah Zemer, according to Jean-Francis Held of *Le Nouvel Observateur*, who quotes her as saying: "We know we can't really win a war with the Arabs. We can only win battles and more battles. How long?" Eric Rouleau, Jean-Francis Held, Jean et Simone Lacouture, *Israel et les Arabes* (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1967), p. 52.

[24] *The Christian Science Monitor*, Apr. 20, 1970, p. 3; Apr. 23, 1970, p. 5.

does not.[25] Students may be less reverent toward Moshe Dayan than they used to be[26] but Dayan has not changed. If anything, he is more bellicose than before, threatening that Israel may attack Russian pilots if they venture into the canal zone.[27] Israel's elections of 1969, which weakened the left and gave additional seats in the Knesset to the *Gahal* and *Mizrachi* Parties, seem indeed to have strengthened the hawks.[28]

Peace induced or imposed by outsiders seems equally remote. There is no slackening in the conviction in some American quarters that the United States must sustain Israel to final triumph. Surely the United States has no intention of abandoning Israel, but it is more likely to see its obligation as not letting Israel lose than as helping it to win. The policy is defensive and must be, for if Israel approaches the point of reducing the Arabs to total helplessness, the Soviet Union may feel obliged to intervene actively. We would then have to come in on the Israeli side with results that need little specification. Hence, the only sensible policy is to see that the Soviet Union is pushed to no such decision.

The Arabs, on the other hand, cannot count on prevailing through the help of the Soviet Union, which is deterred by us as we are by them. Since neither of the great powers dares go so far as to provoke active military intervention by the other, both, whatever they say, are committed to the status quo.

My rueful conclusion is that this conflict will continue for a considerable time into the future and that there is little, if anything, anyone can do to change it for the better. The role of diplomacy is to make sure it gets no worse. The American people are going to have to do what earlier great powers have done—to live with an unhappy, even tragic situation for which there is no visible remedy. The Roman defense of the Danube is a case in point; the British defense of the Khyber Pass is another. In neither case was there any policy of victory in the American sense, but a mere grubby maintenance of the status quo.

These are actions at which Americans have not excelled unless we were clearly at a disadvantage, as in the defense of small frontier settlements against hostile Indians. Since we became a great power we have

[25] *Ibid.*, Apr. 9, 1970, p. 2; Apr. 11, 1970, p. 2.

[26] *Ibid.*, Apr. 9, 1970, p. 2.

[27] *Ibid.*, Apr. 17, 1970, p. 3.

[28] Peretz, esp. pp. 34-35.

not resorted to such a policy except in Korea and, I suppose, in Vietnam, and in each of these cases, at the cost of deep and passionate divisions among our people. We have failed in the British techniques not because we are incapable of mastering them but because we do not respect them. We lack tolerance for a conflict that can not be clearly decided.

It is my contention that in Palestine we must learn such tolerance. Watchful and patient waiting while the suffering goes on is painful, but an attempt to precipitate a decision can be much more painful.

I would therefore urge Americans to adjust to the facts of the Middle East. They might begin by recognizing that the conflict is not the result of misunderstanding which could be settled by dialogue. It is not even in the usual sense a conflict of interest which could be settled by splitting the difference. It is a struggle engaging the deepest aspirations of both sides for a home, for a community, for a place on the surface of the earth.

Our role is to stand by watchfully until such time as we may find it possible to be helpful. The chance of being helpful when the time comes will be better if we have been as impartial as possible in the meanwhile. Some tension between ourselves and the Arabs is unavoidable. The United States identifies Zionism as an active and powerful element in its own society and Communism as a powerful foreign enemy. Arabs identify Zionism as the chief threat to their own society and Communism as a powerful foreign friend. Moreover, by welcoming the intrusion of the Soviet Union, the Arabs have in effect taken sides in the cold war.

Our policy therefore can hardly be expected to be totally impartial. But if it is to avoid complete futility or deadly danger it must make more of an effort than it has to be fair. People who have to submit their performances to popular referendum at regular intervals will find it easier to be fair as the public becomes more so.

It would help also if Americans could insist that the chief function of American diplomacy is to protect the interests of the United States. In the absence of an international community with *enforceable* law this must continue to be not only the right but the duty of a national government. The interests of the United States certainly include friendship with the Arabs. I hesitate to appear as an advocate of our oil companies, but there has to be something wrong with our nation when our people are quite willing to offend the Canadians, our closest friends, because of a supposed need for oil from Alaska, but find it somehow immoral to be

concerned with defending the American oil business in the part of the world where it is most productive.

Nor are the Arabs important internationally solely because of oil. They represent an overwhelming majority of the population on the eastern and southern shores of the Mediterranean. They have the sympathy of millions of Moslems and of ex-colonial people and they have stimulated interest in both China and the Soviet Union. Yet much of our population is not only unwilling to try to win Arab friendship for the west but throws a tantrum when the French try to do it.

Above all, we should be careful that the balance of power is not too drastically altered. This may be the hardest of all for Americans who have regarded the balance of power as a very base ideal. (I have myself.) Nonetheless, until the parties to the dispute can bring it to an end, a balance of power is essential to avoid turning the struggle into a third world war.

Could the United States stand by and allow Israel to be overwhelmed? I very much doubt it. The pressure for intervention by the Zionists, backed by much non-Jewish opinion, would be very strong. Equally strong would be the feeling that the United States was being humiliated and that its international standing would be badly damaged by what would be interpreted as a Soviet victory.

On the other hand, how many more blows can the Soviet Union expect its clients to endure? How many more lightning wars, how many more air raids on Cairo, how many more invasions of Lebanon? As the balance shifts bit by bit in favor of Israel, will not the Soviet Union, bit by bit, increase its aid to the Arabs? What is ultimately the only aid that is of any use is all-out military intervention? Should it not be a vital objective of American diplomacy to see that it does not come to that? And in our present anarchistic world order, what way is there to that objective other than the maintenance of a balance of power?

So, the United States can look for no solution in the Middle East as a result of Arab-Israeli negotiations, with or without our permission, nor can we achieve anything important by compulsion, nor can we say "a plague on both your houses" and retreat into isolation. Our money will not settle things, nor will our power, our democracy, nor our humanity. We must worry along with a very large measure of imperfection. Let us remain alert that the situation does not become worse, let us be deeply concerned for all the values involved, even more concerned for all the people involved, let us strive without stint to bind up their wounds whenever we can — but please, no more crusades!

THE SENATE AND FOREIGN POLICY SINCE 1945: OPERATIONAL, OPTIONAL, OR OBSOLETE?

BY J. CHAL VINSON*

Evidently there is little agreement as to the role Congress has played in formulating foreign policy since World War II. Diplomatic historian Julius Pratt heads a section on this topic in his textbook with a title that speaks of the greatly expanded authority of Congress since 1945. Historian and journalist Merlo Pusey devotes a recent book, *The Way We Go to War* to the way in which congressional authority has declined in that same period. A news commentator asserted earlier this year that "there is growing evidence" that the Senate "is an anachronism and has outlived its usefulness.... It is nothing more than an obstruction to the smooth operation of modern government." Of course Congress has always had critics. A generation ago Will Rogers remarked that when he ran out of material for his humorous writings he just bought a newspaper and read about what Congress was doing. Not only has there been much criticism, but it has varied greatly from decade to decade.

In part this is true because Americans are generally impatient with failure and anxious to correct mistakes. Americans, it has been said, tend to look upon foreign policy as a series of specific problems that can and must be solved; Europeans look upon foreign policy as a predicament that must be endured. Consequently Americans have been concerned with methods and machinery for the definition and resolution of issues in foreign affairs. Much time and effort has gone into perfecting constitutional guarantees to prevent one branch of government from dominating the management of foreign policy. For more than a century and a half Americans have been interested in peace societies and the possibilities of world organizations conceived in the hope that they might achieve just and lasting solutions to end all problems of international life for all time and, indeed, to do away with diplomacy as such. Meanwhile, Europeans have been concerned with diplomatic negotiation as a means for reducing and containing an endless succession of inevitable conflicts. The general outlines of this contrast in viewpoints were well illustrated by French Primer Clemenceau's impatience with

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President Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points. The Frenchman observed that "God Himself had only Ten Commandments."

Certainly so broad a generalization of a national attitude must be subject to reservations, but it is useful here in underscoring the legalistic and mechanistic methods that Americans have hoped would bring a utopian solution to the vexatious problems of diplomacy. As a consequence, even in the brief span of the twentieth century there have been many shifts in the American interpretation of the role of the Senate in foreign policy.

One reaction to any major failure in foreign relations is an attempt to reinterpret the role of the branches of the federal government in such a way as to reduce the power of the branch thought to be most directly responsible for the most recent failure. There are outstanding examples in the last half century.

The Senate was held responsible for defeat of the League of Nations in the United States in 1920 in many scholarly articles and books. Believing this action to have been a disaster, these same scholars, in looking to the future, not infrequently sought to reduce the Senate's evil influence. They agreed with John Hay's conclusion while Secretary of State in 1901 that there would always be one-third of the Senate plus one on the wrong side of every question. The obvious constitutional remedy was to abolish the requirement for a two-thirds majority in the Senate to approve a treaty.

Scarcely a decade later in the 1930's the President rather than the Senate became the scapegoat for failure in foreign policy. This failure was now defined as American intervention in World War I rather than the peace making efforts at Versailles. Revisionists historians, abetted by Senator Gerald Nye's sensational investigation of the munitions industry, won popular acceptance for the theory that President Wilson, either by design or by incompetence, had forced Congress into declaring war.

Many legal checks on presidential authority were suggested. One, the Ludlow Referendum, demanded a Constitutional amendment providing for a national referendum vote of approval before a Congressional decision to enter a foreign war became law. Congressman Walter Frasier of Minnesota introduced a measure to implement the anti-war pledge in the Kellogg-Briand Pact by making it illegal to declare war or to approve any appropriation for armament in peace time. These extreme curtailments of Presidential authority failed, but the neutrality

laws, beginning with the Johnson Act in 1934, specifically removed Presidential discretion in applying or interpreting the acts. They were mandatory, following strictly the steps laid down by Congress to assure absolute neutrality.

The threat to American security represented by the outbreak of World War II bought recognized need for executive acendancy in policy making which President Roosevelt skillfully exploited. Senator Arthur Vandenburg lamented in March, 1941 that the passage of Lend Lease "drove the final nail into the coffin of neutrality." Certainly Roosevelt's authorization in September, 1941 of American naval convoy for ships carrying Lend Lease goods confirmed the Senator's view.

Actual Congressional authority in policy making was sharply reduced insofar as wartime decisions were concerned. At the same time the administration recalled President Wilson's fight for the treaty after World War I and great care was given to preserving and placating Senate prerogatives. The Senate formally gave its advance approval to the peace keeping agency to be formed after the war. In the debates on the United Nations Senate leaders publicly acknowledged that the Senate had "killed" the League of Nations and that a strong League might well have checked the aggression that led to World War II.

Thus the Executive emerged from World War II in a much more powerful position than did the Congress. A lapse into peace might have restored the balance to the legislative branch, but there was no real lapse. The Cold War crisis in 1947 demanded unity and action. President Harry Truman met the crisis with his far reaching decisions for aid to Greece and Turkey and the Marshall Plan. This was strong executive leadership and the title, Truman Doctrine, gave no recognition to Congress. Yet, as Herbert Agar has pointed out in *The Price Of Power*, Congress could have blocked the President. Indeed, this same Congress consistently voted down all the President's major domestic programs and Truman made political capital in the 1948 campaign by denouncing the "do-nothing Eightieth Congress." But it was this same Congress, largely by virtue of Senator Vandenburg's efforts for a bipartisan policy, that approved the Truman Doctrine. Bipartisanship itself was a necessary move to meet crisis conditions, but its overall effect was to reduce the power of Congress by sacrificing debate and minimizing disagreement in order to assure quick action. Continuing crisis since 1947 has reduced the time for deliberation and dulled the edge of honest criticism for executive action.

American foreign policy in the last twenty-five years has broken in many ways with the traditions that guided it from 1776-1945. One obvious example is the proscription against alliances that held down to 1947. Since that year the forty-odd alliances formed by the United States are sometimes described as evidence of *pactomania*. It is even more obvious that this change in method is a symptom of a basic change in position. It is not that Americans have accepted a mission to global leadership and a commitment to world peace only since 1945. President Monroe, said in 1822, "The United States owes to the world a great example, and, by means thereof, to give the cause of liberty and humanity a generous support." It is rather that in former times both of these objectives were, at least in American minds, sought only by peaceful and legal means. Now the United States is committed to the philosophy of peace through power and democracy by intervention. As Selig Adler has written in the *Isolationists Impulse:*

> "By 1950 the United States had returned not to the isolation of Warren Harding, but rather to the Realpolitik of Theodore Roosevelt. . . . Our post war diplomacy thus bore a closer resemblance to the statecraft of Prince Metternich and Bismarck than to the doctrines of President Wilson and F. D. Roosevelt."

The assumption since 1947 and the advent of the Cold War has been the need for unceasing vigilance and superior counterforce to contain the protracted hostility of the Soviet Communist world. The military became more important than heretofore. This led to continual rivalry with the Soviets in every possible sphere. Walter Lippmann complained in 1950: "We can hardly send milk to babies abroad without explaining that this is an important action in our cold war with Russian communism." Or another less well known sage remarked that if we heard that Russia had launched a project to go to hell we would immediately counter it with a plan to get there first.

With the Cold War underway the United States faced a condition unique in its history—an unrelenting threat to its security. Continual crisis inevitably reduced Congressional deliberations in favor of executive actions. Congressional authority reached its apogee in the 1930's when there was a general feeling of national security. It was typified by the expert opinion of Adminal William Sims that not even a navy of 1000 ships, capable of 100 knots per hour could invade the United States. When that feeling of security was shattered at Pearl Harbor enthusiasm for Congressional dominance of foreign policy waned.

Modern technology with the mass destruction of atomic weapons linked to the speed of rockets has reduced time available for deliberations almost to the vanishing point. It has been estimated that in the event of a reported missile attack the President would have fifteen minutes in which to decide whether or not it was a hostile attack and how to react to it in the event that it was. This, of course, contrasts with the three year period of debate before the United States entered World War I and the two years before World War II.

The possibility of an almost instant executive decision of far reaching significance became a fact in 1950 when President Harry Truman ordered American troops into Korea. Congress was subsequently consulted and, in theory at least, the President's act could have been countermanded. It is both difficult and dangerous to withdraw troops already committed to combat; Congress approved Truman's act.

The later unpopularity of the Korean war together with concern about the vast increase in executive agreements after 1938 began to cause Congressional leaders concern in the 1950's. This problem was further complicated by the presence of the United Nations and the possibility that multilateral international agreements might contain provisions counter to the interests of the United States. The Senate, under the leadership of John Bricker, sought to assert itself by constitutional change designed to meet these problems. The Bricker Amendment, first proposed in 1953 and later defeated in 1954 by one vote, proposed to amend the Constitution in order to give Congress power to regulate all executive agreements with foreign nations and require a vote in Congress to implement provisions of treaties relating to the United States. President Dwight Eisenhower attacked this restriction on executive power asserting that the amendment was an attempt to destroy the Constitution brick by brick by Bricker.

Even when Congress has been consulted in advance the results have not been entirely satisfactory. The most celebrated incident of this sort is the Tonkin Gulf Resolution. The resolution has been attacked on the ground that insufficient and inaccurate information was given to Congress at the time the decision was made and that, in any event, Congress did not intend to grant the President unlimited authority to expand the war. As public opposition to the war mounted, recourse to Constitutional checks have once again come into popularity.

Last year the Senate Foreign Relations Committee reported out Resolution 85 with but one dissenting vote. This resolution reaffirmed

the right of the Senate to a voice in making any "national commitment" through means of a treaty, convention, or other legislative instrumentality. In this resolution the Senate charged that "the executive has acquired virtual supremacy over the making as well as the conduct of the foreign relations of the United States. It cited a long list of specific examples over many years of the President's power to commit the country to war by means of unilateral official declarations in the Middle East, Vietnam, SEATO, and Spain. To rectify this situation the resolution proposed to force the executive to reconsider its excesses, and the legislature to reconsider its responsibility for allowing executive domination in the making of foreign policy to the end of restoring the division of responsibilities called for in the Constitution. There have also been other proposals to revoke the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution. After the presidential order to move into Cambodia there were new resolutions to curb his authority along with a general revival of all of the older ones of the last few months.

The possibility that these resolutions will, through the Constitution, provide a larger Senatorial voice in foreign policy making is not well founded. The Constitution despite its 180 years and the relative calm of that era gave the decisive advantage in the conduct of foreign relations to the Executive. Nations of a necessity must deal with each other through individuals and these individuals inevitably belong to the executive branch of the government. Thomas Jefferson observed after he became President: "The transaction of business with foreign nations is executive altogether." Theodore Roosevelt took a parallel but even broader view with the assertion that the Presidency was as big as the man who held the office.

The Supreme Court in reviewing the Constitution has defined the President's powers in foreign relations as "delicate, plenary, and exclusive." Short of the expenditure of money, the binding conclusion of treaties, and the formal declaration of war the President is virtually unrestrained in the conduct of foreign relations. A Monroe Doctrine may be announced without any prior consultation or approval by the Congress. He can make promises, give advice, enter into informal commitments, send the armed forces anywhere in the world and can commit them to hostile acts short of war. Obviously these powers make it possible to so limit the choices which constitutionally lie with Congress as to eliminate them altogether. Truman could have used armed force in the Berlin crisis of 1948 or Kennedy could have done so during

the missile crisis of 1962 and thereby involved the nation in war without any Congressional approval.

Hans Morganthau has wisely observed that not since 1945 has an unconstitutional seizure of power by the executive concerned both Congress and citizens. What is new is the frequency with which the constitutionally sanctioned powers have had to be called into play because of the continuous rather than sporadic demands of contemporary international affairs.

The constitutional intent was for Congress to check the President and for the Senate to check the House. The Senate still can delay, modify, emasculate and even prevent executive action. It cannot, however, directly act to initiate a new policy. It can only adopt a resolution recommending a course of action and the executive may then honor or ignore it. Over the past generation America's commitments in world affairs, as never before, demand action, sometimes almost split second action and Congress simply cannot act under such circumstances. That is to say that in fact the Senate's voice in making policy has been muted.

Another development since 1945 that has tended to reduce the role of Congress in foreign policy making is the vast growth of government. In the early years of the Republic the State Department, which had only 600 employees as late as 1930, alone was responsible for the nations foreign relations. Now the State Department has over 12,000 employees and the Hoover Commission found an additional forty-six "departments agencies, commissions, boards, and interdepartmental councils" at work on some aspects of the conduct of foreign relations. In order to coordinate the work of these diverse agencies, thrity-three interdepartmental committees were at work. Some of these were created by law, some by executive order and some by departmental agreements. These are by no means insignificant groups.

One of these thirty-three committees is the National Security Council created under the National Security Act of 1947. Its members include the President, the Vice President, Secretary of State, and Secretary of Defense. It does not, however, include a member of Congress. It considers options brought up to it by a number of lesser committees. The President's special advisor on foreign affairs heads the planning staff that makes the initial suggestions based on policy papers prepared by members of a Study Committee who work in five regional areas (Europe, Asia, etc.) and five topical divisions (Foreign Aid, Stategic posture, etc.).

This information goes to a Planning Staff, headed by the President's special advisor, which reports its findings to a Review Board also headed by the Presidents special advisor including the State and Defense Departments along with the CIA and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. With this information in hand the National Security Council reviews the options and advises the President on his decisions.

The Department of Defense, with its many agencies and all of its expert opinion on highly technical matters, along with an $80 billion budget, also has vast influence on Congressional decisions relating to foreign policy. The very enormity of government operations tends to complicate the task of any Senator who seeks to give direction to policy.

Congressional authority is limited politically as well as Constitutionally. In regard to China policy A.T. Steele in *The American People and China* asserts that American policy has remained inflexible for twenty years in part because of "congressional paralysis based on the assumption that any suggestion of change would provoke a hostile public reaction." The "loss of China" in 1949 and the Congressional attack led by Seantor Joseph McCarthy against the Roosevelt-Truman administrations and the State Department worked to reduce the issues of China policy to a test of attitude on Communism. Hence, Congress has year after year passed by voice vote resolution opposing the seating of Red China in the UN and no successful presidential candidate since 1944 has advocated anything other than a hard line toward Communism. For good or ill Congressional policy on China has been frozen by the Congressman's estimate of the public attitude on the issue. "The first principle of a politican is to be elected or re-elected, and on this basis the less said about China the better."

In the case of China policy this inflexibility on the part of Congress bound the Executive, Steele says, and "the policy fashioned by John Foster Dulles was a natural out-growth of it." That is to say Congress was the controlling factor in China policy although Dulles as the super active executive agent made it appear that the hard line on Communism was an invention of the executive. Truman, Acheson and the Democratic party were charged with being soft on Communism in 1952 presidential election. In a highly critical article on Dulles in *The New Republic* (October 28, 1967), Hans Morganthau asserted that Dulles assumed he must prove to Congress his adamant anti-communism and to achieve this end was willing to allow the dissmissal of foreign service officers for alleged Communist sympathies when Dulles knew the

charges were not valid. The assumption must be that a strong and continuing demand by Congress for an alternative policy would also have been reflected in executive policy.

China policy also reflects another limit on Congress the power of organized lobbists. Pressure groups have so great an influence on Congress that Robert Dahl asserted in *Congress and Foreign Policy:* "A large part of the history of American foreign policy since World War I might be interpreted as a series of successful intimidations by pressure groups." More recently the Committee of One Million offers possibly the best example of this trend. This committee, organized two months after the conclusion of the Korean War, opposed admission of Communist China into the U.N. The letterhead of the organization carries the names of six senators including Thomas J. Dodd, William Proxmire and Hubert Humphrey. Former senators Paul H. Douglas former congressman Walter H. Judd helped to organize the group. In less than a year the committee got more than one million signatures on a petition to keep Red China out of the U.N. In 1961 a second stronger petition was circulated. It again advocated exclusion from the U.N. and now opposed recognition of Red China by the United States as well as any other steps which might serve to build the power and prestige of the Peking regime. Again over a million signatures were gotten including, by 1964, 345 members of Congress. A third revision of the petition in 1965 almost immediately got approval in the form of signatures from 312 Congressmen. In part this was due to personal conviction and in part to the committee's threat that Congressmen who did not sign would be placed under pressure of letter-writing campaigns, pressure by national organizations, and visits from constituents. The Committee has a "talent for making any suggestion of modification in our China policy seem unpatriotic and contemptable." A majority of Congress has subscribed to its doctrine ever since its foundation even though its executive secretary, Marvin Liebman, has an annual budget of only $60,000. Political expedience enhances immeasurably the leverage of organized pressure groups even though as in this case they be, what one critic called them, "a term rather than a reality."

Whether or not such power by a vested interest constitutes a decline of Congressional authority depends on one's attitude toward the policy in question. Thus, it could be argued that a hard line toward Communism and in particular toward Red China has represented for the last two decades the will of the American people and the will of Congress. Such Presidential policies as the intervention in Korea and the escalation in

Vietnam were taken within the framework of this demand for containment sanctioned by concensus. It is at least interesting to speculate as to the Congressional reaction had Presidents at various points of crisis attempted to gain support for a soft line. It would appear that no President could have long sustained a policy contrary to the general assumptions of policy makers in the Congress.

Congress quite clearly still exercises vast authority in its traditional role of setting general aims for foreign policy and approving the general methods that are to be used to execute them. The question in many cases is the wisdom of a particular policy as proven by time. This, as has been shown, has been the case many times in the last half century in the relations of Congress and the President.

When one branch or the other seems to be responsible for failure the remedy ought to be the use of Constitutional power rather than an attempt to amend it to some imagined higher degree of perfection. Issues between branches of the government are political. The remedy for poor Presidential leadership is not so much legal devices to curb the President but voting power to replace him. Conversely a Congress that is too complacent on foreign policy issues can be changed. The proposal for Constitutional change do serve the purpose of focusing popular attention on a problem. But the problem is more likely to be solved by political measures than constitutional ones.

In summary of the role of Congress in the years since 1945 the Senate Foreign Relations Committee 1967 report on "National Commitments" is instructive. This committee found that Congress had lost a measure of its influence on foreign relations. In part this was due, they believed to the nation's new role in world affairs and the many unprecedented situations growing out of this context. Many of these situations were crisis and under the pressure of emergency Congress had neither the opportunity nor the will to devise a proper response. Congressmen tended to be cautious. Further they were confused and "overawed by the cult of executive expertise." Not many Congressmen were usually well informed on all of the complex problems of foreign relations and none had access to vast amounts of classified information freely available to the top level officers in the State Department and Defense Department. Finally, the report suggested that there "may also be a historical memory at work" in the conviction that Congressional dominance of foreign affairs after World War I with its great emphasis on peace was shown to be a failure by the advent of World War II.

UNITED STATES INVOLVEMENT IN VIETNAM: A SURVEY OF CONFLICTING INTERPRETATIONS

BY THOMAS A. BRYSON*

The American presence in Vietnam has aroused heated debate on American foreign policy, a controversy which has produced a large body of literature. In early 1965 President Lyndon B. Johnson's escalation of the conflict gave rise to an even greater volume of literature on the subject. Since then hawks and doves, each striving to win converts to a particular point of view, have debated the wisdom of the American role in Vietnam. The polemical nature of the literature resulting from this debate highlights the many shortcomings inherent in writing on events of a contemporary nature. Too many writers are concerned with expressing a particular point of view. Their works are general in nature, with little documentation to substantiate their theses. Actually, documents are not yet available to the historian in sufficient number to warrant the writing of an objective history of the American involvement in Vietnam. Memoir material is still in the process of being written. Subjectivity replaces objectivity. Moreover, in the face of highstrung emotions, detachment is well nigh impossible. In spite of these shortcomings, however, many have undertaken to write about the American role in Vietnam.

The purpose of this paper is to survey briefly literature pertinent to the American presence in Vietnam. Some effort has been made to choose representative works from the scholarly community, from administrative apologists, from congressional critics, from the radical left, and from the outnumbered but articulate group that approves the policies that led to Vietnam. A survey of this material made apparent that five basic questions were uppermost in the minds of those conconcerned with the American entanglement in Southeast Asia.

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As Senator Eugene McCarthy so aptly wrote concerning the American involvement in Vietnam: "Quite suddenly and surprisingly we have

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found ourselves involved in the third largest war in our history...."[1] Is United States involvement in this Southeast Asian land the result of drift or of design? If design, what is the purpose of this presence and who is responsible? Accepting the drift thesis, Russell Fifield's cautious, scholarly work *Southeast Asia in United States Policy* views the American presence in Vietnam as one that slowly evolved over a period of years in response to the Communist challenge. The United States had no design for establishing American hegemony in that country.[2] Fred Greene, also, in the equally balanced study *U. S. Policy and the Security of Asia,* maintains that the United States presence in Southeast Asia is in response to the Chinese threat to the security of that area.[3] Greene's work, like that of Fifield, tends to accept official government policy statements concerning the American role in Southeast Asia. Elaborating on this drift thesis, Theodore Draper contends there were actually seven steps involved in the process of step-by-step escalation, each made in response to a political failure of the government of South Vietnam.[4]

The thesis that the United States drifted into the Vietnamese quagmire step-by-step, assumes that policy initiated by President Harry S. Truman in early 1950 was continued by each succeeding President in

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[1] Senator Eugene J. McCarthy, *The Limits of Power: America's Role in the World* (New York, 1967), p. 187. Because of the historiographical nature of this article all items cited a second time or more will follow the short form.

[2] Russell H. Fifield, *Southeast Asia in United States Policy* (New York, 1963), Chapt. 2.

[3] Fred Greene, *United States Policy and the Security of Asia* (New York, 1968), pp. 36-40.

[4] Theodore Draper, *Abuse of Power* (New York, 1966), pp. 16, 24, 30, 49, 54, 68, 107 and 197. Other writers in agreement with this step-at-a-time involvement are John Kenneth Galbraith, "Vietnam: The Moderate Solution," reprinted in John R. Boettiger, *Vietnam and American Foreign Policy* (New York, 1968), pp. 128-37; J. William Fulbright, *The Arrogance of Power* (New York, 1966), pp. 117-18; and Richard Goodwin, *Triumph and Tragedy: Reflections on Vietnam* (New York, 1966), p. 29. Richard Barnet, in an interesting paper entitled, "The National Security Bureaucracy and Military Intervention," in Pricilla Long, ed., *The New Left: A Collection of Essays* (Boston, 1969), views the American involvement in Vietnam as the result of "a series of mistakes" made by officials in the "structure and organization of the national security bureaucracy" rather than by the President or his assistants in the cabinet.

response to the increased Communist challenge. There is little disagreement that Truman made the first commitment to Vietnam in June, 1950, and that it was similar to the policy already initiated in Europe to stem Communist expansion. American aid to France was predicated upon the assumption that France was making a stand against Communist expansion in Southeast Asia. Vietnam was thus tied in with the over-all Cold War struggle.

It is generally agreed that President Dwight Eisenhower's commitment to the Diem regime was limited to economic and military aid for the purpose of creating a viable state as a bulwark against further Communist encroachment into Southeast Asia. Writers George McTurnan Kahin and John W. Lewis, in one of the best works on the subject of American entanglement, agree, saying that the Southeast Asia Treaty did not make an iron-clad American military commitment to Vietnam.[5] These writers note that the treaty did violate the Geneva Accord of 1954, since it granted American *de facto* recognition to a South Vietnamese state when in reality permanent partition was not the intention.[6] Kahin and Lewis point out, too, that, although Eisenhower made no military commitment, he was responsible for a massive military build-up of the South Vietnamese army pursuant to his letter to Diem of October 1, 1954, whereby two billion dollars in American aid was extended to the Diem Regime between 1955 and 1960. But even so, they conclude, the Eisenhower commitment to Diem's regime was limited.[7] It is noteworthy that Eisenhower's commitment to Diem achieved such momentum that his successor in the White House evidently considered himself obligated to continue the policies of his predecessor.

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[5] George McTurnan Kahin and John W. Lewis, *The United States in Vietnam: An Analysis in Depth of the History of America's Involvement in Vietnam* (New York, 1967), pp. 62-63. However, Secretary of State Dean Rusk testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing on Vietnam to the effect that American presence in Vietnam was pursuant to the SEATO commitment. See *The Vietnam Hearings: With an Introduction by J. William Fulbright* (New York, 1966), p. 11. Theodore Draper agrees with the conclusion of Kahin and Lewis concerning the limited nature of Eisenhower's commitment. Draper, *Abuse of Power,* p. 39; the biographer of John Foster Dulles also accepts this view. Louis Gerson, *John Foster Dulles* (New York, 1967) p. 195.

[6] Kahin and Lewis, *United States in Vietnam,* p. 63.

[7] *Ibid.*, p. 333.

President John F. Kennedy, apologists Arthur Schlesinger and Theodore Sorensen agree, inherited the Vietnam question from the Eisenhower administration. Both writers maintain that Kennedy considered the American pledge made by Eisenhower to South Vietnam to be an "overcommitment" and felt himself captive of a policy initiated by the previous chief executive.[8] Kennedy understood the blueprint of wars of national liberation and realized that counter-insurgency was primarily a political problem. But even so, it is recognized by some writers that, while Kennedy inherited the commitment from Eisenhower and had a keen insight into the complexities of guerilla warfare, he was nevertheless responsible for the militarization of American policy in Vietnam. They assert that the young President came increasingly under the influence of the military.[9] In light of this occurrence, some have asked the question: Would Kennedy have escalated the war had he lived? Roger Hilsman, sympathetic to Kennedy and a member of the State Department staff during his time in the White House, states with some degree of assurance that Kennedy would have kept "the fighting as limited as possible."[10] Richard Barnet, also a State Department official during the Kennedy years, addressing himself to Kennedy's policy and the possibility of future escalation, maintains that the young President actually "set in force the bureaucratic momentum that would make it a certainty."[11] But Kahin and Lewis, while agreeing that Kennedy made only a limited commitment to Diem, cautioned that "it is quite impossible to predict what he might have done."[12] Although

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[8] Arthur Schlesinger, *A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House* (Boston, 1965), p. 538 and Theodore Sorensen, *Kennedy,* (New York, 1965), p. 651.

[9] This interpretation is accepted by the following: Draper, *Abuse of Power,* p. 53; Kahin and Lewis, *United States in Vietnam,* p. 137-46; Richard Barnet, *Intervention and Revolution: America's Confrontation with Insurgent Movements Around the World* (New York, 1968), p. 211-12; Sorensen, *Kennedy,* p. 653; Schlesinger, *A Thousand Days,* pp. 544-48 and *The Bitter Heritage: Vietnam and American Democracy, 1941-1968* (Greenwich, Conn., 1966), pp. 20-28.

[10] Roger Hilsman, *To Move a Nation: The Politics of Foreign Policy in the Administration of John F. Kennedy* (New York, 1964), p. 536.

[11] Barnet, *Intervention and Revolution,* pp. 212-15.

[12] Kahin and Lewis, *United States in Vietnam,* p. 146.

Kennedy's future course is difficult to determine, the record is clear on his successor's design for Vietnam.

Lyndon B. Johnson, Philip Geyelin declares, must bear the burden for taking the step that Americanized the war in Vietnam. Geyelin writes that the war was "an orphan when it was passed along" to him, but after February, 1965, Johnson began to give Vietnam serious attention and made the war his own.[13] Although Barnet contends that Kennedy set in motion the process of escalation, he agrees with Geyelin that Johnson, in the final analysis, must bear the onus of widening the war and of relating it to the American global commitment to the free world.[14]

While the latter conclusion is generally accepted, there is some disagreement about Johnson's motive for escalation in early 1965. Geyelin asserts that Johnson carried the war to the North in order to obtain a better negotiating position.[15] Theodore Draper differs with Geyelin, declaring that the American decision to escalate in early 1965 was based on the need "to bolster the morale of the South Vietnamese government . . . ." Escalation was "far more intimately related to South Vietnamese disintegration than to North Vietnamese infiltration," Draper concludes.[16] Richard Goodwin offers the same interpretation, writing, "Vietnam became an irrevocably American war" after the decision to escalate, because American policy-makers feared a Communist victory in Vietnam was imminent.[17] Eric Goldman, Johnson's scholar-in-residence in the White House, takes exception to this view. Goldman points out that Johnson raised the ante in Vietnam in order to prevent another Munich. Johnson, a captive of the Munich analogy who took the position that a monolithic Communist threat in the form of a Peking-Hanoi axis was about to overrun South Vietnam, elected to hold the line rather than to appease the land-hungry Communist dragon.[18]

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[13] Philip Geyelin, *Lyndon B. Johnson and the World* (New York, 1966), pp. 186, 219, and 223.

[14] Barnet, *Intervention and Revolution,* p. 218.

[15] Geyelin, *Lyndon B. Johnson,* p. 219.

[16] Draper, *Abuse of Power,* pp. 84-85.

[17] Goodwin, *Triumph and Tragedy,* p. 32.

[18] Eric Goldman, *The Tragedy of Lyndon Johnson* (New York, 1968), pp. 474-75.

Writers on the Left disagree with the foregoing views, taking the position that the American presence in Southeast Asia was designed to achieve American dominance in that region. Noam Chomsky, the nationally recognized linguist at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, conjectures that the "international Communist conspiracy" is a device designed to justify policies that "extend American hegemony" over that area in order that American bourgeois institutions might prevent the extension of the Communist ideology. He concludes that the United States is leading a world-wide anti-revolutionary movement in defense of "vested interests" in a world-embracing colonial empire.[19] Accepting this position, Gabriel Kolko, a professor of history at the State University of New York at Buffalo, postulates that

> the United States has fought in Vietnam with increasing intensity to extend its hegemony over the world community and to stop every form of revolutionary movement which refuses to accept the predominant role of the United States in the direction of the affairs of its nation or region.[20]

In not quite so strong a vein, Ronald Steel asserts that the American role in Vietnam is in response to a Communist threat, but that as a concomitant result the United States, in the eyes of the world, has extended her colonial empire of "nominally independent client states" to include those of Southeast Asia.[21]

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Mention of colonial empires brings us to the second question. Why, in light of President Franklin D. Roosevelt's wartime declaration of American opposition to the continuation of colonial empires in the post-war era, did the United States not encourage France to give up her imperial holdings in Southeast Asia in the 1940's when the force of nationalism was so blatantly evident? Joseph Buttinger, in one of the more outstanding works on the Vietnamese conflict, suggests that "France was too important an ally in Europe to be officially rebuffed

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[19] Noam Chomsky, *American Power and the New Mandarins* (New York, 1967), pp. 258, 313.

[20] Gabriel Kolko, *Roots of American Foreign Policy: An Analysis of Power and Purpose* (Boston, 1969), p. 132.

[21] Ronald Steel, *Pax Americana* (New York, 1967), pp. vii, 154.

by Washington for her Indo-Chinese policy . . . ."[22] That France was a necessary partner in the containment of Russia in Europe is a generally accepted conclusion. The second part of the question is also raised: Why did the United States aid France in her colonial war to retain Indo-China? There seems to be a basic disagreement on this question. Dean Acheson, former Secretary of State under Harry S. Truman, claimed that American concern for France in Vietnam was tied to the American Europe-first policy. By helping France to conclude successfully the war in Vietnam, the United States would hold to a minimum the strain placed on France, thus enabling her to play a stronger role in Europe, where American policy called for the containment of Russia to preserve European security. The former Secretary concluded that American involvement during the Truman era resulted from the primary concern for the security of Europe.[23]

Opposed to the Europe-first interpretation of Acheson *et al* were those who viewed initial American involvement in Vietnam as linked directly to the preservation of Southeast Asian security, which was threatened by Communist aggression. As Theodore Draper puts it, "Acheson and Dulles enlisted the United States actively on the side of a colonial power—a total about-fact from the Roosevelt position. From their point of view, of course, colonialism was preferable to Communism."[24]

In an attempt to reconcile the conflicting Europe-first and Asian-security theses, Kahin and Lewis declared that at the outset American aid to France was based on the primary concern for French cooperation in the American policy of containing Russian expansion in Europe.

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[22] Joseph Buttinger, *Vietnam: A Dragon Embattled* 2 vols. (New York, 1967), II, 805.

[23] Dean Acheson, *Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department* (New York, 1969), pp. 671-72. In agreement with this thesis are Donald S. Zagoria, *Vietnam Triangle: Moscow, Peking, Hanoi* (New York, 1966), p. 29; Fifield, *Southeast Asia in United States Policy,* p. 16; Buttinger, *Vietnam,* II, 805.

[24] Draper, *Abuse of Power,* p. 27. Sharing this interpretation are works by Senator J. William Fulbright, *The Arrogance of Power,* p. 115; Frank N. Trager, *Why Vietnam?* (New York, 1967), p. 12; Edwin O. Reischauer, *Beyond Vietnam: The United States and Asia* (New York, 1968), p. 21; Hans Morgenthau, A *New Foreign Policy for the United States* (New York, 1968), p. 193; and Steel, *Pax Americana,* pp. 23 and 160.

Only later, after the United States assumed the status of belligerent in the Korean War, was aid to France in Vietnam based on the necessity for containing China.[25]

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The theory of containment of the Communist menace in Asia leads to the next question. Was there, in fact, a plot, motivated by the monolithic Communist movement led by Peking and Hanoi, to overrun Southeast Asia? If so, was the American response to this effort similar to the policy of containment utilized in Europe? If the latter be true, is this policy of containment, given the conditions that obtain in Asia, applicable in Vietnam?

The issue that has aroused perhaps the greatest controversy revolves around the State Department stand that American involvement in Vietnam is a response to the Peking-Hanoi plot to conquer South Vietnam and bring it into the Communist orbit.[26] Secretary of State Dean Rusk repeatedly echoed the official White Paper statement of 1961.[27] The plot thesis has been stated most clearly and concisely by former State Department official William P. Bundy. Chinese Communist leaders, Bundy declares, are trying to restore China to her "past position of grandeur and influence." Adding to the Communist state territory that has been traditionally associated with the Manchu domain has been given top priority. High on the list of aims, the former Assistant Secretary believes, is the annexation of Southeast Asia.[28]

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[25] Kahin and Lewis, pp. 30-31.

[26] "Introduction to United States Department of State White Paper, 1961," reprinted in Kahin and Lewis, *United States in Vietnam,* 396-98 and "Introduction to United States Department of State White Paper, 1965," reprinted in *Ibid.,* pp. 405-08.

[27] For example, Rusk expressed the plot thesis to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, while testifying before that body in 1966. See "The Statement and Testimony of Secretary of State Dean Rusk," reprinted in *The Vietnam Hearings,* p. 12.

[28] William P. Bundy, "The United States and Communist China," reprinted in Boettiger, *Vietnam and American Foreign Policy,* pp. 77-83. Bundy's estimate of Chinese intentions to overrun Southeast Asia is shared by Fifield, *Southeast Asia in United States Policy,* p. 207; General Maxwell Taylor, *Responsibility and Response* (New York, 1966), p. 18; Trager, *Why Vietnam*? pp. 115, 119, 164 and 167; Sorensen, *Kennedy,* p. 650; Marguerite Higgins, *Our Vietnam Nightmare* (New York, 1965), p. 14; Hilsman, *To Move a Nation,* pp. 419 and 471; Gerson, *John Foster Dulles,* p. 192 and Greene, *United States Policy,* pp. 226-28.

That America is actively engaged in Vietnam in response to a Communist plot from the North is an appraisal that has been rejected by a large number of writers dealing with American policy towards Southeast Asia. Kahin and Lewis maintained that the insurrection below the seventeenth parallel is rooted in South Vietnam and was initiated by South Vietnamese in response to the "heavy-handedness of Diem's government." There is no evidence, these writers avow, to substantiate the plot thesis which sees the anti-Diem revolution as cued from Peking through Hanoi, the Vietcong being the tool of the Communist axis.[29] Vehement in their rejection of the plot thesis are the writers on the Left. For example, Noam Chomsky, a polemicist and perhaps the most vehement and articulate of the radical element, declares the "international Communist conspiracy" to be merely a propaganda foil designed by State Department planners to justify policies that extend American domination to Southeast Asia. American presence in Vietnam extends this nation's political and economic goals to that region of the world, he asserts, ensuring thereby American influence and preventing the incursion of the alien Communist ideology.[30]

The matter of preventing the incursion of Communism into Southeast Asia and of containing China brings us to the next basic question. Since stemming the expansive tide of the monolithic Communist plot is the basic *raison d'etre* for American entanglement in the morass of Vietnam, many writers have raised two allied questions: Is this American policy in Southeast Asia similar to the policy of containment initiated by the Truman administration in Europe in 1947? If so, given the conditions that obtain in Asia, is it applicable to that part of the world? In answer to the first question, the distinguished American scholar Hans Morgenthau observed that the American policy in Southeast Asia is

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[29] Kahin and Lewis, *United States in Vietnam,* pp. 119, 199 and 135. Agreeing with this interpretation are the works by Morgenthau, *A New Policy,* p. 136; Reischauer, *Beyond Vietnam,* p. 171; Fulbright, *The Arrogance of Power,* p. 112; Zagoria, *Vietnam Triangle,* p. 104; Schlesinger, *Bitter Heritage,* p. xii; Bernard Fall, *Vietnam Witness, 1953-66* (New York, 1966), pp. 97, 137; Barnet, *Intervention and Revolution,* pp. 206-07; Malcolm Browne, *The New Face of War* (New York, 1965), p. 238; Jean Lacouture, *Vietnam: Between Two Truces* (New York, 1966), pp. 22-23 and U. S. Senator Ernest Gruening and Hubert Wilton Beaser, *Vietnam Folly* (Washington, D. C., 1968), p. 17.

[30] Chomsky, *American Power,* p. 258. In agreement with this view are Howard Zinn, *Vietnam: The Logic of Withdrawal* (Boston, 1967), pp. 73 and 77 and Kolko, *The Roots of American Foreign Policy,* p. 117.

merely an extension of the two-fold European policy of containment and economic restoration expressed in the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan. As the European policy was successful, the pattern has been applied to Southeast Asia.[31] There is wide-spread agreement among writers that the American policy in Europe has been transferred to Asia.[32] However, those on the radical Left view the American presence in Southeast Asia as a means of extending American influence and the prevailing socio-political-economic system, not as a means of containing Communism. Noam Chomsky, for instance, says the Communist conspiracy to overrun Southeast Asia is "a perfect propaganda device to justify actions that reinforce and extend American hegemony."[33]

Moving on to the second part of the question concerning containment, Professor Morgenthau asserts that the policy, as employed in Europe, is not applicable to Southeast Asia, where conditions differ greatly from those that obtained in Europe. Morgenthau declares that the policy of containment, as practiced in South Vietnam, is actually counter-productive, for the American presence forces Hanoi to make common cause with Peking, where she can obtain aid and comfort. But in reality, Morgenthau maintains, the best barrier to Red Chinese expansion would be a viable, highly nationalistic Vietnamese state, perhaps on the order of Tito's Yugoslavia. The University of Chicago professor also observed that, contrary to official State Department pronouncements, no monolithic Communist threat existed in Asia as in Europe. The Vietcong and Hanoi, he asserts, were not the agents of either Peking or Moscow. The Communist bloc, Morgenthau says, has disintergrated. The nationalistic nature of the several entities gives the lie to the charge that the bloc still retains the monolithic nature it

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[31] Morgenthau, *A New Foreign Policy,* pp. 129-30.

[32] In agreement with this point are works by Draper, *Abuse of Power,* p. 156; Kahin and Lewis, *United States in Vietnam,* pp. 58-61, 325; Fulbright, *Arrogance of Power,* p. 109; Acheson, *Present at the Creation,* p. 676; Reischauer, *Beyond Vietnam,* p. 40; Zagoria, *Vietnam Triangle,* p. 79; Zinn, *The Logic of Withdrawal,* pp. 101, 103; Steel, *Pax Americana,* pp. 123, 160; Robert Scigliano, *South Vietnam: Nation Under Stress* (New York, 1964), p. 216; and David P. Mozingo, "Containment in Asia Reconsidered," reprinted in Boettiger, *Vietnam and American Foreign Policy,* pp. 85-96.

[33] Chomsky, *American Power,* p. 258.

enjoyed during an earlier era, because each component seeks its own ends and does not follow a common course in international relations. Finally, Morgenthau questions the wisdom of fighting a war of insurgency by relying totally on military might. The nature of the war in Vietnam, he says, requires a comprehensive program of reform. Unfortunately, reform in Vietnam is futile, for it is asking too much of a government that sees as its chief purpose the maintenance of the social-political-economic status quo to make radical departures in the direction of reform.[34] Ronald Steel agrees with the conclusions of Morgenthau, and he maintains that containment of China is possible only by a *cordon sanitaire* of viable national states in which the several peoples, embued with a spirit of true nationalism, will reject Chinese overlordship.[35] Kahin and Lewis and Senator Ernest Gruening also view the American belligerency in Vietnam as having a counter-vailing result in creating a situation in which Hanoi must seek comfort from Peking.[36] David Mozingo is also critical of containment as practiced in Asia. Economic aid and military containment, Mozingo argues, do not apply Asia. In Europe the American policy met with success because the nations had long histories of political maturity and economic viability. Given this background, the nation states of Europe, which had been blighted by years of war, required only a transfusion of Marshall Plan aid to invigorate and nourish once-healthy economies. In Asia the nation state system is only slightly removed from colonialism. Too, regionalism has not made sufficient headway; there is much competition among the several states; and the force of nationalism is everywhere evident. The factors do not lend themselves to containment. Finally, the Southeast Asians, Mozingo concludes, do not regard China with the same degree of fear that Europeans had for Russia in the 1940's.[37]

However, a number of writers assert that containment is applicable in Asia. William Bundy views Chinese leaders as seeking to reassert Chinese hegemony over Southeast Asia and other areas that had come

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[34] Morgenthau, *A New Foreign Policy,* pp. 130-35.

[35] Steel, *Pax Americana,* p. 160.

[36] Kahin and Lewis, *United States in Vietnam,* pp. 326-27 and Gruening and Beaser, *Vietnam Folly,* p. 24.

[37] Mozingo, "Containment in Asia Reconsidered," pp. 85-96.

under the Manchu domain. Bundy postulates that containment, as utilized in Europe, is the only means of stopping Communist expansion.[38] Frank Trager, in one of the first works defending administration policies in Vietnam, asserts that containment is the only means of preserving the security of Southeast Asia.[39] Russell Fifield shares this view, maintaining that NATO is an excellent model for holding the line against further Communist aggression.[40] On the other hand, Fred Greene, while not viewing containment *per se* as a good alternative, suggests that the United States might use the balance-of-power concept to prevent China from dominating Southeast Asia. With India, Japan, Pakistan, Australia, and the Philippines as counter weights, Greene asserts, China might be prevented from achieving hegemony.[41]

It is apparent that many scholars and others have rejected containment as a valid means of combating the Communist menace. Not only has this policy been rejected, but many have also questioned the almost exclusive reliance on military means to implement this policy. Many officials having special knowledge about counter-insurgency have warned of the futility of relying too heavily on military means to halt Communist expansion without simultaneously inaugurating a comprehensive program of political, social, and economic reform.[42] With this caveat in mind, it is now necessary to turn to the final question.

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The two-fold policy of utilizing military and economic means to deter the spread of Communist expansion in Europe was also employed by Pentagon and State Department planners in Vietnam for a similar purpose. But in the latter instance, Roger Hilsman points out, officials responsible for a strategy of counter-in surgency have relied chiefly on military measures, while making little effort to nourish well-conceived reform programs. This negligence has prompted many critics of the

[38] Bundy, "United States and Communist China," pp. 77-83.

[39] Trager, *Why Vietnam*? pp. 161, 212-13.

[40] Fifield, *Southeast Asia,* pp. 406-7.

[41] Greene, *U. S. Policy,* pp. 36-40, 50.

[42] Roger Hilsman, an American officer engaged in guerrilla war in Asia during World War II, has produced an excellent capsule description of the complexities of guerrilla and counter-guerrilla warfare. See Hillsman, *To Move a Nation,* Chapt. 28 and pp. 578-79.

American Vietnamese policy to question the wisdom of placing too much emphasis on military effort. Donald S. Zagoria states that the United States has made two errors in pursuing its policy. First, frustrated in the South in the attempt to bolster the politically weak Diệm regime, American planners decided to attack the North. Second, officials responsible for Vietnam put too little emphasis on reform in the South. The preservation of the South Vietnamese Republic being the primary American goal, Zagoria writes, major emphasis should have been placed on reform of the Saigon regime to gain the support of the countryside, while a "low-level war strategy" would have been sufficient to meet the military challenge in the South from the insurgents. In light of the militarization of the American counter-insurgency program, Zagoria questions whether the United States has the wisdom to conduct successfully a war of this nature.[43]

Conversely, Hans Morgenthau and Howard Zinn have concluded that, given the right-wing orientation of the Saigon government, the program of reform sponsored by American policy-makers was futile. How, these authors ask, can the United States expect a government based on the preservation of the status quo to make such far-reaching reforms?[44]

Equally concerned with the choice between military and political alternatives, a number of writers feel that conditions in Vietnam after 1959 were not auspicious for the implementation of a broad program of political, social, and economic reform. They hold that military force must be utilized to guarantee the security of South Vietnam, and that only when this goal is achieved will the climate be ripe for reform.[45]

Even more critical of United States policy in Vietnam is the charge leveled by Theodore Draper, Senator Fulbright, Ronald Steel, and

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[43] Zagoria, *Vietnam Triangle,* p. xiii. His criticism is shared by Scigliano, *South Vietnam: Nation Under Stress,* p. 216; Buttinger, *Vietnam:,* II, 918-20; Robert Shaplen, *The Lost Revolution: The Story of Twenty Years of Neglected Opportunities in Vietnam and of America's Failure to Foster Democracy There* (New York, 1965), Chapt. XII; Hillsman, To Move a Nation, p. 578; and Kahin and Lewis, *United States in Vietnam,* pp. 334-35.

[44] Morgenthau, *A New Foreign Policy,* pp. 134-35 and Zinn, *The Logic of Withdrawal,* pp. 47-48.

[45] Accepting this view are works by Trager, *Why Vietnam?* p. 160; Buttinger, *Vietnam:,* II, 805-11 and Taylor, *Responsibility and Response,* p. 29.

Noam Chomsky. The United States, these writers declare, has arrogated to itself the exclusive right to use military force at will for the purpose of achieving desired diplomatic ends.[46] Draper and Fulbright question the wisdom of the frequent utilization of force to achieve ends that, in their opinion, might not really be in the national interest.[47] To a generation of diplomatic historians, aware of the unique relationship between military force and diplomatic goals and of the criteria imposed by the realist school of Hans Morgenthau and George F. Kennan, Noam Chomsky's raising the question of the morality of the American war in Vietnam comes as a reminder of the criteria used in the days of Woodrow Wilson. Chomsky, the parapetetic linguist, poses anew that question: Is the utilization of military means—bombs, napalm, heavy artillery, flame-throwers and the like—morally right in view of the high loss of life among the civilian population?[48]

Also anxious about the resort to military force to obtain a solution, Richard Goodwin, in a more pragmatic vein, asks if increased militarization to achieve ultimate victory does not carry with it the enormous risk of enlarging the war in the North? He points out that a war with China could result from escalation.[49]

Escalation has held no fears for the hawk writers. Hanson Baldwin, the military editor of the *New York Times,* suggests that the situation in Vietnam calls for massive military escalation. This long-time critic of American military and foreign policy argues for the intensification of the bombing effort, additional buildup of ground forces, and removal of restrictions on the military in order that a successful conclusion to the conflict may be achieved. Accepting the Munich analogy that views appeasement as leading ultimately to defeat, Baldwin, in an approach that would find acceptance by the American Right, argues for massive retaliation should China intervene.[50]

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[46] Draper, *Abuse of Power,* p. 219; Fulbright, *Arrogance of Power,* p. 18; Steel, *Pax Americana,* 322 and Chomsky, *American Power,* pp. 247-48.

[47] Draper, *Abuse of Power,* pp. 1-2 and Fulbright, *The Arrogance of Power,* pp. 5, 130-38.

[48] Chomsky, *American Power,* p. 378.

[49] Goodwin, *Triumph and Tragedy,* pp. 48-55.

[50] Hanson Baldwin, "Case for Escalation," reprinted in Wesley R. Fishel, *Vietnam: Anatomy of a Conflict* (Itasca, Texas, 1968), pp. 753-64.

The American Right generally agrees with the argument proferred by Baldwin. J. Bernard Burnham, writing in *The National Review,* the organ of the American Conservatives, opposes what he called "incremental escalation" and urges that "quantum escalation," similar to the scale suggested by Baldwin, would be necessary to bring the war to a conclusion satisfactory to American diplomatic ends.[51] In the same vein, Frank Meyer, also a staff writer for the same journal, urges escalation of the conflict to a degree suficient to destroy the Hanoi regime. Meyer even suggests the use of nuclear weapons should China intervene.[52]

In discussing the use of political or military means to obtain a solution in Vietnam, it becomes immediately apparent that those advocating the former stratagem see the problem in terms of a Southern strategy—a strategy that would emphasize reform sufficient to broaden the political base of the Saigon government. Given greater popular support, a moderate program of counter-insurgency employing a low-profile military force along with a comprehensive program of reform would be more likely to succeed then. Advocates of the primacy of seeking a solution by military means see the conflict in terms of carrying the war to the North by bombing raids, blockade at sea, interdiction of supply lines, and destruction of the will of the enemy to fight an aggressive war. Such a position overlooks the important fact that even if Hanoi were removed from the conflict, some quarter-million guerrillas would continue in the South their war of insurgency.

Fighting a war of counter-insurgency with the proper utilization of military and political means in the right proportions is the main thesis of Roger Hilsman's work *To Move a Nation.* Part memoir and part apology for the Kennedy role in the war, Hilsman's study is very critical of the American military effort in Vietnam. While President Kennedy understood the complexities of guerrilla warfare and their counter-measures, Hilsman maintains, these policies were not implemented, he says, because the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and many generals were lukewarm to the use of new methods of warfare. Hilsman also lays on the shoulders of Diem blame for the

[51] J. Bernard Burnham, "The Bit-by-Bit War," *The National Review,* Jan. 10, 1967, pp. 35-37.

[52] Frank Meyer, "Reflections on Vietnam: Principles and Heresies," *The National Review,* Feb. 22, 1966, p. 162.

poor military showing and the lack of political reform. In so doing, he introduces the press war waged in Vietnam by American correspondents over the effectiveness of the Diem government to carry out adequate political and military policies for the prosecution of the war.[53]

No discussion of the merits and demerits of military versus political resources to wage a war of counter-insurgency would be complete without some mention of the Diem regime. The press war waged by American newspaper people over Diem's efficiency is important, for ultimately the war of ink has expanded and led to very embarrassing credibility gap between Johnson administration claims and accomplishments.

Correspondents David Halberstam and Malcolm Browne have documented the ineffective way in which the Diem regime carried out reforms, lost the support of the people by its brutal tactics of repression, and carried out the war in a slovenly manner. In works very critical of the American conduct of the Vietnamese war, they blame American military leaders in part, but they attribute much of the fault to the Diem regime.[54] Substantiating the charges of Halberstam and Browne, John Mecklin, head of the United States Information Service in Saigon, has also documented the failures of the Diem regime and the shortcomings of the American military.[55]

On the other side of the coin, Marguerite Higgins takes issue with Halberstam, Browne, and Mecklin. It is her view that the Kennedy administration dumped the Diem regime—the only regime capable of winning the war. She blames American policy-makers for trying to impose "instant democracy" and to enforce Western ideas on the Vietnamese. She asserts that Diem was a scapegoat for the failure of the war effort.[56]

Most of the works dealing with the American involvement in Vietnam are concerned with executive decisions, the role of important individuals and with the day-by-day fighting of a war of new dimensions.

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[53] Hilsman, *To Move a Nation,* pp. 499, 578.

[54] David Halberstam, *The Making of a Quagmire* (New York, 1965), pp. 162-78 and Malcolm W. Browne, *The New Face of War* (New York, 1965), pp. 215-17.

[55] John Mecklin, *Mission in Torment: An Intimate Account of the United States Role in Vietnam* (New York, 1965), Chapt. IV.

[56] Marguerite Higgins, *Our Vietnam Nightmare* (New York, 1966), pp. 289-92, 302-3.

Little effort has been made by scholars to study the composition of those agencies in the State Department and Pentagon bureaucracies where alternatives and options were worked out for the consideration of high policy-makers. Political influences at play during the time decisions on Vietnam were made have received little attention by historians. Finally, there are a number of important internal factors such as public opinion, the race and economic questions that have received virtually no treatment.

In a recent paper delivered at the December, 1969, meeting of the American Historical Association, Professor Alexander DeConde suggested that at least thirty years will elapse before all of the sources necessary to competent scholarship are available.[57] Lacking, the historian can often make only assumptions based on semi-educated guesses, and such is the case with the writing about the American involvement in Vietnam. Writers on both sides of the question are, or should be, conscious of the lack of material so necessary to document their interpretations. Sufficient time has not passed to permit the detachment and reflection that must accompany objective historical writing. But the scholar is not to be censured for making a contemporary appraisal of the events leading up to the American involvement in Vietnam and covering the course of that involvement because he cannot substantiate with data his interpretation of events. Critics on both sides of the Vietnamese issue have an obligation to make some effort to explain the American role in Vietnam. Scholarship must have a beginning. Contemporary scholarship, regardless of the limitations imposed by the proximity of the events in question, marks a beginning. It is on this beginning that later historians, with better sources at hand, can make more scientific judgments and avoid the pitfalls of subjectivity.

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[57] Alexander DeConde, "What's Wrong with American Diplomatic History," reprinted in *SHAFR Newsletter* [Society of Historians of American Foreign Relations], I, (May, 1970), 1-11.

ORIGINS OF THE COLD WAR: AN HISTORIOGRAPHICAL SURVEY

BY ROBERT W. SELLEN*

The years since 1945 have been difficult for Americans. We believed that the second World War would teach mankind the lessons at best half-learned in 1918: war is evil, peace can be achieved, men of good will can work together to suppress aggressors. It was to be a good world, whether in Cordell Hull's terms—a world in which spheres of influence and balances of power were abolished—in Henry Luce's terms, an "American Century" of world progress under Yankee leadership—or in Henry Wallace's New Deal terms, a world in which every child had a nutritious diet.[1]

A quarter-century later we look back with wry smiles. As Robert Divine puts it,

> The preparations made at San Francisco for a security league of sovereign nations to prevent aggression now seems like the preparations some little girls might make for a lawn party as a thunderhead gathers just beyond the garden gate. The lemonade will be spiked by lightning.[2]

Americans were euphoric at war's end. Then we became uneasy over little wars that plagued Greece, Palestine, and an almost unknown place called Indo-China. We began to learn of Andrei Gromyko as the *nyet* man at the United Nations. In early March, 1946, millions of us heard the familiar growl of Winston Churchill, speaking in Harry Truman's presence and in the President's home state:

> From Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic, an iron curtain has descended across the continent. Behind that line lie all the capitals of the ancient states of Central and Eastern Europe . . . . All these famous cities and the populations around them lie in what I must call the Soviet sphere,

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[1] Cordell Hull, *Memoirs* (New York, 1948), II, 1314-15; Henry R. Luce, *American Century* (New York, 1941); Henry A. Wallace, *Democracy Reborn* (New York, 1944), p. 188.

[2] Robert A. Divine, *Second Chance: The Triumph of Internationalism in America During World War II* (New York, 1967), p. 315.

> and all are subject . . . not only to Soviet influence but to a very high and in many cases increasing measure of control from Moscow.[3]

Perusing the *New York Times* one finds that by March and April, 1947, fear of war was commonplace. The first mention of the term "cold war" appears in the *Times* of Sunday, October 5, 1947,[4] and by December "cold war" was no longer in quotation marks.

Since then we have lived in crisis, which has varied in intensity from the boredom of *another* veto or *another* harangue by Fidel Castro to the nerve twisting fear of nuclear war during the missile crisis of October, 1962, accompanied by a sudden popularity of fallout shelters. NBC television reached an audience of some 25 million when on September 7, 1965, it pre-empted three and a half hours of "prime" evening time for a news program on the cold war.

NBC President William R. McAndrew stated the purpose as simply "to present the factual history of United States participation in world affairs during this twenty-year period . . . ." What we learned as factual history was that as soon as Hitler was clearly beaten the Soviet Union lost interest in cooperating with the West and felt free "to pursue the Communist aims of world revolution . . . ." Hence, its breach of wartime agreements and our response—and cold war.[5]

The purpose of this paper is to scrutinize various accounts which purport to be factual history of the origins of the cold war. One's hope is that comparing various approaches will help us arrive at a less bewildered condition when we think of the origins of the situation in which we live.

The literature on the cold war's origins is almost infinite. The trail starts in studies of American foreign relations, leads back into histories of Poland, Greece, Yugoslavia, China; into the occult art of Kremlinology; into studies of American political behavior; and at some points into abnormal psychology. In an attempt to stay within reasonable limits this paper deals almost exclusively with American views, though some foreign studies will be mentioned.

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[3] Randolph S. Churchill, ed., *The Sinews of Peace: Post-War Speeches of Winston S. Churchill* (Boston, 1949), p. 100.

[4] *New York Times*, October 5, 1947, III, p. 5, col. 1.

[5] National Broadcasting Company News, *American White Papers: United States Foreign Policy* (New York, 1967), pp. vi, 2-5.

American writings on the cold war began with a flood of memoirs, diaries and tales of trips to Europe. Most of these were done by men who had served in the government and were connected in some way with our foreign relations. Some were defensive, having shared in policy making; some attacked those who had made policy. Eventually, documents appeared which made it possible to verify the memoirs' authenticity.

A second category is the rightist reaction after 1945 to "that man" Franklin Roosevelt, his successor, Harry Truman, and their advisers. That, in turn, called forth a defense of government policies before, during and after the war. This veritable snowstorm of paper became what we may call the orthodox liberal approach. More recently has flowered a new revisionism from the left, another attack upon the Roosevelt-Truman administrations but from a radically different position.

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Journalists were the first into print, as usual. Legions of them had reported the war from various points, and Russia remained a mystery to be explored and, if possible, explained. From conservatives to leftists they reported similar findings: suspicion toward foreigners, an obsession with security, absolutism, misunderstanding of America. Some emphasized the police state or Marxist belief in an inevitable war with capitalism, but in 1945 and 1946 most concluded that the principal Soviet motivation was not conquest but fear, and that war was not inevitable between the United States and the U.S.S.R.[6]

Memoirs began to appear in January, 1947, with General John R. Deane's *The Strange Alliance.* Deane, head of the U. S. military mission in Russia from October, 1943, until October, 1945, noted Russia's secrecy, suspicion, but also its sporadic cooperation with the West. As did the newspapermen, he enjoyed Russian friendliness at the personal level. He ascribed Russian wariness to a mixture of ideology and the Soviet leaders' isolation from and thus ignorance of the West. Writing in the late summer of 1946, Deane concluded that the U. S. could get along with Russia, "once the policies of present Soviet leadership are modified . . . ." In Moscow he had known George Kennan on a first

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[6] John Fischer, *Why They Behave Like Russians* (New York, 1947); Edgar Snow, *Stalin Must Have Peace* (New York, 1947); William L. White, *Report on the Russians* (New York, 1945).

name basis; it is not strange that Deane proposed a "counterpoise" including armed strength, use of economic pressure, cultural exchange and direct negotiation.[7]

The most important among early memoirs was James Byrnes' record of his time as Secretary of State, July, 1945 to the end of 1946. In *Speaking Frankly* Byrnes displayed a controlled pessimism born of frustration at the conferences at Yalta and Potsdam and the difficulty of making peace treaties.

He could still say of Stalin, "The truth is, he is a very likeable person," a remark cut out of Byrnes' later memoirs. But Byrnes dwelled on the difficulties that arose right after Yalta over Poland and Rumania and, shortly, over the U. N. Byrnes believed that Stalin was not much interested in the U. N. and that his "idea of a friendly government is a government completely dominated" by the U.S.S.R.[8]

Byrnes also believed that the Soviet Union violated the Yalta agreements in order to control eastern Europe, that Russia desired to expand into Greece and Turkey but not beyond; it would merely dictate government policies elsewhere through communist party influence. He saw this expansion as rooted in Russian history ("only the personalities and the tactics have changed") and encouraged by victory in war.[9]

Byrnes claims that he was impressed when Stalin and Molotov spoke of seeking security, Russia having been invaded through Poland twice in 25 years. But he assumed that freely elected governments in East Europe could be friendly to the U.S.S.R. and was unable to comprehend Russian suspicion when he said so.[10] Byrnes' memoirs are those of a "total American," so ethnocentric that his self-proclaimed understanding of others' views was hopelessly shallow.

In 1948 appeared a massive book which was ostensibly biography. *Roosevelt and Hopkins* does contain the life story of Harry Hopkins,

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[7] John R. Deane, *The Strange Alliance: The Story of our Efforts at Wartime Co-operation with Russia* (New York, 1947), pp. 48, 160-1, 165-66, 217, 247-8, 254, 273-83, 289-91, 320-34.

[8] James F. Byrnes, *Speaking Frankly* (New York, 1947), pp. 32, 37, 44-5, 49-56, 61-2.

[9] *Ibid.*, pp. 72-4, 115, 282-94.

[10] *Ibid.*, pp. 73, 98-100.

notorious among conservatives as head of the W. P. A. But the core of the book is Hopkins' close relationship with Franklin Roosevelt during World War II, and Sherwood published hundreds of pages of Hopkins' talks with F. D. R., Churchill, Stalin and others. This is probably the greatest contribution to our understanding of summit diplomacy next to the minutes of the meetings, which did not appear for another seven to twenty years.[11]

In the same year three men of obvious good will recalled their experiences, possibly helping to make Americans even more anti-Soviet. General Dwight "Ike" Eisenhower concentrated on the military aspects of the war, disclosed that he tried to keep military and political matters separate so as to concentrate on winning the war, and commented sadly on the tension that "shattered our dream of rapid progress toward universal peace . . . ."[12]

Henry L. Stimson, Republican statesman who was Secretary of State for Hoover and Secretary of War for both Taft and Franklin Roosevelt, was interested in a peaceful world open to trade, with its conflicts adjusted by the new U. N. As did Eisenhower, Stimson praised the Russian cooperation. He disliked Russia's police state and obstructionism. Yet, he emphasized the necessity of not increasing Russian suspicion by brandishing our atomic bombs; instead, we should approach the U.S.S.R. at once to come to an understanding as to the future of atomic energy.[13]

Cordell Hull, Secretary of State longer than anyone else in American history, retired in November, 1944, when few thought of a cold war. His memoirs are a meticulous account in which all the dates and terms of agreements are correct, and in which Hull's personal traits both distorted the record and made it fascinating. Denying what everyone in Washington knew—that Roosevelt ran American foreign policy—Hull revealed his own long held desire to establish free international trade, the object being to raise living standards and minimize the chances of war. A utopian of sorts, he sincerely believed that "there will no longer

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[11] Robert E. Sherwood, *Roosevelt and Hopkins* (New York, 1948).

[12] Dwight D. Eisenhower, *Crusade in Europe* (Garden City, New York, 1948), pp. 194-95, 457-58, 475.

[13] Henry L. Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, *On Active Service in Peace and War* (New York, 1948), pp. 566-8, 591-5, 635-53.

be need for spheres of influence, for alliances, for balance of power, or any other of the special arrangements through which, in the unhappy past, the nations strove to safeguard their security or to promote their interests." So Hull told the U. S. Congress on November 18, 1943. By the autumn of 1944, he says, Russian deeds in the Balkans caused him to worry and he quoted with approval a cable from Ambassador Averell Harriman in Moscow which suggested firmness.[14]

Quite different in tone were oth r memoirs of 1948, savage indictments of the U.S.S.R. by former prime ministers of Hungary and the Polish exile government in London. Supporting them was a former U.S. ambassador to Poland, Arthur Lane, who accused the Russians of arranging the destruction of the Warsaw underground in 1944, removing a host of anti-Russian Poles in so doing. Lane was unsympathetic to Russian security needs, wanted to take a tough position toward the U.S.S.R. in 1944 and was distressed by the police state he found upon arriving in Poland in July, 1945. He made clear the ways in which the elections promised at Yalta were postponed and then rigged for the defeat of non-communist dandidates.[15]

Reaction in American public opinion may have given impetus to former Secretary of State Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., in preparing his memoirs of Yalta. *Roosevelt and the Russians* is an able defense of the President, listing the numerous concessions that F. D. R. wrung from Stalin. Stettinius even believed that Stalin may have had trouble in the Kremlin on his return for having been too friendly and having "sold out" the U.S.S.R. Harriman warned that some elements in the Soviet government were less trusting of the West than Stalin. Stettinius added that Roosevelt's death may have strengthened that group. Soon after, the U. S. S. R. impeded the formation of the German Control Commission and again sought a procedural veto in the proposed U. N.[16]

The one writer of 1950 openly and totally loyal to Roosevelt and Truman was Admiral William D. Leahy, former Chief of Naval Opera-

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[14] Hull, *Memoirs,* I, 191-6, 352-64; II, 1314-15, 1459-61, 1739-40.

[15] Ferenc Nagy, *The Struggle Behind the Iron Curtain* (New York, 1948); Stanislaw Mikolajczyk, *The Rape of Poland: Pattern of Soviet Aggression* (New York, 1948); Arthur Bliss Lane, *I Saw Poland Betrayed* (Indianapolis, 1948), pp. 43-53, 66-72, 79, 161-73, 197-212, 276-88.

[16] Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., *Roosevelt and the Russians: The Yalta Conference* (London, 1950), pp. 272-83.

tions, Ambassador to Vichy France, and the President's Chief-of-Staff during most of the war. Leahy insisted that Roosevelt was mentally alert at Yalta, conducting negotiations there "with great skill," and reminded readers that Russia took the full force of the German army until our Normandy invasion in June, 1944. His narrative becomes critical of the U.S.S.R. only after Yalta, and Leahy obviously admired Truman for adopting a tough attitude toward Charles de Gaulle's France as well as toward Russia.[17]

But General Lucius Clay and Mark Clark recalled the difficulty of dealing with the Russians in Germany and Austria, attributing this to communist zeal for spreading the true faith.[18] General Walter Bedell Smith, well known as Ike's chief of staff during the war, identified by 1948 a "war psychosis" among Soviet leaders who accused the West of acts they were themselves perpetrating. Smith, too, blamed communist ideology but added old Russian imperialism and Stalin's own nature: suspicious, revengeful, and ignorant of the West.[19]

The most important memoir to appear in 1951 was the diary of James V. Forrestal, Secretary of the Navy and the first Secretary of Defense, a man close to Truman during the early years of the cold war. Forrestal was a tense, introspective man who was caustic in his condemnation of the U.S.S.R. and of Americans who favored cooperation with it. His diary is a glimpse into the process of decision making at the highest level of government from November, 1944, to March, 1949, from the point of view of a man who wanted to discredit Harry Hopkins as a revolutionary and whose own belief was in maximizing American power.[20]

Equally important the following year were excerpts from the diaries and letters of Republican Arthur Vandenberg, one of the most influential members of the Senate. Vandenberg had long been suspicious of the U.S.S.R., though he wanted to keep it as an ally until the Axis powers

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[17] William D. Leahy, *I Was There* (New York, 1950), pp. 290-322, 329, 373.

[18] Mark W. Clark, *Calculated Risk* (New York, 1950), pp. 452-94; Lucius D. Clay, *Decision in Germany* (Garden City, New York, 1950); Lucius D. Clay, *Germany and the Fight for Freedom* (Cambridge, Mass., 1950).

[19] Walter Bedell Smith, *My Three Years in Moscow* (Philadelphia, 1950), pp. 61-3, 305-15.

[20] Walter Millis, ed., *The Forrestal Diaries* (New York, 1951), pp. xvi, 14-15, 45, 49, 57, 72-3, 81, 95-8, 102, 107, 110, 462.

were beaten.[21] He was wary of postwar foreign aid, shared the strong congressional hope for the success of the new United Nations as well as congressional restlessness under strong executive leadership. Vandenberg recorded his irritation at Russian tactics in the San Francisco conference on the U. N. and at postwar meetings of the U. N. and the foreign ministers. Believing that "America must behave like the *Number One World Power* which she is," and that Russia must be contained, by April, 1946, he asked publicly what Russia was up to and later forcefully supported aid to Greece and Turkey and then the Marshall Plan.[22]

The era of deep cold war in the early 1950's saw more memoirs from conservative diplomats. Joseph C. Grew, twice Under-Secretary of State and Ambassador to Japan, emphasized his career prior to 1942. Yet, because Stettinius spent much time abroad or at San Francisco with the embryo U. N. charter, Grew was acting-Secretary of State much of the time during Roosevelt's last weeks and Truman's first months. His influence was bent toward countering Russia in Europe.[23]

Admiral William Standley, another former Chief of Naval Operations, was Roosevelt's ambassador in Moscow during two years of the war. His book is full of Russians' suspicion of the West, from Standley's 1896 visit to Vladivostok through 1943. He also reported Stalin's sarcastic references to the promised but undelivered second front and Roosevelt's thoughtful silence when in October, 1943, Standley predicted that Russia would try to control eastern Europe after the war.[24]

Truman himself published memoirs in the middle 1950's, the most important since Winston Churchill's six volumes on World War II. Since Truman was almost totally inexperienced in foreign affairs one is not surprised to find him deeply involved in domestic matters and heavily reliant on what advisers said in foreign affairs. Particularly for April through July, 1945, until Truman went to Potsdam and became

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[21] Arthur H. Vandenberg, Jr., ed., *The Private Papers of Senator Vandenberg* (Boston, 1952), pp. 23, 31-33, 39, 41-2, 45, 47-48, 50, 56, 96-7, 136-8, 148-52, 161, 165, 176-216.

[22] *Ibid.*, pp. 66-74, 167, 171, 176-216, 246-49, 262-87, 289-303, 341-50, 373-91.

[23] Joseph C. Grew, *Turbulent Era: A Diplomatic Record of Forty Years*, 2 vols. (Boston, 1952), II, 1445-65.

[24] William H. Standley and Arthur A. Ageton, *Admiral Ambassador to Russia* (Chicago, 1955), pp. 467, 498-99.

more self-confident, the book is full of what Stettinius, Harriman, Grew and others had to say. What they said about the U.S.S.R. was that it was creating puppet regimes in eastern Europe, violating its Yalta pledges, and giving us only superficial cooperation.[25]

Truman's reaction was amazing and in some ways typically American—"I would not expect one hundred per cent of what we proposed. But I felt we should be able to get eighty-five per cent." Assuming that America *should* get eighty-five per cent of what it sought, Truman began to talk tough, dressing down Russian Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov. Yet, he still sought to carry out his understanding of what Roosevelt had been trying to do, sending Harry Hopkins to Moscow for a final visit to clear up difficulties about the U. N. veto. Truman wanted to avoid making Stalin feel that he and Churchill were ganging up on Russia, tried to oppose colonialism, insisted on keeping our agreement to move our troops to the proper zones of Germany, recognized the new government of Poland, and retained a hope that he could reach an understanding with Stalin.[26]

Truman says that Potsdam taught him that the Russians were relentless bargainers, pressing for every advantage, "not in earnest about peace" because they planned to take advantage of America's weakness during an expected postwar depression. Force, he decided, is all they understand, and he became determined to keep them out of the occupation of Japan.[27]

His memoirs admit no aggressive American intent. He claims that the atomic bomb was used merely to bring about a Japanese surrender, and avers that U. S. economic dealings with postwar Europe were to be a matter of aid to a starving continent and assistance for rebuilding. Hence, we would lend to Britain and also attempt to increase German productivity.[28]

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[25] Harry S. Truman, *Memoirs,* 2 vols. (Garden City, New York, 1955-56), I, 15-25, 70-78.

[26] *Ibid.,* I, 71, 79-82, 257-65, 275, 298-301, 321-22, 341-42.

[27] *Ibid.,* I, 341-412.

[28] *Ibid.,* I, 415-22, 464-97.

Despite his concern over Manchuria, Iran and eastern Europe, Truman continued the demobilization of America's armed forces, apparently assuming that this was the thing to do after a war. Appreciating the importance of atomic energy, he appears to have been unable to come to an early decision about its peacetime control. He decreed secrecy in the meantime, listened to those who wanted secrecy to continue (the Joint Chiefs of Staff) and those who said it would retard scientific progress (science adviser Vannevar Bush). Ultimately, taking a leaf from F. D. R.'s book, Truman put off decisions on international control, and did not approach the Russians as Stimson had urged.[29]

Beneath his mild pretensions Truman's aggressiveness shows. He clearly wanted the British Empire opened to American trade and by early 1946 was "tired of babying the Soviets." He decided that to be heard by the Russians one had to speak bluntly. Hence, when the U. S. S. R. continued to be difficult—keeping troops in Manchuria and Iran, putting pressure on Turkey—Truman reacted. He sent sharp protests and made American aid available to Europe through the Truman Doctrine and Marshall Plan programs. In his view the Russian response, including the Berlin blockade, made permanent the division of Europe and declared the cold war.[30]

Most memoirs since Truman's have been anticlimax. Byrnes produced a volume covering his whole career, but the portions on 1945-1947 are a condensation of *Speaking Frankly* omitting favorable references to Stalin and rewritten to make Byrnes appear much more anti-communist than he really was.[31] David Lilienthal, New Deal head of the Tennessee Valley Authority and first chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, published his *Journals*, which throw light on the botching of international control of atomic energy partly because of Bernard Baruch's senility.[32]

Dwight Eisenhower, writing of later years, put in a few lines on Russian aggression as the cause of cold war,[33] and his old associate

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[29] *Ibid.*, I, 507-39.

[30] *Ibid.*, I, 537, 551-52; II, 76-77, 93-131.

[31] James F. Byrnes, *All in One Lifetime* (New York, 1958), pp. 252-391.

[32] David E. Lilienthal, *The Journals of David E. Lilienthal, II: The Atomic Energy Years* (New York, 1964), pp. 39-40, 49-50, 55, 69, 73.

[33] Dwight D. Eisenhower, *The White House Years, II: Mandate For Change, 1953-1956* (New York, 1965), pp. 111-16.

Robert Murphy added more illustrations of both French and Russian contributions to the breakdown of allied cooperation in Germany.[34] John Morton Blum's edition of the diaries of Henry Morgenthau, Jr., shows the Secretary of the Treasury's role in making soon discarded plans for postwar Germany.[35] Dean Acheson, once denounced by Republican campaigners as the "Red Dean" but always in reality a hard-line cold warrior, summarized a point of view strikingly similar to Eisenhower's.[36]

The only memoirs since Truman's which have contributed new evidence are fragments by Milovan Djilas, Charles Bohlen, and George Kennan's *Memoirs, 1925-1950*. Djilas, obviously anti-Russian, shows us Stalin, endlessly suspicious of the West, pointing to a map of the U. S. S. R. and exclaiming, "They will never accept the idea that so great a space should be red, never, never!" Djilas also portrays Stalin crying out in April, 1945, "We shall recover in fifteen or twenty years, and then we'll have another go at it."[37]

Bohlen's Blaustein lectures at Columbia University in April, 1969, were not intended to be autobiographical. But Bohlen was interpreter for Roosevelt and Truman at all the "summit" meetings, and for Byrnes and Marshall later, and his memories of what happened are important. He reveals Roosevelt's "serious concern" over Russian behavior by April, 1945, the tone of the Soviet press, and the process of inventing the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan. Not quite so indignantly anti-Soviet as Kennan, he still sees the origins of cold war in Soviet ideology, totalitarianism and fear.[38]

George Kennan published his fuller memoirs in 1967, revealing a long-held "intellectual distaste . . . for Russian Marxism." He could

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[34] Robert Murphy, *Diplomat Among Warriors* (Garden City, New York, 1964), pp. 257-323.

[35] John Morton Blum, *From the Morgenthau Diaries, III: Years of War, 1941-1945* (Boston, 1967), pp. 327-62.

[36] Dean Acheson, *Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department* (New York, 1969), pp. 150-51, 194-96.

[37] Milovan Djilas, *Conversations with Stalin* (New York, 1962), pp. 73-4, 81, 114-15.

[38] Charles E. Bohlen, *The Transformation of American Foreign Policy* (New York, 1969), pp. 26, 71-76, 88-89.

never accept "the stony-hearted fanaticism" that meant the end of civil liberties and the liquidation of masses of people. Kennan maintained an anti-Soviet attitude throughout his career, meticulously observing Russian suspicion of foreigners and subversion of Poland's independence, and speculating shrewdly on Soviet motives and future policies. The most revealing and rewarding portions of the book are Kennan's papers on the U. S. S. R., one of September, 1944, the famous "long telegram" of February 22, 1946, which became the "X" article, and others.[39] In these and in Kennan's colloquies with Harriman and members of the State Department are origins of the containment policy.

Researchers of the cold war had to begin with few published documents. The Department of State *Bulletin* did provide speeches and some official correspondence, though for a decade little but private publications appeared. The World Peace Foundation brought out volumes of selected documents[40] and the Rosenman edition of F. D. R.'s papers was completed by 1950.[41] Not until the middle 1950's did the *Foreign Relations of the United States* series approach the cold war, and then only because Republicans who believed that something sinister was hidden in the Yalta papers pushed the State Department into rapid publication.[42]

In the late 1950's the *Foreign Relations* volumes for the period of World War II began to appear, not to be completed until the late 1960's.[43] Finally, the 1960's have also seen the publication of papers from the other summit meetings: Casablanca, Teheran and Potsdam.[44]

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[39] George F. Kennan, *Memoirs, 1925-1950* (Boston, 1967), pp. 68-72, 190, 199-215, 250, 503-65.

[40] Leland M. Goodrich and Marie J. Carroll, eds., *Documents on American Foreign Relations, July, 1944-June, 1945* (Princeton, 1947); Raymond Dennett and Robert K. Turner, eds., *Documents on American Foreign Relations, July 1, 1945-December 31, 1946* (Princeton, 1948).

[41] Samuel I. Rosenman, ed., *The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt, 1941-1945,* 4 vols. (New York, 1950).

[42] U. S. Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States: Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945* (Washington, 1955). Series hereafter cited as *FRUS.*

[43] *FRUS,* volumes for 1941-1946 (Washington, 1958-1969).

[44] *FRUS: Conference of Berlin (Potsdam), 1945,* 2 vols. (Washington, 1960); *FRUS: Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943* (Washington, 1961); *FRUS: Conferences at Washington, 1941-1942, and Casablanca, 1943* (Washington, 1968).

From foreign sources, too, have come diaries, memoirs, and some important documents.[45] The researcher now has almost too much to work with.

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Attack from the right began in the dying days of World War II. William Henry Chamberlin completed a book in early 1945, crying out that Europe was being carved into spheres of influence, that the U. S. S. R. was using its strength and Communist parties to take over eastern Europe. Chamberlin summarized Soviet goals as annexation of territory up to the 1941 boundaries, creation of a wide sphere of influence beyond those borders, and preventing the creation of a British-led bloc in western and southern Europe which might be a counterpoise. He dismissed Russian needs for security, commenting that Russia had twice been invaded when it held Polish and Baltic territories.[46]

William C. Bullitt, a self-styled expert on the U. S. S. R. who had wormed his way into Woodrow Wilson's attention in 1919 and had since served as F. D. R.'s ambassador to Russia and France, completed a book in April, 1946, contending that Stalin's goal was "the great globe itself." Using Halford Mackinder's dubious formula of geopolitics,[47] Bullitt claimed that Soviet control of eastern and central Europe was

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[45] Examples are: Toshikazu Kase, *Journey to the Missouri* (New Haven, 1950); Charles de Gaulle, *The War Memoirs of Charles de Gaulle,* 3 vols. (New York, 1955-1960); Arthur Bryant, *The Turn of the Tide* and *Triumph in the West* (Garden City, New York, 1957-1959), the diaries of Field Marshal Lord Alenbrooke; Mamoru Shigemitsu, *Japan and her Destiny* (London, 1958); Anthony Eden, *Full Circle* and *The Reckoning* (Boston, 1960-1965); *The Memoirs of General Lord Ismay* (New York, 1960); Lord Moran, *Churchill: Taken from the Diaries of Lord Moran* (Boston, 1966); Arthur W. Tedder, *With Prejudice* (Boston, 1967); Harold Macmillan, *The Blast of War* (New York, 1968); Ivan Maisky, *Memoirs of a Soviet Ambassador* (New York, 1968); Royal Institute of International Affairs, *Documents on International Affairs, 1947-1948* (London, 1952) and *Documents on International Affairs, 1939-1946, II: Hitler's Europe* (London, 1954); U.S.S.R. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Stalin's Correspondence with Churchill, Attlee, Roosevelt and Truman, 1941-1945,* 2 vols. (New York, 1958).

[46] William Henry Chamberlin, *America: Partner in World Rule* (New York, 1945), pp. 115-17, 144-45, 165-80.

[47] Who rules East Europe commands the Heartland;
Who rules the Heartland commands the World-Island;
Who rules the World-Island commands the World.

> a terrible military threat to Western Europe and to Great Britain, and ultimately to the United States. No peace is to be found in a division of Europe into a huge zone controlled by the Soviet Union pressing against a small ring of disconnected democracies clinging precariously to the coasts of the Atlantic.

Having frightened himself by his own imagery, Bullitt contended that Stalin was unappeasable because of Russian habits of suspicion, autocracy and expansion; because of the Bolshevik goal of world revolution; and because Russia's "digestive powers are unrestrained by any considerations of humanity or morality."[48]

John Foster Dulles, already a leading Republican spokesman on foreign affairs, used *Life* magazine as a vehicle for his views of the U. S. S. R. as expansionist by any means, fair or foul. Almost echoing Oliver Cromwell, he urged Americans to maintain military defenses and demonstrate religious faith.[49]

Others assured us that Tito was Moscow's agent in winning its "centuries-long struggle to reach the warm-water seas."[50] repeated the contention of Russia's leading a "world-wide, conspiratorial movement for the conquest of a monopoly of power,"[51] asserted that "war between the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics . . . is likely to materialize some time between the summer of 1952 and the fall of 1956,"[52] indicted F. D. R. as weak or ill or witlessly pro-Soviet,[53] added indictments of such aides as Harry Dexter White of

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[48] William C. Bullitt, *The Great Globe Itself: A Preface to World Affairs* (New York, 1946), pp. 27-49, 60-70, 100-1, 194-95.

[49] John Foster Dulles, "Thoughts on Soviet Foreign Policy and What to Do About It," *Life,* XX (Jun. 3, 1946), 113-26; (Jun. 10, 1946), 118-30.

[50] David Martin, *Ally Betrayed: The Uncensored Story of Tito and Mihailovich* (New York, 1946), pp. 1-2.

[51] James Burnham, *The Struggle for the World* (New York, 1947), p. 59.

[52] Ellis M. Zacharias, *Behind Closed Doors: The Secret History of the Cold War* (New York, 1950), p. 3.

[53] William Henry Chamberlin, *Beyond Containment* (Chicago, 1953), pp. 27-46; Edgar E. Robinson, *The Roosevelt Leadership* (Philadelphia, 1955), p. 360; Don Lohbeck, *Patrick J. Hurley* (Chicago, 1956); George N. Crocker, *Roosevelt's Road to Russia* (Chicago, 1959).

the Treasury,[54] presented violently pro-Polish views of the Moscow-Warsaw-Lublin-London struggle,[55] and did all this in an increasingly bitter tone. Anthony Kubek, for instance, wrote in 1963 of "a totally depraved criminal conspiracy openly determined upon our destruction as a free people."[56] Bullitt, one of those who believed Roosevelt was too weak at Yalta to be effective, unconsciously got to the bottom of the Right's approach in saying,

> It was the President's duty to see to it that we won the war and that we won security by our victory. . . . only three years later, our insecurity is such that we may be forced into war this year.[57]

Condemning New Dealers for wanting security for people within the domestic economy, rightists demand security in the infinitely less controllable world of international politics. They somehow assume that the United States can have anything it wants. The difference between them and Harry Truman, expressed in mathematical whimsy, is that while Truman would settle for eighty-five per cent of what he wanted, they insist upon 100 per cent.

Seen in the light of others' writings and from the distance of a decade, some scholars turn out to be quasi-rightist who once might have been considered part of the "liberal establishment." Hungarian-born John Lukacs adopts the view of Winston Churchill that the U. S. S. R. clearly understood its goals in eastern Europe, but Churchill was unable to save that region because the U. S. was "noncommittal and insensitive," having mistakenly separated military from political affairs. Lukacs writes in a glib, overblown style full of portentous phrases but superficial in analysis.[58]

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[54] Anthony Trawick Bouscaren, *Soviet Foreign Policy* (New York, 1962), p. 125.

[55] Edward J. Rozek, *Allied Wartime Diplomacy: A Pattern in Poland* (New York, 1958).

[56] Anthony Kubek, *How the Far East Was Lost* (Chicago, 1963), pp. 441-42.

[57] William C. Bullitt, "How We Won the War and Lost the Peace," *Life,* XXV (Aug. 30, 1948), 83-97, (Sep. 6, 1948), 86-103.

[58] John Lukacs, *A New History of the Cold War* (Garden City, New York, 1961, 1966), pp. 42, 44-8, 282-389.

Walt Whitman Rostow, a darling of the American intellectual community before he became associated with Lyndon Johnson's "escalation" of the Vietnam War,[59] produced a study of American foreign policy at the end of the Eisenhower years, calling for a return to realism from the moralism of "Ike" and Dulles.

Rostow, too, was Churchillian, seeing Churchill himself as aware of reality but Americans as behaving as if their interests could be protected by "a steady retraction of commitment in Eurasia." According to Rostow, Stalin sought to expand "to the maximum" the area he could control in Eurasia, and Mao since 1935 had looked to power in China plus "hegemony in Asia and major power status on the world scene." But the U. S. lacked a conception of interest in Europe sufficiently clear to make the fate of eastern Europe a matter for a military ultimatum. As in the case of Manchuria in 1931, it was worth a protest but no more.[60] Rostow implies that East Europe *was* worth a military ultimatum, possibly forecasting his later zeal for military action in Vietnam. Lukacs and Rostow leave the same final impression: had the U. S. been alert to realism in diplomacy it could have saved eastern Europe from Russia and possibly prevented the cold war.

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At war's end academic liberals still defended the idea of cooperation with Russia, believing in reconcilable differences within "one world," looking for hopeful signs of change inside the Soviet Union, and urging that America act to reduce Russian suspicion of the West.[61]

By 1947 they had read George Kennan's "X" article in *Foreign Affairs,* setting forth the ideological and historical bases for Communist aggression, suggesting that an innate antagonism would continue between Russia and the West and that Russia should

> . . . be contained by the adroit and vigilant application of counter-force at a series of constantly shifting geographical

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[59] Towsend Hoopes, *The Limits of Intervention* (New York, 1969), pp. 20-23.

[60] W. W. Rostow, *The United States in the World Arena* (New York, 1960), pp. 141-43, 166-78.

[61] Harold H. Fisher, *America and Russia in the World Community* (Claremont, California, 1946), pp. 130-55, lectures in the spring of 1945; Quincy Wright, ed., *A Foreign Policy for the United States* (Chicago, 1947), pp. 13, 26-32; Harris Foundation lectures in July, 1946.

> and political points, corresponding to the shifts and maneuvers of Soviet policy . . . .[62]

They had also read Walter Lippmann's rejoinder, printed in his newspaper column and then collected in a small book. Lippmann believed that containment would permit the U. S. S. R. rather than the West to define the issues between them, would mean using a variety of "satellites, clients, dependents and puppets," and would alienate our natural allies.[63]

The liberals wavered. Some tried to understand Russian motives and saw a clash because both the U. S. S. R. and the U. S. reached for greater power as a result of World War II.[64] Some emphasized Russian aggression and its ideological and historical bases;[65] now and then one reminded us of how friendly Americans had been toward Russia during the war.[66]

A consensus began to emerge by the end of the 1940's of a well-meaning America confronting a tendentious Soviet Union. This consensus granted genuine reasons for Russian suspicion of the West—not only Marxist ideology but also the intervention after World War I, western hostility between the wars, the long delay of a second front, our continued recognition of such Fascist states as Spain, the abrupt end to Lend Lease in 1945, and our inept handling of a Soviet request

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[62] George F. Kennan ("X"), "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," *Foreign Affairs,* XXV (Jul., 1947), 566-82.

[63] Walter Lippmann, *The Cold War* (New York, 1947).

[64] Vera Micheles Dean, *The United States and Russia* (Cambridge, Mass., 1947), pp. 36-79, 130-9, 145-57, 174-83, 279-84.

[65] William L. Langer, "Political Problems of a Coalition," *Foreign Affairs.* XXVI (Oct., 1947), 73-89; Philip E. Mosely, "Aspects of Russian Expansion," *The American Slavic and East European Review,* VII (Oct., 1948), 197-213; Philip E. Mosely, "Soviet Policy and Nationality Conflicts in East Central Europe" in Waldemar Gurian, ed., *The Soviet Union* (Notre Dame, Indiana, 1951). Other Mosely articles are reprinted in Philip E. Mosely, *The Kremlin and World Politics* (New York, 1960).

[66] Warren B. Walsh, "American Attitudes Toward Russia," *Antioch Review,* VII (Summer, 1947), 183-90.

for a major loan. Always prominent, too, was the Russian need for security from invasion, especially from Germany. Hence, Soviet suspicion never died out, the changes within Russia were not meaningful and Stalin set up the cold war by creating his own *cordon sanitaire* in eastern Europe as the Red Army went outside of Russia.[67]

But we sought the political independence and economic revival of other nations, social reform, and the cooperation of all countries in the U.N. Though we had been bothered by an apparent lack of Russian gratitude for Lend-Lease, at V-J Day Americans still had "a vast reservoir of good will toward their valiant Russian ally. But the Kremlin brutally slapped aside the outstretched American hand," overusing the veto in the U.N., controlling eastern Europe, preventing the operation of Germany as an economic unit, helping Mao in China, putting pressure on Turkey and Iran, and generally making the West anxious. We soon shifted our position, public opinion became anti-Russian, there was a conservative reaction in the U. S., and the government began containment in the Truman Doctrine and Marshall Plan. Russia's response was to reject Marshall Plan aid, reject economic progress in Germany, and impose the Berlin blockade. To this the West responded with the famous airlift and, presently, the North Atlantic Treaty alliance. The Cominform and Warsaw Pact were established in East Europe and the cold war was a hard, bitter fact by 1949.[68]

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[67] Thomas A. Bailey, *America Faces Russia* (Ithaca, New York, 1950), pp. 289-328; Raymond J. Sontag, "Reflections on the Yalta Papers," *Foreign Affairs*, XXXIII (Jul., 1955), 615-23; Henry Roberts, *Russia and America* (New York, 1956), pp. 58-59; John L. Snell, ed., *The Meaning of Yalta* (Baton Rouge, 1956), pp. 11-14.

[68] Bailey, *America Faces Russia*, pp. 305, 334-35; Thomas A. Bailey, *A Diplomatic History of the American People* (New York, 1940-1969), pp. 777-99; Julius W. Pratt, *A History of United States Foreign Policy* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1955, 1965), pp. 456-61; Dexter Perkins, *The Evolution of American Foreign Policy* (New York, 1948-1966), pp. 109-110; William Reitzel et al, *United States Foreign Policy, 1945-1955* (Washington, 1956), pp. 86-93; Snell, *Meaning of Yalta*, pp. 14-24; Eric F. Goldman, *The Crucial Decade—and After: America, 1945-1960* (New York, 1961), pp. 10-13, 34-35.

This view has dominated American academic writing on the origins of the cold war ever since,[69] but two works stand out above all the rest. William H. McNeill, depending on a few interviews and material published by early 1952, produced a volume for the Royal Institute of International Affairs, amazingly balanced for a work appearing in the "Joe McCarthy" phase of the cold war, and with a breadth apropriate to the future author of *The Rise of the West.*[70] Herbert Feis, once an important official in the State Department, has recently completed a series of books made richer by his being able to use department files and the papers of Truman and Harriman.[71]

McNeill began by labeling Russia "half an ally." Suspicion was suppressed but always present; national interest required collaboration to defeat Germany, but ideology and history led to hatred of the West. The U. S., also wary of foreigners, was led by men dedicated to close cooperation with Britain in a swift military victory over the Axis, but

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[69] Prominent examples are: Richard W. Van Alstyne, *American Crisis Diplomacy* (Stanford, 1952); Frederick L. Schuman, *Russia since 1917* (New York, 1957), pp. 297-369; Norman A. Graebner, "The Truman Administration and the Cold War," *Current History,* XXXV (Oct., 1958), 223-28; Louis J. Halle, *Dream and Reality: Aspects of American Foreign Policy* (New York, 1959), pp. 283-99; Stephen D. Kertesz, ed., *American Diplomacy in a New Era* (Notre Dame, Indiana, 1961), pp. 17-62; John W. Spanier, *American Foreign Policy since World War II* (New York, 1962), pp. 10-26; John L. Snell, *Illusion and Necessity: The Diplomacy of Global War, 1939-1945* (Boston, 1963), pp. 136-215; Richard L. Walker, *Edward R. Stettinius, Jr.* (Vol. XIV in *The American Secretaries of State and Their Diplomacy,* Robert H. Ferrell, ed.; New York, 1965), pp. 32-56; Gaddis Smith, *American Diplomacy During the Second World War* (New York, 1965), pp. 119-74; Herbert Druks, *Harry S. Truman and the Russians, 1945-1953* (New York, 1966), pp. 269-70; Dexter Perkins, *The Diplomacy of a New Age* (Bloomington, Indiana, 1967), pp. 17-41; Charles L. Robertson, *International Politics Since World War II* (New York, 1966); David F. Trask, *Victory Without Peace: American Foreign Relations in the Twentieth Century* (New York, 1968), pp. 130-31; John A. Garraty, *Interpreting American History: Conversations with Historians* (New York, 1970), II, 225-31.

[70] William Hardy McNeill, *America, Britain and Russia, 1941-1946* (London, 1953); *The Rise of the West* (Chicago, 1963).

[71] Herbert Feis, *Churchill, Roosevelt, Stalin: The War They Waged and the Peace They Sought* (Princeton, 1957); *Between War and Peace: The Potsdam Conference* (Princeton, 1960): *The Atomic Bomb and the End of World War II* (Princeton, 1966); *Contest Over Japan* (New York, 1967).

was also a nation in the grip of a myth that the defeat of fascism would mean "an era of international peace, prosperity, freedom, and justice."[72]

What sundered the temporary alliance was German defeat and the question of the shape of the postwar world. Roosevelt and Hull fought off early settlements, tried to prevent the creation of spheres of influence, and hoped for a world security organization to take care of the future. Roosevelt knew that Americans would soon want to withdraw from Europe and believed that a "modest policy" based on the U. N. and "Big Three" cooperation would avoid the reaction of 1919-1920 and permit continued U. S. participation in world affairs. Moreover, Hull's poor health and the State Department's inability to move with the needs of the times allowed military leaders to have almost a monopoly of Roosevelt's attention. Dealing with strategy, they avoided political problems on principle.[73]

But Stalin had specific goals, one being security from another German invasion. Germany must be kept weak, Russia must be strong, the countries between them must be friendly to Russia, and the Big Three must be cordial enough toward each other to prevent Britain and America from joining Germany in an anti-Soviet movement. McNeill believed that Stalin sought security first and by insisting upon it alienated the West "without clearly recognizing what he was doing until it was too late."[74]

Truman's brisk approach clashed badly with Stalin's insistence upon his security goals, and the whole climate of opinion changed radically in the latter half of 1945. America stood on the sidelines for a time while Britain and Russia seemed to be antagonists in the Near East and southeastern Europe. Then a halt to Russia's reparations from West Germany produced a bitter anti-American campaign in the Russian press, and the American loan to Britain in July, 1946, must have shown Stalin an Anglo-American front against him. Communist ideology was once more prominent in Russia and by the end of 1946 Americans gave up their mood of "back to normal." Russian rejection of the Marshall Plan, the coup in Prague and Mao's success in China hardened American opinion against the U. S. S. R. Cold war, says McNeill, began by 1947.[75]

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[72] McNeill, *America, Britain, Russia,* pp. 3-31, 62-87, 402, 760-61.

[73] *Ibid.,* pp. 403-5.

[74] *Ibid.,* pp. 405-9, 579-80.

[75] *Ibid.,* pp. 607-20, 652-737.

Feis follows a similar line, though without quite the impartiality of tone and with a myriad of details added. His books are in some ways anthologies of conversations and documents, and all the more valuable because of it. We learn how blunt Stalin was in expressing his suspicion about the postponement of the second front, and how serious Roosevelt, Churchill, and their military staffs were in trying to find ways to open such a front despite their lack of materiel and different approaches. We sit in on squabbles over the handling of liberated Italy and soon to be liberated Poland. We witness moments of apparently genuine cordiality in the "grand alliance" giving way to pessimism over Poland and then to hope because of Russian leniency with Finland and, for a time, others.[76]

Ambiguity is the watchword for late 1944 and early 1945, with the Lublin (Communist) Poles taking over, Bulgaria dominated by Moscow, but Czechoslovakia and Finland retaining genuine independence. Agreement at Yalta gave way to a coup in Rumania, "incurable troubles" over Poland, and Stalin's total disbelief of western good intentions in the attempted German surrender in Italy. In Roosevelt's last few days of life two messages came from Harriman in Moscow warning of Russian aggression in eastern Europe through the satellites and in western Europe through communist parties.[77]

Truman wavered, testing Soviet intentions by sending Hopkins on a last mission to Moscow, talking tough to Molotov, yet meeting Stalin at Potsdam. But, concludes Feis, the Russians "were trying not only to extend their boundaries and their control over neighboring states but also beginning to revert to their revolutionary effort throughout the world."[78]

Truman, Feis believes, was impressed at Potsdam by Soviet aims and definitely decided that the U. S. S. R. would have no role in the occupation of Japan. And Feis wrote an entire book on Truman's maneuvers to achieve that result.[79]

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[76] Feis, *Churchill,* pp. 47-98, 105-18, 134-35, 182-94, 237-78, 325-27, 378-89, 411-17.

[77] *Ibid.,* pp. 500-98.

[78] *Ibid.,* pp. 634-38, 647-55.

[79] Feis, *Contest over Japan.*

Feis was depressed by the collapse of the alliance and the onset of a cold war in which antagonists were restrained mainly by the "mutuality of terror" of nuclear weapons.[80] It was a feeling common among American intellectuals in the 1960's, brought on by the sadness of writing history that seemed headed nowhere except eventual holocaust.

One task was accomplished with more zeal. That was a defense of Roosevelt, Truman, their advisers, their policies and their deeds. Rightist attacks had moved out of books into political campaigns, becoming a basic weapon of one wing of the Republican Party.[81]

Feis defended Roosevelt's decision to defeat Germany before Japan by indicating the possible unhappy consequences of taking Japan first; he went on to show Roosevelt as a realist who sought first to win the war, who saw that Russia could seize the parts of East Europe it wanted, whose information on Russia was ambiguous at best, and who employed the realistic Harriman.[82]

Philip Mosely and Robert Divine reminded us that where the armies went spheres of influence were created automatically. Mosely adds that Roosevelt tried at Yalta in the Declaration on Liberated Europe to safeguard eastern Europe, and Divine adds that "Roosevelt's attempt to seek a reasonable accomodation with the Russians threw the onus for the subsequent cold war squarely upon Stalin."[83] John L. Snell and Richard Leopold, among others, have said that Roosevelt got what one could get at Yalta, even to Russian support for Chiang K'ai-shek over Mao.[84] Feis and others have portrayed Truman as a realist who responded valiantly to the Russian offensive.[85] This has no doubt com-

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[80] Feis, *Between War and Peace,* pp. 322-24.

[81] See the Republican Party platform on Yalta, 1952; Kirk E. Porter and Donald Bruce Johnson, eds., *National Party Platforms, 1840-1964* (Urbana, Illinois, 1966), pp. 497-500.

[82] Feis, *Churchill,* pp. 46, 125, 174-75, 197-98, 597-98.

[83] Mosely, *Kremlin in World Politics,* pp. 200, 211; Robert A. Divine, *Roosevelt and World War II* (Baltimore, 1969), pp. 73, 97-98.

[84] Snell, *Illusion and Necessity,* pp. 197-98; Garraty, *Interpreting American History,* II, 228.

[85] Feis, *Contest over Japan;* Druks, *Truman and the Russians.*

forted loyal Democrats, but what has it added to our understanding of the cold war?

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Consensus, once a favorite word of Lyndon Johnson's, haunted him in the election year of 1968 when the Vietnam War shattered the Democratic Party. Consensus, once a favorite term of historians, has been wrecked by the New Left's challenge to orthodox liberal historiography. The New Left is not really new; Charles Beard, J. Fred Rippy and others showed the way to economic interpretations and to admitting that America was not flawless in its morality.[86] But the New Left has shocked historians out of the slothful ease of consensus and into a review of evidence on the origins of the cold war. It is thus responsible for our first real progress in interpreting the cold war since McNeill's work of twenty years ago.

Norman Cousins of the *Saturday Review* and Thomas Finletter, later to be Truman's Secretary of the Air Force, were the pioneers. Barely ten months after Hiroshima they inquired,

> Can it be that we were more anxious to prevent Russia from establishing a claim for full participation in the occupation against Japan than we were to think through the implications of unleashing atomic warfare?[87]

But in an increasingly chilly atmosphere of cold war it was all one could do to defend Roosevelt and Truman from the primitives who accused them of being red agents. For a time it was enough to stay out of congressional hearing rooms or avoid being branded as a security risk. And, as we have seen, the orthodox liberals established their own patriotism along with that of Roosevelt and Truman.

For fifteen years there were few hints of the revisionism of the left. Albert Z. Carr, who had been an assistant to Donald M. Nelson when the latter was chairman of the War Production Board, wrote a brave book at a bad time, 1950, recording that Russia sought a loan from us

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[86] Some examples: Charles A. Beard, *The Open Door at Home* (New York, 1935) and *Economic Origins of Jeffersonian Democracy* (New York, 1943); J. Fred Rippy, *The Capitalists and Colombia* (New York, 1931); *Latin America and the Industrial Age* (New York, 1947); *Globe and Hemisphere* (Chicago, 1958).

[87] Norman Cousins and Thomas K. Finletter, "A Beginning for Sanity," *Saturday Review of Literature,* XXIX (Jun. 15, 1946), 5-9, 38-40.

only to be thwarted by America's desire to use the loan for political leverage. Stalin, says Carr, had been emphasizing Soviet economic needs, must have seen Roosevelt failing at Yalta, and in the spring probably worried about this new, unknown factor of Harry Truman. Stalin turned to reparations as a substitute for American credit, upsetting us by despoiling Germany and Manchuria. East-West division had preceded the Potsdam meeting; "haggle and snarl" over Germany and eastern Europe at Potsdam and after merely symbolized the division and the onset of cold war.[88]

William Appleman Williams, who has become the patron of the Left, entered the field in 1952 with a survey of American relations with Russia. This was almost orthodox liberal history, but Williams did pick up the notion of how we thought of using our economic power in the postwar era. His tentative conclusion was that Truman decided to use that power not for negotiation but to force American versions of settlements; hence, Truman's stern attitude toward the U. S. S. R. Williams adds of the atomic bomb that our secrecy fetish merely made Russia more suspicious than ever.[89]

A year later James P. Warburg, scion of an old banking family and New Deal adviser, took Truman to task for adopting an over-simplified view of international politics. Warburg said that the "disastrous consequence" was our having a merely negative foreign policy, one aimed at thwarting the Soviet Union, giving Russia the initiative, and (shades of Walter Lippmann!) making us choose friends on the sole test of their "anti-Sovietism."[90]

But these were mere fragments of history and attracted little attention, as did Herbert Aptheker's obviously pro-Russian writings.[91] Staughton Lynd hinted at something in claiming that the cold war began because "for the first time the challenge of authoritarian socialism to

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[88] Albert Z. Carr., *Truman, Stalin and Peace* (Garden City, New York, 1950), pp. 13-26, 32-42, 59-61, 67-80.

[89] William Appleman Williams, *American-Russian Relations, 1781-1947* (New York, 1952), pp. 262-81.

[90] James P. Warburg, *Germany: Key to Peace* (Cambridge, Mass., 1953), pp. 60-62.

[91] Herbert Aptheker, *American Foreign Policy and the Cold War* (New York, 1962).

democratic capitalism was backed by sufficient power to be an ever-present political and military threat."[92]

A new synthesis, however, had to wait for Williams' researches to bear fruit and for D. F. Fleming to come to the end of a dozen years of work inspired by his being "appalled" at a "new balance of power conflict."[93]

Williams' *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy* begins with the conceptions guiding American foreign policy:

> One is the warm, generous, humanitarian impulse to help other people solve their problems. A second is the principle of self-determination applied at the international level, . . . the right of every society to establish its own goals . . . and to realize them internally through the means it decides are appropriate. These two ideas can be reconciled . . . but the third idea . . . insists that other people cannot *really* solve their problems . . . unless they go about it in the same way as in the United States.[94]

To this controlling attitude Williams added economic as well as political motives for our entry into World War II. Businessmen and government officials alike refused to consider our having "a more self-contained economy" and by 1943, says Williams, there was agreement among officials of business origins — Harriman, Nelson, Stettinius, Forrestal, Adolf Berle, Paul Hoffman — that America would have to seek new economic frontiers to insure postwar prosperity.[95]

Franklin Roosevelt was originally unwilling and later too fatigued to reconsider "America's conception of itself and the world." At his death we had not resolved the contradiction between our tradition of the open door and the new presence of the U. S. S. R. as a great

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[92] Staughton Lynd, "How the Cold War Began," *Commentary,* XXX (Nov., 1960), 378-89.

[93] D. F. Fleming, *The Cold War and its Origins, 1917-1960,* 2 vols. (Garden City, New York, 1961), I, xii.

[94] William Appleman Williams, *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy* (New York, 1959, 1962), p. 9.

[95] *Ibid.,* pp. 160-200.

power with its own messianic impulses, or, indeed, the new revolutions in the underdeveloped regions.[96]

Roosevelt's successors did not understand this problem and "embarked upon a program to force the Soviet Union to accept America's traditional conception" of the world-wide open door. This, says Williams, "crystallized the cold war," hardening the natural antagonism between the U. S. and the U. S. S. R. Truman's tough approach played into the hands of hard line men in Moscow, turning Stalin away from the "softies" who wanted to improve the quality of life in Russia and to have good relations with the West rather than rivalry.[97]

Americans continued to be driven by "the nightmare of depression and the vision of omnipotence," believing that America must find greater markets or suffer a depression or endure a socialist economy. The "vision of omnipotence" came from our monopoly of atomic power combined with a belief that the U. S. was "the agent of positive good" and should combat evil Russia.[98]

"The diplomacy of the vicious circle" ensued. The U. S. S. R. began to rebuild in part on reparations from Germany and eastern Europe and also established its security zone there. However, it did withdraw from Iran and gave up attempts to win concessions from Turkey. Williams ignores "sabre-rattling" remarks from Moscow which began in August, 1945, and calls attention instead to aggressive statements by Truman, Churchill's Iron Curtain speech, and our stopping of further Russian reparations from West Germany. The U. S. S. R., he says, responded with further repression in eastern Europe[99] and the cold war was on.

There are two major problems in Williams' work. One is that he uses Russian thoughts and deeds only at moments which suit his purposes, that is, in presumed response to western aggressive acts. Second, he provides little documentation and his evidence is difficult to track down if not evanescent.

Williams has since dug further into the origins of America's search for an "open world," presenting a challenging mass of evidence on the

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[96] *Ibid.*, pp. 204-6, 297-309.

[97] *Ibid.*, 205-8, 214-18, 225-29.

[98] *Ibid.*, pp. 220-27, 244-54.

[99] *Ibid.*, pp. 259-74.

latter years of the 1800's.[100] One of his pupils has gone farther than Williams in the period of World War II and the cold war. Using the same words, "an open world," Lloyd Gardner records the ideas of Will Clayton, Lachlan Currie, Henry Morgenthau, Jr., and other advisers to Roosevelt and Truman, all to the effect that there must be free international trade even to an "open sky" for air routes. We invited the U. S. S. R. to participate in the Bretton Woods conference and other meetings for opening up future trade, but not to share in Near Eastern oil. By the end of 1944 Americans began to worry about a Russian sphere in eastern Europe being closed, not part of the open world.[101]

Political quarrels over Poland and the meaning of the Yalta agreements made both sides more suspicious of each other. At this point Gardner dumps Truman into the presidency, deciding to "meet the issue now" instead of later and talking boldly to the Russians. Truman, he says, became angry at reports of American interests "rapidly being pushed out of Eastern Europe by the Russian steamroller." There was briefly a division in the administration "between those who demanded good deeds from Russia first and those who argued that the good deeds had to come from America at the same time . . . " and the former won.[102]

Gardner believes that atomic energy made things worse. Secrecy became an American obsession, understandable in a wartime atmosphere, but Truman also became overconfident and before 1945 was over, men in the Kremlin were speaking of preparations to fight the capitalists. By the time we presented the "Baruch Plan" on atomic energy "Cold War positions were already frozen."[103]

In the spring of 1970 Gardner published a second book, a gallery of portraits of Americans responsible for our share in the origins of the cold war. William Bullitt appears, violently anti-Soviet but Gardner

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[100] William Appleman Williams, "Rise of an American World Power Complex" in Neal D. Houghton, ed., *Struggle Against History* (New York, 1968), pp. 1-19; William Appleman Williams, *The Roots of the Modern American Empire* (New York, 1969).

[101] Lloyd C. Gardner, *Economic Aspects of New Deal Diplomacy* (Madison, Wisconsin, 1964), pp. 263-94.

[102] *Ibid.*, pp. 302-18.

[103] *Ibid.*, pp. 319-25.

fails to show that he was of any impact during this period. F. D. R. stands accused of trying to make reality conform to the Atlantic Charter, a charge for which there is some basis but which hardly brands him a cold warrior. Harry Truman disappears among his strong-willed advisers, Gardner seeking once again to find Truman involved in economic expansion. Byrnes is presented as an advocate of tough public diplomacy and Will Clayton more realistically as a believer in the growth of American trade. George Marshall is shown only in his hopeless mission to China, a topic handled with infinitely greater knowledge and skill by Tang Tsou. Bernard Baruch vanishes into our preoccupation with American control of atomic energy, but Gardner nails down Dean Acheson as a manufacturer of mantles of holiness with which we covered crass goals. Two other incisive chapters summarize Lucius Clay's role in the rebuilding of Germany, portray the near-psychotic anti-Soviet Forrestal, and show us George Kennan as almost equally anti-Soviet but balanced in personality and politics and therefore upset at the results of his "X" article.[104]

Finally, Gardner claims that we could have avoided "the worst moments of the cold war" if we had been decent about economic aid to the U.S.S.R., had guaranteed permanent German disarmament, and had approached the Russians sooner and more directly on atomic energy. Instead, "against the fear of revolution, the United States erected a barrier built upon the Bretton Woods system and anchored by the British loan."[105] Gardner is far more reliable than Williams in his use of evidence; his problem is an apparent unwillingness to give adequate weight to non-economic factors in men's minds.

D. F. Fleming's *The Cold War and Its Origins* is also well documented, but most of its footnotes refer to secondary sources and Fleming made heavy use of newspapers. In attitude, Fleming is a good pupil of the late James T. Shotwell, believing in a good world and writing with missionary zeal to help avoid a third and presumably nuclear world war.[106]

Fleming begins with western opposition to Soviet Russia: horror at the very existence of a Bolshevik government, the intervention of 1918-

[104] Lloyd C. Gardner, *Architects of Illusion: Men and Ideas in American Foreign Policy, 1941-1949* (Chicago, 1970). See also Tang Tsou, *America's Failure in China, 1941-1950* (Chicago, 1963), pp. 349-440.

[105] Gardner, *Architects*, pp. 301-18.

[106] Fleming, *Cold War*, I, xii-xiv.

1920, ostracism of Russia between the wars, trying to turn Hitler against Russia at Munich. Russia's response, the expedient alliance with Germany, seizure of territory in Poland, the Baltic region and Rumania, produced further western anger which was only partly cooled by the German attack on Russia in 1941.[107]

Fleming grants that western aid was of crucial importance to Russia, but says that the West's reluctance to confirm Russia's 1941 frontiers led Stalin to depend instead on the Red Army—which won "much wider and deeper guarantees in eastern Europe...." This was self-defeat by the West, which lost a chance to set limits to Russian expansion. The U.S.S.R. was also upset by continued postponement of a real second front. Fleming's account of these matters is marred by an anti-British bias and a lack of strategic sense as to what the West could or could not do, given its resources in 1942-1943.[108]

The tale of Yalta betrays further Fleming's indignation. He finds "historically justified" the moving of millions of Germans to create "a strong Poland, both industrially and agriculturally," without recognizing the fact that Poland's twenty million people were not going to be a strong country. In viewing "unsurpassed suffering" of the Ukraine and Byelorussia, true enough in itself, which made it difficult to deny their claims to seats in the proposed U.N. Fleming ignoring both the facts that they were out of place in an association of independent nations and the real reason for Stalin's insistence upon their being seated—the alarming amount of anti-Soviet sentiment revealed there in 1941.[109]

After Yalta came the clash; we expected the Russians to "accept our way of life in Poland and the Balkans," including the impossible act of allowing free elections. The clash was exacerbated by Churchill's intervention in Greece and Russia's overthrow of reactionary regimes in eastern Europe.[110]

Roosevelt, Fleming thinks, could have prevented the cold war, but Truman

> was quick to *maximize* the difficulties and to be tough with the Russians. He was soon engaged in what would have been

[107] *Ibid.*, I, 3-137.

[108] *Ibid.*, I, 139-70.

[109] *Ibid.*, I, 199-203.

[110] *Ibid.*, I, 208-11.

> inconceivable to Roosevelt—an attempt to "contain" and encircle the Soviet Union with arms, alliances and bases....

Why? Truman was a belligerent personality surrounded by anti-Soviet advisers and pushed to the right by such powerful congressional leaders as Arthur Vandenberg.[111]

Russia, too, emerged from the war with self-confidence, having overcome the worst that could be thrown against it. Russian policy, says Fleming, included "a sincere offer of cooperation with the world" in the U.N. but also security measures in eastern Europe. Polish intransigence, Red Army brutality and the creation of satellites upset the West and led to mutual recriminations. This was made worse by the U. S. monopoly of atomic power and worse yet by both sides' use of a double standard. Each expected the other to acquiesce in its organization of part of Europe but not to organize the other part of Europe.[112]

By the autumn of 1945 America and Russia were going separate ways on the crucial issue of atomic energy and in the winter came a dispute over Iran in which the West forced Russia out of a region of vital Russian interests. At the same time came Churchill's Iron Curtain speech, which Fleming accuses Truman of instigating, basing his charge solely upon Truman's determination to quit "babying" the Soviets. But the result was fury in Moscow and toughness became the response of East and West to each other. Truman fired Henry Wallace for seeking better relations with Russia, illustrating Fleming's contention that Americans and Russians wanted peace but their leaders could not agree on the terms of peace.[113]

Caught in the grip of what Robert M. Hutchins called "tribal self-adoration," the U. S. created the Truman Doctrine that it *"must"* support free peoples who were resisting attempts subjugation. This response to guerrilla war in Greece and pressure on Turkey Fleming regards as the declaration of the cold war. After the U. S. proposed and Russia rejected the Marshall Plan, the U. S. S. R., too, accepted the world as divided into two opposing camps. The coup in Prague in February, 1948, smashed what had been a bridge between East and West.[114]

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[111] *Ibid.*, I, 214-16, 266-84.

[112] *Ibid.*, I, 219-62, 285, 308-30.

[113] *Ibid.*, I, 330-423.

[114] *Ibid.*, I, 415, 438-96; see also Josef Korbel, *The Communist Subversion of Czechoslovakia, 1938-1948* (Princeton, 1959).

There followed the hardest phase of the cold war, with western demands for containment or even preventive war, further Anglo-American cooperation in Germany, the Berlin blockade and airlift, the creation of NATO, Russia's atomic bomb, American work on the fusion bomb, and blind reaction inside both camps—Russia's expulsion of Tito from the Cominform and attempts to overthrow him, and McCarthyism in America.[115]

Fleming often imitated Williams in picking and choosing his evidence. But he had intriguing ideas and enormous scope, inspiring Fred Cook's study of the "warfare state" and possibly helping push ex-banker Warburg farther left.[116]

Attracting much more attention has been Gar Alperovitz's *Atomic Diplomacy,* which contends that Harry Truman decided on a showdown with Russia, tried the pressure of Lend-Lease and troop positions in Europe, found these unsatisfactory, and then delayed a real showdown until the U. S. had possession of the atomic bomb. Then he used the bomb on Japan not to end the war but to overawe the Russians.[117]

One basic flaw in *Atomic Diplomacy* is its narrow concentration on American policy, an approach which makes Alperovitz unaware of realities in Moscow or Tokyo. A second flaw is that the reader is introduced to an automatically anti-Soviet Harry Truman. One infers that American pride and assumptions of superiority, plus anti-Soviet advisers pushed Truman in this direction, but there is a strong impression left that Truman perversely decided to be tough.[118]

A third flaw is Alperovitz's misuse of evidence. He thinks Truman felt himself little bound by the terms of Lend-Lease legislation, but his citations in the Potsdam Conference papers prove the opposite—that Truman *did* recognize Lend-Lease as being a wartime measure. Moreover, Alperovitz ignores strong congressional attitudes, which were

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[115] Fleming, *Cold War,* 1, 449-540. See also Fleming's "Can *Pax Americana* Succeed?" *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science,* Vol. 360 (Jul., 1965), pp. 127-38.

[116] Fred J. Cook, *The Warfare State* (New York, 1962), pp. 68-87; James P. Warburg, *The United States in the Postwar World* (New York, 1966), pp. 11-63.

[117] Gar Alperovitz, *Atomic Diplomacy: Hiroshima and Potsdam* (New York, 1965, 1967).

[118] *Ibid.,* pp. 13-14, 19-33.

bound to have impact on the former Senator Truman. Finally, an important recent article using the Stettinius papers and other such manuscripts reveals not only the legal limits of Lend-Lease but the fact that Stettinius and Harriman wanted no showdown with Russia until after the U.N. conference at San Francisco. The Truman decision on Lend-Lease was to deliver not only what the U. S. S. R. needed for the Pacific War but also industrial plants partially delivered. Bureaucrats fearful of congressional pressure turned ships back, shocking not only Stettinius and Harriman but Will Clayton, who is often cited as a proponent of economic pressure against the Soviet Union.[119]

Alperovitz asserts that Truman then sought to delay the Potsdam meeting until the atomic bomb was ready. He dismisses as "impossibly weak" Truman's explanation to Churchill of preparing a budget message, ignoring all the domestic problems that clamored for a President's attention.[120] Roosevelt had put most of his dwindling energy into the war, peace was approaching and with it endless problems of reconversion, and Truman's own major interests had been domestic.

Another major Alperovitz point is Truman's being "tremendously pepped up" by word of the successful atomic test at Alamogordo and that Truman's manner at the Potsdam conference tabled changed abruptly once he had read the full report of the bomb's power. He became more confident and blunt. Robert Murphy testifies to a change in that direction. Yet, if one goes to the Potsdam minutes one finds Truman perhaps talking a bit more than at previous meetings but not enough or boldly enough to support Churchill's remark that ". . . he was a changed man . . . generally bossed the whole meeting." Alperovitz himself admits that at the first plenary session at Potsdam,

> In striking contrast to Roosevelt, who had habitually allowed Stalin and Churchill to take the lead, Truman confidently produced detailed American proposals for the broad range of issues he intended to discuss during the Conference. Take up Eastern Europe, the President bluntly asserted. . . .[121]

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[119] *Ibid.*, p. 39; *FRUS: Potsdam*, I, 818-19; II, 341, 1184-85; *Vandenberg Papers*, pp. 66-74, 161, 167; George C. Herring, Jr., "Lend-Lease to Russia and the Origins of the Cold War, 1944-1945," *Journal of American History*, LVI (Jun., 1969), 93-114.

[120] Alperovitz, *Atomic Diplomacy*, pp. 55-68.

[121] *Ibid.*, pp. 127, 147-52; Murphy, *Diplomat Among Warriors*, p. 273; *FRUS: Potsdam*, II, 86-98, 116-37, 203-21, 225.

Alperovitz must ultimately stand or fall on the use of the atomic bomb at Hiroshima and Nagasaki. "From any rational military point of view," he says, Japan was beaten. But his discussion of the end of the Pacific war ignores Japanese sources, accepts as "overt and explicit" the ambiguous Japanese peace feelers, fails to mention Japanese preparations for meeting an invasion with over 10,000 *Kamikaze* aircraft, and ignores the deadlock in the Japanese Supreme War Council *after* both atomic bombs and the Russian declaration of war — a deadlock broken by Prime Minister Kantaro Suzuki's arrangements with Emperor Hirohito. Small wonder that Herbert Feis says of *Atomic Diplomacy,*

> The conclusion is reached by ignoring the total pertinent historical circumstance and concentrating on diverse fragments in memoirs and diaries which can be read to fit preconceptions.[122]

The most recent synthesis is Gabriel Kolko's *The Politics of War,* doing for the second world war what Arno Mayer has done for the first one.[123] Kolko builds a picture of a war-wrecked Europe in which the prewar social system was disintegrating and the Left was emerging as the strongest single political force. The West wondered if the U. S. S. R. were behind the Left and by 1943 the assurance of victory revealed that old hatreds were not dead between East and West. Kolko says that the U. S. S. R. actually restrained as much of the Left as it controlled, Tito and Mao being free agents, but the U. S. considered all blocs that it did not dominate as undermining its objectives for "an integrated world capitalism," or, Williams' open world. Coalition had come only from a common need to defeat a common enemy, now Americans saw evidence of Communist expansion and shifted priorities to containment of the dual menace of the European Left and the U. S. S. R.[124]

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[122] Alperovitz, *Atomic Diplomacy,* pp. 106-19, 176-92; see also Kase, *Journey to the Missouri;* Feis, *The Atomic Bomb and the End of World War II,* p. 202n; Robert J. C. Butow, *Japan's Decision to Surrender* (Stanford, 1954); Louis Morton, "The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb," *Foreign Affairs,* XXXV (Jan., 1957), 334-53.

[123] Gabriel Kolko, *The Politics of War: The World and United States Foreign Policy, 1943-1945* (New York, 1968); Arno J. Mayer, *Political Origins of the New Diplomacy, 1917-1918* (New Haven, 1959) and *Politics and Diplomacy of Peacemaking: Containment and Counter-revolution at Versailles, 1918-1919* (New York, 1967).

[124] Kolko, *Politics of War,* pp. 3-37, 618-21.

Kolko handles evidence much more judiciously than Alperovitz and avoids the latter's blunders by placing American foreign policy in the only setting in which it makes sense—the world it had to deal with. His distortions lie in two areas. The first is Anglo-American relations. Properly, he sees the U. S. as opposed to a British dominated West Europe block, but he misses what McNeill had described, the intimate connections through the Joint Boards of the two countries' wartime economies. He also accuses Britain of opposing a second front in France and of putting political goals above military victory, but provides no evidence for this.[125] His second distortion is in going beyond the available evidence in arguing that America was determined to have its way in an open world.

But normally Kolko is meticulous and he reminds us of much that has been forgotten: "the Polish suicide complex" of Sikorski and his associates who believed their country to be a great power and sought to make it head of a bloc of East European states; America knowing the kind of economic world it wanted and making elaborate arrangements for postwar trade, as in the International Monetary Fund; America having only the vaguest political goals and simply opposing spheres of influence, seeking control of the U.N. through the veto and a Latin American bloc, and then throwing a curtain of moral rhetoric around the whole business; the fascist quality of most prewar regimes in eastern Europe, which meant that Anglo-American political traditions were irrelevant there and also that the U. S. S. R. could not reasonably permit a return to 1938 ways.[126]

Kolko sees Truman as carrying out Roosevelt's policies in a harsh, undiplomatic manner, using the atomic bomb to end the war rather than frighten the Russians. But he thinks America preceived the European Left and the U. S. S. R. as far greater threats than they really were. Since we had set a precedent in our exclusive handling of Italian and French politics after liberation, the Russians followed suit in east-

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[125] *Ibid.*, pp. 7, 21-5; McNeill, *America, Britain, Russia,* pp. 118-50; for an example of Churchill's motives see Feis, *Churchill,* p. 202n; for the plight of America and Britain in 1941-1943 see Henry H. Adams, *1942: The Year That Doomed the Axis* (New York, 1967); Winston S. Churchill, *The Second World War, IV: The Hinge of Fate* (Boston, 1950); Eisenhower, *Crusade in Europe,* pp. 16-30; Forrest C. Pogue, *George C. Marshall, II: Ordeal and Hope, 1939-1942* (New York, 1966).

[126] Kolko, *Politics of War,* pp. 99-121, 167, 242-79, 404-20.

ern Europe and did not understand our objections. The combination of old hatreds and fears with new misunderstandings were enough to convince each of the other's bad intentions. Kolko's verdict on Yalta is a good one for his view of World War II: "betrayal . . . was really a deflation of the illusions cultivated . . . ."[127]

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Is there any newer or better way to look at all this? Modified New Left views have been disappointing. Walter LaFeber, too, occasionally distorts evidence, writing that

> Truman delivered a speech larded with references to America's monopoly of atomic power. In one sentence the President attacked Russia's tightening hold in Eastern Europe: it is one of the "fundamentals" of American policy, Truman announced, that "We shall refuse to recognize any government imposed upon any nation by the force of any foreign power.[128]

But if one reads the entire Truman speech of October 27, 1945, one finds the President adding eleven other "fundamentals" which said that we sought no expansion, had no plans for aggression, wanted all nations to have equal access to trade and raw materials, and would work through the United Nations. Moreover, his references to atomic power were to the effect that the U. S. would not use it and wanted international control of it.[129]

Fred Warner Neal, writing a modified Williams approach, did better by contributing the psychological insight that America rejected the "real world," becoming so obsessed with what the Russians might do that we developed "a set of apocrypha" to explain all events by means of a Soviet conspiracy.[130] The *reductio ad absurdum* of this has been the John Birch society.

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[127] *Ibid.,* pp. 38-96, 128-31, 368, 381-82, 436-56.

[128] Walter LaFeber, *America, Russia, and the Cold War* (New York, 1967), p. 1.

[129] *Truman Papers: 1945,* pp. 431-38.

[130] Fred Warner Neal, "The Cold War in Europe, 1945-1967," in Houghton, *Struggle Against History,* pp. 20-40. For a summary of the Williams-Alperovitz approach, see Barton J. Bernstein, ed., *Politics and Policies of the Truman Administration* (Chicago, 1970).

For those who want to begin their own research, Arnold Kaufman has identified the biases of various approaches, Norman Graebner has reviewed recent literature, and Robert Divine has collected a bibliography on World War II and it's aftermath.[131] But for our own new model let us take the outline of the most elegantly written work in the field, Louis J. Halle's *The Cold War as History*. Halle's tone is wistful as he shows people "struggling like Laocoon with the enveloping problems of the day," and there seems an inevitability in his tale. Indeed, he says,

> If you put a scorpion and a tarantula together in a bottle the objective of their own self-preservation will impell them to fight each other to the death. For the moment, at least, no understanding between them is possible. If either stopped fighting he would immediately be killed. From the point of view of each, the basic situation is that the other is trying to kill him. . . . The situation is tragic. The proper attitude for the observer, therefore, is one of sympathy for both parties.[132]

Are the United States and the Soviet Union scorpion and tarantula?

Halle begins with "the behavior of Moscow as a reflection of Russia's historic experience." Experts of widely varying shades of opinion and of different academic approaches agree with him. There is in the borderline States of Russia a xenophobia created by centuries of devasting invasions. As a result of insecurity and the nationalism of a vigorous people there is an old tradition of expansion and an equally old tradition of absolutism. Ideology enters at two points: the ancient sense of Russia's mission as the "Third Rome" and a newer vision of Russia as leader of a movement toward Communism. Stalin's own paranoid personality reinforced these tendencies. Moreover, these same tendencies were a trap, causing Russian leaders to preceive the West as more hostile even

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[131] Arnold S. Kaufman, "The Cold War in Retrospect" in Irving Howe, ed., *A Dissenter's Guide to Foreign Policy* (New York, 1968), pp. 65-94; Norman A. Graebner, "Cold War Origins and Continuing Debate: a Review of Recent Literature," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, XIII (Mar., 1969), 123-32; Robert A. Divine, ed., *Causes and Consequences of World War II* (Chicago, 1969), pp. 31-44.

[132] Louis J. Halle, *The Cold War as History* (New York, 1967), pp. xii-xiii.

than it was and, in Barrington Moore's words, making "it almost impossible to believe in the friendly intentions of American leaders."[133]

To avoid facing these facts is, as Fred Warner Neal would put it, to reject the real world. But it would also be rejection of the real world to ignore American attitudes which are what Halle calls "a reflection of experience opposite to that of the Russians."[134]

Americans have their own notions of the unreliability of foreigners, descended as we are from immigrants who fled the Old World's evils. We have had a sense of being different from the rest of mankind and morally superior to it. We early adopted a double standard that "deeds wrong in themselves when done by other peoples, become perfectly permissible when done by the United States." It was not imperialism for us to annex overseas territory because our purposes were philanthropic. We oversimplified the world into the good, seeking peace, and the evil, aggressors who started wars. Arthur Ekirch, who is far from the New Left, comments that by 1945 we were "supremely confident of America's strength . . . ill-prepared to accept any forthcoming challenge to United States world leadership," especially by "new revolutionary forces." Indeed, "in the fervor of their recent conversion from isolationism to internationalism, the American public was all too frequently blind to the fact that their own new views often only projected older nationalistic prejudices upon a world stage."[135]

Halle contends that after the war "for the moment, the United States was without a workable foreign policy." The public wanted our soldiers brought home and demobilized, the Senate wanted to resume its role

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[133] *Ibid.*, pp. 10-19; Wright, *A Foreign Policy,* pp. 26-29; Dean, *U. S. and Russia,* pp. 36-79; Mosely, "Aspects of Russian Expansion," Barrington Moore, ed. *Soviet Politics* (Cambridge, Mass., 1951), pp. 370-1; Roberts, *Russia and America,* pp. 58-60; George F. Kennan, *Russia and the West Under Lenin and Stalin* (Boston, 1961), pp. 387-93; Frederick L. Schuman, *The Cold War* (Baton Rouge, 1967), pp. 10-23; Adam B. Ulam, *Expansion and Coexistence: The History of Soviet Foreign Policy.*

[134] Halle, *Cold War,* p. 20.

[135] *Ibid.*, pp. 20-29; Charles O. Lerche, *Foreign Policy of the American People* (Englewood Cliffs, N. J., 1967), pp. 108-19; Robert W. Tucker, *The Just War* (Baltimore, 1960), pp. 11-28; Arthur Ekirch, Jr., *Ideas, Ideals, and American Diplomacy* (New York, 1966), 171-72; for a general treatment of American division of the world into good and evil see Halle, *Dream and Reality.*

of watchdog over foreign policy, a national debt of $275 billion meant close scrutiny of budgets. Military spending was pared down sharply even in requests by the Army and Navy, and the Congress was interested in cutting even more. As late as June, 1947, all major contracts for long-range missiles were cancelled and missile research would remain negligible until the early 1950's.[136]

As to America's wish for an open world, we have hunted profits in foreign trade since the colony of Virginia first exported a leaf of tobacco or since the colony of Massachusetts sent its first shipload of fish to Europe. But even Gardner admits that freedom of trade was not to be for America only; all nations were to have equal opportunity. Moreover, American assumptions were that an international economy freed of government controls would be the most efficient one possible, that it would serve all nations' interests equally well, that the many nations' economic interests were in the long run fundamentally harmonious. There is no sinister plot in this, but merely erroneous judgments. New Left writers also err in emphasizing the executive branch, for Congress had its own ideas which acted as a latent veto on a loan to Russia and which kept the executive on a short tether with only brief renewals of the Trade Agreements Act.[137]

America in 1945 could not decide on the role of power. While demobilizing our armed forces, in October, 1945, Truman asked for Universal Military Training as a permanent measure. In the same month he spoke of the Golden Rule as our guide, and added,

> I think Russia has been badly misrepresented in this country, as we have been badly misrepresented in Russia.... We have always been friends, and I hope we always will be.[138]

Given these mixed attitudes, how did Russo-American trouble begin?

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[136] Halle, *Cold War,* p. 102; Reitzel *et al, U. S. Foreign Policy,* p. 91; Edward A. Kolodziej, *The Uncommon Defense and Congress, 1941-1963* (Columbus, Ohio, 1966), pp. 38-64.

[137] Gardner, *New Deal Diplomacy,* pp. 287-88; William Y. Elliott *et al, The Political Economy of American Foreign Policy* (New York, 1955), pp. 206-9; Thomas G. Paterson, "The Abortive American Loan to Russia and the Origins of the Cold War, 1943-1946," *Journal of American History,* LVI (Jun., 1969), 70-92; William G. Carleton, *The Revolution in American Foreign Policy* (New York, 1957), p. 32; for what Stettinius, Acheson and Clayton actually said see Goodrich and Carroll, eds., *Documents,* pp. 28-39, 467-79, 485-99.

[138] *Truman Papers; 1945,* pp. 380-87, 404-13.

World War II was obviously a three-cornered war. Each of the major allies entered it in a different way, Britain because of Neville Chamberlain's frustration at being swindled by Hitler and to seek a new balance of power; Russia by attack from Germany, once more fighting off a western invasion; the U. S. by Japanese attack but really because of its partnership with Britain and sympathy for China. Each nation fought its own war.

One point upon which right, center and left all agree is that mutual suspicion was thinly concealed during the war, hostility emerging at real or imagined grievances. The U. S. S. R. declined to recognize the difficulties of a second front in France[139] and the New Left joins it in suspicion of British motives, though the British strategy of opening the Mediterranean fitted western capabilities and weakened Germany sufficiently for the Normandy invasion to be a swift success.[140] The U. S. S. R. also failed to appreciate fully the contribution of Lend-Lease and it is worth noting that in the spring of 1945 when American suspicion was rapidly growing we increased deliveries to Russia while cutting them to other countries.[141]

Franklin Roosevelt had always "played by ear," seeking to keep freedom of action, all possible options open, as was his basic political style. His foreign policy goals remained vague, his attitudes toward Russia were ambivalent to his dying day. But Stalin knew him and, despite inevitable misgivings,[142] found it possible to deal with him. Truman was entirely different. Not nearly as smooth as Roosevelt, he could be as blunt as any Soviet leader, and lacked experience in foreign affairs. Moreover, he often botched administrative matters in his early months in the White House, permitting misunderstandings to arise or

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[139] Standley, *Admiral Ambassador,* pp. 271, 274, 282, 467; see also references in note 138 above.

[140] See Churchill, *The Second World War;* Bryant, *Turn of the Tide;* Bryant, *Triumph in the West.*

[141] Robert H. Jones, *The Roads to Russia: United States Lend-Lease to the Soviet Union* (Norman, Oklahoma, 1969); Goodrich and Carroll, eds., *Documents,* p. 152.

[142] James McGregor Burns, *Roosevelt: The Lion and the Fox* (New York, 1956); Robert McNeal, "Roosevelt Through Stalin's Spectacles," *International Journal* (Toronto), XVIII (Spring, 1963), 194-205.

to grow worse.[143] While it is clear that he used the atomic bomb primarily to insure a quick Japanese surrender rather than to threaten the U. S. S. R., it also appears probable that the change in the White House was upsetting to the Russians.

Walter LaFeber sees another point: the movement of fleets and armies toward the defeat of Germany and Japan put American and British forces in positions from which the Axis had threatened the Soviet Union. Given the Russian attitudes toward the West, the trap in which Soviet leaders could never really trust the West, it was inevitable that they became intensely suspicious of western motives. Between August and November, 1945, Mikhail Kalinin, president of the Supreme Soviet, and Foreign Minister Molotov both warned Russians that their country was still alone in a world of enemies. The Russian press followed suit.[144]

In this context of hostility there were real problems. The bourgeois Poles had been defeated in their attempt to create a great Poland, leaving a bad taste in American and Russian mouths.[145] A civil war raged in Greece, perhaps based on old internal troubles left unsolved by repressive governments but with communist involvement now. While direct evidence was lacking, the U. S. S. R. and the Greek communist party used similar arguments and there was aid from Tito and Bulgaria.[146] The U. S. S. R. was obviously marking out a sphere of influence in Azerbaijan in northern Iran,[147] and great power cooperation broke down in Germany. *Le Canard Enchaine* (Paris) quipped, "At Potsdam, the Germans divided the Allies into four zones."[148]

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[143] Truman, *Memoirs*, I; Lilienthal, *Atomic Years*, p. 7.

[144] LaFeber, *America, Russia*, pp. 1, 23; McNeill, *America, Britain, Russia*, pp. 653-4.

[145] Martin F. Herz, *Beginnings of the Cold War* (Bloomington, Indiana, 1966); for a New Left review of Herz see Gar Alperovitz, "How Did the Cold War Begin?" *New York Review of Books*, VIII (Mar. 23, 1967), 6-12.

[146] L. S. Stavrianos, *Greece: American Dilemma and Opportunity* (Chicago, 1952); D. George Kousoulas, *Revolution and Defeat: The Story of the Greek Communist Party* (London, 1965), *Balkan Studies* VIII (1967), 225-296.

[147] Lincoln Bloomfield and Amelia C. Leiss, *Controlling Small Wars* (New York, 1969), pp. 55-75.

[148] Clay, *Decision in Germany;* John L. Snell, *Wartime Origins of the East-West Dilemma Over Germany* (New Orleans, 1959); Carr, *Truman, Stalin*, p. 67.

Ambiguity was the pattern through 1946. Finland and Czechoslovakia remained free, Hungary apparently so, the Red Army evacuated Iran; but the foreign ministers wrangled whenever they met, vetoes became the style in the U.N. Security Council, and the Greek and German problems remained troublesome. During the year came an escalation of words.

On February 9, 1946 Stalin warned Russians that the recent war had been "the inevitable result of . . . world economic and political forces on the basis of modern monopoly capitalism." It was impossible to avoid such wars "under present capitalist conditions . . . ."[149] A month later Churchill delivered his Iron Curtain speech. In February George Kennan's long telegram (the "X" article) had arrived from Moscow and some worried American policy makers thought that it was what we had been looking for.

We now had a theoretical base for our foreign policy that led us to the Truman Doctrine[150] and Marshall Plan. They in turn led to a Soviet reaction and our counter-reaction, NATO. But as Kennan admits containment got out of hand. In an orthodox liberal view of the cold war, Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., warns us of "the classical revisionist fallacy—the assumption of the rationality . . . of states" even when they are in the grip of ideology. Halle adds that "ideologically minded societies are given to a rhetoric of generalization that . . . is absolute and universal." It may not be intended for use, but this rhetoric scares others who may think that one *does* mean it.[151]

We wind up with what Reinhold Niebuhr calls "the mythical distortion of the adversary's expansiveness, . . . singling out the most unacceptable motive, such as the exploitative." But the "mythical

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[149] Alvin Z. Rubinstein, ed., *The Foreign Policy of the Soviet Union* (New York, 1960), pp. 221-23.

[150] Joseph M. Jones, *The Fifteen Weeks* (New York, 1955).

[151] Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., "Origins of the Cold War," *Foreign Affairs,* XLVI (October, 1967), 22-52; Halle, *Cold War,* p. 159.

distortion of one's own expansiveness . . . consists in singling out the missionary motive, rather than the exploitative or power motive."[152]

The U. S. and the U. S. S. R., building on old fears made new, saw each other's worst and ignored each other's better impulses, while each one reassured itself that its own deeds were pure. Caught in this predicament they are not scorpion and tarantula, fighting by instinct, but rather two victims of hysterical paralysis sitting in wheelchairs. They are able to hurl epithets at each other, but while there is no organic block to their reaching out to each other such an outreach has become functionally impossible.

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[152] Reinhold Niebuhr, "The Social Myths in the 'Cold War,'" in John C. Farrell and Asa P. Smith, eds., *Image and Reality in World Politics* (New York, 1968), pp. 40-56.

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FOREWORD

The papers contained in this issue were delivered as speeches at Kennesaw Junior College in Marietta, Georgia on April 30, 1971 during the course of a symposium on changing values in American society. Sponsored jointly by the Cobb County Medical Society, Kennesaw Junior College, the Cobb Judicial Circuit Bar Association, and the Marietta-Smyrna Ministerial Association, *Symposium '71* represented an effort to evaluate from a variety of perspectives the impact of the revolutionary changes now occurring in the American value system.

This symposia also included a paper by Dr. Margaret Mead entitled "The Revolution in Values—An Overview." It was given as a banquet address at the Regency Hyatt House on Friday evening, April 30, 1971. Because of other commitments by her, that article does not appear here. Earlier symposia titles beginning with the first in 1966 are as follows: "Law—Moral, Medical, Civic—Man's Responsibility;" "Eastern and Western Views of Man," 1967; "Human Sexuality," 1968; "The Progress of Man Towards the Year 2000," 1969; and "Frontiers of the Mind," 1970. Copies of these may be obtained from the Cobb County Medical Society, 737 Church Street, Marietta, Ga., 30060, for a nominal fee.

The *Studies in the Social Sciences* is an organ of the Division of Social Sciences, at West Georgia College. This publication was privileged to carry the symposia proceedings this year. Upon request, copies of this journal are provided free of charge to institutions of higher learning throughout the United States and abroad. The regular distribution is to all institutions of higher learning in Georgia, the five largest universities in each souther state, and approximately one hundred high schools throughout Georgia.

The editorial staff wishes to express appreciation to the members of the *Symposium '71* Committee for their assistance in preparing this edition. Special thanks are due to Dr. Noah D. Meadows, Jr., Chairman of the Board of Trustees of the Cobb County Symposia, Inc. whose enthusiastic support for this project proved invaluable to its consumation.

Eugene R. Huck, *Editor*
Roald Mykkeltvedt, *Assistant Editor*

"JUSTICE YE SHALL PURSUE"

By TOM CLARK*

About 150 years ago Daniel Webster elaborated a little bit on the ancient Biblical command of "Justice, ye shall pursue," by saying that justice is the first interest of man on earth. And certainly so it is today. But it is nothing new because it has been the great interest of man on earth for many centuries. We hear much today that the system is too slow; that the Establishment is on the other side; that it is America against America. I trust this conflict is on a philosophical basis, and not on a physical one. Some have a tendency to put it on a physical basis which is a great mistake. Their error is more compounded because change can be—indeed, has been—brought about within the system itself. It shall first be my purpose to bring you just a few instances of change that have occurred during the lifetimes of most living Americans—changes that have been phenomenal.

You know well the changes in science, in communication, and in transportation. I am sure that if I were to have told my father that I would one day be able to see on a screen someone speaking simultaneously in India, he would have thought that I should be sent to a mental asylum for safekeeping. But today television is an actuality which we take for granted—it is "old stuff." Justice and law likewise are too frequently regarded as "old stuff!" Many people think justice just occurs and they do not have to do anything to preserve and promote it. That is one of the greatest mistakes that we make today. Behind that traffic light that appears when you cross the street is a whole phalanx of a constabulary, and of the court system, that causes the electricity that changes that bell to have real force and authority. If that electricity and that bell and light did not have that force and authority, it would break down the system, and therefore would bring chaos insofar as traffic is concerned.

Now we have made great progress in law. I am going to allude to just three phases of law in which we have made significant advances in recent decades. First, consider criminal law, because criminal law is the closest to all of us. I hope and I know you hope that it never will touch you, that the knock will not come to your door. But in order that if it does come, that knock will be an orderly knock, we must protect every door, and every person who is behind that door. Those doors are only as secure as is the weakest door of anyone's house regardless of his station in life or the amount of money that he may have in the bank.

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*Former Associate Justice of the U. S. Supreme Court.

When I went on the Court about 21 years ago, we did not permit a defendant to have a transcript of the record of his trial. Now when you think about it, that is an amazing thing. How could a person appeal a case intelligently unless he had a record of the proceedings at his trial? Of course, if he had the money to buy a transcript, he could get it very easily. In the case of *Griffin v. Illinois* (1957) the court rectified this injustice by holding that Griffin was entitled to have a record even though he could not pay for it—that the state had to provide a free transcript for appellate purpose. Following this decision, indigent defendants began to get free trial records in other states.

Before long, however, defendants asked, "What is the use of having a record?" if a person has little or no knowledge of the law he can hardly be expected to tell from the transcript of his trial whether or not he was convicted by due process of law. Using this reasoning, persons convicted of crimes began petitioning the Supreme Court to provide free defense counsel for indigent defendants. Prior to that time by *Betts v. Brady* (1947), we required that states provide free defense counsel for indigents in capital cases, but not necessarily in felony or misdemeanor cases. Eventually, in *Gideon v. Wainwright* (1963) the court reversed this position by holding that all persons accused of felonies were entitled to defense counsel—that the state must provide free counsel for any penniless defendant.

Almost immediately, the court was asked to decide at what point in the criminal proceedings an accused should have the advice and counsel of a defense attorney. Defendants in state criminal cases quite properly observed that the presence of a defense counsel at their trial was of little benefit to them if the police had secured a confession from them prior to the trial. If an accused does not know his rights he may, under duress, confess to a crime he did not commit. The court quickly responded to the logic of this agrument in the cases of *Escobedo v. Illinois* (1964), and *Miranda v. Arizona* (1966). As a result of these rulings in these cases, police must now issue a four-pronged warning to any person taken into custody before interrogating him: that he is entitled to a lawyer; that he may demand that counsel will be provided if he can not afford to hire his own attorney; that he may demand that counsel be present during interrogation; and that anything he says can be used against him in a court of law.

This was regarded as a revolutionary development in the field of criminal law. We heard many cries of outrage and anguish from police officials throughout the country. I recall, for example, attending the Convention of the International Chiefs of Police in St. Louis following the *Miranda* decision. I had been asked to address the delegates and present various awards for distinguished achievements. The President of the State Bar Association met me at the airport to warn me that I might

expect a hostile reception—that the delegates to the convention believed the court had handcuffed the police and contributed to the rising crime rate. During the course of our conversation I asked him if *Miranda* had significantly reduced the number of confessions obtained by police in his state. He indicated that the decision had very little impact on the confession rate—that despite the advice of counsel to remain silent, persons accused of crimes often felt compelled to relieve their consciences by admitting their guilt. To illustrate, he cited one case in which the accused had secured the aid of a public defender immediately after being taken into custody at 2:00 a. m. The attorney advised him of his rights and told him to remain silent. At 10:00 a. m. the defense counsel returned to confer with his client only to discover that he had voluntarily confessed to 27 burglaries in the interim. When the astonished lawyer asked him why he had ignored his advice, the accused responded that he just wanted to get it off his chest.

This is not an isolated incident. In the surveys that we have made since *Miranda,* we have found all the way from New Haven to Los Angeles that the number of confessions has increased. For a while after *Miranda* they diminished by about 10%, but they went up after about six months. We have had other fruits from *Miranda.* One of them is that criminal detection has been improved. Now, of course, we have spent millions of dollars since *Miranda*—about 500 million last year alone—on improving techniques of criminal detection. But that case has done more to improve the techniques of criminal detection than all the money that we have expended because it taught the police one thing—that is, that a confession is suspect. You may lose this confession when it goes to trial. There may be some fault in it. Before *Miranda* when police got a confession they generally closed a case from an investigative standpoint. Why investigate anymore? The defendant has confessed. But after *Miranda,* police knew that a confession could well be thrown out, and consequently they continued the investigation to secure supportive evidence. We find now that more cases are prosecuted on testimony that has been secured from investigations after confessions are made than they are on the confessions themselves.

The second area of law in which we have made tremendous progress concerns the right to vote and to have one's vote count. Prior to our decision in *Baker v. Carr* (1962), state governments had not generally required that either state legislative districts or Congressional districts be equal in terms of population. This meant, in particular, that persons living in urban areas were not as well represented either at the state or national levels as persons living in rural areas. When urban voters brought their case to court as in *Colegrove v. Green* (1947), and asked that they be granted a more equitable voice in our state and national legislative assemblies, they were told that this was not a legal issue that could be resolved by judicial orders—it was a political issue which must

be settled by the very legislative assemblies which were dominated by rural representatives. In the *Baker* case we changed this ruling and declared that courts could hear and decide such cases. Subsequently, in *Reynolds v. Sims* (1964), and *Wesberry v. Sanders* (1964), we held that state legislative districts and congressional districts respectively had to be equal in terms of population—that regardless of where people lived, their vote should count the same. Out of all the 50,000 cases on which I have passed, none was as important as the *Baker* case because it gave one the power to tell a politician, "No! No! That's far enough!" And I tell you, the young people in particular, that you are going to see a complete change in our system within the decade that is before us because of this one case. The power that was once vested through the legislatures in the rural communities is going to be placed in the population-infested communities, the metropolitan areas, the places where people live. And one's vote is going to have as much weight as the vote of anyone else in this great state.

Finally, I direct your attention to the changes in the field of education which have been effected through the law. I recall that when I first came to the court in 1949, *Brown v. Board of Education* (1954), was one of the cases pending on our docket. It was not decided, however, until five years later. Precipitous? It took us five years to resolve! In the meantime we reached decisions in several other cases involving segregated educational programs. In *Sweatt v. Painter* (1950), for example, we held that the University of Texas Law School must admit black students. Finally, in 1954, we passed down our decision in *Brown* that segregation in all levels of public education was inherently unequal and thus in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.

I now reiterate, "Justice ye shall pursue." The question is, how do you pursue it? You are a young man or woman in a university or in business, or you are a middle-aged person in business, or you are an old man like me, now retired. How do you pursue it? Well, there are plenty of ways you can pursue it. Do not get into the habit of saying "I am just a small fellow and I cannot do a thing about it." You can do so much about it. You can do so much about it in your community. You can do it in part through the law established in *Baker v. Carr*, through that power that you have of voting, and voting to see that the will of the people is brought about. You can bring to the attention of people those injustices that we still have. I am the first to say that we still have injustices. We have done our best to try to correct them and today we are making great progress in that area. Recently, at a very distinguished town, Williamsburg, Virginia, the President of the United States, the Chief Justice of the United States, the Attorney-General of the United States, 44 chief justices of the states of the United States, 37 attorneys general of the United States, and over 200 other people interested in the improvement of the administration of justice met together. They

passed a resolution that called upon the states to create a national center for state courts. This is now in the realm of possibility. Indeed, the Conference of Chief Justices has appointed a committee which I think is going to announce shortly its creation. It will be an institution which will have tremendous force in correcting injustices throughout the country.

But it is also up to you! It is you who see the injustices first, because you live with them. They come in contact with you. Living in communities that have become heavily populated, metropolitan areas, you brush shoulders with more people, and you see the injustices that are done them. If you report those injustices to those in authority and receive no response, then have the courage to speak up! If you do, we will see these transgression of justice cured; we will see them abolished; we will see that the justice which Daniel Webster spoke about become a reality. Chief Justice Hughes once said that a Constitution is but a piece of parchment unless all of us act to give that parchment life, force, and implementation. That is your job, the job of every American, and I know we are going to do it!

CHURCHES IN REVOLUTION

By WILLIAM M. PINSON, JR.*

My task is to outline some of the changes, revolutionary developments, and conflicts in the religious life in America. From personal experience as well as academic research I have come into contact with the conflict. Each seven years the seminary in which I teach gives a faculty member a year to travel and study. Last year my leave took me across the United States and I read everything I could about what was happening in our country, especially in the cities. Somehow I felt that unless I could live in the major cities, breathe the air, hear the sounds, and feel the fear of the metropolis—that I really could not grasp the conflicts in America. So with my family, I set out.

I tried to pick the cities which seemed to be the key places in America to grasp an understanding of what was happening in our nation. I chose Atlanta as our first stop and we lived in a downtown highrise, the Landmark. I walked the streets at night, visited the churches of all denominations, spent time in the black and the white areas, visited the rich and the poor churches, and talked with students and faculty on the various campuses of the city. Then we lived in New York six months, San Francisco six months, and Los Angeles a month. The situation is truly America versus America. It is not just long hairs versus short, or straights versus hips. It is not simply those who crave a new kind of economy versus those who crave an old one. We are in a revolution—a revolution consisting of people who want a new way of life, a new style of living, and a new way of doing things. This revolution affects all of us. Although rapid changes are occurring, it is difficult to draw a clear picture of what is actually taking place. I really doubt if it is possible.

The American religious situation is like a huge river—it is constantly changing and its appearance varies according to the vantage point of the observer. For example, I have seen the Mississippi River many times. I have flown over it, driven over it on bridges, ridden across it on ferries, been on it in boats, and walked beside it. From an airplane it looks like a small crooked brown string. On a bridge it appears slow, sullen, and shallow. From a ferry it looks treacherous, fast, and deep. When you walk along the shore, although you think the Mississippi runs from north to south, you find that sometimes it runs from south to north, and east to west, and west to east as well. And that is the way it is with religion in America: it depends on how you are looking at it, where you are stand-

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ing, what your perspective is as to how you see it. There is one thing about it, however, and that is that it is terribly complex and diverse.

Most people think of religion in America in regard to traditional institutional churches, but that is just like the bit of the iceberg that sticks up among the waves. Most of the religious life in America is not confined to the traditional institutional churches.

America's religious make-up is like a three-layered cake. One layer—the top which most people see—is made up of the institutional churches. This visible layer is composed of the traditional structures which people usually attend on Sundays or on Saturdays to sing, pray, worship, and study sacred scriptures.

The second layer, not so readily seen, is also composed of institutions and organizations, but not traditional denominational structures. This layer is composed of different elements. There are the organizations dedicated primarily to specific causes, such as evangelism. For example, the Billy Graham Evangelistic Association, which is not a church, has an employee list of about 500 people with a budget of over $14 million a year. This organization reaches all the way around the world and is more active than many of the mainline denominations. Or there is Oral Roberts with a university, a television show, and a radio program with mail sacks flooding into his office. Other organizations in this middle layer are devoted mainly to spiritual renewal. Elton Trueblood, Keith Miller, Bruce Larson, Word Books, and *Faith at Work* are examples of those active in the renewal movement. Also in the second layer are groups which deal with some particular social issues, such as the anti-Communism organization of Billy James Hargis and others. Most of those in the renewal movement are still attached in some way to institutional churches but are disatisfied with them and are trying to find meaning, direction, and soul fulfillment in a retreat-renewal concept of life.

There is also a third layer. This is the layer that so far is largely uncharted and misunderstood. It is the underground church, the unorganized element of the Christian movement. In this layer are the Jesus Freaks, the house churches, the thousands of informal Bible study and prayer groups across America, and the commune Christians. It is a boiling cauldron of agitation and concern which sometimes spills over into excessive ecstatic experience. This is a segment of American life which most of us really do not know much about. We are not part of it, and we find it difficult to understand. But there is great feeling here that tends to push up into the other two layers to affect us all.

To make the American religious scene more complex there are also differences of outlook which cut across the three layers. There are the denominational differences, for example. We still have them, you know—Methodist, Baptist, Presbyterian, United Church of Christ,

Church of Christ, Assembly of God, Roman Catholic, Jews, and others. Ours is the most pluralistic land in the world, in regard to religious groups and denominations. But to further complicate the picture within these denominational structures are many differences of opinion.

There are theological differences, for example. The old orthodoxy which existed relatively unchallenged up until the seventeenth century has been challenged by liberalism. Liberals try to reconcile orthodoxy with the scientific approach to life by taking the Bible as something of a search by man for God instead of God's search for man. Liberalism was met with a reaction, the fundamentalist movement, led by men such as Billy Sunday of several generations ago. Sunday insisted that the Bible was the literal word from God and that there was no need to try to reconcile it with science.

The next main theological development was the neo-orthodox movement which began after World War I. This movement was led by Karl Barth, Emil Brunner, and Reinhold Niebuhr. Generally the neo-orthodox theologians insisted that the Bible was truly the Word of God, but that it could in some ways be reconciled with science. Neo-orthodoxy maintained that the Christian faith demanded the people of God to take seriously the social problems of the day.

Next there developed a kind of theology called by many names, conservatism and neofundamentalism being the most common. Conservatism has been led by Billy Graham, Carl F. H. Henry, and a host of people who insist that fundamentalism is too rigid, negative, and restrictive; there should be a certain openness about life while still taking the fundamentals of the faith seriously. More recently a radical left movement in religion has emerged led by men such as Thomas Altizer, who talk of the death of God. So the theological scene is literally fragmentized.

The conflicts go beyond theological divisons. Debate has raged on the ethical scene. Joseph Fletcher, advocate of situation ethics, decries legalism and insists that love is the only absolute. John R. Rice, Bob Jones, and others, on the other hand, insist that there are certain rules to be followed because they come directly from God. T. B. Maston and other moderate principlists insist that there is a "middle way" between the two extreme positions on ethics. There are also racial divisions—the black churches, the brown churches, and the white churches with different life styles and different viewpoints. There are different views on how the Christian life is to be expressed. For example, the pietists stress prayer and the activists emphasize action.

Now against this backdrop of the complex and frustrating situation in American church life today, I would like to try to paint in broad strokes—like painting a mural with a broom, not with any fine lines of distinction—the two main thrusts of revolution and unrest in American

churches: first, in regard to that which centers in conflict, and then that which centers in basic trends and movements.

The conflict in American churches seems to be not primarily over theology, or how you do ethics, or denominational differences, but really over basic life styles. For example, there is a serious conflict between the institutionalists and the noninstitutionalists. The former believe that there has to be a building in which to meet and a liturgy to follow. The institutionalists believe that until an idea is captured, programed, and mortarized, that it in no way bears influence. Denominational bureaucrats, the defenders of the programs of the traditional churches, seminary professors, pastors, and lay leaders frequently are among the institutionalists.

Another host of people, however, believe very strongly that the moment an idea, a belief, or a conviction is captured, programed, and mortarized, that in some way it is mutilated and lost. They insist that the only way religious expression can breathe freely and approximate what God wants is through a noninstitutional expression. The underground church is probably the best example of this approach—simply meeting together in homes, no boards, no committees, no synods, no judicatory, just people getting together with people.

The above two seem to be in irreconcilable conflict. If you sit them down together in a room for very long, you usually have a heated argument. I have yet to be at a meeting in which there was ever really much reconciliation because each believes that the other is so wrong, so dangerous, and so harmful that they must in some way be eliminated.

A similar conflict exists between the pietists and the secular activists. The pietists believe that the main function of religion is to get people in a relationship to God so that they can feel accepted, reconciled, or forgiven. They emphasize saving souls, prayer, devotional life, worship, and personal ethics. They make up the dominate part of most of the traditional institutional religious structures. On the other hand, a growing number of people believe that man in relationship to God exists primarily to see that God's will is done in all of life, including the social order. They see that there is racial injustice and they know that God is no respector of persons. Their primary religious response is not prayer, worship, reading holy scripture, but action to eliminate racial injustice which is contrary to God's will. They see people who suffer economic injustice and who are paid inadequate wages such as the migrant farm laborers in the valley of Texas, or the grape pickers in California, or the domestic help of many of the homes of the South. The activists feel that inadequate, unjust, and unlivable wages must be eliminated and replaced by justice between employer and employee. They see their religious activity in strikes, crusades, demonstrations, meetings for economic reform. When the pietists and the activists get

together there is frequently nothing but conflict for they see their roles so differently. It is America versus America within the churches.

Another conflict exists between those who are traditionalists and those who are iconoclasts. Traditionalists tend to identify religion with the status quo. They see religion's role as supporting things in the way they have been, as they were in the "good ole days." For them religion serves to tie the generations together, as links in a chain, and keeps values ongoing without a break in the chain. The traditionalists generally are afraid of the new, whether it is the new mass in English in the Roman Catholic Church or new ministry forms in Baptist congregations or new policies in regard to women in the Episcopal Church.

The iconoclasts, on the other hand, think that if anything is old it is bound to be bad. The only thing to do with something old is to replace it. They swallow everything new that comes along. They use little discernment and demonstrate small ability to tell what is good and bad. They simply accept something because it is new, because it opposes the old. Again, these two forces—America versus America—are very difficult to reconcile within our churches. They tend to tear the structures apart in the traditional ones and frequently gravitate to the underground church.

There is another conflict on the horizon, one which looks like it is going to build to storm proportions. That is the conflict between the civil religionists and the prophetic religionists. Civil religion wants state prescribed prayer and Bible reading in the public schools. It attempts to wed the flag and the cross. It believes that American foreign policy is the way God does his work in the modern world.

In conflict with the civil religionists are the prophetic religionists who insist that they owe allegiance to no country and to no man. They claim to be citizens of the Kingdom of God. Their primary responsibility is to God and not to any country, employer, or economic system. One of my students had a meeting with a corporation president who was considering hiring him as a chaplain. The man tried to force his beliefs about ecology, race, and other things on the student. And finally the corporation president insisted to the student that his main belief was in his country. And this student said, "Mine is not. It is in Jesus Christ." Now that is the way of the prophets. They challenge anything that they feel to be contrary to God's will. And the two are very difficult to reconcile. The civil religionists feel fervently that their patriotic cause is right. And you know the prophets: there have always been those who felt so strongly that they were right that they were willing to get sawed in two or thrown into pits or stoned. In fact some prophets seem to have a masochistic bent about them. They almost seem to enjoy getting kicked.

Out of the conflict in American church life, there apparently is developing some basic trends which cut across all three layers of the

cake. Let me briefly outline them. One is the trend toward religious revival in America—the spiritual awakening which many observers are now calling the Great Awakening 1970-71, comparing it to the awakening under Jonathan Edwards in pre-revolutionary America. Some feel that it is the greatest, the most significant, the most basic revolution in religion and spiritual experience which has hit this nation. A number of people do not know that it is happening because they still keep their religious statistics from the traditional, institutional churches and that is not where the revival is taking place. All the polls show declining church attendance. Most of the denominational budgets show drops in offerings. But if you consider what is going on across the whole of the three-layered religious cake. a mighty and significant religious revival is taking place.

The revival is expressed in many different ways—in the large numbers of young people who are responding to religion, the thousands who march in religious parades on the West Coast, the Christian communes, the Jesus Freaks, the students who preach the gospel on campus, the Bible-study groups, and Campus Crusade. It is a fantastic phenomenon—unparallelled and unprecedented in our history. It is different from the religious revival of the 1950's which was primarily made up of middle-class, sedate people joining traditional churches. This is not that kind of revival. It is a revival of people who are anything but staid and sedate. It often expresses itself in ecstatic experiences; there is an outburst of speaking in tongues, for example. The folks leading the revival know nothing about liturgy, but they know a great deal about celebration. They know little about quiet organ music, but they know a good bit about hand-clapping and foot-patting music. It is an experience which affects all age groups, but mostly the youth.

The revival is also affecting the traditional churches. Experiences have been happening in local churches which have seldom happened before. One church in a two-week period had four thousand people make public commitments to Christ. Another in a period of six months saw twelve hundred people come into its fellowship on commitment to Christ. Another church grew to a membership of sixteen thousand in a relatively short time. Inadequate facilities cause the stacking of worship service upon service and the spilling into apartment houses and trailer parks in order to try to minister to the people. In the underground church, in the Billy Graham movement, in Campus Crusade, in traditional churches, in all layers of the cake there is a phenomenal spiritual awakening.

Another characteristic of the developing religious life in America is that it is not just "pie-in-the-sky-by-and-by" religion, but it has a very practical aspect to it, a rugged aspect. For these people who are experiencing the tug of God upon their lives are committed to more than prayer and Bible study—they are committed to changing the world! They are

revolutionaries! Most of them are non-violent. But they are revolutionaries none the less. They are determined to see that the Bible which says that God is no respector of persons is applied in daily life. They have come to see that the Bible they believe in and read speaks about hunger as well as heaven, about race relations as well as about regeneration. And they are determined to see that the Bible they believe is practiced.

Many leaders in the religious revival are biblical literalists. They take the Bible to be literally true. They will tackle city hall, the Federal government, the state capitol, the courthouse, anything to bring about change and eliminate what seems to them to be contrary to the way God wants things.

Religion in America has a definite social action emphasis. The civil rights movement was the first major social action thrust by religious leaders. Later peace, and now ecology became primary concerns. Churches are also organizing to try to minister more effectively to urban problems—tutorial services, breakfast programs, literacy education, activities for dropouts, ministries to youth in the summer, aid for those who are poor, and housing committees. It is a new day. Many of those involved in these programs are pietists with an activist bent. It may be the beginning of the breakthrough of the reconciling of the pietists and the activists.

Another trend in America's religious life is openness. There is no settled way of doing things in most churches anymore; it is kind of a "let's try it and see what happens" attitude. This openness manifests itself in getting together across professional lines, such as this very program represents. It manifests itself in cooperative Christianity. Although the ecumenical movement seems to be floundering, cooperative Christianity is thriving with denominations working together for spiritual renewal, evangelism, ministry, and social action. It is showing itself in the way that people are trying new programs in churches. For example, new opportunities are opening for women. The Episcopal Church has considered ordaining women to the priesthood. American Baptists ordain women, and they serve as pastors. Some Southern Baptist churches are ordaining women as deacons. It is a new day for women, and it is going to be an even newer one. There are also opportunities in new programing; new things are being tried. And finally, it is a new day for youth. The main religious movement is among young people and laymen. We who are the professional clergy are in danger of being left behind. Youth, in all aspects of what is happening, in all three-layers of the cake, lead the way; and laymen are not far behind.

I do not know what the future holds. But there is one thing for sure. God is a long way from dead! Apparently He is not even sick. And the churches, though they may not be recognizable by former standards, are very much alive and on the move. I am rather glad that God has let

me be a churchman in this day. With a colleague, I have recently written a thirteen-volume set on church history entitled *20 Centuries of Great Preaching*. From the study done on this project I feel that of all the years which have ever been, if I had my choice, I would pick this era in which to be alive!

BEYOND GOOD AND EVIL, OR: HOW TO CREATE THE DARK IN WHICH TO WHISTLE

By MARK ALTSCHULE, M. D.*

The title of this symposium—America versus America—mentions values but it does not require that the speakers make value-judgments. When physicians consider their patients' illnesses they do not make moral judgments concerning them. Accordingly I shall not discuss any of today's revolutionary changes in terms of their possible morally good or evil effects or attributes. If on occasion my words have the appearance of adverse comment, this is only an appearance. For the most part my feelings will not be identifiable, if at all detectable, and I suggest that you waste no time in searching for them and in attempting to relate them to my childhood experiences, or to what is more serious, to the fact that I have forgotten my childhood experiences. What I shall say will be entirely descriptive and largely self-explanatory.

Before, however, discussing the revolutionary changes with which we are all familiar, it would be well to establish whether they lie in the field of morals or of manners. We shall define the first as those aspects of human behavior (including the verbal) that involve content, whereas manners involve form. Although content and form inevitably overlap, a general separation is possible.

To start with a summary: One serious problem is "the ridiculous and deplorable softness of parents, slaves to the caprices of the immature. . ." "Each gives his children an education superior to that which is suited to their social and financial status; so that children, despising the knowledge of their parents, reject criticism based on the latter's experience. Accustomed to follow all his inclinations, and not accustomed to discipline and to contradiction, the child, having arrived at maturity, cannot resist the vicissitudes and reverses by which life is agitated. . . ." On the other hand "an undue severity—reproaches for the slightest faults, harshness exercised with passion, threats and blows, exasperate children, irritate youth, destroy the influence of parents, produce abnormal tendencies to disease." "The ties of marriage are mere pretenses, which are formed by the wealthy either for gain or to gratify their self-love, and which the common people neglect, through disdain for the clergy, indifference, and immorality. . . ." In recording medical histories information about whether the patients are married or unmarried is valueless because it in no way bears on their behavior. "From a record kept for ten years at several hospitals, one third of the women admitted are very aged, paralyzed, and in senile dementia. . . .

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These infirm patients would formerly have remained in their families... People avail themselves of an easy means of relieving themselves of the burden of their support."

These comments are descriptive of today's society; however they were made by a leading European physician of 150 years ago. Another physician, an American, who practiced and wrote a hundred years ago made comments that are even more applicable to today's problems. He stated a century ago that American "social life scattered widely the seeds of distrust; developed precocious ideas of independence; and made youth familiar with evil before it was prepared to judge intelligently, and when it should be shielded by parental care." These evils, he said, "were but too plainly exemplified in the mental traits characteristic of young America and in the increasing stream of depravity, and disease both physicial and mental, which permeated the social fabric, and threatened to injure not only the present but future generations." We may therefore immediately make two conclusions: 1) the views of a physician are likely to be different from those of philosophers and social critics, and 2) mankind has not changed much, at least in the last 150 years.

It is evident to any physician that today's revolution is largely one of manners. This conclusion is most evident to a physician in a community with strong academic ties. With two notable differences, no individual person that I may see now is doing or saying anything different from what a number of individual patients of mine did and said forty years ago. Although individual human behavior has not changed, there have been changes in the relative numbers of people engaged in different types of behavior. Moreover although individual behavior has not changed in detail, group behavior has changed somewhat for reasons that will be discussed.

In addition, evaluation of our behavior has changed markedly in that it has been given an unwarranted implication of moral change. This is owing to several reasons, the most important of which is that now behavior manifested by persons more than twenty-five years old is ascribed by some social critics to boring, stupid, or vicious motives, whereas all behavior of persons less than twenty-five years old is said by these critics to be motivated by truly humane, idealistic and honorable impulses, unless the behavior was distorted by the boring, stupid or vicious acts of people more than twenty-five years old. Today we recognize that a middle-aged man who intoxicates himself with the alcohol in liquor is making a disgusting brute of himself whereas a young man who intoxicates himself with the other alcohols in marijuana is undergoing an ennobling experience.

Early in their careers medical practitioners learn that people are all alike. (If people were not all alike physicians could not function.) Somewhat later in their careers physicians learn that all people are also dif-

ferent. (If they were not there would be no need for physicians and some machine could make diagnoses and recommend treatment.) Appreciation of the similarities and dissimilarities of people is the basis of all medical practice, regardless of whatever scientific data may be involved. In preparing to care for a particular patient a medical practitioner must learn how his patient resembles and differs from other persons, and he does this by studying his patient's past life. In short, he must be a historian, and, in Plutarch's words, he must be "like the watermen who look astern while they row the boat ahead."

A sick society must be similarly studied if the causes of its malaise and its possible cure are to be worked out. The utility of history for this purpose has been denied by a segment of our population, and to some extent properly so. All physicians know that most of a patient's history is not relevant to the problem at hand; the physician must seek and select those items that lead to an understanding of the malaise, if there is one, or to an appreciation of the factors that may make an old illness seem new. Actually, it is impossible to avoid historical evaluations in discussing social ills. For example when we read: "We have changed our old usages in favor of speculative ideas and dangerous innovations. . . . There are no longer any domestic feelings, not of respect, not of love, not of authority," followed by the statement that fifteen percent of all persons in mental hospitals are students, we should know that the comments were made in 1838 by the world's leading psychiatrist, Esquirol, and not by some modern Cassandra.

Rather than multiply and amplify such generalities we shall limit ourselves to a few specific aspects of behavior that many today deplore. For example, as regards the hippies, the Epistle of Jude stated, "These filthy dreamers defile the flesh, despise dominions, and speak evil of dignities." It is, however, impossible to know today whether this actually referred to hippies. Perhaps a more explicit statement might be more illuminating. Another author wrote". . . A youth approached me. He was bearded; his clothes were dirty; he wore a student's cloak and he looked a typical New Cynic of the sort I deplore. I have recently written at considerable length about these vagabonds. In the last few years the philosophy of Crates and Zeno has been taken over by idlers who, though they have no interest in philosophy, deliberately imitate the Cynics in such externals as not cutting their hair or beards, carrying sticks and wallets, and begging. But where the original Cynics despised wealth, sought virtue, questioned all things in order to find what was true, these imitators mock all things, including the true, using the mask of philosophy to disguise license and irresponsibility. Nowadays, any young man who does not choose to study or to work grows a beard, insults the gods, and calls himself Cynic." This was written by the Emperor Julian in the fourth century A. D. Perhaps this is too remote in time or place to be—to coin a cliché—relevant.

Let us turn to another author who wrote about people who were recognized by their "taciturnity and downcast looks, a total neglect of dress and person, long nails and beard, dishevelled and matted hair, indifference to surrounding objects, insensibility to heat and cold. . . . Such persons seek for, rather than shun human society. Sometimes they wander through neighborhoods in the capacity of beggars. . . .There are some instances in which the moral faculties are impaired, in which case they are mischievous and vicious, but they are more generally inoffensive, and disposed to be kind, and even useful, in hospitals and families."

These words are not from some modern writer's description of hippies; they are written by Benjamin Rush of Philadelphia in his discussion of what he called "partial insanity," published in 1812. (I believe that his clinical diagnosis was correct.) At any rate it is clear that the pursuit of hippiness is not new, and that the relation of drug abuse to today's hippy behavior is not an essential one.

As in earlier times, today the desire to legitimize avoidance of responsibility prevails among many inadequately educated persons who use fragmentary and distorted knowledge to disguise their aims. The wish to be free of all responsibility is probably as ancient as man, but good records regarding this matter go no further back than the Greco-Roman era. For example, Seneca said, "To make a man happy, add not to his possessions, but subtract from the sum of his desires." These words were merely a paraphrase of what Stoic philosophers and their Oriental precursors had been saying for generations. The ancient idea that peace of mind can be attained only by not striving for property, position, or power is still popular today. It implies that the effort of securing or maintaining any of these materialistic goals produces unbearable uncertainty and disappointment as well as destructive changes in the personality. This view holds that when finally the goals have been reached—if they ever are—they prove to be not only a nuisance to maintain but so boring in themselves as to increase the dissatisfaction that originally had led to the pursuit. The youth of the Classical Era who absorbed the teachings of the Stoic and then the Cynic philosophers believed that those who lived according to these philosophies were a fellowship of superior souls, not bound by family ties; they were the only ones who were happy, free, beautiful, and truly wealthy. These happy few maintained that they were also emancipated from all moral laws. All other men, according to these ancient philosophies, were mad or wicked creatures who wasted their lives as slaves to conformity. These ancient philosophies seem to have a perpetual appeal.

What about the drug scene? We shall not refer to the lotus-eaters, or to the men changed into beasts by Circe, nor shall we mention that Charlemagne took hallucinogenic drugs, or that the Holy Roman Emperor Henry IV became permanently insane when his wife gave him drugs for erotic reasons. Nor is there any need to refer to the fact that

what is today called the witchcraft epidemic of late medieval Europe evidently was an epidemic of drug abuse, and the descriptions of what witches did were based on delusions and hallucinations. This was pointed out by Foderé in his *Traite du Delire* in 1817 and more recently by Barnett, in the *New Scientist*, July 22, 1965. The main drugs used were apparently of the stramonium-mandrake group, similar to the Asthmador used by today's drug abusers. Since according to current views of history these remote events cannot possibly have any relevance for us today, let us turn to others.

In one country, in the decades following a long and bitter (and probably useless) war five percent of the population became addicted to morphine; this was our own Civil War. The widespread opium addiction of the late Georgian and early Victorian eras is better known. The pattern of drug abuse has however changed. The abuse originally seems to have been related to affluence. For example the psychiatrist Sir Charles Ellis wrote in 1830: "The ultimate effects produced upon the nervous system from taking opium to excess are very similar to those which arise from spirit drinking; but this vice is not one generally committed by the lower orders."

Today anybody can be a drug abuser, and this clearly represents social progress. Drug abuse is a most common cause of death in young people in America. Moreover in some cities, the number of men of military age dying of drug abuse in one year exceeds the number of men from that city killed in the entire Viet Nam conflict. It is ironical that some of those most violently opposed to the war are equally vigorous in their attempts to make drug abuse easier. The cure of drug addicts under 25 is virtually impossible, and of addicts over 25 statistically disappointing. Hence, as in dealing with an infectious epidemic disease, prevention becomes most important, but this is impossible in our permissive society.

Why has drug abuse always been so persistent a human practice? Let us consider some biological observations: If monkeys are connected to an apparatus that injects intravenously a measured amount of a drug when a bar is pressed, the animals will press the bar frequently in order to receive morphine, pentobarbital, ethyl alcohol, cocaine, or amphetamine but not some other drugs. In the self-administration of alcohol malnutrition is a frequent complication. Cocaine causes "the most frightening picture. After one injection experience, the monkey will self-administer the drug until he dies in convulsions." (See M. H. Seevers, "Laboratory Evaluation for Drug Dependence," in *New Concepts in Pain and Its Clinical Management*. E. L. Way, Ed. Philadelphia, Pa.: F. A. Davis Co. 1967.) Does the monkey thus become a drug addict in order to escape the stresses of his daily life? Does he have a death wish? Does the monkey wish to extend his mind? Or are these currently popular romantic psychologizings nonsense? Perhaps the best answer to this

question is provided by Sir Humphrey Davy's report almost a century and a half ago. He inhaled nitrous oxide and experienced an awe-inspiring revelation of the secret nature of everything in the universe. He wrote it all down, and after recovering from the effects of the inhalation, hastened to read what he had written. The words said: "This stuff has an awful stink." Despite Sir Humphrey's disappointing experience young people of his time, including many college students, continued to have ether parties or laughing-gas parties as a lark.

Actually the fact that the alleged benefits of psychedelic drugs were illusory seems to have been recognized centuries ago. One account of the Garden of Eden events is to be found in an old English poem, today called Genesis B. (See *Speculum 44:*86, 1969). This tale describes how the Serpent promised Eve that if she ate the fruit of the Tree of Knowledge she would be granted the sight of heaven and of the throne of God. She did eat the fruit and she did have the vision, which she described in words of exaltation and joy. Heaven and earth seemed brighter to her, she could see for great distances, and wherever she looked light shone brightly before her. (The vision of Heaven she experienced is identical to other described visions of the Last Judgement.) The account indicates that Eve did not really see all these things but only believed she did. At any rate she used the promise of the vision to tempt Adam to eat the fruit. Adam ate it but had no vision, and when the effects of the fruit in Eve had worn off they both recognized that they had been ruined. Although Eve's action had been in good faith their punishment proceeded. Regardless of which plant history proves to have led to Eve's hallucinations in the Garden, the event itself foretold what today seems to be a frequent occurrence, the ruin of a young person by a friend, lover, or spouse who induced him or her to try a drug through the promise of a beautiful experience.

What about the *cannabis* group, marijuana and hashish? Predictions of the future status of *cannabis* can be made only through extensive study of its past history. Most current accounts refer only to its use by laymen as an intoxicant: this use, or at least the sale leading to this use, is now illegal in most countries. However *cannabis* (as tincture of *cannabis*) was considered a valuable medication in the nineteenth century for the treatment of maniacal patients in mental hospitals. These patients had not only great strength but great cunning, and the tincture was given to make them both docile and stupid. It was included in the form of the extract and the fluid extract in the U. S. Pharmacopeia as an official drug up to 1930 but, since there was no way in which it could be standardized, it was dropped from it. Today its active principle is known, and hence should be used medically where tincture of *cannabis* was formerly employed. Since *cannabis* is effective when inhaled, its use as an aerosol by police attempting to control a mob is a possibility. Aldous Huxley's *Brave New World* describes an event of this sort: The police sprayed the

unruly crowd with some substance that made the mob peaceful and full of happiness and love for everybody. Of course when the police begin to use the drug in this way, students will shun it.

What about the generation gap? Is this new? Pinel around 1800 quoted La Bruyere as saying that "there are strange parents whose whole life seems to be spent in giving their children reasons to be consoled for their death." Pinel added: "The public houses of correction, and the asylums for the insane are constantly furnishing examples suitable to serve as commentaries on this text. How often do we see bitter reproaches for the slightest faults—harsh words uttered in the voice of anger—nay even threats and blows—exasperate a hasty youth, break through all the ties of blood, produce the most abnormal disposition, or precipitate the sufferer into serious madness." On the other hand Shakespeare said: "How sharper than a serpent's tooth it is to have a thankless child." In fact it is traditional for the elders to complain about the youngsters. For example in ancient Greece Socrates said: "Children now love luxury. They have bad manners, contempt for authority. They show disrespect for elders, and love chatter in place of exercise. Children are now tyrants. . . ."

In a slightly more modern era, this behavior was described as owing to the children's insecurity. For example, one author of several decades ago, John P. Marquand, in Chapter III of his book *Life at Happy Knoll*, ironically ascribes all sorts of teenage rowdiness and general misbehavior to young people's search for the security of which society has deprived them. The discovery that they are considered to have been made insecure by our imperfect society has been one aspect of social progress that has been a boon to teenagers. Of course, the ancient Greeks did not know that young people acted that way because they were insecure—which shows how much the world has progressed since then.

Successive generations have always regarded each other as peculiar and to some extent difficult. However although the exteriors differed, the generations were usually regarded as internally alike, at least by the elders. These ideas were well described by the poet Cowper, in a letter to Unwin, his friend: "When we look back upon our forefathers, we seem to look back upon the people of another nation, almost upon creatures of another species; we can hardly believe that a people who resembled us so little in their tastes, should resemble us in anything else. But in everything else, I suppose, they were our counterparts exactly;. . . time. . . has left human nature just where it found it. The mind of man, at least, has undergone no change; his *passions*, *appetites*, and *aims*, are just what they were; they wear perhaps a handsomer disguise than they did in the days of yore, for *philosophy* and *literature* will have their effect upon the exterior, but in every other respect a modern is only an ancient in different dress."

This benign view of things is far from universal today. Although a certain amount of conflict between generations is to be expected, today we seem to have an excessive amount of it. Some conflict between generations is inevitable, since a generation that grows up in a given social or physical environment knows no other, and inevitably takes a different view of it from that taken by an older generation that had to adapt itself to an environment that was new to it. This revolt of the young against their elders has always taken one of several forms, and has always been justified by basing it on idealism, freedom, and the preservation of individuality. The last is most strongly emphasized and gives rise to the same so-called individuality among the entire generation. This collective individuality is not individuality at all but is merely conformity carried to excesses of hypocrisy. Nevertheless these mass movements of pseudo-individualistic young people with their restless energy and strong idealism may accomplish good, either as such or by calling emphatic attention to things that need to be done, as many philosophers including Plato and Aristotle have pointed out.

On the other hand the urge to be individualistic may deteriorate into mere unthinking rebellion: What should be a well thought-out positive attitude becomes an uncritical negative position. This rebellion has repeatedly fallen into a few stereotyped patterns for a thousand years or more:

1. Delinquent behavior and disrespect toward parents. Shakespeare, in his *Winter Tale*, summarized thus: "I would there no age between ten and three-and-twenty, or that youth would sleep out the rest, for there is nothing in the between but getting wenches with child, wronging the ancientry, stealing, fighting. . . ."

2. Favoring one's country's enemies (this must be distinguished from expressions of a desire for peace). The pattern is as follows: The students and faculties of the universities are sick of war. Although the eneny had been guilty of many atrocities the young academics ignored this and instead praise the enemy forces for their heroism and nobility. They describe their own country as a monster of imperialism ruled and ruined by a lot of old men—their parents—who are not only incompetent but wicked. This familiar pattern occured, e. g., in the English universities in the 1920's and was described by Claude Cockburn in his autobiography, *In Time of Trouble.*

3. Disdain toward established modes in fashion and the arts. This pattern is described, for example, in *La Nevrose Revolutionnaire* by Cabanis and Nass (1906).

4. Derogation of accepted standards of cleanliness and neatness owing to a faked preoccupation with spiritual matters. St. Jerone (A. D. 340-419) described the Roman youth who claimed to have turned their backs on the materialistic world, affecting "hair as long as women's and beards as goats" worn in order to convince people of their wearers' spiritual superiority. He pointed out that if the relative length of the beard is an index of spirituality nobody is more spiritual than a goat. Paradoxically the denser the hair covering a fact the easier it is to see through.

5. Contempt towards their elder's accumulated worldly goods because they are assumed to destroy spiritual values. After the death of Lorenzo the Magnificent the youth of Florence, activated by Savonarola's sermons, formed mobs to destroy the accumulated evidence of Renaissance worldly luxury. They attacked wealthy and cultivated men and women and burned books by classical scholars and the paintings of great artists. The movement ended in severe repression by a new government. In other events groups of young men who had just completed their formal education settled in an abandoned house and decided to spend their lives in a freely-shared ascetic life seeking mystical awakening. This occurred in various places and at various times, for example in Venice in 1400.

The reasons for today's excessively wide generation gap require elucidation. Shakespeare described this discord as a symptom of a weak social order. When in his *Troilus and Cressida* (Act 1, Scene 3) he has Ulysses say, "And the rude son should strike the father dead" he was describing what happened in such societies. We have to answer a question: If, as we have shown, the general patterns of human behavior have not changed in the two thousand years of recorded history, why is our social order so much weaker than some others? Stating that our order differs from the others only as regards quantitative and not qualitative aspects of behavior does not satisfactorily answer the question but it does give direction to the inquiry.

There is no need to multiply the examples that show the stereotype of human behavior; every physician knows that people are all alike. It is important to examine the factors that have produced the quantitative differences in what is basically stereotyped human behavior. These clearly fall into two main groups:

1. technologic changes
2. prevalence of superstitious psychologic and sociologic doctrines, including those that lead to faulty education

There is no need to emphasize that technologic developments change behavior drastically. It is not our purpose to refer to such specific inventions as that of the electric guitar, that has made rock and roll music so great a cultural force, or the bull-horn, that essential instrument of social protest. We shall speak in more general terms.

The Industrial Revolution, during which machine power came to replace human muscular effort, started the process which has now reached a point at which the laborer is often merely a gadget attached to a machine or is a cog in a complicated administrative complex. The creative aspects of work have largely been lost and a vast boredom has supplanted it. The fact that boredom creates serious psychologic stresses has long been known to observers of human activity although largely neglected by modern psychologists and psychiatrists.

As Crichton, an early nineteenth-century English psychiatrist noted: "It is a favorite opinion with Helvetius and many other philosophers, the ennui is one of the most powerful motives in the mind of man which stimulates him to great actions. There can be no doubt of the general truth of this fact, only it is not quite accurately expressed; for it is the desire of relief from pain and not the languor from which the actions spring." These philosophers evidently believed that boredom, or the need to avoid it, is one of the most powerful motive forces in human life. (They differed with John Locke, who said that anxiety, or the need to avoid it, played that role. Today Locke's name is spelled F-r-e-u-d.) In everyday life physicians have the opportunity to observe how protracted boredom produces increasing restlessness, tension, and in some persons, anxiety. One of the effects of stress is regression in behavior patterns, so that previous patterns emerge. Hence boredom, like any other stress, induces immature and pre-social behavior.

The recent technologic (including the chemical) revolutions have made sexual activity much less likely to have some untoward results than was true in the past. This has removed one important incentive to chastity and has helped to reveal the insubstantiality of virtue. (This is reminiscent of the medieval situation. In those days no lady could yield to a gentleman until he had proved his manliness in three armed conflicts. This made some men appear braver than they actually were and since many of the men did not survive the requisite three fights, it made many women appear more virtuous than they really were.) The technologic developments responsible for the improvement in contraceptive practice have permitted the development of the sexual freedom that prevails today in the so-called civilized world. They have permitted an unprecedented degree of enjoyment of venereal pleasures. Unfortunately they have permitted a prevalence of venereal diseases that makes them outrank all other infectious diseases in teenagers. The increase in teenage pregnancy, with its high rate of medical complications, is

a paradoxic consequence of the sexual revolution induced by technologic changes.

Another behavioral consequence of the current advanced state of technology is the prominence of the Female Liberation Movement. No amount of philosophizing or of propagandizing could ever have advanced that movement to its present prominence but for the technologic processes that permitted women to have employment in industry, that filled the house with labor-saving devices, and that markedly reduced child-bearing. Whether or not any significant number of women has formally joined some segment of the Female Liberation Movement is not under discussion here. What is meant rather is that technologic developments permitted women sexual freedom and partial escape from the demands of a mother's role. The sexual freedom has not by itself been as liberating to the spirit as was expected and the results have been experimentation involving the social organization of sexual behavior, e. g., spouse-sharing and group sex, and experimentation involving the physical practice of sex. Both have produced a sex-life devoid of its most elevating emotional aspects and conducive only to more boredom than they were intended to relieve.

Worst of all is the fact that the technologic revolution has crowded people into cities and adjacent suburbs. Agriculture as a way of life that permitted people to exist spread out in the country can no longer exist. Also modern technology demands the creation of huge manufacturing centers and in consequence a concentration of population. At the same time man's innate search for anything that will permit decreases in the requirements for physical and mental effort has drawn him to the cities. These factors have emptied much of the country (a fact that escapes the notice of those who travel only by main highway) and has concentrated people into environments that have no precedent in primate biology. In addition to the problems of water supply, solid waste and sewage disposal and atmospheric pollution created when people cease to be dispersed and became aggregated—and these are bad enough—there are the worse problems caused by the effects of people on people.

Although animals with highly developed societies exist—and their rigidity and stereotypy should not be ignored—primates living in nature comprise small and loosely organized social groups. The huge groups organized into complex societies that characterize today's highly industrialized cultures are of recent origin. In fact permanent village life is probably no more than ten thousand years old. Contrast this with the millions of years in which social insect societies evolved and came to exist. It is evident that when human personalities come into contact each of them must lose some of its attributes. Compare the personality of any normally developed individual studied alone with the personality of a

group of ten and then of a hundred, and then a thousand. There is no doubt that the total is always less than the sum of its parts; the larger the number involved, the greater the difference between the total and the sum. This loss of personality is transitory, often briefly so and hence unnoticed, when a few people aggregate for limited periods. However when large numbers of people come together for extended periods, a serious persistent atrophy of their personalities occurs. This atrophy may be masked by the pace of interaction that may occur in aggregated populations but this interaction is simplified and stereotyped; in fact it is boring to watch and boring to participate in. The underdeveloped or atrophied personality is highly susceptible to boredom, and cannot escape from it. Lacking the personal resources for a stimulating existence, it can only seek the company of other personalities many of which are similarly underdeveloped or atrophied, and hence, boring. A further atrophy of the personality, and increasing frequency and persistence of the boredom are the bewildering result, and it becomes more pronounced with advancing age. No wonder the young find most older people unsatisfactory but will follow any stimulating older person no matter how depraved or nutty he may be. The aging atrophied personality is capable only of simple stereotyped responses and hence is labeled conservative. This is not a correct use of the term—a conservative personality is not necessarily a stultified one and vice-versa.

Another consequence of city living has, to my knowledge, been touched on by few if any sociologists. This is a change in the attitude toward people in general. To rural people *Nature* often exhibits inimical attributes: storm, flood, drought, frost, insect pests, etc. If these natural hazards exist at all in the city, they are so rare and so diminished that Nature ceases to be regarded as inimical and Man takes its place. Anything untoward that occurs to the city dweller can be blamed, rightly or wrongly, on the actions of other people. Hence, whereas the country dweller takes mankind as, in the words of John Quincy Adams, "as we take a wife—for better or for worse," to the city dweller every man who is not at the moment a friend is—at least at the moment—probably an enemy. This paranoid thinking is further stimulated by the involuntary togetherness prevalent today. The paranoia often leads to a belief in witchcraft among the superstitious and of conspiracies (e. g. the Establishment) or familial malevolence (e. g. the mother as the cause of schizophrenia, the spouse as the cause of alcoholism, the children as the cause of senile psychosis) among the half-educated. This general attitude also leads to the fantastic belief found in children's fairy tales, the belief that some day soon the Final Battle between Absolute Good and Absolute Evil will occur, and the rich, bloated arrogant treacherous forces of Evil will be wiped out (except for the few who confess their error) by the ragged, starved, poorly equipped but unceasingly valiant forces of Good.

Our advanced technology has led to a habit of immediate gratification of all wants, with little or no effort. This habit, or at least expectation is far more prevalent than it was a century ago. Immediate gratification and no toil could not possibly be widespread in the mainly agricultural society that then existed. The idea of planting, cultivating and, after considerable time, harvesting, prevailed in occupations and carried over to other matters of daily life. The number of persons who could legally exist off the surplus created by the toil of farmers was not large. These non-producers instinctively limited their numbers by excluding, ostensibly for genetic reasons, those who wanted to join their number. Although the industrial revolution has permitted the harnessing of water and steam power for a variety of manufacturing processes, manufacturing as a whole still involved much direct contact between the worker and the object, and the transformation of raw materials into manufactures was still relatively slow and dependent on the effort of individual workers.

Life today is completely different in this country. Agriculture is a way of life for only a small segment of the population. Those who today participate in industry do not see the gradual transformation of raw material into finished product. They are more closely in contact with some machine than with the product it is helping to create: in fact are more likely to think and act like attachments of machines than like the creators of products. Moreover, the development of electric power and of electronic regulating devices has made man even less of a participant in the creation of things he uses than he was a generation ago. These and other recent developments have produced an entirely different pattern of behavior from that which previously prevailed.

Today's persons less than thirty years old were brought up conditioned to respond to most wants, both physical and mental, by pressing buttons, ripping open cans, dissolving concentrates, thawing frozen food or drink, spraying a mist on some surface alive or inanimate, etc. The idea that at least the onset of gratification might be delayed as much as thirty minutes is enough to make a person start hiding candy bars under his mattress.

As John Reid said in 1816: "Expectation is the vital principal of happiness. It is that which constantly stimulates us to exertion, and fills up the vacant spaces of life. We are in general more interested by a precarious good in prospect, than by, the most valuable realities in our possession. The blossoms of hope are better than the ripened fruits of fortune. We complain of the vicissitudes and uncertainty attending upon our present state, and yet as it is, in this very uncertainty and vicissitude, that its interest, and of course its value, principally consists. Anticipated changes constitutes the predominant charm of life." This has been largely lost.

Today's era of electronic gadgetry has had another effect: it has not only created the delusion that immediate gratification is the normal way of life for everyone but it has also created vast surpluses that seem to justify this notion. The effects of these economic factors have been reinforced by current American theories of child-rearing which theories hold that anything restrictive is bad.

The affluence produced by the recent technologic revolution has also created problems. The idea that poverty is bad and hence affluence must be good is one of the inanities of current sociologic thinking. Huge efforts are currently being made to eliminate poverty, because poverty has evidently demoralized many people of all ages, especially those under 25 years of age. It is equally evident, however, that affluence has also demoralized many people, especially those under 25 years of age. In fact as the affluent segment of the population becomes more numerous, the demoralization produced by affluence becomes more evident. We unfortunately have no great body of current writing on the sociologic disorders produced by affluence although psychiatrists of earlier eras did have much to say on this subject. It is clear that affluence spoils particularly when it is combined with permissiveness. For example, Sir Charles Ellis, superintendent of the mental hospital at Wakefield, wrote (1838): "When in early life the inclinations have never been thwarted, and the passions have been allowed to remain unsubdued, the disappointments and reverses of fortune, which almost invariably attend every human being in his passage through the world, frequently cause overanxiety in the mind, before unaccustomed to restraint." Conolly wrote (1830): "Mental ease is destroyed by the want of those privations and difficulties of which the operation is always beneficial, though seldom duly appreciated" even when the person is distracted by the excitements of life in a large city.

Although it would be absurd to declare that technologic advances and affluence can only be evil, it is difficult to say any such thing about permissiveness in child-rearing. A permissive upbringing is widely recommended as a means of preventing personality disorders. However, permissiveness is, in fact, one of the most subtle and extreme forms of rejection.

It is at least as important as excessive harshness in separating parents and children. Another behavioral consequence of parental permissiveness is the spread of antisocial phenomena, phenomena that interfere with or even interdict those social processes that favor the maximal development and operation of the personality attributes of all the members of the community consistent with minimal impairment of particular personality attributes of any of its members. This is true because the demand for permissiveness is a demand for abdication of judgment in social affairs, and derives from the absurd notion that since there is no such thing as an absolute standard then there should be no standards at all.

The reason for the prevalence of permissiveness in our society is hard to define. The philosophy that underlies it evidently originated in the writings of Rousseau. In his defence—and he is not an easy man to defend—he did not believe that his theories of child-rearing should be universally applied; he intended them to be used only by the upper classes. Since at that time these classes were numerically insignificant, his theories could not lead to a serious collapse of society. However his philosophy became one of the main components of modern American social science. Today the so-called social sciences have come to dominate all aspects of mental life in this country.

As that outstanding social scientist Professor Martin Gross pointed out in *The New School Bulletin* five years ago, they have gained in the colleges power of "magnificent, and undeserved proportions. The typical university curriculum is heavily weighted in the social sciences. . . .It might be said, without too great a fear of exaggeration, that the modern undergraduate is a social science addict. In the community outside the campus, the social sciences exert an impressive influence in such institutions as free public education (through educational psychologists and educators) welfare, penology, probation, social work, family and child guidance, adoption, numerous manifestations of psychology and psychiatric care, work with delinquents, and massive federal programs of every variety, from poverty to race relations. . . ." This enormous expansion of a need for practitioners of the social science led our educational system to turn out large numbers of mediocrities in this field (as in some others). As de Tocqueville observed, "A middling standard is fixed in America for human knowledge. All approach to it as near as they can; some as they rise, others as they descend." The general tendency of American education to produce mediocrity, acting upon a branch of learning notable for its vagueness of formulation, disregard of rules for interpreting data and validation of method, and bizarreness of some of its leading thinkers had produced a vast number of educationalists who have created a crashingly erroneous concept of the nature of man and the goals in his education.

In passing, it might be noted that the harmful effect of philosophies has been a matter of comment since earliest days. Athenaeus told how Antiochus Sidetes, a Syrian king of the second century B. C., wrote to one of his officials: "We have already directed you that no philosophers shall stay in the city or district, yet we hear that there are not a few, and that they debauch the young, owing to my orders not being carried out. Upon receipt, therefore, of this letter, issue a decree to expel all philosophers, threatening any youths found in their company with hanging, and their parents with gravest censure. Let there be no mistake about this." Similarly, the Roman Senate, in 161 B. C., passed a decree expelling philosophers on the grounds that they were corrupting Roman youths to abandon their parents, traditional habits of thought and ways of life.

Today's popular philosophies deny the importance of contact between successive generations either as such or through their works. In so doing they ignore the biological nature of man. As Cassirer has pointed out, man is a "time-conserving animal" because man consciously and unconsciously uses the past experience of his species more than does any other animal; indeed, as far as is known, only man has developed history as a scientific discipline and a literar mode. To put i in more general terms, man as a biologic organism seeks the consolation of certainty in tradition at the same time that he seeks the consolation of hope in change. He conserves the past but flavors it with anticipation of the future. To assume that man can create a future while ignoring, or actually by rejecting the past is the height of biologic absurdity.

The lessons of the past are useful because they maintain social forms that are of proven value—either as guides to behavior, as examples of beauty enjoyed by all, or as inspiring reminders of some great events in people's history. In addition, of course, the traditions created by past experience help to give culture the unity that binds different ages and different social groups so that the culture may survive. Traditions should be questioned because conditions change. Moreover, traditions are often a poor guide in making cultural changes required by changing conditions. Adherence to tradition may submerge new modes that clearly should be adopted; this happens because men find it difficult to believe in—or even notice—the unfamiliar while the familiar is constantly before their

The decision when to modify or abandon a tradition is a difficult one. Impatient and foolish men solve this problem by advocating the overthrow of all traditions. This suggestion may be advanced either as having practical ends or as a way of "liberating the spirit"—whatever that means. The indiscriminate overthrowing of traditions has always had unfavorable results. It is clearly not in harmony with man's biologic nature. The two opposing forces implied in the wish to preserve tradition and to institute change underlie all human social life.

It is evident that man's biologic nature, that of a time-conserving animal, must use both the past and the future. (The present is only a point in time and strictly speaking has no duration.) The radical ignores most of the past in planning for the future and hopes to create a static Utopia. The reactionary wants to return to the modes of the past, even though they have ceased to work and, in some cases, have been rejected by society. He too hopes to create a static Utopia. Accordingly, neither radicals nor reactionaries are time-conserving animals. The truly time-conserving man must pay equal attention to both the past and the future: he must therefore always favor things as they actually are—i. e., con-

stantly changing through the fusion of useful old traditions with the new ideas for the good of the future.

Unfortunately those young people whose peculiar education conditions them to believe that there are no valid standards, that only feelings should determine actions, and that the beliefs (and feelings) of any who differ with them are irrelevant are clearly unable to maintain, and much less to build a just and orderly society. It is unfortunate that all that some young people have acquired is little more than these notions from the education that we have provided for them. The fanatical allegiance to their own group that many of them exhibit is not praiseworthy. Exclusive loyalty to an immediate group prevents the growth—or survival—of any larger social organization. It prevents social coherence and may lead to pointless conflicts characterized by a meaningless alternation of victories and defeats. A higher loyalty, to society as a whole, must outweigh all limited allegiances. Loyalty is the cement of a social system, much more so than any system of laws. All those who comprise a social order—and two social orders cannot occupy the same place at the same time—must be loyal to each other.

It is evident that if we apply the word revolution to recent events in this country, in most cases the word should mean going in circles. This circular phenomenon, with its recurrence of the same types of event, is freed from complete stereotype mainly through social changes introduced by the accidents of technologic discovery. Moreover much of what we call the revolution in moral values today is merely a revolution in manners. In large part this change in manners is due to the change in the proportion of affluent in society. Since there are many more of them, their defects in behavior are more noticeable. The only real revolution in manners that has occurred is the rejection of privacy and at least outward respect for the rights and comfort of others together with the stated wish to be offensive to all persons, friend or foe (and this includes offending the senses of hearing, sight and smell). The issue has become confused because this revolution in manners is not only excused as a consequence of a moral revolution but actually claimed to be such a revolution. This is an attempt to give it an elevated status that it does not deserve. Today's revolutionary changes in behavior cannot be judged in terms of moral good or evil. For example the notion that considerate manners are mere hypocrisy is merely an attempt to justify inconsiderate manners on fake moral grounds. Those accustomed by poor education to use slogans as if they were great moral principles easily fall into this error.

Unfortunately this error has been reinforced and perpetuated because some men who claim high principles have adopted the notion that it is necessary to perform antisocial acts to gain a purported future good. The imagined good end has been used to justify the present means:

however socially desirable formulas become not indications of planned reforms but rather the battle cries of antisocial violence. When this kind of violence deliberately sacrifices the present for an imagined future, it always loses the future too. Violent behavior and its attendant dogmatism become the refuge of weak persons who lack the character to endure dissatisfactions long enough to eliminate them by democratic processes without replacing them with new (and worse) ones.

When men who claim high principles condone—or recommend—antisocial actions in the name of social progress, less highly motivated individuals are encouraged to pursue similarly antisocial behavior. Today, many antisocial acts are performed out of boredom by persons who lack the resources needed to initiate worthwhile engrossing activities. When such people lack ethical standards of behavior of their own and reject the guidance offered by moral leaders in the community, they easily fall into antisocial ways. Antisocial behavior undertaken to escape boredom leads to more—and more extreme—antisocial behavior.

The general decline in personal standards of behavior is largely due to educational practices of the last few decades. The Dewey-eyed theorists (John Dewey, that is), who established child-rearing practices, have failed to take into account the need for externally imposed discipline in children if self-discipline is to develop in adults. (Giving self-discipline the pejorative name "inhibition" is not only harmful, it is inaccurate. Self-discipline is voluntary and rational; inhibition is involuntary and irrational.) When a community's leaders and their unthinking followers engage in antisocial pursuits, all the rascals are emboldened to do likewise. Hence the responsibility for wisespread antisocial behavior lies with the leaders of the community. When these leaders encourage antisocial actions by word or example, the community deteriorates. Such leaders are therefore not qualified to lead. Men of sense and tolerance instinctively work both for the present and for the future. In order to do so, however, they must borrow from the past, because borrowing wisely from the past strengthens the possibility of an improved future. Ignoring the past favors the perpetuation of disorder, the most ancient social condition, in which irrational slogans, senseless planning, and pointless destruction predominate. Accordingly, those who today claim to be the most revolutionary as regards the social system are actually the most reactionary. Contrariwise, those who today seem to be least revolutionary by advocating deliberation in reform and study of the past are, in fact, the most revolutionary. They alone can be responsible for whatever progress is made. What is equally important is that they will lead the community in the direction of progress without the setbacks produced by antisocial times. They will be acting in accordance with man's biologic nature—the time-conserving animal.

It is easy to see how the development of affluence and urban crowding, the ascendancy of an absurd philosophy in sociology and edu-

cation, and above all the confused thinking of persons widely regarded as community leaders have created the dark in which we now are. Let him who will whistle in it.

In 1688 Fontenelle wrote in his *Les Anciens et les Modernes*, "We are under obligations to the ancients for having exhausted almost all the false theories that could be formed." The young of today should be similarly grateful to their elders; the young will be spared the impossible task of creating new false theories.

A PATTERN FOR A NEW SOUTH

By DAVID MATHEWS*

Almost one hundred years ago, Henry Grady used Atlanta as a forum for his plea for a new South, a South that should shed its romantic myths in order to participate in the new industrial and commercial prosperity of what became known as the Guilded Age. Like Henry Grady, I am here today to talk of Souths, old and new, but I am not here to talk of plowing under and building up. Nor am I here to talk about a new romanticism for the South. I am here to talk of using myths and traditions for a new reality.

In the real world, the South has always been a powerful stimulant, and the role of the South is therefore an important topic. For example, at the 1970 meeting of the Southern Historical Association, Joe Frantz of the University of Texas gave a witty and perceptive address on the effect of the South upon the Presidency. He noted the fact that with few exceptions, Southerners dominated the Presidency until the Civil War. But he concluded that since the war, the South has served as a goad to the Presidency; that is, the problems presented by the South to the nation have constantly challenged the Presidency and have forced it to extend itself to be and to do other than it would have.

The "Southern Question," whether it be political reconstruction, cultural assimilation, or economic revival, has been before the nation since the Civil War. Today the South longs to be something other than a problem. And possibly in this decade, the nation may find in the South a source of answers, not of problems. The heritage of the South presents the nation with wholesome opportunities to blunt the harshness of modern life and to soften the undesirable aspects of a technologically dominated society. Today, with increasing concern for the quality of national life, people may be looking to the South, which has since the founding of the Republic prided itself on the unique quality, the distinctive flavor of its life style. I heard recently of a small town newspaper editor in Alabama who was asked by Northern urban planning group to serve as an advisor. The editor asked what he could possibly contribute to the study of urban life. The Northerner quietly assured him that perhaps he knew more about living in his small town than any one in the East.

The challenge of building a "New South" as a shining example to the nation, of course, is not new. Almost one hundred years ago young men of the South, like Henry Grady, turned from the wounds of war to

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proclaim a "New South" of industrialization and dynamic change. Today, Southerners turn from the scars of the civil rights battles of the 1960's to press the claims of the South to pre-eminence in solving the problems of change. I am too much a realist to talk of grand and glorious designs for a New South, but I can talk realistically about the South that was, is, and may be. Our problem may well be not so much deciding what should be new in the South, but what should be retained of the old and woven into the future. Indeed, the heart of creating a future is the job of sorting among a multitude of traditions, each often filled with contraditions, for a new mythology that is coherent and compeling—and most importantly capable of working in the real world. That after all is the ultimate test of any hypothesis, law of nature, or myth.

The South has more than once in its history been identified with a quest for renewal. In the 1500's Ponce de Leon sought the fountain of youth in Florida; in the days of the early Republic Jefferson sought pure democracy in the yeoman farmer; in the 1850's William Lowndes Yancey and other young romantics sought aristocratic idealism in a plantation-dominated independent nation; in the 1880's and 1890's Henry Grady and his colleagues sought economic plenty in textile and iron mills; and in the 1920's and 1930's Allen Tate and the Agrarians sought refuge from industrialized materialism in the South's heritage and tradition. Each sought the uniqueness and the promise of the South in a separate area, sometimes in a totally different one from that of the preceding search.

What then, or even where, is the South? Is the South Jefferson's yeoman farmer in the foothills of the Piedmont? Is the South Yancey's independent nation, a nation in essence of black belt and delta planters? Is the South Grady's bustling mills in cities such as Atlanta and Birmingham? Is the South Tate's heritage in the hearts of those who love it? Perhaps Tate, the poet who deals in ideals and qualities rather than tons of production and dollars of exports, gives us the best clue as to where to seek the quality of the South.

The Tates have been those who have understood that what we need is to examine carefully the history, the legends, the traditions of the South and to choose from them those qualities that can impart individuality and, above all, humanity to the modern world which so often seems to thunder over us in a mass of computer cards, plastic, and uncollected garbage.

But which of the many traditions of the South is the South that we wish to preserve.

While I do not want to fall into the trap which prompts many historians and South-watchers of this century to see only the negative qualities of the South, I must admit that there are certain aspects of our heritage that we should gladly forget.

Poverty, for one, has been a prevalent condition of the South. In 1938, Franklin D. Roosevelt labeled the South as the nation's number one economic problem, and that, or today's poverty, is nothing to be proud of.

The South has also been too often characterized by racism. Ulrich B. Phillips, the noted southern historian and native Georgian, observed that *the* distinguishing characteristic of the South was a fervent belief in white supremacy. Time and the civil rights movements of our day have shown many that racism is not peculiar by any means to the South. The South has lived with the problems of race relations longer and more intimately than any section of the nation. Many have observed that if the complex national problems of racism are solved, it will be the South which provides many of the answers. We are beginning to eradicate the heritage of racism and we tire of being assigned the role of scapegoat for what is indeed a national, even a world, problem.

The South has too often been associated with isolationism. Perhaps because of the labels of poverty and racism the South has borne, Southerners have too often prejudged others, believing that they did not like us and we therefore would not like them in retaliation. That reaction is not to our credit, and it is not a legacy we need to pass on to our children.

The South has too often been characterized by anti-intellectualism. Our introspective, defensive attitude has made us resist currents of thought which could improve our way of life. It was after all, one of the most pre-eminent Southerners, Thomas Jefferson, who said, "I have sworn upon the altar of God, eternal hostility against every form of tyranny over the mind of man."

The South has too often been characterized by violence, a corollary of anti-intellectualism. Southerners have fought opposing ideas with the sword. Henry Adams, descendent of presidents and an intellectual Bostonian, observed that Southerners of the 1850's had no mind; they had only temperament. Temperament and passion have too often led Southerners to lash out with anger rather than to reach out with reason. The terrible results of violence in our society during our own lifetimes make it clear that violence is a tradition best forgotten.

The South has too often been characterized by a neglect of education. Indeed there has been a long tradition of belittling education in the South. In the South itself this stereotype has been accepted to an amazing extent, and it is daily reflected in the pessimism of many of the region's leaders. Southerners have marched so long in the rear guard of educational advance that their idea of the possible is fixed not by the front file but by those who are just one step ahead.

The South has too often been characterized by its dependence upon the past. The past has served to shelter us from criticisms hurled by

those who emphasize the baleful characteristics of the South. As an historian, I cherish the past. But it is pitiful to see those who can think of nothing but the past, whether the victories or the defeats. It immobilizes them; it blinds them. It makes them incapable of acting when action is required. We need to remember the past, to use it, but not to live it.

The Southerner's history is not simply a textbook experience. And this perhaps is what makes this area distinctive. As Mr. Toynbee observed, history for us, black and white, is something that visited our people and left its stamp. The past for the Southerner has left a legacy of myths, myths which persist today. I am not speaking here of myths as untruths, although there is that aspect, but of myths as a set of pervading feelings that recognizably are part of the Southern character.

Southerners love their land, and justly so. Even the young radical Southerner is likely to be distinguished from his Northern counterpart by his sense of place. We are historically an agrarian people, close to the soil and to the lessons of nature. Even as cities rise in our midst and more of us live in urban areas, most of us are still descendents of rural people, and none of our cities are far from large areas where crops, crossroad stores, checker games, all-day singings, and dinners-on-the-ground are regular features of society. The benefits of nature have been a chief source of our heritage and of our pride, and publicists of the South have long emphasized the attractiveness of our land and climate.

But our land must be preserved if it is to continue to be a source of pride. We used to blame most of our economic troubles on the destruction wrought by Yankees during the Civil War. But the Yankees did not destroy our air, our water, or our land. Yet, we in our own mad dash for industrialization stand in danger of destroying the very irreplaceable treasures the Civil War never touched.

A second aspect of our heritage which we must preserve is our sense of identity, our belief that we do have a heritage upon which we can draw. Carried to its extreme, this characteristic becomes an immobilizing retreat into the past, but intelligently used our sense of who and where we are in history gives us roots and imparts meaning to our lives. A Southerner can come home (Thomas Wolfe, to the contrary notwithstanding) and that in our stress-filled world is of immeasureable value. Many serious thinkers in this country are worried that the American people are becoming culturally homogenized to such an extent that all our own individuality will be lost and even worse, that we will lose the creativity and resiliency that are products of a sense of who we are. Cultural "rootlessness" can produce in society an alienation, an instability not unlike that produced by a personal loss of identity.

A third aspect of our heritage which we must preserve is our independence. Those who have a land and a history are their own men.

They owe only themselves and their God, and to these they owe a willingness to dare and to do, which sets them apart and gives them confidence of spirit, of ambition, and of dignity. These qualities move the world, and as long as we are careful to retain a sense of balance in our purpose, we as Southerners could trade more confidently on our independence. The quality that has made us defiant could be put to far more constructive ends.

We must also preserve our sense of pride, a sense of working hard and of doing a job well, whether it results in a straight furrow or a good sermon. Pride keeps people involved until the job at hand is done and done well. Today we face many problems—some of them seem insoluable—but pride will keep us to the tasks until solutions come. Pride makes people "pitch in" rather than "drop out."

We must also preserve from our heritage the courtesy, the civility for which we have long been famous. Too many people today believe that civility is frivolous. In the history of man, however, politeness has been one of the most effective devices men have used to allow them to live together in times of great stress. The simple act of politeness is social insurance against the destructiveness that inevitably comes from the abrasion and friction of human competition. It is a rare and disappearing quality in our society. Without genuine thoughtfulness and consideration, our other virtues—identity, independence, and pride—become instead, faults of isolationism, and racism. Each beneficial aspect of our heritage can be carried to a point where it becomes a damaging characteristic unless it is a genuine concern for humanity. Our civility must have depth, or else it is meaningless form.

Finally we must preserve a sense of mission. The South has too long been known as a land of lost causes. But the causes of Jefferson, and of Jackson were not lost. Our causes when they have suffered, perhaps, have not been so much lost as ill-chosen.

This time we must choose causes that are just and have a future. We must choose them deliberately and realistically. We must, if need be, create our future not by abandoning our past but by realizing that all of our traditions are two sided coins, and that the very tendencies that have made Sourtherners reactionary could, indeed, have at times made them progressive. We must use myths then, but we must not do what we have done time and time again, turn from reality to romanticism. That is true of both Northern romanticism and the Southern version. The people of the South, black-white, rich-poor, conservative-liberal, have one thing in common; they are keenly aware that they must once again influence their own destiny. And they must begin by weaving together a common vision of future reality—hard nosed, tough minded, individual and humane.

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